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OF
JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

BY

WILLIAM SMITH, LL. D.

WITH A MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR

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THE WAY TOWARDS THE BLESSED LIFE
OR
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION

OUTLINES OF THE DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE

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LECTURE I.

IDEA OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY.

WE now enter upon a series of meditations which, nevertheless, at bottom contains only a single thought, constituting of itself one organic whole. If I could at once communicate to you this single thought in the same clearness with which it must necessarily be present to my own mind before I begin my undertaking, and with which it must guide me in every word which I have now to address to you, then from the first step of our progress, perfect light would overspread the whole path which we have to pursue together. But I am compelled gradually, and in your own sight, to build up this single thought out of its several parts, disengaging it at the same time from various modifying elements: this is the necessary condition of every communication of thought, and only by this its fundamental law does that which in itself is but one single thought become expanded and broken up into a series of thoughts and meditations.

Such being the case, and especially as I am not here to repeat what has been already known of old, but to put forth new views of things,—I must request of you at the outset not to be surprised if our subject does not at first manifest that clearness which, according to the laws of all communication of thought, it can acquire only through

a

subsequent development; and I must entreat you to look for perfect light only at our conclusion, when a complete survey of the whole shall have become possible. Nevertheless it is the duty of every man who undertakes to propound any subject whatever, to take care that each separate thought shall assume its proper place in his arrangement, and be produced there with all the distinctness which it is possible to throw around it in that place,—at least for those who can appreciate distinct language, and are capable of following a connected discourse; and I shall use my most earnest efforts to fulfil this duty.

With this first and only premonition, let us now, without farther delay, proceed to our subject.

A philosophical picture of the Present Age is what we have promised in these lectures. But that view only can be called philosophical which refers back the multiform phenomena which lie before us in experience to the unity of one common principle, and, on the other hand, from that one principle can deduce and completely explain those phenomena. The mere Empiricist who should undertake a description of the Age would seize upon some of its most striking phenomena, just as they presented themselves to casual observation, and recount these, without having any assured conviction that he had understood them all, and without being able to point out any other connexion between them than their coëxistence in one and the same time. The Philosopher who should propose to himself the task of such a description would, independently of all experience, seek out an Idea of the Age (which indeed in its own form,—*as Idea*,—cannot be apparent in experience), and exhibit the mode in which this Idea would reveal itself under the forms of the necessary phenomena of the Age; and in so doing he would distinctly exhaust the circle of these phenomena, and bring them forth in necessary connexion with each other, through the

common Idea which lies at the bottom of them all. The first would be the *Chronicler* of the Age; the second would have made a *History* of it a possible thing.

In the first place, if the Philosopher must deduce from the unity of his presupposed principle all the possible phenomena of experience, it is obvious that in the fulfilment of this purpose he does not require the aid of experience; that in following it out he proceeds merely as a Philosopher, confining himself strictly within the limits which that character imposes upon him, paying no respect whatever to experience, and thus absolutely *a priori*, as this method is termed in scientific phraseology;—and in respect to our own subject it is clear that he must be able *a priori* to describe Time as a whole, and all its possible Epochs. It is an entirely different question whether the *present time* be actually characterized by the phenomena that are deduced from the principle which he may lay down, and thus whether the Age so pictured by the speaker be really the Present Age,—should he maintain such a position, as we, for example, shall maintain it. On this part of the subject every man must consult for himself the experience of his life, and compare it with the history of the Past, as well as with his anticipations of the Future; for here the business of the Philosopher is at an end, and that of the Observer of the world and of men begins. We, for our part, intend to be no more than philosophers in this place, and have bound ourselves to nothing more; and thus the final judgment, so soon as you are in a position to pass such a judgment, must devolve upon you. It is now our business, in the first place, strictly to settle and define our theme.

Thus then: Every particular Epoch of Time, as we have already hinted above, is the fundamental Idea of a particular Age. These Epochs and fundamental Ideas of particular Ages, however, can only be thoroughly understood by and through each other, and by means of their

relation to Universal Time. Hence it is clear that the Philosopher, in order to be able rightly to characterize any individual Age—and, if he will, his own—must first have understood *a priori* and thoroughly penetrated into the signification of Universal Time and all its possible Epochs.

This comprehension of Universal Time, like all philosophical comprehension, again presupposes a fundamental Idea of Time; an Idea of a fore-ordered, although only gradually unfolding, accomplishment of Time, in which each successive period is determined by the preceding;—or, to express this more shortly and in more common phraseology,—it presupposes a *World-plan*, which, in its primitive unity, may be clearly comprehended, and from which may be correctly deduced all the great Epochs of human life on Earth, so that they may be distinctly understood both in their origin, and in their connexion with each other. The former,—the *World-plan*,—is the fundamental Idea of the entire life of Man on Earth; the latter,—the chief Epochs of this life,—are the fundamental Ideas of particular Ages of which we have spoken, from which again the phenomena of these Ages are to be deduced.

We have thus, in the first place, a fundamental Idea of the entire life of Man, dividing itself into different Epochs, which can only be understood by and through each other; each of which Epochs is again the fundamental Idea of a particular Age, and is revealed in manifold phenomena therein.

The life of Mankind *on this Earth* stands here in place of the *One Universal Life*, and *Earthly Time* in place of *Universal Time*;—such are the limits within which we are confined by the proposed popular character of our discourses, since it is impossible to speak at once profoundly and popularly of the Heavenly and Eternal. Here, I say, and in these discourses only, shall this be so; for, strictly speaking, and in the higher flights of speculation, Human Life on Earth, and Earthly Time itself, are but necessary

Epochs of the ONE TIME and of the ONE ETERNAL LIFE;—and this Earthly Life with all its subordinate divisions may be deduced from the fundamental Idea of the ETERNAL LIFE already accessible to us here below. It is our present voluntary limitation alone which forbids us to undertake this strictly demonstrable deduction, and permits us here only to declare the fundamental Idea of the Earthly Life, requesting every hearer to bring this Idea to the test of his own sense of truth, and, if he can, to approve it thereby. Life of MANKIND on Earth, we have said, and Epochs of this Life. We speak here only of the progressive Life of the *Race*, not of the *Individual*, which last in all these discourses shall remain untouched,—and I beg of you never to lose sight of this our proper point of view.

The Idea of a World-Plan is thus implied in our inquiry, which, however, I am not at this time to deduce from the fundamental Idea indicated above, but only to point out. I say therefore,—and so lay the foundation of our rising edifice,—*the End of the Life of Mankind on Earth is this, —that in this Life they may order all their relations with FREEDOM according to REASON.*

With FREEDOM, I have said;—their own Freedom,—the Freedom of Mankind in their collective capacity,—as a *Race*:—and this Freedom is the first accessory condition of our fundamental principle which I intend at present to pursue, leaving the other conditions, which may likewise need explanation, to the subsequent lectures. This Freedom becomes apparent in the collective consciousness of the *Race*, and it appears there as the proper and peculiar Freedom of the *Race*;—as a true and real fact;—the product of the *Race* during its Life and proceeding from its Life, so that the absolute existence of the *Race* itself is necessarily implied in the existence of the fact and product thus attributed to it. (If a certain person has done something, it is unquestionably implied in that fact that

the person has been in existence prior to the deed, in order that he might form the resolution so to act; and also during the accomplishment of the deed, in order that he might carry his previous resolution into effect; and every one might justly accept the proof of *non-existence* at a particular time, as equivalent to the proof of *non-activity* at the same time. In the same way,—if Mankind, as a Race, has done something, and appeared as the actor in such deed, this act must necessarily imply the existence of the Race at a time when the act had not yet been accomplished.)

As an immediate consequence of this remark, the Life of Mankind on Earth divides itself, according to the fundamental Idea which we have laid down, into two principal Epochs or Ages:—the one in which the Race exists and lives without as yet having ordered its relations with **FREE-DOM** according to **REASON**; and the other in which this voluntary and reasonable arrangement is brought about.

To begin our farther inquiry with the first Epoch;—it does not follow, because the Race has not yet, *by its own free act*, ordered its relations according to Reason, that therefore these relations are not ordered by Reason; and hence the one assertion is by no means to be confounded with the other. It is possible that Reason of itself, by its own power, and without the coöperation of human Freedom, may have determined and ordered the relations of Mankind. And so it is in reality. Reason is the **FIRST LAW** of the Life of a Race of Men, as of all Spiritual Life; and in this sense and in no other shall the word 'Reason' be used in these lectures. Without the living activity of this law a Race of Men could never have come into existence; or, even if it could be supposed to have attained to being, it could not, without this activity, maintain its existence for a single moment. Hence, where Reason cannot as yet work by Freedom, as in the first Epoch, it acts as a law or power of Nature; and thus may be present in conscious-

ness and active there, only without insight into the grounds of its activity; or, in other words, may exist as mere feeling, for so we call consciousness without insight.

In short, to express this in common language:—Reason acts as *blind Instinct*, where it cannot as yet act through Free Will. It acts thus in the first Epoch of the Life of Mankind on Earth; and this first Epoch is thereby more closely characterized and more strictly defined.

By means of this stricter definition of the first Epoch, we are also enabled, by contrast, more strictly to define the second. Instinct is *blind*;—a consciousness without insight. Freedom, as the opposite of Instinct, is thus *seeing*, and clearly conscious of the grounds of its activity. But the sole ground of this free activity is Reason;—Freedom is thus conscious of Reason, of which Instinct was unconscious. Hence, between the dominion of Reason through mere Instinct, and the dominion of the same Reason through Freedom, there arises an intermediate condition,—*the Consciousness or Knowledge of Reason*.

But further:—Instinct as a blind impulse excludes Knowledge; hence the birth of Knowledge presupposes a liberation from the compulsive power of Instinct as already accomplished; and thus between the dominion of Reason as Instinct and that of Reason as Knowledge, there is interposed a third condition,—*that of Liberation from Reason as Instinct*.

But how could humanity free itself, or even wish to free itself, from that Instinct which is the law of its existence, and rules it with beloved and unobtrusive power?—or how could the *one* Reason which while it speaks in Instinct, is likewise active in the impulse towards Freedom,—how could this *same* Reason come into conflict and opposition with itself in human life? Clearly not directly; and hence a new medium must intervene between the dominion of Reason as Instinct, and the impulse to cast off that dominion. This medium arises in the following way:—the

results of Reason as Instinct are seized upon by the more powerful individuals of the Race;—in whom, on this very account, that Instinct speaks in its loudest and fullest tones, as the natural but precipitate desire to elevate the whole race to the level of their own greatness, or rather to put themselves in the room and place of the Race;—and by them it is changed into an *external ruling Authority*, upheld through outward constraint; and then among other men Reason awakes in another form—as *the impulse towards Personal Freedom*,—which, although it never opposes the mild rule of the inward Instinct which it loves, yet rises in rebellion against the pressure of a foreign Instinct which has usurped its rights; and in this awakening it breaks the chains,—not of Reason as Instinct itself,—but of the Instinct of foreign natures clothed in the garb of external power. And thus the change of the individual Instinct into a compulsive Authority becomes the medium between the dominion of Reason as Instinct and the liberation from that dominion.

And finally, to complete this enumeration of the necessary divisions and Epochs of the Earthly Life of our Race:—We have said that through liberation from the dominion of Reason as *Instinct*, the *Knowledge* of Reason becomes possible. By the laws of this Knowledge, all the relations of Mankind must be ordered and directed by *their own free act*. But it is obvious that mere cognizance of the law, which nevertheless is all that Knowledge of itself can give us, is not sufficient for the attainment of this purpose, but that there is also needed a peculiar knowledge of action, which can only be thoroughly acquired by practice,—in a word, *Art*. This Art of ordering the whole relations of Mankind according to that Reason which has been already consciously apprehended, (for in this higher sense we shall always use the word Art when we employ it without explanatory remark)—this Art must be universally applied to all the relations of Mankind, and realized therein,—

until the Race become a perfect image of its everlasting archetype in Reason;—and then shall the purpose of this Earthly Life be attained, its end become apparent, and Mankind enter upon the higher spheres of Eternity.

Thus have we endeavoured to pre-figure the whole Earthly Life of Man by a comprehension of its purpose;—to perceive *why* our Race had to begin its Existence here, and by this means to describe the whole present Life of humankind:—this is what we wished to do,—it was our first task. There are, according to this view, *Five Principal Epochs of Earthly Life*, each of which, although taking its rise in the life of the individual, must yet, in order to become an Epoch in the Life of the Race, gradually lay hold of and interpenetrate all Men; and to that end must endure throughout long periods of time, so that the great Whole of Life is spread out into Ages, which sometimes seem to cross, sometimes to run parallel with each other:—*1st*, The Epoch of the unlimited dominion of Reason as Instinct:—*the State of Innocence of the Human Race.* *2nd*, The Epoch in which Reason as Instinct is changed into an external ruling Authority;—the Age of positive Systems of life and doctrine, which never go back to their ultimate foundations, and hence have no power to convince but on the contrary merely desire to compel, and which demand blind faith and unconditional obedience:—*the State of progressive Sin.* *3rd*, The Epoch of Liberation,—*directly* from the external ruling Authority—*indirectly* from the power of Reason as Instinct, and *generally* from Reason in any form;—the Age of absolute indifference towards all truth, and of entire and unrestrained licentiousness:—*the State of completed Sinfulness.* *4th*, The Epoch of Reason as *Knowledge*;—the Age in which Truth is looked upon as the *highest*, and loved before all other things:—*the State of progressive Justification.* *5th*, The Epoch of Reason as Art;—the Age in which Humanity with more sure and unerring hand builds itself up into a fitting image and

representative of Reason:—*the State of completed Justification and Sanctification*. Thus, the whole progress which, upon this view, Humanity makes here below, is only a retrogression to the point on which it stood at first, and has nothing in view save that return to its original condition. But Humanity must make this journey on its own feet; by its own strength it must bring itself back to that state in which it was once before without its own coöperation, and which, for that very purpose, it must first of all leave. If Humanity could not of itself re-create its own true being, then would it possess no real Life; and then were there indeed no real Life at all, but all things would remain dead, rigid, immoveable. In Paradise,—to use a well-known picture,—in the Paradise of innocence and well-being, without knowledge, without labour, without art, Humanity awakes to life. Scarcely has it gathered courage to venture upon independent existence when the Angel comes with the fiery sword of compulsion to good and drives it forth from the seat of its innocence and its peace. Fugitive and irresolute it wanders through the empty waste, scarcely daring to plant its foot firmly anywhere lest the ground should sink beneath it. Grown bolder by necessity, it settles in some poor corner, and in the sweat of its brow roots out the thorns and thistles of barbarism from the soil on which it would rear the beloved fruit of knowledge. Enjoyment opens its eyes and strengthens its hands, and it builds a Paradise for itself after the image of that which it has lost;—the tree of Life arises; it stretches forth its hand to the fruit, and eats, and lives in Immortality.

This is the delineation of Earthly Life as a whole and in all its various Epochs, which is necessary for our present purpose. As surely as our present Age is a part of this Earthly Life, which no one can doubt;—and further, as surely as there are no other possible Epochs of the Earthly Life but the five which we have indicated,—so surely

does our Present Age belong to one of these. It shall be my business to point out, according to my knowledge and experience of the world, to which of these five it belongs, and to unfold the necessary phenomena in which the principles above stated must manifest themselves;—and it will be yours to consider and observe whether you have not encountered these phenomena during your whole life both internal and external, and do not still encounter them;—and this shall be the business of our future lectures.

The Present Age considered *as a whole*, I mean;—for since, as I have remarked above, different Ages may, in perfect accordance with their spiritual principle, coëxist in one and the same chronological Time, and even cross or run parallel to each other in different individuals,—so it may be anticipated that such will be the case in our own Age, and hence that our application of the *a priori* principle to the present condition of the world and of humanity may not embrace all men alive in the present Time, but only those who are truly products of the Age and in whom it most completely reveals itself. One may be behind his Age, because in the course of his culture he has not come into contact with a sufficiently extensive mass of his fellow-men, but has been trained in some narrow circle which is only a remnant of a former Time. Another may be in advance of his Age, and bear in his breast the germs of a future Time, while that which has become old to him still rules around him in true, actual, present and efficient power. Finally,—Science raises itself above all Ages and all Times, embracing and apprehending the ONE UNCHANGING TIME as the higher source of all Ages and Epochs, and grasping that vast idea in its free, unbounded comprehension. None of these three can be included in the picture of *any* present Age.

The object of our lectures in this course, during the present winter, is now strictly defined, and, as it seems to me, clearly enough set forth and announced;—and such

was the purpose of to-day's address. Allow me, further, a few words on the external form of these discourses.

Whatever may be our judgment upon the Present Age, and in whatever Epoch we may feel ourselves compelled to place it, you are not to expect here either the tone of lamentation or of satire, particularly of a personal description. Not of lamentation:—for it is the sweetest reward of Philosophy that, looking upon all things in their mutual dependence, and upon nothing as isolated and alone, she finds all to be necessary and therefore good, and accepts that which is, as it is, because it is subservient to a higher end. Besides, it is unmanly to waste in lamentation over existing evil the time which would be more wisely applied in striving, so far as in us lies, to create the Good and the Beautiful. Not of satire:—an infirmity which affects the whole race, is no proper object for the scorn of an individual who belongs to that race, and who, before he could depict it, must himself have known it and cast it off. But individuals disappear altogether from the view of the philosopher, and are lost in the one great commonwealth. His thought embraces all objects in a clear and consequential light, which they can never attain amid the endless fluctuations of reality;—hence it does not concern itself with individuals and, never descending to portraits, dwells in the higher sphere of idealized conception. As to the advantages derivable from considerations of this kind, it will be better to leave you to judge for yourselves after you have gone through some considerable portion of them, than to say much in praise of them beforehand. No one is further than the philosopher from the vain desire that his Age should be impelled forward to some obvious extent through his exertions. Every one, indeed, to whom God has given strength and opportunity, should exert all his powers for this end, were it only for his own sake, and in order to maintain the place which has been assigned to him in the ever-flowing current of existence. For the rest, Time rolls on in the steadfast

course marked out for it from eternity, and individual effort can neither hasten nor retard its progress. Only the co-operation of all, and especially of the indwelling Eternal Spirit of Ages and of Worlds, may promote it.

As to my present labours, it will be to me a flattering reward, if a cultivated and intelligent audience shall pass a few hours of this half year in an agreeable and worthy manner, raised above the business and pleasures of every-day life into a freer and purer region,—a more spiritual atmosphere. Above all, should it happen that upon some young and powerful mind a spark may fall which shall dwell and live there, and perhaps develop my feeble thoughts into better and more perfect results, and kindle a vigorous determination to realize them,—then would my reward be complete.

In this spirit I have been induced to invite you to such lectures as the present; in this spirit I now take my leave of you, and leave it to your own judgment whether you desire to proceed further in my company.

LECTURE II.

GENERAL DELINEATION OF THE THIRD AGE.

IN the first place, let him who desires to be met with the same honest purpose which I presume leads him here, cast back a kindly glance upon our former lecture. It appears that many of this assembly have not been able altogether to follow the greater part of that which I said at the beginning of my previous address. In so far as this may have any other cause than want of acquaintance with the style, voice, and manner of the lecturer, and the novelty of the whole situation,—all of which may be overcome by a few minutes' custom,—allow me, as some consolation should the like happen again, to add the following:—That which some of my hearers have been unable thoroughly to comprehend, does not so much belong to the subject itself, as to the practice of the art which we now employ,—the art of philosophizing. It is serviceable to us in finding an introduction and commencement in the circle of other knowledge from which to set forth our subject, and in strictly defining our point of separation from this system of knowledge; it is a part of the account which we teachers and masters must render of our manner of working. Every other art,—as poetry, music, painting,—may be practised without the process showing forth the rules according to which it is conducted;—but in the self-cognizant art of

the philosopher no step can be taken without declaring the grounds upon which it proceeds; and in it theory and practice go hand in hand. It was necessary for me to proceed in this way on the former occasion, and in similar circumstances I must proceed in the same way again. But if any one choose to admit beforehand, and without further proof, that I proceed correctly and according to the rules of my art, and will calmly and candidly test, by his own natural sense of truth, that which I have laid down as the foundation of the edifice, such an one will lose nothing essential by thus missing the scientific explanation; and it will be perfectly sufficient for our present purpose if, out of that which we laid down in our former lecture, he has thoroughly understood and accepted the following propositions, and has retained them in his memory, so that he may connect with them what we have further to lay before you.

He must, I say, thoroughly understand, accept, and keep in mind the following:—The life of the Human Race does not depend upon blind chance; nor is it, as is often superficially pretended, everywhere alike, so that it has always been as it is now and will always so remain; but it proceeds and moves onward according to a settled plan which *must* necessarily be fulfilled, and therefore *shall* certainly be fulfilled. This plan is—that the Race shall in this Life *and with freedom* mould and cultivate itself into a pure and express Image of Reason. The whole Life of Man is divided—I am now supposing that the strict derivation of this has not been thoroughly understood or has been forgotten,—the whole Life of Man is divided into *five* principal Epochs:—that in which Reason governs in the form of blind Instinct; that in which this Instinct is changed into an external ruling Authority; that in which the dominion of this Authority, and with it that of Reason itself, is overthrown; that in which Reason and its laws are understood with clear consciousness; and finally, that in which all the relations of the Race shall be directed and ordered by perfect

Art and perfect Freedom according to Reason:—and, in order to impress these different Epochs firmly upon your memory by means of a sensuous representation, we made use of the universally known picture of Paradise. Further, he must understand that the Present Age, to which especially our present purpose refers, must fall within one or other of these five Epochs; that we have now to set forth the fundamental Idea of this Epoch, distinguishing it from the other four, which, except for the purposes of illustrating our own, we may here lay out of view; and that from this fundamental Idea we must deduce the peculiar phenomena of the Age as its necessary consequences. At this point our second lecture begins.

And so let us set forth with declaring at what point of the whole Earthly life of the Race we place our Present Age. I, for my part, hold that the Present Age stands precisely in the middle of Earthly Time; and as we may characterize the two first Epochs of our scheme (in which Reason rules first *directly* as Instinct, and then *indirectly* as Instinct through Authority) as the one Epoch of the dominion of *blind* or *unconscious Reason*;—and in like manner the two last Epochs in our scheme (in which Reason first appears as Knowledge, and then, by means of Art, enters upon the government of Life) as the one Epoch of the dominion of *seeing* or *conscious Reason*;—so the Present Age unites the ends of two essentially different Worlds,—the World of Darkness and that of Light,—the World of Constraint and that of Freedom,—without itself belonging to either of them. In other words, the Present Age, according to my view of it, stands in that Epoch which in my former lecture I named the THIRD, and which I characterized as *the Epoch of Liberation—directly from the external ruling Authority,—indirectly from the power of Reason as Instinct, and generally from Reason in any form; the Age of absolute indifference towards all truth, and of entire and unrestrained licentiousness:—the State of completed Sinfulness.*

Our Age stands, I think, in this Epoch, taken with the limitations which I have already laid down,—namely, that I do not here include all men now living in our time, but only those who are truly products of the Age, and in whom it most completely reveals itself.

Let this then be now said, and said once for all. It was needful that I should say this once, for this my declared opinion is the only ground why I select for investigation that Epoch which I now take up, leaving the other four out of view ;—otherwise I must have entered upon all five, or at least selected some other one for consideration. But I can here only announce this opinion, not prove it. The proof lies out of the domain of the philosopher, and belongs to that of the observer of the world and of men ;—and this character I do not wish to assume here. I have said this now once for all.—I now proceed calmly and without restriction, as becoms a philosopher, to that higher principle which we have already laid down as the fundamental principle of any Age whatsoever, not as something of our own devising, but as deduced from the general conception of an Earthly Life ; and from thence infer whatever may justly be inferred as to the form and phenomena of a life founded upon this principle. Whether the life which now exists before your eyes resemble that which I, guided only by the laws of syllogistic reasoning, shall deduce *a priori* from that principle,—this inquiry, as I have already said, belongs to you ;—you must resolve it upon your own responsibility, and whatever you may or may not say on the subject, I shall have no part in it. If, according to your judgment, I have hit the mark, it is well ;—if not, we shall at least have philosophized ; and philosophized, if not upon the present, yet upon some other possible and necessary Age ;—and so our labour not be wholly lost.

The Present Age, I have said, without further explanation ; and it is sufficient at the outset if, without any stricter definition, these words shall be understood to mean the time

in which we, who now live and think and speak to each other, do actually exist and live. It is by no means my purpose at present to mark out the centuries, or even cycles, which may have elapsed since that which I call the Present Age first appeared in the world. Obviously, an Age can only be judged and understood by observation of those nations who stand at the head of the civilization of their time: but as civilization has wandered from people to people, so with this civilization an Age too may have wandered from people to people, remaining unchangeably one and the same in principle amid all variety of climate and of soil; and so likewise, in virtue of the purpose of uniting all nations into one great commonwealth, may the Age be arrested and detained on the stage during a considerable period of chronological Time, and thus, as it were, the Time-current be compelled to a pause. Especially may this be the case with an Age like that which we have to describe, throughout which adverse worlds meet and struggle with each other, slowly striving to attain an equilibrium, and thereby to secure the peaceful extinction of the elder time. But, it is only after we have acquired a more intimate knowledge of the *principle* of the Age, and have learned at the same time how history is to be questioned and what we have to seek from her, that it will be useful or proper for us to adduce from the history of the actual world whatever may be necessary for our purpose and may serve to guard us from error. Not whether our words, had they been uttered centuries ago, would then have depicted reality,—nor whether they shall picture it forth after centuries have passed away,—but only whether they *now* represent it truly, is the question which is proposed for your final decision.

So much by way of preface to our first task,—to unfold the principle of the Age;—now to the solution of this problem. I have laid down this principle as *Liberation from the compulsion of the blind Authority exercised by Reason as*

Instinct;—*Liberation* being understood to mean the state in which the Race *gradually* works out its own Freedom,—now in this, now in that individual,—now from this, now from that object, with respect to which Authority has hitherto held it in chains;—not that in which it already is *free*, but at most only that in which those who stand at the head of the Age, and seek to guide, direct, and elevate the others, are, or imagine themselves to be, free. The instrument of this liberation from Authority is Understanding; for the characteristic of Instinct as opposed to Understanding consists in this,—that it is blind; and the characteristic of Authority, by means of which Instinct has governed in the preceding Age, is this,—that it demands unquestioning faith and obedience. Hence the fundamental maxim of those who stand at the head of this Age, and therefore the *principle* of the Age, is this,—to accept nothing as really existing or obligatory but that which they can understand and clearly comprehend.

With regard to this fundamental principle, as we have now declared and adopted it without further definition or limitation, this *third* Age is similar to that which is to follow it,—the *fourth*, or Age of Reason as Knowledge;—and by virtue of this similarity prepares the way for it. Before the tribunal of Knowledge, too, nothing is accepted but the Conceivable. Only in the *application* of the principle there is *this* difference between the two Ages,—that the *third*, which we shall shortly name *that of Empty Freedom*, makes its fixed and already acquired conception the measure of existence; while the *fourth*—*that of Knowledge*—on the contrary, makes existence the measure, not of its acquired, but of its desiderated belief. To the former there is nothing but what it already *comprehends*: the latter strives to *comprehend*, and does comprehend, all that is. The latter—the Age of Knowledge—penetrates to all things without exception;—to the Conceivable, and even to that which still remains absolutely Un-

conceivable accepting it as Unconceivable:—to the first, the Conceivable, so as thereby to order the relations of the Race;—to the second, the Unconceivable, in order to assure itself that all the Conceivable is exhausted, and that it is now in possession of the limits of the Conceivable. The former—the Age of Empty Freedom—does not know that man must first through labour, industry, and art, learn *how to know*; but it has a certain fixed standard for all conceptions, and an established *Common Sense of Mankind* always ready and at hand, innate, and ever present without trouble on its part;—and those conceptions and this Common Sense are to it the measure of the efficient and the real. It has this great advantage over the Age of Knowledge, that it knows all things without having learned anything; and can pass judgment upon whatever comes before it at once and without hesitation, —without needing any preliminary enquiry:—‘Whatever I do not immediately comprehend by the conceptions which already dwell within me, is nothing,’—says Empty Freedom:—‘Whatever I do not comprehend through the Absolute, Self-comprehensive Idea, is nothing,’—says Knowledge.

You perceive that this Age is based upon an already present conception,—an innate Common Sense, which pronounces irrevocably upon its whole system of knowledge and belief; and if we could thoroughly analyze this inborn conception or sense, which is thus to it the root of everything else, we should then, undoubtedly, be able to take in the whole system of the beliefs of the Age at a single glance, perceive the inmost spirit beneath all its outward wrappings, and bring it forth to view. Let it be now our task to acquire this knowledge;—and for this purpose I now invite you to the comprehension of a deep-lying proposition.

This namely:—The third Age throws off the yoke of Reason as Instinct ruling through the imposition of outward Authority. This Reason as Instinct, however, as we have

already remarked, embraces only the relations and life of the Race as such, not the life of the Individual. In the latter the natural impulse of self-preservation and personal well-being alone prevails. Hence an Age which has thrown off Reason as Instinct, without accepting Reason in any other form in its stead, has absolutely nothing remaining except the life of the Individual, and whatever is connected with or related to that. Let us further explain this weighty conclusion, which is of essential importance to our future inquiries.

We have said that Reason as Instinct, and generally Reason in any form, embraces only the life and relations of the Race. To wit,—and this is a principle the proof of which cannot be brought forward here, but which is produced only as an axiom borrowed from the higher philosophy where the strict proof of it may be found,—there is but ONE existing LIFE, even in reference to the subject; i.e. there is everywhere but ONE animating power, ONE living Reason;—*not*, as we are accustomed to hear the unity of Reason asserted and admitted, that Reason is the one homogeneous and self-accordant faculty and property of reasonable beings, who do nevertheless exist already upon their own account, and to whose being this property of Reason is only superadded as a foreign ingredient, without which they might, at any rate, still have been;—*but*, that Reason is the only possible independent and self-sustaining Existence and Life, of which all that seems to us to exist and live is but a modification, definition, variety, and form. To you this principle is not altogether new, for it was already contained in the definition of Reason which I laid before you in our first lecture, to which I then particularly directed your attention and besought you to fix it in your mind. And now to explain this principle somewhat further, so that I may at least make it historically clear to you, although I cannot prove it in this place:—it is the greatest error, and the true ground of all the other errors which

make this Age their sport, that each individual imagines that he can exist, live, think, and act for himself, and believes that he himself is the thinking principle of his thoughts; whereas in truth he is but a single ray of the ONE universal and necessary Thought. I shall not by any means be surprised if it should appear to you that in making this assertion I have uttered a monstrous paradox. I know too well that such an opinion must arise, because we can only speak of the present Age to the present Age;—and, if I do not err, the fundamental character of the Age consists in this, that it knows not the principle of which I have spoken, or holds it, when announced, in the highest degree incredible and absurd. This principle is, however, absolutely incontrovertible upon any other ground than that of the mere feeling of personality; the existence of which as a fact of consciousness we by no means deny, since we ourselves experience it as well as others. But we do most earnestly deny the validity of this feeling when the question respects truth and real existence, in the firm conviction that such questions must be decided upon quite other grounds than the deceptive revelations of consciousness; and we are perfectly able, in the proper time and place, to justify this our denial upon decisive grounds. Here, however, we can only announce this principle, and historically communicate it to you; and it is necessary to do this, because only by means of it can we separate ourselves from the Age and rise superior to it; and no one can truly characterize the Age, or comprehend its characteristics, who does not so raise himself above it. Hence I must entreat you to accept this principle in the meantime upon trust, until I shall be able to lead you, in a popular way, at least to a tacit admission of it, which I shall do in my next lecture.

It is only by and to mere Earthly and Finite perception, that this one and homogeneous Life of Reason is broken up and divided into separate individual persons; the ground of which division, as well as its form and mode, are to be

found in the higher philosophy;—which individual persons exist and are in no other way than in this Earthly and Finite perception, and by means of it;—not at all in themselves, or independent of Earthly and Finite perception. You see here the origin of the division of the One Life of Reason into individual life, and the ground of the necessity which there is, for all who have not raised themselves by Knowledge above mere Earthly and Finite perception, to continue in the faith of this personal existence.

(In order that this principle may not be misunderstood in a sense entirely opposed to my meaning, I add the following;—but merely in passing, and without any connexion with my present subject:—The Earthly and Finite perception, as the foundation and scaffolding of the Eternal Life, as well as all that is contained therein,—and therefore, all the individual persons into whom the One Reason is divided by this Earthly and Finite perception,—endures, at least in memory, in the Eternal Life itself. Hence, far from anything arising out of my principle against the continuation of personal existence, this principle furnishes the only sufficient proof of it. And—to express it briefly and distinctly—persons endure through Eternity as they exist now, i.e. as the necessary phenomena of Earthly and Finite perception; but in all Eternity they can never become,—what they never were nor are,—independent beings.)

After this short digression, let us return to our task. The One and homogeneous Life of Reason of which we have spoken, dividing itself to mere Earthly and Finite perception into different individual lives, and hence assuming the form of the collective life of a Race, is, as above stated, founded at first upon Reason as Instinct, and as such regulated by its own essential law;—and this continues until Knowledge steps in and clearly comprehends this law in all its varied aspects, demonstrates and establishes it, and so makes it evident to all men;—and after Knowledge has done its part, then by Art is it built up into Reality. In this

fundamental law lie all those higher Ideas which belong to the One Life, or to the form which the One Life here assumes,—viz the Race:—which Ideas altogether transcend Individuality, and indeed radically subvert it. Where this fundamental law does not prevail under one form or another, there can Humanity never attain to the One Life,—to the Race; and hence nothing remains but Individuality as the only actual and efficient power. An Age which has set itself free from Reason as Instinct, the first principle of the Life of the Race, and does not yet possess Knowledge, the second principle of that Life, must find itself in this position:—with nothing remaining in it but mere naked Individuality. The Race, which alone possesses real existence, is here changed into a mere empty abstraction which has no true life, except in the artificial conception of some individual founded only on the strength of his own imaginings; and there is no other Whole, and indeed no other conceivable Whole, except a patchwork of individual parts, possessing no essential and organic Unity.

This individual and personal life, which is thus all that remains in such an Age, is governed by the impulse towards self-preservation and personal well-being; and Nature goes no further in man than this impulse. She bestows upon the animals a special instinct to guide them to the *means* of their preservation and well-being, but she sends forth man almost wholly uninstructed on this point, and refers him for guidance to his understanding and his experience; and therefore it could not fail that this latter should in the course of time, during the first two Epochs, assume a cultivated form, and gradually become an established art;—the art, namely, of promoting to the utmost self-preservation and personal well-being. This form of Reason,—this standard of conceptions,—the results, present in the general consciousness of the Time, of the art of Being and Well-Being, is what the third Age encounters at its advent;—this is the universal and natural Common Sense, which it

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receives without labour or toil of its own, as its hereditary patrimony; which is born with it like its hunger and its thirst, and which it now applies as the undoubted measure of all existence and all worth.

Our first problem is solved;—the significance of the Third Epoch is, as we promised that it should be, dragged forth from its concealment and brought forward into open day, and we cannot now fail in likewise reproducing its systems of faith and practice with as much accuracy and sequence as it could itself exhibit in their construction. In the first place,—the fundamental maxim of the Age, as already announced, is now better defined, and it is clear that from its asserted principle ‘What I do not comprehend, that *is not*,’ there must necessarily follow this other:—‘Now I comprehend nothing whatever except that which pertains to my own personal existence and well-being;—hence there *is* nothing more than this, and the whole world exists for nothing else than this,—that I should *be*, and *be happy*. Whatever I do not comprehend as bearing upon this object, *is not*,—does not concern me.’

This mode of thought is *either* operative only in a practical way, as the concealed and unconscious, but nevertheless true and real, motive of the ordinary doings of the Age, —or it elevates itself to theory. So long as it only assumes the first form, it cannot easily be laid hold of and compelled to avow its real nature, but generally retains a sufficient number of lurking holes and ways of escape; it has not yet become a specific Epoch, but is only in the early stages of its development. So soon, however, as, having become theory, it understands itself, admits its own proper significance, and loves, approves, and takes pride in itself, and indeed accounts itself the highest and only truth, then does it assume the distinct Epochal character, reveal itself in all the phenomena of the Age, and may now be thoroughly comprehended by its own admissions. We prefer to approach the subject at its clearest point, and shall

therefore begin our description of the Third Age at its latter stage—when its mode of thought has elevated itself to theory.

We have already remarked that Nature has not bestowed upon man, as it has upon animals, a particular instinct whereby he may be led to the means of his preservation and well-being. This being the case, and also because nothing can be learned upon this subject from *a priori* Ideas, which relate only to the One and Everlasting Life of the Race, it follows, that in this province nothing remains for man but to try, or to let others try at their own proper cost, what is good for him and what evil, and to note the result for his guidance at a future time. Hence it is quite natural and necessary that an Age whose whole theory of the world is exhausted in the means of personal existence, should value Experience as the only possible source of Knowledge, since those very means, which are all that such an Age can or will recognise, are only to be recognised through Experience. In mere Experience,—from which however we must carefully distinguish scientific *Observation* and *Experiment*, with which an *a priori* Idea is always associated, that, namely, of the object of inquiry,—in mere Experience there is contained nothing but the means of physical preservation, and on the other hand these means can only be recognised by Experience:—hence it is Experience alone from which this Age derives its views of the world; and the world again, as seen by it, points to Experience as its sole original;—and thus they react upon each other with the same result. Such an Age is thus obliged to deny and deride all the knowledge which we possess *a priori* and independent of Experience, and the assertion that from knowledge itself, without intermixture of any sensuous element, new knowledge may originate and flow forth. Did it possess Ideas of a higher world and its order, then it would easily understand that these are founded on no Experience whatever, since they transcend all Experience; or if, on the other hand, it had

but the fortune to possess a nature wholly animal, it would then not be obliged laboriously to seek, by means of Experience, its knowledge of the world,—that is, the means of its physical preservation,—but it would possess these *a priori* in the animal instinct; since in fact the ox grazing on the meadow leaves untouched those grasses which are hurtful to his nature, without ever having tasted them and discovered by experience their pernicious qualities; and in like manner takes to those which are healthful to him without previous trial; and consequently, if we were to ascribe knowledge to him, possesses a knowledge absolutely *a priori* and independent of all Experience. Only in the middle state between humanity and animalism is Experience,—that wherein our race ranks below the animals, and in its superiority to which the meanest insect may be an object of envy to man, if destitute of *a priori* conceptions of an Eternal World,—only in this middle state, I say, is Experience elevated to be the crown and standard of humanity, and such an Age steps boldly forward and asks,—‘Might it but know then how any knowledge whatever is possible except by Experience?’ as if by this question, indeed, every one would be frightened, retreat within himself, and give no other answer than the desired one.

In so far as this Age admits the possibility of anything lying beyond the confines of the mere knowledge of the physical world, although it does so in a somewhat inconsequential manner, and only because such things are also present in Experience, and on account of such Experience are taught in the Schools, it becomes its highest wisdom to doubt of everything, and in no matter to take a part either on the one side or the other. In this neutrality, this immoveable impartiality, this incorruptible indifference to all truth, it places its most excellent and perfect wisdom; and the charge of having a system appears to it as a disgrace by which the reputation of a man is irretrievably destroyed. Such scientific cobwebs are only devised in order that young

persons of the lower classes, who have no opportunity of seeing the great world, may, by amusing themselves with them, develop their capacities for active life. For this purpose every opinion and every proposition, affirmative as well as negative, are equally available; and it is a contemptible blunder to mistake jest for earnest, and to interest oneself for any side of such a controversy as if it were something of importance.

With respect to the influence which it exerts upon Nature and its employment of her powers and products, such an Age looks everywhere only to the immediately and materially *useful*,—to that, namely, which is serviceable for dwelling, clothing, and food,—to cheapness, convenience, and, where it attains its highest point, to fashion; but that higher dominion over Nature whereby the majestic image of Man as a Race is stamped upon its opposing forces,—I mean the dominion of Ideas, in which the essential nature of Fine Art consists,—this is wholly unknown to such an Age; and even when the occasional appearance of men of more spiritual nature may remind it of this higher sovereignty, it only laughs at such aspirations as mere visionary extravagance; and thus Art itself, reduced to its most mechanical forms, is degraded into a new vehicle of fashion, the instrument of a capricious luxury, alien to the Eternities of the Ideal world. With respect to the legislative constitution of States and the government of Nations, such an Age either, impelled by its hatred to the old, constructs political fabrics upon the most airy and unsubstantial abstractions, and attempts to govern degenerate men by means of high-sounding phrases without the aid of firm and inflexible power; or, impelled by its idol Experience, it hastens, on every emergency, whether of great or small importance,—being convinced beforehand of its own utter inability to determine upon a course of action for itself,—to consult the chronicles of the Past, to read there how others have formerly acted under similar circumstances, and takes

from thence the law of its own conduct;—and in this way constructs its political existence out of a confused patchwork gathered from many different Ages long since dead, thereby openly displaying a clear consciousness of its own utter nothingness. With respect to Morality, it proclaims this as the only Virtue,—that we should pursue our own individual interests, at furthest adding thereto those of others (either as bound in honour so to do, or else from mere inconsequence) so far as they are not inconsistent with our own; and this as the only Vice,—to fail in the pursuit of our own advantage. It maintains, and—since it can have no difficulty in discovering an ignoble motive for every action, inasmuch as it is quite unacquainted with aught that partakes of nobleness,—it even pretends to prove, that all men who live or have ever lived have actually thought and acted in this way, and that there is absolutely no other motive of action in man than Self-Interest;—compassionating those who assume the existence of any other as silly fools who are as yet ignorant of the world and of men. Lastly, with respect to Religion, it also is changed into a mere Doctrine of Happiness, designed to remind us that man must be temperate in enjoyment in order that his enjoyments may be lasting and varied; a God is deemed necessary only in order that he may care for our welfare, and it is our wants alone which have called him into existence and determined him to be. Whatever it may chance to retain of the super-sensual elements of any already existing system of Religion owes this forbearance only to the need there may be of a curb for the unbridled populace, which however the cultivated classes do not require; and to the want of a more efficient means of supplementing the deficiencies of the Police or of judicial Evidence. In short,—and to express the matter in one word,—such an Age has reached its highest point of development when it has attained a clear conviction that Reason, and with Reason all that lies beyond mere sensuous personal Existence, is

only an invention of certain idle individuals called Philosophers.

So much for the general delineation of the Third Age, the individual features of which we shall set forth and examine in detail in our future addresses. Only one other characteristic we shall notice at present, which inasmuch as it affects the form of the whole Epoch, cannot be passed over here;—this, namely,—that this Age, in its best representatives, is so confident, so firmly assured of the truth of its views, that in this respect it is not surpassed even by the certainty of scientific conviction. It looks down with unspeakable pity and compassion upon those earlier Ages in which men were still so weak-minded as to allow themselves to be seduced from pleasures which were offered to their immediate enjoyment by a spectre which they named Virtue, and by a dream of a super-sensual world;—upon those Ages of darkness and superstition, when they, the representatives of a new Age, had not yet appeared,—had not yet fathomed and thoroughly laid open the depths of the human heart,—had not yet made the great and astounding discovery, and loudly proclaimed and universally promulgated it,—that this heart is at bottom nothing but a base puddle. It does not oppose, but only compassionates and good-naturedly smiles at those who, living in it, yet reject its opinions; and calmly settles itself in the philanthropic hope that they too may one day raise themselves to the same point of view, when they shall have been matured by age and experience; or when they shall have studied, as thoroughly as its own representatives have done, that which it calls History. But here, although this is lost upon those representatives, Knowledge is their master; inasmuch as the latter perfectly comprehends its opponents' mode of thought, can reconstruct it from its separate parts, is able to restore it, should it unfortunately be lost to the world, and even finds it to be perfectly just when considered from its proper point of view. Thus, were we

to speak in the name of Knowledge, the supposed impregnability of the mode of thought which we have now described arises precisely in this way;—that, considered from the point of view where its advocates are placed, it is perfectly just; and however frequently they may re-examine the chain of their conclusions they will never discover any break in its sequence. If there be absolutely nothing but the sensuous existence of Individuality, without any higher life of the Race; then there can be no other source of knowledge but Experience, for we are obviously informed concerning this sensuous existence only by Experience; and just on that account every other pretended source of knowledge, and whatever may flow therefrom, must of necessity be a mere dream and phantom of the brain;—whereby indeed is left unexplained the actual possibility of such dreaming, and of so conjuring out of the brain what in reality the brain does not contain; from which explanation, however, our representatives wisely abstain, satisfied with the experience that such dreams are. And that there actually is nothing except this sensuous individual existence, they know very well from this;—that however often and deeply they have fathomed the abysses of their own being, they have never been able to discover therein aught but the feeling of their own personal and sensuous existence.

And thus it follows from all that has been said, that this manner of thinking is by no means founded upon an error of reasoning or of judgment, which may be remedied by pointing out to the Age the mistake into which it has fallen, and reminding it of the rules of logic which it has transgressed; but it is founded upon the altogether defective character of the Age itself, and of those in whom this character most distinctly shows itself. While it and they are what they are, they must necessarily think as they now think; and if they are to think otherwise than they do think, they must first of all become something different from what they are.

To close our lecture with the only consoling view which the subject affords:—It is a happiness that even the most inveterate champions of this manner of thinking are always, against their own thought and will, something better than their speech proclaims them; and that the spark of a higher life in Man, however it may be concealed, is yet never extinguished, but gleams on with silent and secret power until material is presented to it at which it may kindle and burst forth into bright and steady flame. To fan this spark of a higher life, and as far as possible to furnish it with materials for its activity, is also one of the objects of these lectures.

LECTURE III.

THE LIFE ACCORDING TO REASON.

It is only by degrees that clearness can spread itself over our inquiry;—only step by step can light penetrate its deeper recesses; until at length the end reveal itself before us in unclouded brightness. This condition of our inquiry lies, as we said in our first lecture, in the unchangeable laws which regulate all communication of thought. Beyond the duty incumbent on the speaker to arrange his thoughts in their proper order, and to set each in its proper place, his art can do nothing to modify the condition of which we have spoken, except this,—heedfully to pause at each brighter point which presents itself in the course of his communication, and from thence to send forth rays of light upon what has gone before and what is to follow.

In our last lecture we arrived at one of these brighter points in the inquiry which we have undertaken; and it is fit and proper that we should to-day more fully develop this point. *That the Human Race should order all its relations with Freedom according to Reason*;—this was set forth as the end and purpose of the Earthly Life of our Race; and the characteristic peculiarity of the Third Age, which it is our business to describe, was declared to be, that it had thrown off the yoke of Reason in every shape. But what Reason itself is, and in what a Life according

to Reason consists, and what are the relations which are ordered by Reason in a life so governed by it;—these things have been indeed indicated in many ways, but not yet anywhere placed in a clear light. In our last lecture, however, we said—'Reason embraces only the ONE Life, which manifests itself as the Life of the Race. Were Reason taken away from human life, there would remain only Individuality and the love of Individuality.' Hence the Life according to Reason consists herein,—that the Individual forget himself in the Race, place his own life in the life of the Race and dedicate it thereto;—the Life opposed to Reason, on the contrary, consists in this,—that the Individual think of nothing but himself, love nothing but himself and in relation to himself, and set his whole existence in his own personal well-being alone:—and since we may briefly call that which is according to Reason *good*, and that which is opposed to Reason *evil*, so there is but One Virtue,—to forget one's own personality;—and but One Vice,—to make self the object of our thoughts. Hence the view of Morality depicted in our last lecture as that of the Third Age here as everywhere precisely reverses the fact, and makes that its only Virtue which is in reality the only Vice, and that its only Vice which is in truth the only Virtue.

These words are to be understood strictly as we have spoken them, in their most rigorous sense. The mitigation of our principle which might be attempted here, namely—that it is only our duty not to think of ourselves *exclusively*, but *also* upon others,—is precisely the same Morality as that which we have represented as belonging to the Third Age, only that here it is inconsequential, and seeks to disguise itself, not having yet altogether triumphed over shame. He who but thinks *at all* of his own personality, and desires any kind of life or being, or any joy of life, except *in* the Race and *for* the Race, with whatever vesture of good deeds he may seek to hide his deformity, is

nevertheless, at bottom, only a mean, base, and therefore unhappy man. Hence our principle, as we ourselves have expressed it in all its rigour,—it and nothing else,—is our meaning, against which it is, and always will be, impossible to bring forward any essential objection.

Whatever has been urged against this principle hitherto since mankind had a being, or can be urged so long as it shall have a being, is grounded upon the bold assertion that man *cannot* forget himself, and that personal self-love has grown up in such intimate union with his nature that it is now inextricably interwoven with it. I ask such assertors, Whence then have they obtained their knowledge of what man can do, and what he cannot? Obviously this assertion of theirs can be founded on nothing else than observation of themselves;—and it may indeed be true that they for themselves, since they have become what they are and wish to remain so, may never be able to forget their own personal welfare. But by what right do they make the standard of their ability or non-ability the measure of the capacity of the Race? The noble mind can indeed understand the thought of the ignoble, for we are all born and fashioned in Egoism, and have all lived in it, and it needs struggle and effort to destroy this old nature within us; but the ignoble cannot know the thoughts of the noble, because he has never entered the world to which they belong, nor traversed it, as his world has of necessity been traversed in all its extent by the noble. The latter surveys both worlds, the former only that which holds him captive;—as the Waker may in his waking understand the Dream, and the Seer conceive of Darkness; but the Dreamer cannot in his dream comprehend the Waking, nor the Blind-born imagine Light. Only when they have attained to this higher world, and have taken possession of it, shall they be able to do that which they now declare they cannot do, and only by acquiring this ability for themselves can they learn that Man is capable of acquiring it.

Herein, therefore, have we placed the True Life,—the Life according to Reason,—that the personal life of Man be dedicated to that of his Race,—that the one be forgotten in the other. To forget oneself in others :—not in others regarded likewise in a personal character, where there is still nothing but Individuality ;—but in others regarded as the Race. Understand me :—the sympathy which prompts us to mitigate the sorrows of others, and to share and exalt their joys ; the attachment which binds us to friends and relatives ; the love that entwines us with our families ;—all these, being frequently attended with considerable sacrifices of our own personal convenience and enjoyment, are the first secret and silent movements of Reason as Instinct, gently breaking down the harshest and coarsest forms of Egoism, and so laying the foundation for the development of a wider and more comprehensive love. But as yet this love, far from comprehending Humanity as a whole, without distinction of person and considered as the Race, embraces only individual persons ; and although it is thus assuredly the vestibule to the higher Life, and no one can obtain entrance to the latter who has not first been consecrated thereto in this realm of gentler impulses,—still it is not in itself that higher Life. That embraces the Race itself, as a Race. But the Life of the Race is expressed only in Ideas ;—the fundamental character of which, as well as their various forms, we shall come to understand sufficiently in the course of these lectures. Thus the formula which we laid down,—‘ *That the life of Man be dedicated to that of his Race,*’—may also be expressed thus,—‘ *That the life of Man be dedicated to Ideas ;*’—for Ideas embrace the Race as such, and its Life ; and thus the Life according to Reason, or the only good and true Life, consists in this,—that Man forget himself in Ideas, and neither seek nor know any enjoyment save in Ideas, and in sacrificing all other enjoyments for them.—Thus far for our explanation. Let us now proceed to another matter.

This, namely:—If you yourselves, compelled by an inward power, should feel it impossible to withhold your approval, your admiration, and your reverence from a Life such as we have described, and were even compelled to reverence it more profoundly the greater and more evident the sacrifices made at the shrine of Ideas,—so surely, I say, would it be obvious, from this your approval, that there is a principle, indestructibly rooted in your minds, which proclaims that the personal life *ought to be* brought a sacrifice to the Idea, and that the Life in which it is so offered up is the only true and upright Life;—hence, if we regard the matter strictly,—that the individual life has no real existence, since it has no value of itself, but must and *should* sink to nothing; while, on the contrary, the Race alone exists, since it alone *ought to be* looked upon as really living. In this way we should keep the promise we gave in our former lecture, to show you, in a popular way and by your own knowledge of yourselves, that the principle which we then announced, and which at first sight seemed so paradoxical, was in truth already well known and admitted by you, and indeed was the constant director and guide of your judgment, although you might not be clearly conscious of it;—and we should thus attain both the objects which I had in view in the present lecture.

That you should actually be necessitated to approve, admire, and reverence such a Life as we have described, was the first step in our argument, upon which all else depended, and from which all else necessarily followed;—and this we must commit entirely to your own reflection, without interference on our part. Hence it is only my task to make an experiment on you and within you, and should this succeed, as I expect it will, then we shall have proved our position.

I shall make this experiment upon your minds, unquestionably with the view of exciting a certain feeling in you; but not so as to take you unawares, or to excite this feel-

ing merely for the sake of exciting it, and that so I may be enabled to make a momentary use of it to aid my purpose, as the orator does; but, on the contrary, that this feeling may be excited in you with your own clear and distinct consciousness and concurrence, not exerting a mere passive influence on you, but to the end that its existence may be clearly recognised by you, and that it may thus be more fully and completely understood.

The philosopher is compelled, by the rules of his art, to deal with perfect openness and honesty; and in return he acquires a power which lies far beyond the sophistries of mere eloquence;—he is able to declare to his hearers beforehand the emotion which he desires to excite within them, and, provided they rightly understand him, to attain his object notwithstanding the disclosure.

This free and open announcement of the purpose which we have in view, lays me under an obligation to describe more particularly the nature of the effect which I shall attempt to produce within you; and in order to maintain the clear, intelligible position which we have now attained, I shall at once proceed to this description. I have only to ask you to fix in your mind a few expressions and phrases which may not as yet be entirely distinct to you, but which shall be made perfectly clear in the sequel.

The Life according to Reason must necessarily love itself; for every form of life, as its own perfect result and fulfilment, is enjoyment of itself. As surely as Reason can never be entirely extinguished among men, so surely can this love of Reason for itself never be utterly destroyed; nay, this love, as the deepest root of all rational existence, and as the sole remaining tie which keeps men within the circle of rational existence, is precisely that whereby we may most surely recognise and attain the Life according to Reason, if we will only be honest and unprejudiced.

Now the Life opposed to Reason,—that of mere Individuality,—likewise loves itself; since it too is life, and all

life necessarily loves itself. But as these two forms of life are thoroughly opposed to each other, so also are the kinds of love and satisfaction which they have in themselves quite opposed to each other,—wholly and specifically different;—and in this specific difference they are easily recognised and distinguished from each other.

To begin with the love which the Life according to Reason entertains for itself. Towards this Life we may stand in a double relation:—*either*, we may possess it only in conception, in a feeble and imperfect representation, and only as received from others;—*or*, we may ourselves truly and in reality be and live this Life. That mankind cannot at the present day stand in the latter relation,—since, in that case, there would be not only no Egoism, and no Third Age of the world, but also no true Freedom,—this has already been admitted; nay more,—that we have been all fashioned and born *outside of* this relation, and can only by labour and toil place ourselves therein. Hence it must be the first relation, namely the possession, or the capacity of possessing, the Life according to Reason *in conception*, which is never wholly extinguished among men, which all have the power to attain, and by which all may at least comprehend the Life according to Reason.

The love which the Life opposed to Reason bears to itself, with which indeed we are all better acquainted, and to which our language more easily accommodates itself, manifests itself in its specific character, both in general and in particulars,—as delight in its own sagacity, petty pride in its own cleverness and penetration, and,—to designate an ignoble thing by a befitting ignoble expression,—as self-satisfied chuckling over its own cunning. Thus in the former lecture it was represented as a fundamental characteristic of the Third Age, that it looked down with haughty self-complacency on those who suffer themselves to be defrauded of present enjoyment by a dream of Virtue, congratulating itself that it is far above such delusions, and therefore secure from

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being imposed upon;—its true character being admirably expressed in a single phrase,—would-be-Enlightenment.¹⁹ Thus the highest and most refined enjoyment which he who cares best for his own advantage, and successfully pursues it through many difficulties, can attain, is the satisfaction he must feel in his own shrewdness and skill. On the contrary, the love which the Life according to Reason bears to itself, as a legitimate and well-ordered existence, manifests itself in its specific character, not as unexpected gratification, but in the dignified form of approval, esteem, and reverence.

In so far as we have attained the Life according to Reason, in the first way, namely, in *conception*, and as a picture of a Life removed from our own, in so far will this conception lovingly welcome and dwell upon itself in delighted complacency;—for, in that case, we shall at least have entered so far into the sphere of the Life of Reason, as to possess a worthy and adequate image of it. (We may add here, for the benefit of those who are acquainted with the scientific language of philosophy, that the feeling thus produced is an æsthetic pleasure, and indeed *the highest æsthetic pleasure*.)

This pleasure, however,—this approbation of something foreign to us,—something which we ourselves are not,—inspires us with respect and reverence, combined, in the best of our race, with silent unsatisfied regards thrown back upon themselves, and a secret longing to assimilate their own life to the object of their love; out of which longing the higher Life gradually unfolds itself. In so far as, in the second way, the Life according to Reason actually becomes conscious of itself as a real and present existence, it flows forth in unspeakable enjoyment and satisfaction, before the thought of which the Egoist must retreat in envy could he entertain the thought;—in this love to itself, it becomes pure Blessedness. \\\ For all feelings of disappointment and dissatisfaction, as well as those of desire and insufficiency, are nothing else

than the birth-pains of the higher Life struggling towards its perfect development. Is it developed?—then is it thoroughly satisfied with itself, and sufficient for itself, needing nothing more, but possessing the most perfect Freedom within itself and in the consciousness of its own inherent power. Let us in the present lecture test the first condition by ourselves; in the next I shall attempt to present to you a feeble description of the second.

For our present purpose, I shall maintain the following proposition:—Everything great and good upon which our present existence rests, from which it has proceeded, and on the supposition of which alone our Age can order itself in the way it actually does, has an existence only because noble and powerful men have resigned all the enjoyments of life for the sake of Ideas; and we ourselves, and all that we are, are the result of the sacrifices of all previous generations, and especially of their worthiest members. I have, however, no thought of making use of this remark to bribe you into toleration towards our predecessors by contemplation of the advantages which we have derived from their sacrifices; for in that case I should excite in you, and make use of for my present purpose, precisely that mode of thought which, had I the power, I would extirpate from the world; and then I might justly expect this answer,—‘It is well for us that these fools have lived, who, in the sweat of their brow, gathered together the treasures we now enjoy; we shall, so far as in us lies, avoid similar folly:—let other generations look to their own prosperity when we shall be no more;’—and I should not be able to avoid commending this answer as, at least, consistent. It has even been seen, that with regard to efforts for the sake of Humanity which, provided they were otherwise conducted with propriety, have deserved no blame in this respect, men have lifted up their voices and asked,—‘Is it right that this generation should make such sacrifices for the future?’ and thereupon looked around with triumph, as if they had:

uttered something very profound and secure from controversy. At present, however, I only wish to know this,—whether you do not feel constrained to respect and admire in the highest degree such a course of thought and action, quite independently of any consideration of its prudence, upon which no judgment is now demanded.

Let us cast a glance on the world around us. You know that even now many tracts of the Earth's surface are still covered with putrid morasses and impenetrable forests, the cold and damp atmosphere of which gives birth to noxious insects, and breathes forth devastating epidemics; which are almost entirely the dwelling-place of wild animals, and only afford to the few creatures in human form who are to be found in them the means of dragging on a dull and joyless existence, without freedom, usefulness, or dignity. History informs us that the countries which we inhabit at the present day formerly bore the same character to a large extent. *Now*, the morasses are dried up; the forests cleared out and changed into fruitful plains and vineyards which purify the air and fill it with enlivening fragrance; the rivers are taught to keep their channels, and enduring bridges are laid across them; villages and towns have arisen, with lasting, convenient, and agreeable dwelling-places for men, and public buildings, which have already braved the storms of centuries, for the purposes of mental improvement and elevation. You know that, even at the present day, savage hordes roam over vast wildernesses, maintaining a miserable life upon impure and loathsome food, and yet, when they encounter each other, engaging in warfare for the sake of this scanty subsistence, and of their wretched implements of acquisition and enjoyment,—extending the fury of their vengeance even to devouring their fellow-men. It is in the highest degree probable that we are all of us descendants of such races; that our forefathers, at least in some of their generations, have passed through this condition. *Now*, men are assembled from out the

forests and united together in masses. In the savage state each family had to provide for its manifold wants immediately and without assistance from others, and had even to fabricate for itself the utensils for that purpose, with much loss of time and waste of energy:—*Now*, the human multitudes are divided into classes, each of which pursues its own profession, to the acquirement and exercise of which its life is devoted; providing in its own department for all other classes, and provided for by them with respect to all its other wants; and thus are the forces of Nature confronted by the greatest possible amount of the cultivated, ordered and combined powers of Reason. The laws and their administrators interpose an insuperable barrier to the fury of personal warfare and spoliation; quarrels are adjusted without bloodshed, and the lust of crime is scared back by severe punishments into the dark recesses of thought;—and thus is internal peace secured, and every one moves in safety within the limits which are prescribed to him. Large masses of men, frequently sprung from the most dissimilar origin, and united one scarce knows how, encounter similar masses in as wonderful combination, and neither being fully acquainted with the power of the other, reciprocal fear steps in between them, so that men are sometimes blessed even with external tranquillity; or when it does come to war, the superior power is often worn out and broken by the determined resistance of its opponent, and instead of the secretly desired extermination, peace is the result;—and thus has sprung up a kind of international law between independent countries, and from among opposing tribes a kind of republic of nations has arisen. You know how, even to the present time, the timid savage, unacquainted even with himself, finds a hindrance or a destroying foe in every power of Nature. To us, Science has laid open our own spiritual being, and thereby, in a great measure, subjected to our will the outward physical forces of the universe. Mechanical science has multiplied, almost to infinity, the

feeble powers of man, and continues to multiply them. Chemistry has introduced us into many chambers of the secret workshop of Nature, and enabled us to apply her wonders to our own uses, and to protect ourselves from the injuries they might otherwise inflict upon us. Astronomy has scaled the heavens for us, and measured their paths. You know, and the whole history of the Past as well as the description of the savage tribes which still exist upon the earth proves it to you, that all nations, the most cultivated not excepted, flying from the horrors of external Nature, and penetrating to the secret depths of their own heart, have first discovered there the most fearful of all horrors;—the Godhead as their enemy. By cringing humiliation and entreaty, by sacrifice of that which was dearest to them, by voluntary self-imposed penances, by human immolation, by the blood of an only-begotten Son, if need were, have they sought to bribe this Being so jealous of human happiness, and to reconcile him to their unexpected strokes of fortune, by humbly deprecating his resentment.

This is the Religion of the ancient world, and of the savage tribes which still exist, and I challenge the student of History to point out any other. From us this phantom has disappeared long ago; and the redemption and satisfaction spoken of in a certain system is a public matter of fact, in which we may either believe or not,—and which is all the more a matter of fact the less we believe in it. Our Age, far from shunning the Godhead, has, by its representatives, constituted the Deity the minister of its pleasures. We, for our part, far from finding fault with them on account of this want of the fear of God, rather count it one of their advantages; and since they are incapable of the right enjoyment of the Godhead,—of loving it, and living in it, and thus attaining Blessedness,—we may be well pleased that, at least, they do not fear it. Let them, if they please, throw it off altogether, or so fashion it as may be most agreeable to them.

What I have declared in the first place, was *once* the form of Humanity, and in part is so still: what I have described in the second, is its *present* form, at least among ourselves. How, by whom, and by what manner of impulses, has this new creation been accomplished ?

Who then, in the first place, gave to the countries of Modern Europe their present habitable shape, and made them worthy to be the dwelling-place of cultivated men ? History answers the question. It was pious and holy men, who, believing it to be God's Will that the timid fugitive of the woods should be elevated to civilized life, and thereby to the blessed knowledge of a Godhead full of love to man, left the abodes of civilization and all the physical and intellectual enjoyments to be found there,—left their families, friends and associates, and went forth into the desert wilderness, enduring the bitterest privations, encountering the severest labour, and, what is more, pursuing their end with unwearied patience, that they might win the confidence of untutored tribes, by whom they were persecuted and robbed;—frequently terminating an anxious and weary life by a martyr's death at the hands of those for whom, and for us their descendants, they died,—rejoicing in the hope that from their ashes a worthier generation should arise. These men, without doubt, gave up their personal life and its enjoyments for their Idea, and in this Idea for the Race. And should any one offer this objection :—' They indeed sacrificed the present life for the expectation of an infinitely higher, heavenly, and blessed life, which they hoped to deserve by these sacrifices and sufferings; but still it was only enjoyment for enjoyment, and indeed the lesser for the greater ;'—then I would entreat such an objector earnestly to consider with me the following. How inadequately soever they might express themselves in words as to the Blessedness of another world, and with what sensuous pictures soever they might clothe their descriptions of this happiness, I ask only to know how they arrived at this firm

Faith in another world, which they attested so nobly by their deeds; and what this Faith, as an act of the mind, really is. Does not the mind which faithfully accepts another world as certain, in this very acceptance renounce the present?—and is not this Faith itself the sacrifice, once and for ever accomplished and perfected in the mind, and which only manifests itself outwardly when special circumstances call it forth? Let it be no wonder at all, but quite a conceivable thing, and only what thou thyself, who makest this objection, wert thou in the same position, wouldst do,—that they willingly sacrificed everything to their belief in an Eternal Life:—let this be so; then is it the wonder that they *did believe*; in which belief the Egoist, who is incapable of letting the Present escape, even for a moment, from his view, can never follow nor even approach them.

Who has united rude races together, and reduced opposing tribes under the dominion of law, and to the habits of peaceful life? Who has maintained them in this condition, and protected existing states from dissolution through internal disorder, or destruction by outward power? Whatever name they may have borne, it was Heroes, who had left their Age far behind them, giants among surrounding men in material and spiritual power. They subdued to their Idea of what *ought to be*, races by whom they were on that account hated and feared; through sleepless nights of thought they pondered their anxious plans for their fellow-men; from battlefield to battlefield they rushed without weariness or rest, renouncing the enjoyments which lay within their grasp, making their life a spoil, often shedding their blood. And what sought they by these labours?—and how were they rewarded? It was an Idea, a mere Idea of a new condition of things to be brought about by them, to be realized for its own sake alone, and without reference to any ulterior purpose;—this it was which inspired them; and it was the unspeakable delight of this Idea which rewarded and

indemnified them for all their labours and sacrifices;—it was this Idea which lay at the root of their inward life,—which cast the outward life into shade, and threw it aside as something undeserving of thought;—it was the power of this Idea which made them giants in physical and mental energy, although by birth like their fellow-men; and their personal life was dedicated to this Idea which first moulded that life into a worthy and accepted offering.

What impels the King, securely seated on a hereditary throne, with the fulness of the land spread out before him for his enjoyment,—what impels—(to combine my question with a well-known example so often misconstrued by a race of pigmy sentimentalists)—what impels the Macedonian hero to leave his hereditary kingdom already well secured on all sides and richly provided for by his father and to seek foreign lands to the conquest of which he forces his way by unceasing efforts? Will he thereby be happier or more contented?—What chains victory to his footsteps, and scatters before him in terror the countless hordes of his enemies?—Is this mere fortune? No!—it is an Idea which first gives the impulse, and which crowns the effort with success. Effeminate half-barbarians had looked down with scorn upon the most highly civilized people then living beneath the sun on account of their smaller numbers, and had even dared to entertain the thought of their subjugation; they had actually subdued kindred tribes dwelling in Asia, and subjected the cultivated and the free to the laws and odious inflictions of rude and enslaved nations. This outrage must not be perpetrated with impunity: on the contrary, the civilized must rule and the uncivilized must obey, if *Right* is to be the *Law* of the world. This Idea had already been long cherished in the nobler Grecian minds, until in Alexander it became a living flame which animated and consumed his personal

life. Tell me not of the thousands who fell around his path; speak not of his own early ensuing death:—after the realization of his Idea, what was there greater for him to do than to die?

LECTURE IV.

THE LIFE ACCORDING TO REASON.

IN our last lecture we set forth the principle directly opposed to that of the Third Age which we have undertaken to characterize,—the principle of the Life according to Reason ;—this, namely,—that the personal life of man should be devoted to the Life of the Race, or, as we further defined this expression, to Ideas ; and we found it desirable to prolong our consideration of this principle, as one of the more luminous points in our inquiry. I proposed, in the first place, to show you by your own nature, that you could not help approving, admiring, and respecting in the highest degree the sacrifice of the enjoyments of life for the realization of an Idea ; that hence a principle upon which this judgment was founded must exist indestructibly within you ; a principle namely to this effect,—that the personal life *ought to be* given up for the Idea ; and that, strictly speaking, personal existence *is not*, since it should thus be sacrificed ; while, on the contrary, the life in the Idea alone *is*, since it alone *ought to be* maintained. I explained this expected admiration on your part by this proposition : All life necessarily loves itself, and therefore the Life according to Reason must love itself, and, as the only true and real Life, must love itself with a love far exceeding all other love. Now the Life according to Reason may exist and be known

to man in two different ways:—either in mere conception, and as the picture of a condition foreign to his own;—or by himself *living* this life. In the first case, it loves itself and delights in itself as seen in this conception, because this is at least the conception of the Life according to Reason, and is itself according to Reason; and then there arises the approval, admiration, and reverence of which we have spoken. In the second case, it rises to infinite enjoyment of its own being, which is Blessedness. The former condition,—that of approval,—I proposed to test by your own feelings in our last lecture; promising you for to-day a feeble description of the second.

And in the fulfilment of my first object, that I might not roam about at random, blindly groping among my materials, but arrange my thoughts around a common centre, I said—‘Everything great and good on which our Age rests, and by the power of which it exists, has been brought about by the sacrifices which the Past has made for Ideas.’ By calling to mind that the land had been redeemed from the state of wildness to that of cultivation, mankind from the state of war to that of peace, from ignorance to knowledge, from blind terror before God to emancipation from such fear,—I showed that the first of these changes, at least in the countries which we inhabit, had been effected by pious and holy men; and the last, everywhere and in all lands, by Heroes;—all of whom, the one class as well as the other, had sacrificed their life and its enjoyments for the sake of their Ideas. While I was proceeding to answer an objection which might be made with reference to this last point, my discourse was interrupted by the expiry of our usual time, and I now resume it at the same place.

It is Honour, some one may say, which inspires the Hero,—the burning image of his fame now and in after-times, which impels him onward through difficulty and danger, and which repays him for his life of sacrifice and self-denial in the coin on which he sets most value. I

answer, even if this should be so, what then is this Honour? Whence has this thought of the judgment which others may pass upon us, particularly of the judgment of future generations whose praise or blame shall echo over our graves unheard by us;—whence has it acquired this amazing power which enables it to suppress and extinguish the personal life of the Hero? Is it not obvious that in the depths of his mind there lies a principle which tells him that only on one condition can his life be of any value to him,—can be even endurable by him;—this, namely, that the voices of Mankind at large shall unite in ascribing a value to it? Is not this very thought the Idea of the Race, and of its judgment as a Race on the Individual, and the admission that the Race alone is entitled to pass the final judgment upon true merit? Is it not the supposition that this final judgment must be grounded on the inquiry whether the Individual has or has not devoted himself to the Race?—and is it not a silent, respectful acquiescence in this judgment proceeding on these premises?—in a word, is not this Idea precisely that in which we have placed the Life according to Reason? But let us more thoroughly investigate this matter.

The Hero acts:—undoubtedly then, I add, he acts in a certain way;—in order, it is said, thereby to acquire fame in the eyes of Present and Future Ages:—undoubtedly then, I add again, without having first interrogated the Present and Future Ages whether they would laud a life so employed;—without, I add yet again, having *had it in his power* to seek counsel of experience in any way upon this question; because his mode of action, so surely as it proceeds upon an Idea, is a new, hitherto unknown mode, upon which therefore no human judgment has ever yet been pronounced. But, it is said, he reckons so securely on fame being the result of this mode of action, that he is ready to peril his life on the accuracy of his calculations. How does he know, then, that he has not miscalculated?

At the time when he goes forth into action, and has already once for all completed in his own mind the consecration of his life, he and he only, and none other but himself, has examined and approved the mode of life which he has set before him;—how then does he know that Present and Future Ages will likewise approve it and cover it with immortal glory?—how does he come so boldly to ascribe to the whole Race his own standard of what is honourable and praiseworthy? Yet he does this, as is alleged; and this single remark of itself proves, that, in acting as he does, far from being moved thereto by the hope of future fame, he holds up to future Ages, in his own deeds springing forth in native purity from the primeval fountain of honour, the example of what they *must* approve and reverence, if their judgment is to have any weight with him;—despising and even utterly rejecting such judgment if it be not in accordance with that which has already approved itself to him as worthy of eternal honour and respect. And thus it is not ambition which is the parent of great deeds, but great deeds themselves give birth to faith in a world in which they must command respect. That form of Honour, indeed, which comes before us in every-day life, and of which we do not now speak, proceeds entirely from fear of disgrace; without power to excite man to active duty, it only holds him back from that which would be notoriously despised, and disappears as soon as he can hope to pass unnoticed. Another Ambition, of which too we do not now speak, which first pores over ancient chronicles to discover what in them is commended, and then endeavours to imitate that, so as also to become an object of commendation; and which being incapable of creating the New, strives to reproduce in itself certain effete memorials of the Past, which once indeed may have possessed life and energy:—such an ambition may sacrifice itself, but that to which it devotes itself is not an Idea but a Con-
ceit;—and it misses its purpose; for what is once dead

never lives again,—and whatever may be its success in the senseless and purblind Present, the Future will assuredly despise the Imitator who mistakes himself for a Creator.

This remark upon Honour, which has been here adduced only in reference to Heroism, is also applicable to what is to follow, where in like manner superficiality is wont to speak of an ambition the nature and possibility of which it has not power to comprehend.

In our former lecture we said that the once timid savage, to whom every power of Nature was an obstacle and a hindrance, is now through Science made acquainted with his own constitution, and has thus attained a mastery over the powers of the outward universe. Who are they who have discovered and extended the Sciences?—have they accomplished this without labour and sacrifice?—what has been their reward?

While the Age in which they lived spent its days in gay enjoyment, they sat wrapt in solitary thought, in order that they might disclose a law or a relation which had called forth their admiration, and with respect to which they had absolutely no other desire than simply to disclose it; sacrificing pleasure and fortune, neglecting their outward concerns, and lavishing their finest genius in these researches; laughed at by the multitude as fools and dreamers. *Now*, their discoveries have proved of manifold advantage to human life, as we have already called to mind. But have they themselves enjoyed these fruits of their labours? have they foreseen or even conjectured these results?—have they not rather, when their spiritual aspirations have been repressed by such views of their occupation, uttered truly sublime lamentations over the desecration of the Holy to the profane uses of life, it being concealed from them that life itself must be thereby sanctified? Only when, through their labours, these discoveries had been made so comprehensible, and a knowledge of them had been so widely

diffused, as to be carried out into practice by less inspired minds (whom we, looking from an entirely different point of view, would by no means on that account despise, but of whom it should be distinctly understood that they are not of so noble a nature as the first;)—only then have these discoveries been applied to the wants of life, and so become the means of arming the Human Race with superior power over the forces of Nature. If, thus, no vision, not even a presentiment, of the usefulness of their discoveries could indemnify them for their sacrifices, what was their reward?—and what, at the present day, is the reward of those, if at the present day there be such, who with the same devotion, the same sacrifices, the same disinterested zeal, amid the scorn and mockery of the vulgar, raise their eyes towards the ever-flowing fountain of Truth? This it is:—they have entered into a new life-element of spiritual clearness and purity, whereby life in any other form becomes absolutely repulsive to them. A Higher World, which is first and most intimately made known to us by the light which is native within it, has arisen upon them; this light has filled their eyes with its beneficent and inspiring radiance, so that henceforth and forever they can regard nothing but that illumined height shining in deep surrounding darkness. This heavenly vision so rivets their gaze, so enchains their whole being, that every other sense is silently absorbed therein. They need no recompense; they have made an incalculable gain.

The dreadful phantom of a Deity hostile to Mankind has vanished, and the Human Race is now delivered from this horror, and enjoys tranquillity and freedom. Who has eradicated this error, so widely spread and deeply rooted among all nations?—has this been accomplished without sacrifice?—what has been the reward of such sacrifice?

It is the Christian Religion alone which has wrought this stupendous miracle, and it has accomplished this triumph by means of countless sacrifices on the part of

those whose lives have been filled by its inspiration and devoted to its service. What they have endured;—what the Exalted Founder himself,—what his immediate followers,—what their successors through a long series of ages, until even to us, as to a later birth, their word came;—what they all have wrought and suffered among rude and superstitious nations, animated only by the gladdening and inspiring truth which had risen upon their souls and become the ruling impulse of their lives,—I shall not here call to mind. This Age is not ignorant of these things; it brings them sufficiently into notice, in order that it may laugh at the fanaticism which is all it can discover in them. Only through Christianity; through the vast miracle in which it had its origin, and by which it was ushered into the world, has this change been effected. It is no doubt quite conceivable that after the Truth has once been proclaimed, and in consequence of its numerous adherents has even acquired an authority among men, we may by peaceful inquiry investigate its foundations, reconstruct it by the power of our own understanding, and so, in a certain sense, rediscover it: but whence the great Founder obtained courage boldly to confront the phantom which had been consecrated by the universal assent of all former Ages, and the very thought of which had paralysed every exertion, and to discover that *it was not*, but that instead of it there was only Happiness and Love:—this was the miracle. So far as regards the representatives of this Age, it is very certain, if we may judge by other proofs of their acuteness and penetration, that it is not this acuteness, but only the unacknowledged influence exercised over them by this very tradition,—an influence which they deride wherever their dull eye can reach it,—to which they owe it that they do not, even to the present day, smite their faces before idols of wood, and pass their children through the fire to Moloch.

Whether you can forbear from passing a sentence of

approval on the sacrifice of personal enjoyment for the sake of Ideas manifested in all these examples, is the question which I must now leave you to answer for yourselves, and also to draw from this phenomenon the inferences which, as we formerly maintained, must necessarily follow from it.

This approval is, as we formerly explained, the immediate effect of the contemplation of the Life in Idea merely in *conception*, and as a condition foreign to ourselves. We added that the existence of this Life, not in conception only, but *in living reality*, was the source of an infinite self-enjoyment, which is Blessedness; and we promised a description of this state, which may indeed prove but weak and inadequate, as every mere picture of a living reality must prove.

This is the place more definitely to explain the peculiar nature of the Idea as such;—an explanation for which we have endeavoured to prepare the way by our previous course of thought.

I say, then, that *the Idea is an independent, living, matter-inspiring Thought*.

First,—*an independent Thought*: Herein, indeed, consists the perverted way of thinking of the Third Age, and generally every perverted way of thinking,—that it ascribes independence, self-reliance, and self-subsistence to mere dead and torpid matter, and then superadds to that the quite superfluous quality of thought, one knows not why or how. No! Thought itself is alone truly independent and self-existent;—not indeed the thought which belongs to the single thinking Individual, which truly cannot be self-existent,—but the One Eternal Thought, in which all Individuals are but Thoughts. / The innermost root of this world is not Death,—Death which, by gradual restriction and limitation of its power, may be refined and subtilized into Life;—but, on the contrary, Life is the root of the World, and what there *seems* to be Death is but a

feebler form of Life. / *A living Thought*: as is obvious at once, for Thought is by its very nature living, even as self-existence is by its very nature living; and thus Thought can only be conceived of as self-existent, and self-existence can only be ascribed to Thought, inasmuch as both bear within them the Idea of Life. *A matter-inspiring Thought*:—and this in a two-fold sense: All material Life is the expression of the Idea;—for matter itself is but the reflection of a latent Idea, from which it derives the motion and vitality it contains. But where the Idea breaks through this external covering, reveals itself openly and distinctly as Idea, and bursts forth in its own peculiar self-sustaining Life, then the lower grade of life, where the Idea lies latent, disappears in the higher, which now alone fills the individual life, and lives its own Life therein;—and then arises, in a word, that phenomenon which has shown itself in all our previous descriptions, — the phenomenon of the sacrifice of the personal, i. e. of the undeveloped ideal life, to the Life of the Idea distinctly revealed as such. Thus, I say, it is with Life:—not the flesh liveth but the spirit; and this fundamental truth, which the speculative philosopher can prove by the necessary laws of thought, has been verified and proved in his own person by every one in whom the Idea has assumed a determinate living form, although it may be that he himself has not been clearly conscious of it. To raise this direct proof from personal experience into the clearness of distinct consciousness, and so bring it home to every one, is the business of popular-philosophical teaching, and here especially it is mine.

We said that where the Idea manifests itself in its proper and independent Life, the lower form of life, namely the sensuous, entirely disappears in it and is for ever superseded and extinguished. The love of this lower form of life for itself, and its interest in itself, is annihilated. But all our wants arise only from the existence of this interest, and all

our griefs from wounding it. The Life in the Idea is forever secured against all disturbance in this respect, for it has withdrawn itself from the sphere in which alone such disturbance is possible. For this Life there is no self-denial and no sacrifice;—the self which has to be denied, and the desires which have to be sacrificed, are withdrawn from its sight, and its love for them has disappeared. This self-denial and these sacrifices excite astonishment only in him for whom their objects still possess value, because he himself has not yet relinquished them;—when they are once relinquished they vanish into oblivion, and he finds that, in truth, he has lost nothing. The stern and authoritative Law of Duty, which presupposes vicious inclinations, and only exists that it may scare back the first movements of desire into the dim obscurities of thought, is abolished in the Life in the Idea. '*Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte.*' This higher Life once attained, that which at first was enforced upon man as the stern command of Duty becomes his spontaneous rule of conduct, the end for which alone he desires to live,—his sole joy, love, and blessedness. Thus, it is only ignorance which dreams that a profound philosophy would recall the gloomy morality of self-crucifixion and martyrdom. Oh no!—it invites man to cast from him that which can afford no enjoyment, in order that the source of infinite enjoyment may approach him, and fill his being with its presence.

The Idea is independent, self-sufficient, self-existent; it lives and has its being absolutely for its own sake alone; and scorns every outward and adventitious object. Hence it does not value and love its Life according to the foreign standard of any result, use, or advantage which may arise therefrom. As in the Life of the Race the Idea strives constantly towards absolute worth, not mere welfare,—worth in itself, not mere deserving;—so when it nourishes the individual life of man it is wholly

satisfied with this worth, without demanding any ulterior results. The uncertainty of such results can thus never cloud its inward brightness, nor the actual want of them cause it grief; for it has never counted upon outward consequences, but on the contrary has resigned them along with every other desire of sense. How could sorrow, pain, or disturbance ever enter within the circle of a Life thus strictly comprehended within itself?

The Idea is sufficient in itself for the living, active Life which eternally flows forth from it, without need of aught else, and without allowing aught else to exercise an influence within it. The consciousness of this ever-present independence; this self-sufficiency for infinite and unceasing activity; the purity of this sacred, self-fed flame, which with steady and unvarying power burns onward through Eternity,—is the love of the Life of Reason for itself, its self-enjoyment, its Blessedness. No idle brooding over its own image, no contemplation of its own excellence;—for reflection is swallowed up in fact, and the unresting, ever-burning flame of real Life, having annihilated the Past and sunk it into the depths of oblivion, leaves neither time nor opportunity again to recall it thence.

To those in whom the Idea has never attained to life in any form, such delineations of the Blessedness of the Life in Idea are wholly unintelligible—tones from another world; and—since they necessarily deny the existence of any world but their own,—dreams, folly, and fanaticism. But are we not entitled to calculate with some measure of certainty that in cultivated society every one has in some way or other come into contact with Ideas?

As the Idea is simple in its nature, so is the Blessedness of the Life in the Idea everywhere one and the same;—namely, the immediate consciousness of original spontaneous Energy. It is only in relation to the objects on which this Energy descends, and in which it reveals itself within

our own sense and consciousness, that the one Idea assumes different forms;—which different forms are then themselves named Ideas. I say expressly,—*within our own sense and consciousness*; for only in consciousness do these manifestations of the Idea differ from each other: beyond that they are but one.

¶ The first form assumed among men by this effluence of Original Energy,—that in which it has manifested itself in the earliest Ages, and in which it is most widely active at the present day, is its expression in outward matter by means of our own material power;—and in this expression of the Idea the *Fine Arts* consist. *Effluence of Original Energy*, I have said,—flowing forth from itself, and sufficient for itself, independent of experience or observation of the external world. This latter gives us only individual, and therefore ignoble and hateful, conceptions, which in having attained reality in one instance, have attained it once too often already;—the repetition and multiplication of which by Art would be but an evil service to humanity. *In outward matter*, I said,—irrespective of its peculiarities:—whether the physical representation of one lost in the Idea (for this alone is the true object of Art) stand fixed in marble, or glow upon the canvass; or the emotions of an inspired soul find an utterance in music, or the feelings and thoughts of such a mind speak themselves simply in words;—still it is the effluence of Original Energy in outward matter.

The true Artist, in the sense in which we have spoken of him, finds in the practice of his Art the highest enjoyment of the Blessedness we have described; for his whole being goes forth in free self-sufficient activity, and in the consciousness of this activity. And is there any one, then, to whom every way is closed of participating in the enjoyment of such creations; and so, in a certain sense, and in a far inferior degree, becoming a joint-creator of them;

and in this way at least perceiving that there is a delight which immeasurably transcends every enjoyment of sense?

Another and higher form of the Idea, which however manifests itself in fewer individuals, is the effluence of Original Energy in the *Social relations* of Mankind; the source of all great world-embracing political Ideas; in life the parent of Heroism, and the author of all Law and Order among men. What power this Idea confers upon man, we have already seen; with what Blessedness it fills the soul devoted to its service, follows from what we have said; and whoever amongst you can think of the world and his country, and can devote his life to their service in forgetfulness of self, knows it from his own experience.

A third form of the Idea is the effluence of the Original Energy in the building up and reconstructing the Universe from itself, i.e. from Thought,—in other words *Science*; for whenever Science has shown itself among men, it has been essentially this which I have said, and so it must be forever. The high enjoyment which Science ensures to her votaries has been already described:—we have but to add that this pleasure is more spiritual, and hence higher and more exquisite, than any other ideal enjoyment, because here the Idea is not only present, but is felt and enjoyed *as Idea*,—as Thought itself rising into visibility from the depths of its own nature;—and this is without doubt the highest Blessedness to which mortal can attain here below. It is only in their outward influence that the Fine Arts have an advantage over Science, inasmuch as they are able at times to raise even the uninitiated to their own height by the magic of spiritual sympathy, and so give him a foretaste of perfect enjoyment; while the secrets of Science are accessible only to those for whom they have ceased to be secrets.

Finally:—the most comprehensive, all-embracing and universally comprehensible form of the Idea;—the con-

scious dwelling of all activity and all life in the One, Ever-Present Source of Life, the Godhead;—or *Religion*. He in whom this consciousness arises with immediate and unalterable certitude and becomes the soul of all his other knowledge, thoughts, and feelings,—he has entered into possession of a happiness which can never be disturbed. Whatever he encounters, is a form of that original source of Life which in all its forms is holy and good, and which he cannot but love in every shape it may assume; for it is, as he may express it in other words, the Will of God, with which his Will is always at one. Whatever he may be called upon to do, however difficult, mean, or ignoble it may seem, is the living form of that fountain of Life within him, to be the expression of which constitutes his greatest happiness;—it is the Will of God with him; and to be the instrument of God is his supreme delight. He who ploughs his field in this Faith and Love is infinitely more blessed than he who, without them, removes mountains.

These are the materials for the picture of the One Life according to Reason, to the delineation of which we have devoted the last and the present lecture. Let us now gather together these materials into one conception.

We said that the different forms into which the conception of the One Eternal Original Energy separates itself in our consciousness, and of which we have now indicated the most remarkable, are nevertheless, beyond this consciousness of ours, only one and the same Energy. Wherever this Energy enters into life in any one of these forms, it nevertheless, in and by virtue of that form, embraces itself as a whole, loves itself as a whole, and develops itself as a whole, only without its own knowledge or consciousness; nowhere separated into parts, but always the One, undivided Energy repeated and reproduced in different shapes; everywhere the One Life, the fountain of whose Being is in itself Alone, ceaselessly producing itself anew

in its own primitive unity, and in its movement rolling forth the one undivided stream of Time. This One Idea, in the form of the Fine Arts, impresses upon the life-elements which lie around us the outward image of a Humanity lost in the Idea,—to this end only, whether conscious of it or not, that thereby future generations, even on awakening to life, may be surrounded by representations of what is excellent and worthy, and thus receive a sympathetic education of the outward sense, whereby an efficient preparation is made for the cultivation of the inward life;—and so, in this particular form, the Idea struggles towards itself, and labours for itself, as a Whole. Or, the same One Idea, in the form of Religion,—of the soaring of all Earthly Life and activity towards the One, Eternal, Ever-pure, Ever-good, Ever-blessed Source of Life,—what is it? What noble mind, thoroughly aware of the true character of the Earthly Life, and no longer attracted by it, could prevail upon itself to pursue this Life without that relation to the One, Eternal, and Abiding Life which Religion offers to its view? And thus it is again the One, Undivided Idea which in this form of Religion upholds itself and its final issues, and resolves the otherwise indissoluble contradictions between the feelings which it inspires and the burdens which it cannot help imposing. And so it is with every other form of the Idea which we have named, and with every other possible form;—the elucidation of which I must leave to your own reflection.

Thus, I said, does the One, Eternal, Self-comprehensive, Self-existent Idea roll forth in the undivided Stream of Time. And, I add, that in every individual moment of this Time-stream it comprehends and pervades itself, being throughout all Time eternally present to itself. What takes place in it at any moment of time, is now, only because the Past *has been*, and because the Future *Eternity shall be*. Nothing in this system is lost. Worlds produce

worlds, Ages produce new Ages, which stand in contemplation over those which have gone before, and bring to light the secret bond of connexion which unites causes and consequences within them. Then the grave opens,—not that which men heap together on the earth, but the grave of impenetrable darkness wherewith the first life has surrounded us,—and from out it arises the mighty power of Ideas, which sees in a new light the End in the Beginning, the Perfect in the Partial; every work however humble which springs from Faith in the Eternal is revealed, and the secret aspirations which are here imprisoned and bound down to earth soar upwards on unfettered pinions into a new and purer ether.

In one word: As when the breath of Spring enlivens the air the strong and fixed ice, which but a moment before imprisoned each atom within itself and shut up each neighbouring atom in similar isolation, now no longer maintains its rigid bondage but flows forth in one free, animated, and glowing flood; as the powers of Nature, which were before divided, and in their separation and antagonism produced only devastation and death, now rush together, embrace and interpenetrate each other, and in this free communion send forth a living balsam upon every sense; so does the Spirit-World not indeed *flow* together at the breath of Love, for in it there is no Winter, but there all *is* and *abides* in eternal communion with the mighty Whole. Nothing individual can live in itself or for itself, but all live in the Whole, and this Whole unceasingly dies for itself in unspeakable love, that it may rise again in new Life. This is the law of the spiritual world:—All that comes into existence falls a sacrifice to an eternally increasing and ascending Life; and this law constantly rules over all, without waiting for the consent of any. Here alone lies the distinction;—whether man allow himself to be led, with the halter round his head, like a beast, to the slaughter; or freely

and nobly bring his life a gift to the altar of the Eternal Life, in the full fore-enjoyment of the new Life which is to arise from his ashes.

So is it:—under this sacred Legislation, willing or unwilling, asked or unasked, we all stand;—and it is but a heavy fever-dream which weighs upon the brain of the Egoist when he thinks that he may live for himself alone, whereby he cannot change the nature of things, but only does himself a wrong. Might there some more gladdening dream from out the Infinite Silence at times refresh the slumberer in the cradle of Eternity!—might there, from time to time, prophetic whispers fall upon his ear, that there *is* a Light and a Day!

LECTURE V.

FARTHER DELINEATION OF THE THIRD AGE.

RETURNING from a digression through which we promised ourselves additional light upon our way, we resume the straight path of our inquiry. Let us once more cast a glance over the purpose of this inquiry as a whole.

It is the end of the Earthly Life of the Human Race to order all its relations with Freedom according to Reason. To do this with Freedom, with a Freedom of which the Race shall be conscious, and which it shall recognise as its own, presupposes a condition in which this Freedom had not yet appeared;—not that the relations of the Race have at any time not been ordered according to Reason, for in that case there could have been no Race; but only that this ordering has not been accomplished *by Freedom*, but by Reason as a blind power; that is, by Reason as *Instinct*. Instinct is *blind*; its opposite, Freedom, must therefore be *seeing*;—that is, must be a Knowledge of the laws of Reason according to which the Race is to order its relations by means of its own unconstrained activity and art. In order that the Race may be able to attain to Reason as Knowledge, and from thence to Reason as Art, it must in the first place set itself free from the blind dominion of Reason as Instinct. But far from having even a wish to free itself from this constraint, Humanity can-

not help loving it, in so far as it rules as an unconscious power within Humanity itself. Hence this constraint must, in the first place, assume the form of an External Authority, and impose itself on Humanity with outward compulsion and power, as the foreign Instinct of a few Individuals; against which External Authority, Humanity now rises in opposition and sets itself free — primarily from this External Authority itself, but, at the same time, from Reason also in the form of Instinct; and — since Reason has not yet appeared in any other form, — from Reason altogether.

From this principle we arrived at *five* great and only possible Epochs, exhausting the whole Earthly Life of the Human Race: — *First*, That in which human affairs are governed by Reason as Instinct without violence or constraint. *Second*, That in which this Instinct has become weaker, and now only manifests itself in a few chosen Individuals, and thereby becomes an External Ruling Authority for all the rest. *Third*, That in which this Authority is thrown off; and, with it, Reason in every shape which it has yet assumed. *Fourth*, That in which Reason in the shape of Knowledge appears among men. *Fifth*, That in which Art associates itself with Knowledge, in order to mould Human Life with a firmer and surer hand into harmony with Knowledge, and in which the ordering of all the relations of Man according to Reason is, by means of this Art, *freely* accomplished, the object of the Earthly Life attained, and our Race enters upon the higher spheres of another World.

We chose for the principal subject-matter of these discourses the characteristics of the *Third* of the Epochs above mentioned, in consequence of the opinion which we expressed that the Present Age stands in this Third Epoch: — of the correctness or incorrectness of which opinion we left you entirely to judge for yourselves.

This Third Epoch, as the declared foe of all blind Instinct

and of all Authority, takes this maxim as its motto:— ‘Accept nothing but what is understood,’—that is, understood immediately, and by means of the previously existing and hereditary Common Sense. Could we lay open the true nature of this Common Sense, which the Third Epoch assumes as the standard of all its thoughts and opinions, we should then have a clear analysis of its whole system of thought and opinion.

This also we have accomplished. Reason in whatever shape it reveals itself, whether as Instinct or as Knowledge, always necessarily embraces the Life of the Race *as a Race*;—Reason being thrown off and extinguished, nothing remains but the mere *individual, personal life*. Hence in the Third Age, which has set itself free from Reason, there is nothing remaining but this latter life; nothing, wherever the Age has thoroughly manifested itself and arrived at clearness and consistency, except pure, naked Egoism; and hence it naturally follows that the inborn and established Common Sense of the Third Age can be nothing else, and can contain nothing else, than the wisdom which provides for its personal well-being.

The *means* of the support and well-being of the personal life can only be discovered by Experience, since man has no direct guide thereto, either in an animal instinct such as the beasts possess; or in Reason which has for its object only the Life of the Race: and hence the assumption of Experience as the only source of knowledge is a characteristic trait of such an Age.

From this principle there arise further those views of Knowledge, of Art, of the Social Relations of Men, of Morality, and of Religion, which we have in like manner adduced as prevailing characteristics of such an Age.

In one word: the permanent and fundamental peculiarity and characteristic of such an Age is this,—that every genuine product of it thinks and does all that he actually thinks and does solely for himself and for his own peculiar

advantage;—just as the opposite principle, that of a Life according to Reason, consists herein,—that each Individual ought to devote his own personal life to the Life of the Race; or in other words,—as it afterwards appeared that the form in which this Life of the Race enters into consciousness and becomes an active power in the life of the Individual is called Idea,—that each Individual ought to place his personal life, and power, and all enjoyment thereof, in Ideas. In order to make clearer our farther characterization of the Third Age, by contrasting it with the Life according to Reason, we have in our last two lectures entered upon a delineation of this Life, and with respect to that matter, I have now only to add the following remarks:—

In the first place: Herein,—namely, in the distinction which we have pointed out between a life devoted to mere personal well-being, and a life devoted to the Idea,—lies the difference between the Life opposed to Reason and the Life according to Reason; and it is of no importance here whether, in the latter case, the Idea reveal itself in the obscurity of mere Instinct, as in the First Epoch; or be imposed by External Authority, as in the Second; or stand bright and clear in the fulness of Knowledge, as in the Fourth; or rule in the equally clear realization of Art, as in the Fifth;—and in this respect the Third Age does not stand opposed to *any one* of the others in particular; but, as being essentially and throughout contrary to Reason, it stands opposed to *all other* Time, as essentially and in substance in accordance with Reason though from Age to Age under various forms.

In the particular manifestations of the Idea, and its mode of working, which we have adduced in our last two lectures, it appears only in the form of Instinct; for we have there described only the Time which *precedes* the Third Age, which indeed first makes the existence of that Age possible,—and when Time in general has not yet advanced to the

manifestation of the Idea in clear consciousness. Let this distinction be henceforth kept in view to prevent misunderstanding.

Now should any one reject and repudiate our delineation of a mode of thought in which everything is dedicated to Ideas, as well as this mode of thought itself; should fret over it, attempt to decry it, and represent it as unnatural, (always to himself of course) and as a foolish fanaticism;—against such a repudiation we can do nothing, and would do nothing if we could. The more frequently, loudly, and openly this is done, the more thoroughly is there developed, and the more quickly will pass away a mode of thought through which humanity must necessarily pass; and, I may add, the more clearly does it appear that I have hit my mark. But I wish that this repudiation were honestly, openly, and unequivocally avowed; and in so far as it lies with me, I would remove every pretence behind which such a repudiation can take shelter while something else seems to occupy its place. In this way I desire to do everything and am conscious of having hitherto done everything in my power to take away the pretext that these discourses have not been thoroughly understood; and that if they were they would be at once assented to. These discourses still exist precisely as they were delivered: the meaning of the language, the sequence of thought, the definition of each individual thought by other thoughts,—upon which the clearness of a discourse depends,—all these things have their well-defined rules; and it may still be determined whether these rules have been followed; and I, for my own part, believe that I have said nothing but that precisely which I intended to say. A discourse, indeed, which undertakes really to say something must be heard from beginning to end and in all its parts. But when a man, let him hear as often as he will, at each new hearing still misconceives what is said;—in him there is no understanding at all, but only some empty husks of phrasology learned by rote, like chaff upon the granary

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floor. To make this clear by two examples selected at random: Should some one, for instance, with his head full of the unhappy, newly invented, confusion of language according to which every thought may, by a pleasant change of expression, be named *Idea*, and in which there is no objection to speaking of the *idea* of a chair or a bench;—should such an one wonder how so much importance is attached to the dedication of Life to *Ideas*, and how in this can be placed the characteristic distinction between two opposite classes of men, whereas everything which enters the mind of any human being is *Idea*; such an one has understood nothing at all of what we have hitherto said; but without any fault of ours. For we have not failed strictly to discriminate between *Conceptions* which, by means of Experience, find their way into the understanding of the mere sensuous man; and *Ideas* which, independent of all Experience, kindle into self-sustaining life in those who are inspired by them.

Or should any one be unable to get over a certain catch-word, brought into circulation, with others of the same kind of which it would be quite as difficult to give any rational account, by some conceited *bel esprit*,—the word Individuality—fair, lovely Individuality!—and with this understanding of the word, which may indeed be true in one sense, find himself unable to reconcile our unconditional rejection of all Individuality;—then such an one has not understood that by Individuality we mean only the personal, sensuous existence of the Individual, which is the true meaning of the word; and by no means deny, but rather expressly teach and inculcate, that the One Eternal *Idea* assumes a new and hitherto unknown form in each Individual in whom it comes to Life, and this by its own power and under its own legislation, and quite independently of physical nature:—consequently in no way determined thereto by the sensuous Individuality, but on the contrary abolishing such Individuality altogether, and of

itself alone moulding the Ideal Individuality, or, as it may be more properly called, Originality.

Finally, in this connexion let us add the following :—We by no means assume here the strict tone and compulsive form of demonstration ; but, in addressing open and unprejudiced minds, we have limited ourselves to the modest style of popular lectures, and to the moderate desire of holding intercourse with such minds in a convenient and becoming way. But should there be some one who loves to examine and judge upon more special grounds, and wishes to do so here ; then let it not be conceald from him that, notwithstanding our apparent superficiality, we have yet surrounded him with a chain of argument, which he may well consider and bethink himself what link of it he shall first attempt to break. Should he say,—‘All this devotion of Life to the realization of an Idea is a mere chimera to which we ourselves have given birth;’—then we have proved to him historically, that at all times there have been men who have led this Life in the Idea, and that all things great and good which now exist in the world, are the products of this Life. Or should he say,—‘Even if this has been so, this way of Life is an old folly and superstition, and our present enlightened Age is far above it;’—then we have shown that since he himself cannot refrain from admiring and reverencing, even against his will, such a mode of Life, there must lie at the bottom of this admiration and reverence a principle to this effect,—that the personal life *ought to be* dedicated to the Idea; and thus, by his own confession, such a mode of Life is approved by the voice of Reason immediately audible within us, and therefore is no superstition. Both these positions being cut off, there would remain no other course for him but to declare boldly that he has never discovered in himself any such specific feeling as that of admiration or reverence, and that it has never happened to him to reverence or respect anything;—and in this case he

would have entirely got rid of our premises and therefore of all their consequences; and we should then be perfectly satisfied with him.

In the extended picture of the Third Age which it is now my duty to present to you, I ought, perhaps, in the opinion of most of those who may have considered the matter, to proceed to a description of the relation of the Present Age to the several forms of the One Idea which I have set forth in the last lecture; and this plan I have approximately followed in the general characterization of the Age which is contained in the second lecture.

But I have already stated, and I now repeat, that the fundamental maxim of this Age is to accept nothing but that which it can understand:—the point upon which it takes its stand is thus a *conception*. It has also been already shown that it does not attain the Epochal character, and assume the rank of a separate Age, so long as it only blindly follows this maxim; but that it can then only be clearly understood when it recognises itself in this maxim, and accepts it as the Highest. Hence the distinctive and peculiar characteristic of this Age is this notion of conception, and it bears the *form* of Knowledge;—only the *empty form*, indeed, since that from which alone Knowledge derives its value, the Idea, is wholly wanting here. Hence, in order to get at the root of this Age, we must first speak of its system of Knowledge. In our description of this system, its views of the fundamental forms of the Idea, as necessary parts of the system itself, must likewise come into view.

In order to give you, in this place, a still more comprehensive glance of what you have now to expect, I add the following ground of distinction, to which I have not yet adverted. The maxim of the Age is to accept nothing but that which it can understand,—understand, that is to say, through the mere empirical conceptions of Experience;—

and, therefore, wherever the Age can establish itself in sufficient power and consistency, it sets up this maxim as its scientific principle, and by it estimates and judges every acquisition of knowledge. But it cannot fail that others, not so entirely under the rule of the prevailing spirit, but without having yet descried the morning-dawn of the new Age, must feel the infinite emptiness and platitude of such a maxim; and then, imagining that to get at the True we have only to reverse the False, are disposed to place all wisdom in the Incomprehensible and the Unintelligible. But since these too, with their whole mode of thinking, arise out of the Age, and are nothing but its reaction against itself; so, notwithstanding the antagonism of their principles, they as well as the others are products of the Age, and under other conditions would have been but the residue of a former Time; and he who would comprehend the Knowledge of the Age, must bring forward and investigate both principles:— as we shall do.

There is now only one more general remark with which I must preface our delineation, namely, the following:— Whether that which we call the Third Age is precisely our own, and whether the phenomena which I shall derive by strict deduction from the principle of this Age, are those which now exist before our eyes;—on this point I have more than once said I leave you to form your own judgment. But in case any one should desire to pass such a judgment, it is necessary to guard him against such reasoning as the following:—‘ Well, suppose that it cannot be denied that this is the case at present, yet it is by no means a feature peculiar to our Age, but may always have been so.’ With this view, when speaking of any phenomena of which this might by possibility be said, I shall call to your recollection Ages in which it was otherwise than it is now.

We commence the delineation of the scientific condition of the Third Age, by a description of its *form*,—that is, of the fixed and essential peculiarities which permeate its whole existence; and we trace these peculiarities in this way:—

When the Idea enters into life it creates an inexhaustible power and energy, and only from the Idea can such energy arise: an Age without the Idea must therefore be a weak and powerless Age; and all it does, all wherein it shows any sign of life, is accomplished in a languid and sickly manner, without any visible manifestation of energy. And, with respect to its pursuits,—since we are now in particular discoursing of Knowledge,—it is neither powerfully drawn towards any one subject, nor does it thoroughly penetrate any; but, impelled by a momentary caprice or other passion, one day to this and another day to that subject, it satisfies itself with glancing at some superficial Appearance, instead of penetrating to the inmost Truth. In its opinions on these subjects, such an Age is dragged here and there by the blind influence of association, consistent in nothing but in this universal superficiality and fickleness; and in its first principle,—that in this levity true wisdom consists. Not so with him who is animated by Knowledge in the form of the Idea. It has arisen upon him in one particular point of enquiry, and to this one point it holds his whole life and all its powers enchained, until it becomes perfectly clear to him and sheds forth a new light on the entire Universe of Thought. That such men have formerly existed, and that Knowledge has not always been prosecuted in such a shallow and feeble manner as that in which the Third Age must necessarily pursue it, is proved at least by the discovery of Mathematics among the ancients. Finally, in its communication of thought, whether in speech or in writing, the same mediocrity and feebleness are apparent. These communications never show forth an organic whole, with

all its parts proceeding from, and referred back to, one central point; but they rather resemble a cloud of sand in which each grain is a whole to itself, and which is only held together by the inconstant wind. It seems a master-stroke of invention in such an Age to hit upon the mode of communicating knowledge after the order of the letters of the alphabet. Hence its representations can never possess clearness; the want of which is supplied by a tiresome perspicacity amounting to nothing more than frequent repetition of the same thing. Wherever this Age attains to its full efficiency, this mode of communication even comes to understand itself and to represent itself as worthy of imitation; so that from thenceforward elegance is placed in neither giving the reader the trouble of thinking for himself, nor in any way calling forth his own independent activity, which indeed is considered obtrusive;—and the classical writings of the Age are those which every one may read without preparation, and peruse, and lay aside, and still remain exactly what he was before. Not so he who has Ideas to communicate and who is moved by Ideas to such communication. Not he himself speaks, but the Idea speaks, or writes, in him with indwelling power;—and that only is a good discourse wherein the speaker does not so much declare the thought, as the thought declares itself by the organ of the speaker. That such discourses have been delivered, at least in former times, and that it has not always been the fashion to avoid arousing independent thought in the mind of the hearer or reader, is proved by the writings which are left to us of classical antiquity; the study of which, indeed, and of the languages in which they are written, will be discountenanced and discarded by the Third Age wherever it acts consequentially,—in order that its own productions alone may be held in honour and esteem.

The Idea, and the Idea only, fills, satisfies, and blesses the mind:—an Age without the Idea must therefore neces-

sarily suffer from the consciousness of unsatisfied vacuity, which manifests itself in an infinite, unappeasable, constantly recurring weariness:—it must be wearied as well as wearisome. In this unpleasant state of feeling it grasps eagerly at that which seems its only remedy,—namely, Wit; either for its own gratification, or else to break, from time to time, the weariness which it is conscious of producing in others, and thus, in the long deserts of its seriousness, to sow here and there some grain of sport. This design must indeed of necessity fail, for he only is capable of Wit who is susceptible of Ideas.

Wit is the communication of profound Truth,—that is, of Truth belonging to the region of Ideas,—in its most direct and intuitive aspect. *In its most direct and intuitive aspect*, I say;—and in this respect Wit is the opposite of the communication of the same Truth in a chain of consecutive reasoning. When, for example, the philosopher separates an Idea, step by step, into its individual component parts; interprets each of these separate parts, one after the other, by means of some other conception which limits and defines it, and pursues this course until he has exhausted the whole Idea; then he proceeds in the way of methodical communication and proves indirectly the truth of his Idea. Should it happen, however, that he can at last encompass the whole Idea in its absolute unity with one single light-beam which shall, as with a lightning flash, illumine and reveal it, and penetrate each intelligent hearer or reader, so that he must at once exclaim, 'Yes, truly, so is it; now I see it at one glance;'—then is this the representation of the Idea in question in its most direct and intuitive aspect, or its expression by Wit; and in such a case by direct or positive Wit. Again, Truth may also be proved indirectly, by showing the folly and error of its opposite; and when this is done, not by methodical and gradual exposition, but in immediate and intuitive clearness, then this is indirect,

and, in relation to the Idea, negative Wit; exciting laughter in those to whom it is addressed:—it is Wit as the source of the Ridiculous; for Error in its direct and intuitive aspect is essentially ridiculous.

What this Age attempts to reach is not Wit in the first sense, of which even its theories are silent, but in the second,—namely, in the form of derision, and as exciting laughter;—laughter being a means pointed out by the instinct of Nature itself, for refreshing the mind exhausted by long-continued weariness, and in some measure enlivening its stagnation by the stirring emotion which it communicates. But even in this shape Wit remains necessarily inaccessible to this Age, for in order freely to perceive and represent Error in direct and self-evident clearness it is necessary to be oneself superior to Error. This Age has no Wit;—but rather it is often the object of Wit, and that most frequently when, in its own estimation, it is most witty;—i.e. it then manifests to the intelligent observer, in its own person, Folly and Error in their highest perfection; but without the slightest suspicion of doing so. He who, in order to paint the Age to the life, has put things into its mouth to which it often unexpectedly gives utterance with the greatest possible gravity,—he may securely call himself a Wit.

How then does the Third Age acquire its measure of the Ridiculous, and the kind of scoffing irony which serves it in place of Wit? Thus:—it sets it down as indisputable that *its* Truth is the right Truth; and whatever is contrary to that must be false. Should any one then take up the opposite position he is of course in error,—which is absurd: and hereupon it shows, in striking examples, how entirely different the opposite view is from its own, and that in no single point can they coalesce; which indeed may be true. This once laughed at, it readily finds those who will join the laugh, if it only apply to the right quarter. Assuming a scientific form, according to established custom, this

principle is soon understood and dogmatically announced; and it now appears as an axiom to this effect,—that '*Ridicule is the touchstone of truth,*' and consequently that anything may be at once recognised as false, without farther proof, if a jest can be raised at its expense,—in the manner indicated above.

Observe the immense advantages which an Age acquires through this, at first sight, insignificant discovery. In the first place, it is by this means established in secure possession of its own wisdom; for the Age will always be careful not to apply this test of the Ridiculous to its own Knowledge, nor to join in the laugh should others so apply it,—an application which is not at all impossible. It is thus spared the trouble of disproving what is brought against it, and has no more to do than to show how far this is from agreement with its own views, and from having hit the mark of its opinion; thus making its opponents ridiculous, and,—should it bring ill-humour in its train,—suspected and even hated. Finally, this laughter is in itself a pleasant and healthy recreation, by which the most oppressive ennui may frequently be dispelled.

No!—I speak to all here present without exception, in whom I believe that I speak not to members of the Third Age, with whom indeed I never wish to speak, nor to members of any other Age,—but of whom I suppose that they are with myself elevated above all Time, and are now looking down on this particular portion of it:—no, I say, Wit is a godlike spark, and never condescends to Folly. It dwells eternally with the Idea, and never quits its fellowship. In its first shape, it is the wonderful light-conductor in the Spiritual World, by which Wisdom spreads from the point on which she first alights until she reach and embrace all other points. In its second shape, it is the avenging lightning of the Idea, which seeks out every folly, even in the midst of its disciples, and surely strikes it to the

ground. Whether hurled by the hand of an individual with deliberate aim, or not so directed, it still, even in the latter case, reaches its object with the sure course of concealed and inevitable fate. Like the suitors of Penelope, who, when already beset with impending destruction, raved through the dim palace-halls of Ithaca, with frenzied laughter mocking their lugubrious aspects; so do these laugh with insensate mirth, for in their laughter the Eternal Wit of the World-Spirit laughs at them. We shall not grudge them this enjoyment, and we shall be careful not to take the bandage from their eyes.

LECTURE VI.

SCIENTIFIC CONDITION OF THE THIRD AGE.

THE principle of the Third Age,—that Age which we have undertaken to describe,—is now sufficiently apparent:—this, namely,—*to accept nothing whatever but that which it understands*. The Comprehensible is its highest Idea;—it is thus Scientific in its form; and any complete delineation of it must commence with a description of its Scientific position, because it here becomes most clear and intelligible to itself; and from this, its best defined point, all its other characteristics may most readily be deduced.

In our last lecture, we described this Scientific position in the first place as regards its *form*,—that is, by means of certain general and fundamental peculiarities which are visible in all its phenomena, and which spring directly from its essential characteristic—its incapacity for the Idea. The Idea, we said, was the source of all power; this Age must therefore necessarily be feeble and powerless:—the Idea was the source of a perennial satisfaction; this Age must therefore be conscious of an emptiness which it endeavours to supply by means of Wit, although this is unattainable by it. To-day we desire to present you with a concise description of this Scientific position itself as it actually exists.

In the first place, let me remark what I have already mentioned in passing on a previous occasion; but here de-

sire to enforce, and for the first time to apply:—Every possible Age strives to encompass and pervade the whole Race; and only in so far as it succeeds in doing this does it manifest the true character of an Age, since besides this Life of the Race there is nothing remaining but the phenomena of individual life.

So also the Third Age. It is in its nature an Age of Knowledge; and it must therefore labour and strive to raise all Mankind to this position. To this Age, Understanding, as the highest and decisive tribunal, possesses a value in itself; and indeed the highest value, determining all other value: hence men are esteemed only in so far as they readily receive or studiously acquire the Conceptions of the Understanding, and easily apply and clearly discriminate among them;—and all the efforts of the Age in the Culture of Mankind must be directed to this end. It matters not that individual voices may be heard from time to time exclaiming—'Act! act!—that is the business: what shall mere knowledge avail us!'—for either by such action is meant only another form of learning; or else those voices are but the reaction against itself of an Age dissatisfied with its own emptiness, of which we have already made mention in our last lecture: and by such a reaction this Age, in all its varied manifestations, is usually accompanied. In judging of this point, the decisive test is the Education which an Age bestows on the children of all classes, but particularly on those of the people. Is it found that, among all classes, the aim of such Education is that children should *know something*; and that, in particular among the people, the main object is that they should be enabled to read with facility, and, so far as it may be attainable, to write also; and generally, that they should acquire the Knowledge peculiar to the class on whom their Education devolves: as for example, where that Education is entrusted to the clerical body, that they should be well versed in

a systematic and tabular code of dogmatics under the name of a catechism ;—is this, I say, found to be so?—then experience makes good that which we have said. Should other maxims of popular Education here and there make their appearance, and even be in part carried out, this is but the reaction :—the former is the rule, without which indeed no reaction could take place.

It is impossible that these influences, directed upon the Age on all sides and from every quarter, should entirely fail of their purpose. Every individual, even the most insignificant and least cultivated, will in some measure acquire an independent consciousness and knowledge of himself; that is, since the enlightenment of the Age is throughout negative, he will by means of reflection raise himself above something which has been taught him in his youth, and will no longer be restrained by many things which before restrained him. And thus does man recognise himself as Man, attain to independent thought, and the whole Age transforms itself into a fixed camp of Formal Knowledge, —in which, indeed, many and various degrees of rank are to be found, but where each brings his contribution to the common armoury.

I trust that no one here will so far misunderstand what I have said, as to suppose that I unconditionally condemn the characteristics of this Age which we have now adduced, and thereby attach myself to a party which has already appeared in many shapes, and lately in that of Philosophy also, and which in every shape it has assumed has rightly borne the name of *Obscuranti*. Were the Knowledge of the Third Age Knowledge of the right sort, it should in that case deserve no blame for its striving to reach all men of every class. Rather do those representatives of the Age, who desire to retain their wisdom to themselves, and will not allow it to be spread forth among the masses, only exhibit their inconsistency on a new side. The Age which succeeds the Third,—that of True Know-

ledge,—will also strive to embrace all men, for if the Laws of Reason are to be made manifest by Art throughout the whole Race, every individual of the Race must possess at least a certain amount of knowledge of these Laws, since each individual must uphold, by his own private and individual conduct, the outward and public dominion of Reason in the Race, which again reacts in aid of individual effort. All without exception must sooner or later attain to Reason as Knowledge; therefore all without exception must first be set free from the blind faith in Authority. To accomplish this is the object of the Third Age, and in this it does well.

Understanding, I said, for its own sake possesses a value to this Age,—and indeed the highest value, determining all other value; and upon it is made to depend the dignity and worth of all personality. It is therefore an honour in the estimation of this Age, simply to have thought for oneself, provided only that something new has been brought forward, even although this originality may be merely an obvious perversion of Truth. This Age will never pronounce a final judgment; and by this judgment arrive at ultimate Truth, where it might then remain steadfast and for ever:—it is too faint-hearted to do this;—it only desires a treasury of materials for opinion, among which it may have the power of choice, should it at any time desire to form a judgment;—and therefore every one is welcomed who can increase this store. Thus it happens that individuals, not only without shame, but even with a certain self-satisfaction, step forth and proclaim—‘See, here is my opinion; this is the way in which I, for my part, conceive of this matter:—for the rest I willingly allow that others may think quite differently of it,’—and that these individuals even give themselves credit for an amiable modesty of spirit;—whereas, in the truly reasonable mode of thought, it is the greatest arrogance to suppose that our personal opinion is of any essential

value, and that any one can be interested in knowing how we, important personages as we are, look upon the matter; and before the tribunal of this mode of thought no one has a right to open his mouth before he is thoroughly satisfied that his speech shall be not of himself, but the utterance of the Pure Reason within him; and that therefore every one who comprehends him, and desires to maintain the rank of a reasonable being, will recognise his utterance as true and genuine.

Understanding, for its own sake, possesses the highest value for this Age:—this Understanding has therefore supreme Authority, and becomes the first and primitive Authority, limited by no other. Hence arises the all-ruling idea of Intellectual Freedom,—freedom of Scientific judgment and of public opinion. Let it be made manifest to a true son of this Age that what he has produced is absurd, ridiculous, immoral, and corrupt:—‘That is nothing,’ he replies; ‘I have thought it,—of my own self I have created it,—and thought of itself is always some merit for it costs some labour; and man must be at liberty to think what he pleases:’—and, truly, against this one can have nothing further to say. Let it be shown to another that he is ignorant of the very first principle of an Art or a Science upon the results of which he has pronounced at great length, and that the whole domain to which it belongs is quite beyond his knowledge:—‘Am I thereby tacitly to understand,’ he replies, ‘that I ought not to have exercised my judgment under these circumstances? Surely those who say this have no conception of the Freedom of Judgment which belongs of right to men of learning. If a man were in every case to study and understand that upon which he pronounces a judgment the unconditional Liberty of Thought would thereby be much limited and circumscribed; and there would be found exceedingly few who could venture to pronounce an opinion;—whereas the Freedom of Judgment consists

in this,—that every man may judge of all things whether he understands them or not!’ Has any one, in the circle of a few friends perhaps, allowed an assertion to escape him which it may be supposed he would not willingly see published to the world? In a week or two the printing press is at work to announce the remarkable fact to the world and to posterity. The journals take a part on one side and on the other, carefully investigating and inquiring whether the assertion was actually made or not, before whom was it made, what were the exact words employed, and under what conditions the offender may be dismissed in the meantime with a partial punishment, or else be irretrievably condemned. He must stand the brunt; and it will be well for him if, at the end of a few years, he find his business forgotten in some new affair. Let no man smile at this;—for thereby he will only show that he has no sense of the high value of Public Opinion. But should any one who is summoned before the tribunal of this Public Opinion dare to despise its authority, then total perplexity takes possession of the minds of its representatives, and to the end of their lives they gaze in profound astonishment at the man who has had courage sufficient to scorn their jurisdiction. They have of a truth thought this which they say;—at least they have assumed the air of having thought it. How then can any reasonable man refuse to pay them that respectful submission which is their due?

The right to raise itself in thought to the conception of the Laws of Reason, free from all constraint of outward authority, is indeed the highest, inalienable right of Humanity:—it is the unchangeable vocation of the Earthly Life of the Race. But no man has a right to wander recklessly about in the empty domain of unsettled Opinion; for such a course is directly opposed to the distinctive character of Humanity, i.e. to Reason. Neither would any Age have such a right, were it not that this unsettled

hovering between authority and mere emptiness is a necessary step in the progress of our Race, whereby it may first be set free from blind constraint, and then be impelled towards Knowledge by the oppressive sense of its own vacuity. Let these men, then, with their pretensions about unlimited Freedom of Thought and unrestrained Public Opinion, make what demands they please; and let no man hinder them from degrading themselves as far, and making themselves as ridiculous, as they please;—this must be permitted them. And who should desire to hinder them? Not the State,—at least no State that understands its own interest. The State has charge of watching over the outward actions of its citizens, and ordering these actions by means of imperative laws which, if they are rightly adapted to the nation and imposed without distinction upon all, must, without danger of failure, secure and maintain the order which is contemplated. The opinions of the citizens are not actions;—let these opinions be even dangerous, still if crime is sure of its threatened punishment it will be suppressed despite of opinion. The State may either attempt to change the opinions of its citizens for its own advantage:—and in this case it partly undertakes a thing which it cannot accomplish, and partly shows that its laws are not adapted to the existing condition of the nation to which this system of opinion belongs; or, that the governing power is inadequate, and, being unable to trust to its own resources, needs the aid of a foreign power which yet it cannot incorporate with itself. Or, the State may attempt,—perhaps with the purest intentions, and from the warmest zeal on the part of its administrators for the advancement of the dominion of Reason,—it may attempt to combat the prevailing opinions by means of external power;—and in this case it undertakes a thing in which it can never succeed, for all men feel that it then takes the form of injustice, and the persecuted opinion, being thus to a cer-

tain extent put in the right, gains new friends by the injustice which it suffers, and by this conviction of the justice of its cause acquires a stronger power of opposition; and the matter ends by the State being obliged to yield, whereby it once more shows only its own weakness. In like manner, neither will the few worshippers of True Knowledge hinder these advocates of unrestricted license. They have no power to do so; and if they had, they would not desire to use it. Their weapons are no other than the forces of Reason; their wishes for the world no other than that these forces should make their way by means of free conviction. Whatever they say is to be clearly understood as true and as alone true: nothing they say is to be learned by rote and accepted in faith and trust; for then would Humanity be only brought back again to bondage, and subjected to a new authority; and instead of the desired progress there would be only a retreat in a new direction. Could these men comprehend it, they would no doubt acknowledge its truth;—for we do not charge them with the baseness which disavows its own conviction of better things. But precisely because they do not comprehend it they are what they are; and so must they remain so long as they do not comprehend it:—since they are once for all what they are, it is impossible for them to become anything else;—and they must be endured, as integral parts of an unchangeable and necessary order of things.

This mode of thought, I said before, will strive to spread itself universally; and in certain masses of the Human Race it will succeed in this, and with them the whole Age will become a camp of mere Formal Knowledge. Who rules in this camp, and leads on its armies?—‘Clearly,’ it will be answered, ‘the Heroes of the Age; the champions in whom the Spirit of the Time has most gloriously revealed itself.’ But who are these, and by what marks are they to be recognised? Perchance by the importance of the researches

which they set on foot, or the truth which radiates from their doctrines, and enlightens all men? How were that possible, when the Age passes no judgment whatever upon the importance or truth of anything, but only collects a store of opinions as materials for a future judgment? Thus he who only announces an opinion, and thereby brings his contribution to the great magazine of general speculation, in this way qualifies himself to be a leader of the host. But, as we have already observed, there is no preëminence to be attained in this Age; for every one who breathes its atmosphere, has at one time or another swelled the general store of opinion by producing some conception of his own. Unfortunately a disaster often befalls this fertile capacity of thought;—this, namely,—that the opinion which bears universal sway in the evening is in the morning forgotten by all the world, even by its own prolific inventor;—and so this new contribution to the treasures of the Age vanishes into thin air. But should a method be discovered by which this fact of an opinion having been announced, as well as the opinion itself in so far as this latter may be possible, should be firmly established and protected against the next morning's breeze, so that all who are blessed with sound eyesight might be distinctly advertised that an opinion had been ushered into the world, and the thinker himself be provided with a safeguard against forgetting what he has thought;—if, for example, the arts of Writing and Printing were discovered then should the Age be delivered from its perplexity. Then he whose opinions stood permanently recorded by means of ink and paper should belong to the Heroes of the Age, the sublime phalanx of whom constitutes a community of votaries of Knowledge, or, as they better love to be called,—their whole being resting only on empiricism,—a Republic of Letters.

In this view the Age is by no means disturbed by the consideration that the admission into this glorious senate of humankind is usually effected through the nearest printer,

whose knowledge of what he prints is even less than that of the writer as to what he writes, and whose only desire is to exchange his own printed paper for that of others.

In this way the Republic of Letters is brought together. By means of the printing press it is separated from the masses who do not print anything, and whose position in the camp of Formal Knowledge is that of Readers only. Hence arise new relations and connexions between these two principal sections of the camp of Formal Knowledge.

The first purpose of printing is obviously to announce publicly to all the world the independence of mind possessed by the Author;—from this arises, in *Science*, a straining after new or seemingly new opinions; and in *Literature*, a struggling after new forms. He who has attained this end, gains the favour of his Reader, whether or not, in the one case, his *opinion* be true; or, in the other, his *form* be beautiful. But when the printing press has thoroughly come into play even this novelty is laid aside, and mere printing, for its own sake alone, becomes a merit;—and then arises, in *Science*, the tribe of *compilers*, who give to the world what has been given to it a hundred times before, only with some slight transposition of its parts; and in *Literature*, the *fashionable author*, who continues to repeat a form which has already been so long employed by others or by himself, that at last no man can discover anything good in it.

This stream of Literature now flows forth, constantly renewing itself; each new tide displacing its forerunner; so that the purpose originally contemplated in printing is frustrated, and the hope of immortality by means of the press destroyed. It matters not to have brought forth one's opinion in open print, unless one also possess the art to continue so to do unceasingly:—for all that is Past is soon forgotten. Who is there that shall bear it in memory? Not the Author as such: for since each strives after

something new, no one listens to another, but each goes his own way, and promulgates his own conceptions. Not the Reader: for he, glad to be done with the old, flies to the newest comers, in choosing among whom he is for the most part guided by mere chance. In these circumstances no one who commits his lucubrations to the press, can be sure that any one, except himself and his printer, shall know anything of the matter. Hence it becomes indispensably necessary to set on foot and establish some public and general record or memorial of Literature. Such are the literary Journals and Magazines, which once more make known what it is which the Author has made known, and by means of which an Author is enabled to repeat, even after the lapse of half a year, what he has said already; and a similar opportunity is afforded to the reading public to learn what he has said, if they read the Journals. But it would not accord with the dignity of the authors of these publications, and would place them too far below other writers, if they only conveyed this intelligence of the thoughts of others; they must therefore, while reporting their information, also assert their own independence by discussing these thoughts and announcing their own opinion thereon;—the leading maxims in this business being the following:—that the Reviewer shall always find something to censure; and that he knows everything better than the original Author.

With such writings as commonly appear this is of little moment; for it is no great misfortune that something which is bad at first should be made worse by the new treatment of the Reviewer. Writings which really deserve to see the light, whether in the department of Science or that of Literature, are ever the expression of a Life wholly devoted to the Idea in some new and original form; and until such writings have seized upon the Age, and penetrated it, and fashioned it after their own thought, no judgment of them is

possible: and therefore it is obvious that no thorough and comprehensive Review of such works, even by the ablest critic, can be produced in a half or even in a whole year. It is of course understood that the ordinary critics do not make this distinction, but unhesitatingly seize upon all that comes under their notice without discrimination; and also that the same judgment is pronounced upon truly original works, as upon the most thoroughly worthless productions. But even this fault is no misfortune except to themselves; for nothing really good is lost in the stream of Time:—how long soever it may lie defamed, misunderstood, and disregarded, the day at length arrives when it breaks its way through such hindrances and comes forth into light. But any one who should feel aggrieved by such perverted views of his writings,—who should vex himself at such attacks, instead of compassionately laughing at them, would only show thereby that his opponent had a certain amount of truth on his side,—that his own individual personality had not yet wholly disappeared in the Idea, and in the Knowledge and Love of Truth;—that therefore this personal feeling may indeed have shown itself in his work, and that the more offensively, the purer the expression of the Idea with which it is associated:—and such an one receives thereby the most urgent and impressive summons to retire within his own soul and to purify himself. ‘Do they regard this matter falsely?’—thinks he who is pure within himself:—‘it is to their prejudice, not mine; and that they do regard it falsely, is not the fault of an evil will but of a feeble vision;—they themselves would be glad indeed were it possible for them to come to the truth.’—Finally it is to be noticed as an advantage arising from the creation of the critic species, that he who has no great pleasure in reading, or has not much time to devote to that purpose, no longer requires to read books; but by mere reference to the literary Journals finds the whole Literature

of the Age brought within his grasp;—and in this way, indeed, it may be said that books are only printed in order that they may be reviewed; and there would no longer be any need for books, if Reviews could be fabricated without them.

Such is the portraiture of the active section of this camp of Formal Knowledge;—namely, the Authora. After their image, the passive or receptive section,—the body of Readers—fashions itself, that it may become their exact counterpart. As the former write on, without rest or intermission; so do the latter read on, without rest or intermission,—straining every nerve to keep their head above the flood of Literature, and, as they call it, to advance with the Age. Glad to have hurried through the old they eagerly grasp at the new, while the newest already makes its appearance; and not a single moment remains for them ever to revert to the old. They can by no means stop themselves in this restless career in order to consider what they read;—for their business is pressing, and time is short:—and so it is left wholly to chance what and how much of their reading may stick to them in this rapid transit, how it may influence them, and what spiritual form it may assume.

This custom of reading for its own sake is specifically different from every other habit of mind; and, having something about it in the highest degree agreeable, it soon becomes an indispensable want to those who once indulge in it. Like other narcotic remedies, it places those who use it in the pleasant condition betwixt sleeping and waking, and lulls them into sweet self-forgetfulness without calling for the slightest exertion on their part. It has always appeared to me to have the greatest resemblance to tobacco-smoking, and to be best illustrated by that habit. He who has once tasted the delights of this condition will desire continually to enjoy them, and will devote himself to nothing else: he now reads even without regard to the

knowledge of Literature, or to advancing with his Age; but with this view only, that he may read, and reading live;—and so represents in his person the character of the pure *Reader*.

At this point Authorship and Readership both reach their end; they disappear in themselves, the final result being its own extinction. To the pure Reader, as we have described him, there is no longer any instruction in his reading, nor does he derive any clear conceptions from it; for any printed production forthwith lulls him into listless repose and placid self-forgetfulness. Besides, all other means of instruction are cut off from him. Hence verbal communication, by continuous discourse or scientific conversation, possesses infinite advantage over the mere dead letter. Writing was only practised by the Ancients in order to convey such spoken instruction to those who had not access to the speaker; everything that was written had in the first place been verbally communicated, and was but a copy of the spoken discourse: only among the Moderns, and particularly since the invention of printing, has this method of intercourse claimed recognition for its own sake; whereby style, among other things, having lost the living corrective of speech, has fallen to ruin. But even for spoken communication, a Reader such as we have described is from the first wholly unfit.

How could such an one, habitually given up to absolute passivity, understand the bearings of a connected discourse, which demand an active effort of the mind to lay hold of and retain them? How could he, were the discourse broken up into periods, as every good discourse ought to be,—how could he combine the separate periods together, and review them as a whole? If he could have them put before his eyes in black and white,—then, he thinks, his difficulty should be removed. But he deceives himself. Even in that case, he would not

mentally comprehend the unity of the discourse, but would only, through his eye, embrace the extent of it included within his range of vision, hold this fast upon the paper and by means of the paper;—and then imagine that he had comprehended it.

Arrived at this point, I said, the scientific effort of the Age has destroyed itself! and the Race stands in absolute impotence on the one side, and in absolute incapacity on the other, for farther cultivation:—the Age can no longer read, and therefore all writing is in vain. Thus it is high time to begin something new,—and, in my opinion, this something should be, on the one side, to return to the method of spoken discourse, and to cultivate proficiency in this Art;—and on the other, to acquire the requisite capacities for appreciating this form of communication.

If reading is still to be practised, it should at least be in another way than is customary now. In order that I may follow up the repulsive description which I have had to bring before you to-day, with something more pleasing, allow me to say what mode of reading I hold to be the right one.

Whatever ought to be read in print, is either a work of Science, or a product of Literature: whatever is neither of these, and is without relation to one or other of them, is much better unread, and might as well have remained unwritten.

In the first place, with respect to works of Science:—The first object of reading them is to understand them, and to apprehend historically the true meaning of the Author. To do this, we must not passively resign ourselves to our Author, and suffer him to mould us as chance or fortune may direct; or accept at once whatever dicta he may choose to propound, and so depart, and get these by rota. But as the Experimentalist subjects Nature to his interrogatories, and compels her not to speak at random but to reply to

the questions which he puts to her; so is the Author to be subjected to a skilful and well-considered experiment by the Reader. This experiment is made in the following way. After a cursory perusal of the whole book, with the view of obtaining beforehand a general conception of the Author's design, the Reader ought to turn to the first leading principle, period, or paragraph, as the case may be. This is necessarily, even with respect to the purpose of the Author, only to a certain extent defined—in other respects undefined;—were it already completely defined, then were the book at an end, and there were no need for the continuation, the only purpose of which is, that therein what still remains undefined, may gradually be brought to light. Only in so far as this principle is defined, is it intelligible; in so far as it is undefined, it as yet remains unintelligible. These separate portions, the Intelligible and the Unintelligible, the reader sets clearly before himself in the following way. 'The subject of which this Author treats is, in itself, and independently of the Author, definable in this way, and in this.' The more completely the various possible modes of defining the conception are understood beforehand, the better are we prepared. 'Of these different ways of defining his subject, the Author in his first principle touches only this, and this; and thus defines his subject only in such and such respects, as distinguished from the other modes of defining it which are also possible. So far only is he intelligible to me. But he leaves his principle undefined in this, and this, and this respect; how he may view it on these sides, I know not as yet. I stand fast in an intelligible position, surrounded by a distinctly recognised circle of what is as yet unintelligible. How the Author may think upon these points, provided he has not declared it at once, will be seen from the way in which he follows up the principle he has laid down; the use which he makes of his admitted propositions will reveal this. Let me read further

until the Author more fully declare himself: by this new definition, a portion of the former indefiniteness certainly disappears; the clear point is extended, the sphere of the Unintelligible is narrowed. Let me make this new acquisition of the Intelligible thoroughly distinct to myself, and impress it on my mind, and read on until the Author declare himself anew;—and so on in the same way until the sphere of the Undefined and the Unintelligible has wholly disappeared in the general mass of light, and I can re-create for myself the whole system of the Author's thought in any order that may be desired, and from any selected point deduce all its other forms.' And in order that he may strictly watch over himself during this examination of his Author, and also in order that what has once become clear and distinct may not again be lost, it would even be advisable that he should undertake this whole operation pen in hand, although it should be necessary, as at first might well be the case, to devote twenty written sheets to a single printed one. Any lamentation over the loss of paper were here out of place;—only let him take care that this paper do not hastily find its way to the press under the name of a commentary! This commentary, as proceeding from the amount of culture which he has brought to the study of his Author, is still a commentary for himself only: and every one who truly desires to understand the matter would require to practise the same operation upon his commentary. Let him rather, as is more becoming, leave others to perform upon the original Author the same operation for themselves which he himself has had to do.

It is obvious that in this way a writer may often be much better understood by another than by himself, particularly when the Reader sets out from a clearer conception than his Author. '*Hers* he gets involved in his own reasoning,—*there* he makes a false conclusion,—*elsewhere* fitting utterance is denied him, and he writes

down something wholly different from what he wishes to express;—what is that to me? I know *how* he ought to have proceeded, and *what* he would have said, for I have penetrated his whole thought. These are the failings of human weakness, which, when united with true merit in the subject itself, no honourable mind will reprove.'

It is also clear, that by this mode of reading it may soon be discovered when the Author is not master of the Science of which he aspires to write, and is ignorant of the extent to which it has already been cultivated; or when he is only a bewildered dreamer. In both cases his book may be quietly laid aside: it will not be necessary to read it further.

And in this way, the first object,—the understanding and historical recognition of the Author's meaning,—is attained. Whether this meaning be consistent with Truth,—to ascertain which is the second purpose of reading,—will be very easily determined after such a searching study as we have described; if, indeed, a judgment upon this latter point has not already been formed during the study itself.

In the second place, with respect to the reading of a Literary work:—The sole purpose of such reading is, that the Reader may partake of the inspiration, elevation, and culture of mind which the work may be designed to communicate. For this purpose, mere passive self-abandonment is all that is requisite; for it is not the business of every man to penetrate to the source of æsthetic pleasure, or even to trace its operations in individual cases. Art summons all men to the enjoyment, but only a few to the use, or even to the knowledge, of her secrets. But in order that a work of Art may even come into contact with our minds, and we ourselves enter into communion with it, it must first of all be understood;—that is, we must thoroughly comprehend the purpose of

the Artist, and what it is which he desires to communicate to us by his work, and be able to reproduce this purpose, as the pervading spirit of the whole work, out of all its parts, and again to deduce these from the purpose which created them. Still, this is not the work itself, but only the prosaic part of it;—that only which, in the contemplation of the work from this point of view, lays hold of and penetrates us with irresistible power, is the Truth of Art:—but still we must first possess this introductory knowledge, this comprehension of the work in its organic unity, before we are capable of its enjoyment. This organic unity indeed, like all works of Genius, still remains infinite and inexhaustible, but it is no mean pleasure to have approached it, although only at a distance. We may return to our common occupations, and forget this glorious revelation; but it will abide secretly in our souls, and gradually develop itself there unknown to us. After a time we will return to our work, and see it under another form; and thus it shall never become old to us, but with every new contemplation assume a new life before us. We shall no longer desire something new, for we shall have discovered the means of transforming even the oldest into fresh and living originality.

What this organic unity of a work of Art, which is before all things to be understood and comprehended, really is,—let no one ask to whom it is not already known, and whose own thoughts I have not either repeated, or at least given clearer utterance to, in what I have already said. With regard to the unity of a *Scientific* work, I could make myself quite clear to you, and I think that I have done so; not so with respect to the unity of a work of *Art*. At all events, the unity of which I speak is not that unity of its plot, and coherence of its parts, and its probability, and psychological value, and moral instructiveness, which are prated of in the common theories, and by the common critics of Art:—vain chatter of barbarians who wilfully

belie the true feeling of Art in themselves, to other barbarians who belie it at second hand!—the unity of which I speak is another than this,—and is best made known to those who have not yet attained to it by examples, and by actual analysis and comprehension of existing works of Art in the spirit which we have described. Would that a man could be found who would work out this high advantage for humanity, and thereby rekindle in young minds the almost extinguished sense of Art!—such an one, however, must not himself be young, but a thoroughly tried and mature man. Until this come to pass, others may quietly refrain from the reading and study of those existing products of Art which by reason of their infinite depth are unintelligible to them, and the enjoyment of which, since enjoyment presupposes an understanding of them, is also shut off from their participation. They will find it to far better account to content themselves with Artists of another class, who take the favourite tendencies, weaknesses, and amusements of the Age under their protection; and so crowd together, within a brief season of enjoyment, what all men crave, and even actually experience, in life, although unfortunately not without frequent interruptions. And so it shall be in reality, henceforward as hitherto, whether we have accorded it our sanction or not.

LECTURE VII.

EARLIER CONDITIONS OF THE SCIENTIFIC OR LITERARY
WORLD, AND ITS IDEAL CONDITION.

THERE are two objections which may be anticipated to such descriptions as have been presented to you in my last lecture, and which require consideration :—*First*, that everything we have adduced may indeed exist in Human Nature generally, but not in the constitution of any particular Age; and hence may chance to be found in all Times: *Second*, that the whole view is one-sided;—that we have only adduced whatever is defective in the Age, and set it in an unfavourable light, but have passed over in silence the good which is nevertheless to be found in it. The former objection may be best met by recalling to mind Ages in which it has been otherwise than we have described, and showing historically how, and by what causes, the present state of things has arisen. The latter objection cannot affect us, if we only keep in mind the nature and purpose of our present undertaking. We have asserted nothing whatever upon the ground of experience, but on the contrary, have deduced the different elements of our description from principle alone. If our deduction has been correct and rigid, we have no occasion to inquire whether these things are so in present reality or not. Are they not so?—then we do not live in the *Third* Age. The sufficient

justification of our description—that these phenomena constitute a real stage in the progress of Humanity, which our Race must of necessity pass through;—this has not been denied. We must also keep in view the general remark made in an early portion of these lectures, that the elements of very different Ages may often be found coëxistent in the same period of chronological time, and may intermingle or cross each other; and in accordance with this remark, our case may be thus stated:—We have not taken up empirically the literary condition of *our own Time*, as such; but we have put together a philosophical picture of that of the *Third Age*:—it was this which we had to make out, and not its opposite; and it was of it alone that we undertook to speak. If in the same period of Time there are found other elements, then these are either the remnants of a Past or the forecasts of a Future Age;—neither of which we are now called upon to notice.

Nevertheless, to guard ourselves in every possible way against misconception, and particularly against that most hateful of all misconceptions,—that we have denied everything good which exists in our Age,—and also in order to make a distinct and complete separation of whatever belongs to different Ages,—it will be proper to show in the latter respect, how the Scientific world *ought to be* constituted. Both of these questions,—the last which we have mentioned, as well as the first,—we shall consider in this day's discourse.

In the first place:—we have to show that the state of literature has not always been such as we have described in our last lecture; and to declare how it has now become so. Among the two classical nations of antiquity with which we are best acquainted, the Greeks and Romans, there was much less written and read than among ourselves; while, on the contrary, there was much more spoken, and vocal discourse was much more carefully

cultivated. Almost all their writings were in the first place delivered in speech, and were thus only copies of spoken discourses for the use of those who could not themselves be present at their delivery; and from this circumstance arises, amongst other advantages, the great superiority of the Ancients over the Moderns in respect of style, since, among the latter, written productions claim a peculiar value for themselves, and, for the most part, want the corrective of living speech. Among the Ancients there existed no particular interest in spreading scientific culture among the people;—the culture in which they actually participated was chiefly accidental and more a culture of Art than of Science.

Christianity appeared in the world and there arose an entirely new interest in general cultivation,—for the sake of Religion to which all men were now called. There are in our opinion two very different forms of Christianity:—the one contained in the Gospel of John, and the other in the writings of the Apostle Paul; to which latter party the other Evangelists for the most part, and particularly Luke, belong. The Johannean Jesus knows no other God than the True God, in whom we all are, and live, and may be blessed, and out of whom there is only Death and Nothingness; and he appeals, and rightly appeals, in support of this Truth, not to reasoning, but to the inward practical sense of Truth in man,—not even knowing any other proof than this inward testimony. ‘If any man will do the will of Him who sent me, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God?’—such is his teaching. As to its historical aspect, his doctrine is to him as old as the creation,—it is the first and primitive Religion;—Judaism, on the contrary, as a corruption of later times, he unconditionally and unsparingly rejects:—‘Your father is Abraham; mine is God,’—he says to the Jews;—‘Before Abraham was, I am;—Abraham rejoiced to see my day, and he saw it, and was glad.’

This latter assertion,—that Abraham saw Jesus' day,—refers without doubt to the occasion when Melchizedek, the Priest of THE MOST HIGH GOD,—(which Most High God is expressly opposed, throughout the whole first chapter of the first book of Moses, to the subordinate and creating God Jehovah)—when, I say, this Priest of the Most High God blessed Abraham, the servant of Jehovah, and took tithes from him; from which latter circumstance the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews very fully and acutely proves the greater antiquity and superior rank of Christianity over Judaism, and expressly calls Jesus a Priest after the order of Melchizedek, and thus represents him as the restorer of the Religion of Melchizedek;—without doubt entirely in the sense of that peculiar revelation of Jesus which is given by John. In this Evangelist it remains wholly doubtful whether or not Jesus was of Jewish origin at all;—or if he were, what was his descent and parentage. Quite otherwise is it with Paul, by whom, even from the commencement of a Christian Church, John has been superseded. Paul, having become a Christian, would not admit that he had been in the wrong in having been once a Jew; both systems must therefore be united, and fitly accommodate themselves to each other. This is brought about in the following way, as indeed it could not easily have been effected in any other:—He sets out from the powerful, angry, and jealous God of Judaism; the same whom we have already depicted as the God of the whole Ancient World. With this God, according to Paul, the Jews had made a Covenant;—this was their advantage over the Heathen. During the existence of this Covenant they had but to keep the Law, and they were justified before God; that is, they had no farther evil to fear from him. By the murder of Jesus, however, they had broken this Covenant; and since that time it no longer availed them to keep the Law. On the contrary, since the death of Jesus,

a New Covenant came into operation, to which both Jews and Heathen were invited. According to this New Covenant, both had only to acknowledge Jesus as the promised Messiah, and were thereby justified; as the Jews had been justified before the death of Jesus by the keeping of the Law. Christianity became a New Testament or Covenant, existing now for the first time, and abolishing the Old Testament or Covenant. Now, indeed, it was necessary that Jesus should become a Jewish Messiah, and be made a son of David, that the prophecies might be fulfilled;—genealogies were discovered, and a history of his birth and of his childhood,—which, however, in both the shapes in which they appear in our canon, strikingly enough contradict each other. I do not say that in Paul, generally, true Christianity is not to be found: when he is not directly engaged with the great problem of his life,—the intercalation of the two systems,—he speaks so justly and so excellently, and knows the True God of Jesus so truly, that we seem to listen to another man altogether. But wherever he treats of his favourite theme, it is as we have stated it above.

The immediate consequence of this Paulinean system;—a system which undertook to remove the objections raised by the disputatious reasonings of the Jews;—(the first principle of which reasonings, *i.e.* that Judaism was once the True Religion,—which is wholly denied by the Johannean Jesus,—is in the Paulinean system not only not denied but fully asserted:)—I say, that the immediate and necessary consequence of such a system was that it should itself appeal to argumentative reasoning as its judge;—and indeed, since Christianity is addressed to all men,—that it should appeal to the reasoning of all men. And so did Paul in reality;—he reasoned and disputed with the pertinacity of a master; and gloried in having taken captive—*i.e.* convinced—all minds. Thus the Understanding was already to him the highest Authority, and

it necessarily assumed this position in a system of Christianity of which Paul was the author. But by this means the way was already prepared for the ruin of Christianity. 'You have challenged me to reason;—I, with your good leave, will reason for myself. You have indeed tacitly taken it for granted that my reasoning cannot issue in any result different from your own; but should it fall out otherwise, and I should arrive at some wholly opposite conclusion,—as will unquestionably happen should I proceed upon some other prevalent philosophy,—then must I prefer my own conclusions to yours, and that too with your own approval, if you are consistent with your own teaching.' Such liberty was very assiduously cultivated in the first centuries of the Christian Church, and arguments without end were carried on respecting dogmas which owed their origin wholly to the Paulinean scheme of Mediation; and there arose in the One Church the greatest possible variety of opinions and disputes;—all proceeding upon the maxim that the Understanding is the Supreme Authority:—and this scheme of Christianity, I may once for all term Gnosticism. But in this way it was impossible to preserve the unity of the Church; and since all parties were equally far from discovering the true source of the evil in the original departure from the simplicity of Christianity for the purpose of gaining the good graces of Judaism, there was nothing left but a very heroic expedient; this, namely, to forbid all farther thought, and to maintain that, by a special providence of God, the Truth was deposited in the Written Word and the existing Oral Traditions, and must be believed whether it was understood or not;—and as any farther interpretation of those infallible sources of Truth which might be necessary rested with the Church at large, or with a majority of the voices of the Church, it followed that the statutes in which this interpretation was contained demanded a faith as unconditional as the

original media themselves. Henceforward all invitations on the part of Christianity to individual thought and conviction were at an end: on the contrary, such thought became a forbidden enterprise, visited with all the punishments of the Church; so that he who could not abandon it must pursue it at his own peril.

In this condition the matter remained for a long time, until the Reformation broke forth;—the Art of Printing, the most important instrument of this Reformation, having been previously discovered. This Reformation was as far removed as the original self-constituted Church from perceiving the true ground of the degeneration of Christianity; it remained at one with the Church in its rejection of Gnosticism, and in its demand for unconditional Faith even without Understanding;—only it directed this Faith towards another object; rejecting the Infallibility of Oral Tradition and of the Decrees of Councils, and taking its stand upon that of the Written Word. The inconsistency of this position,—that the Authenticity of this Written Word itself rested upon Oral Tradition and upon the Infallibility of the Councils who collected and fixed our Canon,—was overlooked. And thus, for the first time in the world, a *Written Book* was formally installed as the highest Standard of Truth and the only Teacher of the way of Salvation.

Out of this Book, thus elevated to be the sole criterion of Truth, the Reformers combated whatever flowed from the other two sources of belief; thus obviously reasoning in a circle, and ascribing to their opponents a principle which they disowned; these asserting that without Oral Tradition and the Decrees of the Church it is impossible to understand the Scriptures of which they contain the only authentic interpretation. In this position of their cause, and its absolute untenableness for an *educated* public who were acquainted with the points at issue, they had no course remaining open to them except an appeal to the *people*.

For them, therefore, the Bible had to be translated into the vulgar tongues, and thus placed in their own hands; and they had to be called upon to read and to judge for themselves, whether that which the Reformers found in the Scriptures is not clearly contained therein. These means could not but succeed. The people were flattered by the privilege conferred upon them, and eagerly availed themselves of it on every opportunity; and by means of this principle, indeed, the Reformation would certainly have spread over the whole of Christian Europe, had not the authorities set themselves against it, and hit upon the only certain antidote to its progress; i.e. to prevent the Protestant translations of the Bible, and the other writings of the Reformers, from falling into the hands of the people.

It was only through this zeal for Christianity, as represented by the Bible, which Protestantism called forth, that the printed *letter* acquired the high and universal value which it has possessed since the Reformation: it became the almost indispensable means of salvation; and without being able to read, a man could no longer, properly speaking, be a Christian, or be tolerated in any Christian and Protestant State. Hence the prevailing notions on the subject of popular education; hence the universality of reading and writing. We need not be surprised that the primary object,—Christianity,—was afterwards forgotten, and that what was at first only the means became in itself the end: this is the common fate of all human arrangements after they have endured for any length of time.

This abandonment of the end for the means was more particularly promoted by a circumstance which, for other reasons, we cannot leave untouched. The Old Church, wherever she was enabled to maintain herself against the first assaults of the Reformation, soon discovered new means of defence, whereby she was relieved from all

dread of the new power; and this the more easily that Protestantism itself placed these means in her hands. There soon arose, namely, in the bosom of the latter, a new Gnosticism; bearing indeed the form of Protestantism and taking its stand on the Bible, but, like the old Gnosticism, maintaining the principle that the Bible must be interpreted by Reason; that is, by such Reason as these Gnostics themselves possessed;—and they were just so far reasonable as the worst of all philosophical systems, that of Locke, enabled them to be. They did no other service than combating some of the Paulinean notions;—that of vicarious satisfaction, saving faith in this satisfaction, &c.;—leaving untouched the great leading error of an arbitrary God, now making Covenants, and now abolishing them, according to time and circumstances. By this means Protestantism lost almost every feature of Positive Religion, and the followers of the old faith were enabled, aptly enough, to represent it as absolute Infidelity. Thus securely protected against its assailants, the Church had nothing more to fear from Authorship and its attendant tribe of Readers; and these could now propagate their opinions out of Protestant into Catholic States under the name of Independent Philosophy.

Thus much it was necessary for me to say in order to resolve the question with which we set out, as to the origin of the high value which is now set upon the *printed letter*. In this inquiry, I have had to touch upon matters which possess great value for many who associate them with what alone is possessed of absolute value—with Religion. I have spoken of Catholicism and Protestantism, so that it may be seen that I hold them both to be in error in the most important matter at issue; and I would not willingly leave this matter without, at least, declaring my own view of it.

In my opinion, both parties stand on one common ground which is wholly untenable,—the Paulinean theory;—which,

in order to give validity to Judaism, even for a limited time, had necessarily to proceed upon the conception of an arbitrary God; and both parties being completely at one as to the truth of this theory, and not harbouring the slightest doubt regarding it, dispute only concerning the grounds upon which the Paulinean scheme is to be maintained. Thus peace and unity are no more to be thought of; nay, it were far from desirable that a peace should be concluded in favour of either side. Peace, however, would forthwith be the result, were mankind to throw aside this theory altogether, and return to Christianity in its original form as it exists in the Gospel of John. There no proof is recognised but the Inward Testimony,—the appeal to man's own sense of Truth, and to his spiritual Nature. Who Jesus himself, in his mere personality, was or was not, is of importance only to the follower of Paul, who would make him the abrogator of an Old Covenant with God, and the mediator of a New one in the same name, for which business it was of essential importance that he should possess a significant descent. The true Christian knows no Covenant or Mediation with God, but only the Old, Eternal, and Unchangeable Relation, that in Him we live, and move, and have our being; and he asks not *who* has said this, but only *what* has been said;—even the book wherein this may be written is nothing to him as a proof, but only as a means of culture; he bears the proof in his own breast. This is my view of the matter, which does not seem to contain anything very dangerous, and does not overstep the limits of the freedom of philosophical inquiry into religious topics recognised among Protestants; and I have communicated it to you in order that you may test it by your own knowledge of Religion and its history, and may try whether by means of it, light, order, and connexion are introduced into the whole;—but I have no wish to invite the *Theologian* to a discussion of it. Educated myself in the schools of the Theologians, I am well acquainted with

their weapons, and I know that upon their own ground they are invincible; but I also know my own theory, which I have now communicated to you, too well not to perceive that it altogether supersedes the whole present Theology, with all its pretensions; and that whatever is valuable in the inquiries of these men, has reference only to the departments of historical and philological learning, without possessing any influence upon Religion or Happiness;—and thus I cannot join issue with the Theologian who desires to remain a Theologian rather than a Teacher of the People.

So much for our first business,—to exhibit historically the way in which that state of Literature and Science, already described as characteristic of the Third Age, has actually arisen. Now to our second task,—to show how this Literary and Scientific world *ought to be* constituted.

In the first place:—All the existing relations of actual life, which can only be superseded in and by the Age of the perfect Art of Reason, demand that only a few shall devote their lives to Science, and by far the majority to other pursuits;—that thus the distinction between the Scholar, or let us rather say between the Learned, and the Unlearned, must still subsist for a long period. Both have yet to raise themselves to the real substance of Knowledge, to the true creative Reason; and the formalism of mere unreasoning Conception must be wholly got rid of. The people, in particular, must be raised to Pure Christianity, such as we have described it above, as the only medium through which at first Ideas can be communicated to them. In this respect both parties, Learned as well as Unlearned, are in the same position. They are separated in the following way:—the Learned find Reason itself, and all its modifications, in a system of connected and consecutive Thought; to them, the Universe of Reason, as we have elsewhere expressed it, reveals itself in pure Thought as such. This knowledge they then communicate to the

Unlearned, unaccompanied however by the strict proof of which it is susceptible in the system of pure Thought,—to adduce which would render the communication itself Learned and Scholastic;—which knowledge is then authenticated immediately by the Unlearned themselves through their own natural sense of Truth; just as we have proceeded in these lectures which we have announced as popular discourses. I myself have found what has been here taught in a consecutive system of Thought, but I have not communicated it to you in this shape. In one of our first lectures I requested you to inquire whether you could withhold your approval from such a way of thinking as I there described, and if you should find it impossible to do so, I asked you whether, within your own selves, Reason does not in this way declare in favour of such a mode of Thought:—in the two last lectures I have presented the opposite view to you in such a light that its falsehood and perversion must have been immediately evident; and if I made myself intelligible to you it must have excited, at least, inward amusement. Other proofs I have not here adduced. I teach the same things in my scientific philosophical lectures; but there I accompany my teachings with proofs of another description. Further,—these lectures have been addressed,—as popular-philosophical discourses,—to a cultivated audience, and therefore I have clothed them in cultivated language, and in that garb of metaphor which belongs to it. I might have taught the same things to the people, from the pulpit, in the character of a preacher, and then it would have been necessary to make use of Bible language:—for example, what I have here termed the Life in the Idea, should in that case have been named Resignation to the Will of God; or Devotion to the Will of God, &c. This popular communication of knowledge by the Learned to the Unlearned, can only be effected in discourses,—or by means of the press if

those to whom it is addressed possess at least the art of reading.

Secondly:—In the cultivation of the whole domain of Science, and therefore in the constitution of the Literary Republic, plan, order, and system are requisite. From Reason as Knowledge, or the Absolute Philosophy, the whole domain of Science may be completely surveyed, and the office of each individual strictly defined. Every one who lays claim to the name of a Scholar must necessarily be in possession of this pure Reason; otherwise, however well-informed he may think himself in some particular department,—if he be ignorant of the ultimate ground of all Science, upon which his own Science depends, then of a surety he cannot understand even his own Science in its ultimate foundations, and indeed has not yet thoroughly penetrated into its significance. Every one can in this way distinctly see when there is something yet wanting in the circle of Science, and what it is which is wanting; and can thus select some particular department as the field of his own exertion. He will not think of completing anew what has been already completed.

All Knowledge which is strictly *a priori* may be completed and the inquiry closed; and it will be brought to this conclusion so soon as the Literary Republic shall carry on its labours systematically. Empiricism only is infinite; as well in its fixed department, *i.e.* Nature, in Physics,—as in its changing department, *i.e.* the varying phenomena of the Human Race, in History. The first, Physics, when all its *a priori* elements have been distinguished, completed and perfected in their several forms by the higher Reason, will be limited to Experiment; and receive from Reason the Art of rightly comprehending the significance of Experiment, and the knowledge how Nature is to be again interrogated. The second, History, will by the same Reason be relieved of the myths respecting the origin of the Human Race

which properly belong to Metaphysics; and will receive instead a distinct conception of the true objects of historical inquiry, and what belongs to them; with a Logic of historical Truth:—and thus, even in this inexhaustible province, we shall have a sure progress according to rule instead of an uncertain groping in the dark.

As the substance of all Knowledge has its fixed law, so both its scientific and popular expression have their settled rules. Have these been transgressed?—then the error may perhaps be discovered by some one else, and corrected in a new work:—have they not been transgressed, or am I unable to make any improvement on that which already exists?—why should I change it for the mere sake of change? In every Science let the *best* scientific and the *best* popular works remain the only ones, until something really better appear to take their place;—then let the former be altogether laid aside, and the latter alone remain. True, the unlearned public is a progressive body; for its members are presumed to advance in the ranks of culture by means of the fit teaching of the Learned, and what they already know they do not need to be taught again. It is thus quite conceivable that a popular work, which is well suited to the period of its appearance, may afterwards, when the Time has changed, become no longer adequate to its purpose, and must be replaced by another; but this progress will certainly not be so rapid that the people shall need to be supplied with something new every half-year.

From Reason as Knowledge, I have said above, the whole domain of Science may be surveyed. Every Scholar must be in possession of this Knowledge, were it only that he may thereby be able at all times to understand the actual state of the scientific world, and thus to know at what point his labour may be most advantageously applied. There is no reason why this actual condition of the scientific world should not be chronicled in a continuous work devoted to

that purpose, and a survey of it recorded there, partly for the use of cotemporaries, and partly for future history. Something similar to this was said in our description of the Third Age as the function of the Literary Journals and Magazines. Thus if we describe how such a Review would be executed in the Age of Reason as Knowledge, we shall at the same time declare how a Literary Journal *ought to be* conducted, if such Journals must exist; and from the contrast, it may also become obvious why such Journals, in their common form, are good for nothing, and can be good for nothing. To complete the antithesis between our last lecture and our present one, we must now proceed to this description.

The scientific position of every point of Time must manifest itself according to the Idea which we have already announced; and the supposition is that it will so manifest itself in the works of the Time. These lie open to every eye; and all who are interested in the question which we have proposed can answer it, without our aid, by reference to the same source from which we, without their help, have answered it. We see not to what end our assistance is needful here. If we would make our aid necessary, we must do something which others either cannot do at all, or cannot do without some specific labour of which we can relieve them. We cannot again inform the Reader of what the Author himself has said; for the Author has already said this for himself, and the Reader may satisfactorily learn it from him. What we must declare for him, is precisely that which the Author has not said, but from which he has drawn everything which he has said; we must lay bare what the Author himself really *is*, perhaps unconsciously to himself, and how all which he has said has become to him such as it is;—we must extract the spirit from his letter. If this spirit in the individual be also the spirit of the Time, and if we have made it manifest in any one instance

belonging to the Time, and possibly in that instance in which it is most clearly visible, then I do not see why we should repeat the same thing with reference to others, in whom there may indeed be some accidental and outward difference, but internally an exact similitude;—and thus become mere copyists of ourselves. The question is not concerning the position of Sempronius, or Caius, or Titus, but concerning the position of the Age;—if we have already made this manifest by the example of Sempronius, then we have, at most, to add the remark that Caius and Titus are examples of the same kind; so that no one may expect that they should be separately considered. Should these possess, in addition to the essential and prevailing spirit of the Age, such and such subsidiary and characteristic tendencies, then we must thoroughly investigate these tendencies, and exhibit each of them clearly by means of its most remarkable example:—as for the other instances belonging to the same class, we may, at most, apply to them the remark already suggested.

It is not otherwise with the estimate of the Age in reference to Art; in which department we here confine ourselves to Literature. The measure of excellence is the elevated purity, the ethereal clearness, the serene calmness, untroubled by individual imperfection or by any relation which does not belong to the domain of pure Art, which the work displays. Have we set these forth as they exist in the masterworks of the Age;—why need we concern ourselves with the efforts of mere aspirants? or even with the *studies* of the master? The latter we employ, in order thereby the better to penetrate and understand the individuality of the Artist,—which, as such, is never a sensuous, but always an ideal individuality,—and by means of this knowledge of his individuality to attain a more thorough comprehension of his work. In short, such a Review must be nothing else, and desire to be nothing else, than a record of the essential spirit of Science and of Art;—whatever

cannot be regarded as a variation and farther embodiment of this spirit, should have no place in it, and should not enter within the circle of its observation. It matters not that each day in the calendar may not send forth its printed sheet of such a Review; nor every month, nor even perhaps every half-year, its volume;—in that case paper has been saved and the Reader has been spared much useless labour. Does no continuation appear?—it is a sign that nothing new has occurred in the intellectual world, but that everything moves in its old round:—has something new occurred?—the record will not be wanting to announce it.

With regard to Art alone an exception to the strictness of this rule may be permitted. Humanity is as yet much further removed from true Knowledge in Art than in Science, and there will be needed a much longer course of preparation before it can arrive at the former, than may be required in its progress towards the latter. In this respect, even feeble efforts employed on the interpretation of imperfect works of Art may be welcomed,—not indeed as portions of our true spiritual record, which can only describe the real, living movement of Humanity; but only as popular aids, that thereby the general public may become more conversant with the art of understanding a work;—and if the common Journals of Criticism only sometimes made such attempts they might be entitled to our thanks. But with reference to Science no such exception to the strictness of the rule can be admitted:—for beginners in this department there are Schools and Universities in existence.

LECTURE VIII.

MYSTICISM AS A PHENOMENON OF THE THIRD AGE.

THE Third Age has now been described in its fundamental character,—*as an Age which accepts nothing but what it understands* ;—and its leading conception in this process of understanding has been sufficiently set forth as that of *mere sensuous Experience*. From this fundamental principle of the Age we have deduced the distinction between a Learned and an Unlearned Class, and the constitution of these two classes, both in themselves and in their relation to each other. In addition to this we have shown historically, in our last lecture, that this relation has not always existed as at present; how and in what way it has arisen and become as it now is;—and also how this relation must exist in the following Age,—that of Reason as Knowledge.

Now we have formerly remarked, in our general survey of this subject, that such an Age of mere naked Experience and of empty Formal Knowledge does by its very nature stir up opposition, and bears within its own breast the germs of a reaction against itself. Let us take up this remark in the lecture of to-day, and pursue it somewhat further. It cannot be but that single individuals,—either because they actually feel the dreary barrenness and emptiness of the results of such a principle, or else moved by the mere

desire of bringing forward something wholly new, which desire itself we have already discovered among the characteristics of this Epoch,—precisely inverting the principle of the Age, and representing its pretension to understand all things as its bane and the source of all its error,—should now, on the contrary, set up the Incomprehensible as *such*, and on account of its incomprehensibility, as their own principle,—as all of which man stands in need, the true source of all healing and sanctification. Even this phenomenon, as I said before, although apparently quite opposed to the Third Age, does nevertheless belong to the necessary phenomena of this Age, and is not to be overlooked in a complete delineation of it.

In the first place, the fact that the supporters of the maxim,—*that we must be able to understand everything which we ought to admit as true*,—do nevertheless constantly accept many things which neither they nor their opponents understand, is a manifest contradiction of the maxim itself; which contradiction obviously cannot take place, or be theoretically propounded until the maxim itself be announced, and indeed only arises in the polemical discussion of the maxim;—a contradiction, however, which must necessarily make its appearance so soon as this maxim has been prevalent for any length of time, has received mature consideration, and has been brought out in clear and unequivocal distinctness. Thus the announcement of this principle of the Incomprehensible is neither the beginning nor yet any essential element of the new Age which is to arise out of the Third, namely, the Age of Reason as Knowledge; for it finds no fault with the maxim of absolute Intelligibility, but rather recognises it as its own; finding fault only with the mischievous and worthless notion which is now made the standard of this Intelligibility, and the measure of all authentic Truth; while as to Intelligibility itself, the Age of Reason as Knowledge lays it down as a fundamental principle, that everything, even

the Unknown itself, as the limit of the Known, and as the only possible pledge that the domain of the Known is exhausted, must be comprehended; and that in all Times, and as the only sufficient substratum of the Time, there must be a *then* Unknown,—known only as the Unknown; but at no Time an absolute Incomprehensible. This principle of absolute Incomprehensibility is thus much more directly opposed to Knowledge, than even the principle of the Intelligibility of all things through the conceptions of mere sensuous Experience. Finally, this principle of Incomprehensibility, as such, is not a remnant of any former Age, as is obvious from what we have already said on this point. The absolute Incomprehensible of Heathen and Jewish antiquity,—the arbitrary God, never to be understood but always to be feared, with whom man could only by good fortune come to terms,—far from having been sought out by these Ages, was imposed upon them by necessity, and in opposition to their own will, and they would gladly have been delivered from this conception had that been possible. The Incomprehensible of the Christian Church, again, was accepted as true,—not on account of its being incomprehensible, but because it existed in the Written Word and in the Traditions and Doctrines of the Church, although it had accidentally turned out to be incomprehensible. The maxim of which we now speak, on the contrary, sets up the Incomprehensible as the Highest, *in its own character of incomprehensibility*, and even on account of its incomprehensibility; and it is thus a wholly new and unprecedented phenomenon peculiar to the Third Age.

When the matter does not end in this mere acceptance of the Incomprehensible generally,—so that it might be left to each man to determine for himself what is incomprehensible to him;—but when besides this, as might be expected from the dogmatic Spirit of the Age, a specific

and defined formula of the Incomprehensible is set forth and proposed for our acceptance; the question presents itself,—How does this phenomenon arise? Not from the elder superstition,—for this has now passed away so far as the cultivated classes are concerned, and its residue is only to be found in Theology;—nor from Theology,—for this is, as we have already seen, something altogether different. It is through insight into the emptiness of the previous system, and thus by means of reasoning, that this new system has arisen; it must therefore establish its Incomprehensible by means of reasoning and free thought, which here, however, assume the forms of Invention and Imagination:—Hence the founders and representatives of this system will bear the name of Philosophers.

The production of an Unknown and Incomprehensible, by means of unrestrained Imagination, has always been named Mysticism; we shall therefore comprehend this new system in its essential nature, if we set forth distinctly what Mysticism is, and wherein it consists.

Mysticism has this in common with true Reason as Knowledge;—it does not recognise the conceptions of mere sensuous Experience as the Highest, but strives to raise itself above all Experience;—and since there is nothing beyond the domain of Experience but the world of Pure Thought, it builds up a Universe for itself from Pure Thought alone,—as we have already said of Reason as Knowledge. The defenders of Experience as the only source of truth thus hit the mark as closely as they possibly can, and more closely perhaps than they themselves are aware of, when they denominate him a Mystic who, on whatever ground, denies the exclusive validity which they claim for Experience;—for this Mysticism, which they can only apprehend by an effort of fancy, and from which they have so carefully guarded themselves beforehand by strict adherence to Experience,—this Mysticism,

I say, does indeed raise itself above Experience;—whilst the other way of rising above Experience,—namely, by Knowledge,—has never presented itself to them in its true character, and on this side they have had, as yet, no temptations to overcome.

In this firm reliance on the world of Thought, as the Highest and most excellent, Reason as Knowledge and Mysticism are completely at one.

The distinction between them depends solely upon the nature of the thought from which they respectively proceed. The fundamental thought of Reason as Knowledge—which because it is a fundamental thought, is absolutely one and complete in itself—is, in the view of Reason, thoroughly clear and distinct; and from it Reason perceives, in the same unchangeable clearness, the immediate procession of all the multiplicity of particular thoughts; and, since *things* can only exist in thought, of the multiplicity of all particular things,—making them, in this procession, the subject of immediate apprehension;—this even to the limits of all clearness; and, as these limits must likewise be conceived of as necessary limits, even to the boundaries of the Unknown. Further, this thought does not spontaneously present itself to Reason, but must be pursued with labour, assiduity, and care; for Reason must never rest satisfied with anything which is, as yet, imperfectly understood, but must continually ascend to a higher principle of interpretation, and again to a higher, until at last there shall be but one pure mass of Light. So it is with the Thought of Reason. But the *thoughts* from which Mysticism may arise,—for these are very different in the different individuals who entertain them, and are even very variable in one and the same individual,—these *thoughts* can never be clearly referred to any fundamental principle. On this account they are only to a certain extent clear even in themselves; and, so far as regards their connexion with each other, they are abso-

lutely unintelligible. On this account, too, these thoughts can never be proved, nor attain any greater degree of clearness than that which they already possess; but they may be postulated,—or, should the language of true Reason be already current, the reader or hearer may be directed to the 'Intellectual Intuition'; which latter, however, has a totally different meaning in Reason from that which it bears in Mysticism. For the same reason, no account can be given of the method in which these thoughts have been discovered, because, in reality, they have not been discovered by means of a systematic ascent to a higher principle, like the primitive thoughts of Reason,—but are, in truth, the mere conceits of Chance.

And this Chance,—what is it at bottom? Although those who are in its service can never explain it, yet cannot we explain it? It is a blind thinking-power, which, like all other blind powers, is, in the final analysis, only a force of Nature from the control of which *free* thought sets us at liberty; depending, like all other natural conditions, upon the state of health, the temperament, the mode of life, the studies, &c. of the individual;—so that these Mystics, with their fascinating philosophy, notwithstanding their boast of having raised themselves above Nature, and their profound contempt for all Empiricism, are themselves but a somewhat unusual empirical phenomenon, without having the least suspicion of the real state of the case.

The remark that the principles of Mysticism are mere accidental conceits, imposes upon me the duty of distinguishing it from another, and, in some respects, similar process of thought;—and I embrace this opportunity of more strictly defining it. In the domain of Physics, namely, not only the most important experiments, but even the most searching and comprehensive theories are often the results of chance, or it may be said, of mere conjecture; and so must it be, until Reason be sufficiently

extended and spread abroad, and have fulfilled the duty which it owes to *Physica*, as strictly defined in our last lecture. But the true Physical Inquirer always proceeds beyond the Phenomena, seeking only the Law in the Unity of which the Phenomena may be comprehended; and as soon as he has reached the primitive Thought, returning again to the Phenomena in order to test the Thought by its application to them;—undoubtedly with the firm conviction that the validity of the Thought can only be established by its sufficiency for the explanation of the Phenomena, and with the determination to throw it aside should it not be verified in this way. It is verified; and he is thereby satisfied that his conception has been no arbitrary conceit, but a true Thought revealed by Nature herself;—and thus his inspiration is not *Mysticism* but is to be named *Genius*. Quite otherwise is it with the *Mystic*:—he neither proceeds outwards from *Empiricism*, nor yet does he recognise *Empiricism* as the judge of his fancies,—but he demands that Nature should regulate herself by his thoughts;—in which he should be perfectly justified, had he only got hold of the *right* Thoughts, and if he knew how far this *a priori* conception of Nature can go, at what point it comes to an end, and where Experiment alone can decide.

*pure
idea*

These fancies of the *Mystic*, I have said, are neither clear in themselves, nor are they proved, or even capable of theoretical proof which indeed is renounced in the avowal of *Incomprehensibility*; but yet they may be true, and may therefore be confirmed by our natural sense of Truth, provided they fall within its sphere. How is it then, that they are believed in by their original authors themselves? I am bound to solve this question before we proceed further.

These fancies are, at bottom, as we have shown above, the products of a blind natural thinking-power; which power must necessarily manifest itself in these particular

circumstances and in these particular individuals exactly as it does manifest itself;—*must*, I say, unless the individual were to elevate himself above the mere natural thinking-power to free and clear Thought; and so foreclose this necessity. If this do not happen, then the necessary consequence is as follows:—every blind power of Nature is constantly active, although invisibly and unconsciously to man; it is therefore to be anticipated that this thinking-power, as the essential nature of this individual, should have already manifested itself in many shapes within him, and thus from time to time have passed through his mind without its principle being discovered, or any distinct resolution being taken as to its adoption. Thus he goes on passively, or listening attentively to the voice of Nature thinking within him; till at last the true centre-thought of the whole reveals itself; and he is not a little astonished to find unity, light, connexion, and confirmation spread over all his previous fancies; never imagining for a moment that these earlier fancies were but shapes or branches of that ever-active thought which has now come forth into light, with which they must therefore unquestionably harmonize. He satisfies himself of the truth of the whole by its sufficiency to afford an explanation of all the parts; for he does not know that they are only *parts of* this whole, and have only an existence *by means of* the whole. He accepts Imagination as Truth because it coincides with so many earlier Imaginations, which, without any suspicion on his part, have come to him from the same source.



Since this imagination of the Mystic is but a thinking-power of Nature, it returns upon Nature, attaches itself to her soil, and attempts to exercise an activity there; in one word, Mysticism is, and always must be, a Philosophy of Nature (*'Natur-Philosophie.'*) It is necessary that we should carefully consider these latter remarks, in order strictly to distinguish between Mysticism and something

else which is often inconsiderately mistaken for it. Either the mere sensuous instinct, the desire of personal preservation and of physical well-being, is the only impulse to the thoughts as well as to the actions of men,—and then Thought is only the servant of Desire, and only exists for the purpose of observing and choosing the means of its satisfaction; or, Thought is living and active in itself and by its own proper power. Upon the first supposition is founded the whole wisdom of the Third Age, which we have already sufficiently described, and need not further refer to at present. On the second supposition there are, on the other hand, two, or it may be, three cases. Namely, this self-existent and active Thought is either the mere Sensuous Individuality of Man clothing itself in the form of Thought, and is thus still a mere sensuous desire, only disguised, and therefore not recognised as such,—and then it is Mysticism,—or, it is Pure Thought flowing forth from itself without any dependence on Sense, not recognising individual persons, but always comprehending the Race, as we have already sufficiently described it in our second, third, and fourth lectures;—i.e. the Idea. Is it the Idea which is present—then again, as we have already said, it may manifest itself in two different ways:—either, in one of its primitive forms which we previously indicated; and in this case it struggles irresistibly onward to direct outward activity, streams forth in the personal life of the man, extinguishing all his sensuous impulses and desires; and then he, is an Artist, Hero, Man of Science, or Religious Man;—or, the same Pure Thought may manifest itself in its absolute unity; and then it is easily recognisable as the one, perfectly clear, and undisturbed thought of the Higher Reason, which in itself impels to no activity in the World of Sense, but only to free activity in the World of Pure Thought; or, in other words, is true and genuine Speculation. Mysticism will not of itself act in direct

opposition to the Life in the Idea ; but that it may act in conformity with it, requires a specific determination of the will moved thereto by desire. Thus Mysticism is still Speculation ; it does not, however, comprehend the Race as such but only Individuality, because it proceeds only from the Individual and refers only to that whereon the life of the Individual depends, namely, to Physical Nature,—and it is thus necessarily Speculation founded on Nature (*Natur-Spekulation*.) Hence the Life in the Idea, which the uneducated man presumes to call Mysticism, is in reality very widely and distinctly separated from Mysticism. We have already sufficiently distinguished Mysticism from true and genuine Speculation ; but in order that we may be able to distinguish this true and genuine Speculation from its opposite, — that of the Mystic, with reference to the Philosophy of Nature (*Natur-Philosophie*),—we ought to be already in possession of the former, and this is not the business of the unlearned public. Upon this matter,—and therefore upon the ultimate principles of Nature,—no true Scholar will think of communicating with the general public ; the Speculative theory of Nature presupposes scientific culture and can only be comprehended by the scientific intellect and the general and unlearned public never stands in need of it. But with respect to that whereon the true Scholar can and ought to communicate with the general public,—with respect to Ideas,—there is an infallible test whereby this public may determine for itself whether any doctrine which is presented to it is, or is not, mere Mysticism. Let it be asked,—‘ Has this doctrine a direct and immediate bearing on action, or does it rest on a fixed and immovable constitution of things ? ’ Thus for example, the question which I put to you at the beginning of these lectures, and upon the assumed answer to which, the whole of my subsequent discourse have proceeded as their true principle :—this question

whether you could refrain from approving, respecting, and admiring a Life wholly devoted to the Idea?—this question refers exclusively to an action, and to your judgment upon that action; and therefore, while we were elevated above the world of mere sensuous Experience, it is evident that there was nevertheless nothing of Mysticism in our inquiries. To adduce a still more marked example:—The Doctrine of a Perfect God; in whose nature nothing arbitrary or changeable can have a place; in whose Highest Being we all live, and in this Life may and ought at all times to be blessed;—this Doctrine, which ignorant men think they have sufficiently demolished when they have proclaimed it to be Mysticism, is by no means Mysticism, for it has an immediate reference to human action, and indeed to the inmost spirit which ought to inspire and guide all our actions. It can only become Mysticism when it is associated with the pretext that the insight into this truth proceeds from a certain inward and mysterious light, which is not accessible to all men, but is bestowed only upon a few favourites chosen from among the rest:—in which pretext the real Mysticism consists, for it betrays a self-complacent assumption of personal merit, and a pride in mere sensuous Individuality. Thus Mysticism, besides the essential and inward criterion which can only be thoroughly discovered by true Speculation, has also an outward mark by which it may be recognised;—this, namely, that it is never a Moral or Religious Philosophy, to both of which it is, in its true character, wholly antagonistic; (what it calls Religion is only a deification of Nature)—but it is always a mere Philosophy of Nature;—that is, it strives to discover, or believes that it has discovered, certain mysterious and hitherto inconceivable properties in the principles of Nature, by the employment of which it endeavours to produce effects surpassing the ordinary course of things. Such, I say, is Mysticism,—neces-

sarily such by reason of its vital principle;—and such it has always been in reality. Let us not be deceived by the frequent promises it has held forth of introducing us to the secrets of the Spirit-World, and revealing to us the charm whereby we may spell-bind and enthral Angel and Archangel, or even God himself;—the purpose of all this has been only to employ such knowledge for the production of results in the world of sense; and these spiritual existences have therefore never been regarded as such, but only as powers of Nature. The end has always been to discover some charm, some magical spell. If we consider the matter strictly, as I do here, and do it advisedly, in order by this example, at least, to make myself perfectly clear and intelligible;—if, I say, we consider the matter strictly, the system of Religion which was described in our last lecture, which proceeds upon the conception of an Arbitrary God, and admits an interposition between Him and man, and believes that,—through the efficacy of a ratified Covenant, either by observation of certain arbitrary, and, so far as their purpose is concerned, unintelligible laws, or by an historical belief equally unintelligible as regards its end,—it can redeem itself from any farther inflictions on the part of God; this Religion itself, I say, is such a system of mystical enchantment, in which God is contemplated, not as the Holy One, to be separated from whom is, in itself and without farther consequence, the greatest of all evils; but only as a dreadful power of Nature, threatening man with its devastating visitations, whose agencies, however, we have now discovered the means of rendering harmless, or even of diverting to our own purposes.

This which we have now described, and, I think, sufficiently defined and distinguished from all other things wherewith it may be associated, is Mysticism in general; and wherever it manifests itself, it must do so with those characteristics which we have now set forth: it estab-

lishes itself in the way we have now described wherever it is mere nature. In the case in which we have here to speak of it,—as the reaction of the Third Age against itself,—it is not mere nature but chiefly Art. It proceeds from deliberate opposition to the principle of the Third Age; from dissatisfaction with the recognised emptiness and impotence of that Age; from the opinion that man can save himself from this emptiness and impotence only by means of the principle directly opposed to the commonly received notion of the comprehensibility of all things,—i. e. by the Incomprehensible; and from the determination which arises therefrom, to establish such an Incomprehensible. Further, there is in the Third Age, and in all natures which proceed from it, but little energy to be applied to this Mysticism. How then do its adherents establish this Incomprehensible, and summon up the amount of Mysticism which they actually exhibit? They proceed in this way:—They set to work to invent some imaginary theory as to the hidden principles of Nature,—for it is the invariable habit of the Mystic to place Nature before him as his object; he admits whatever fancies may occur to his mind, and entertains those among them which are most agreeable to him; stimulating himself, should such fancies not flow so readily as he desires, by means of physical appliances,—the recognised and established support of all Artists in Mysticism, in ancient and modern times, amongst rude and civilized people;—a means through which the clearness, discretion, and freedom which belong to genuine Speculation, and which demand the highest degree of temperance, are infallibly lost, and from the use of which, for the sake of production, we may at once and with certainty conclude that what is produced is not true Speculation but mere Mysticism. If even with the aid of these accessories the veins of fancy still do not flow with sufficient fulness, recourse is had to the writings of former Mystics. The more singular and the

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more decried these writings are, the better; for, according to their principles, everything is good in proportion as it departs from the prevailing spirit of the Age;—and with these extraneous fancies they now decorate their own imperfect conceits, if indeed they do not take credit for them as their own. I may remark in passing, what cannot be denied, that among these fancies of the old and now decried Mystics, there are many admirable and genial thoughts; and we have even no wish to deny that among the more modern of them also there may be found many excellent expressions; but these gleams of genius are always surrounded by errors, and are never clear in themselves: in order to discover the beauties contained in these writings, the reader must bring similar excellencies with him to their study, and no one will learn from them who was not already wiser than they when he sat down to their perusal.

All Mysticism goes forth in a kind of enchantment; this is its invariable characteristic. What form of this art-magic, then, does that kind of Mysticism of which we now speak, exhibit? Only its Scientific form;—at least we now speak only of the scientific Mysticism of the Age; although there is doubtless another Mysticism of Art, as well as one of Life, which we may perhaps characterize at another time. This scientific Mysticism must therefore endeavour to produce some extraordinary and magical effect in science—something wholly impossible in the ordinary course of Nature. What then?—Science is either *a priori* or *empirical*. To comprehend *a priori* Science, partly as creating the world of Ideas, and partly as determining the world of Nature so far as it does determine it;—there is needed calm dispassionate thought, ceaselessly examining, correcting and explaining itself;—and it requires time and labour, and half a life of devoted endeavour, to produce anything remarkable after all. This is too well known for any one to dream of the influences of enchant-

ment here;—hence the Mystics look upon themselves as excluded from this province, and whatever they may require from it for the frame-work of their own productions, they can borrow from others, and elaborate after their own fashion so that no one may be able to recognise it;—and they may the more securely reckon upon concealment if they abuse him whom they plunder while they are plundering him. *Empiricism* still remains. In so far as this is purely empirical, by separation from all that is *a priori* in Nature, it is the common opinion, which may indeed be the right one, that this province can only be investigated by way of experiment, and that every inquirer must in the first place acquire an historical acquaintance with what is already known, and carefully test it again for himself, and can only hope to arrive at any new result by means of new experiments based upon an intelligent survey of the whole existing stores of Experience. This however is too tedious, and demands time and persevering exertion; and there are too many skilful fellow-labourers who might anticipate our discoveries; so that we might labour on to the end of our lives without getting credit for originality. Here some charm might be applied; and it is necessary to have one. Here therefore the Mystic attempts to penetrate, by a direct incursion of fancy, to the secret principles of Nature, and thus to supersede the course of laborious study and the troublesome method of experiment which peradventure might overturn all his previously formed systems.

On account of the universal propensity of human nature for the Wonderful, this scheme cannot fail to attract general attention and to call forth ardent enthusiasm. Although old men who have already travelled this path of laborious study, and perhaps have themselves produced fortunate and fruitful experiments, may see with some jealousy their former labours regarded as fruitless and inglorious, the results brought to light by their experiments demonstrated

a priori in a few sentences, and proved to have been attainable in other ways,—this phase of the Wonderful not having yet appeared when they were young;—the more welcome to those who have not yet entered upon this path of study, but now stand at the point whence according to former usage they must enter upon it, will be the promise of being safely lifted over it in the course of a few paragraphs. Should there, after all, no miracle ensue, as is the common fate of such magic arts; should no new empirical knowledge arise, and the Faithful remain exactly as wise or as ignorant as they were before;—should it be obvious, at least to every one who is not blind, that whatever is essential in any particular instance actually brought forward has not been deduced *a priori*, nor even attained by any course of reasoning, but has been already known by means of previous experiment, and is now only compressed into an allegorical form, in which compression the pretended deduction consists;—should the wonder-worker himself neither satisfy the demand which must of necessity be made upon him to authenticate his higher mission by at least one fulfilled prophecy, nor even produce, as he ought, a single experiment never before made either by himself or others in some region unattainable by means of inference from previous experiment, the results of which, distinctly announced by himself beforehand, shall be found coincident with its actual fulfilment, but should proceed, like all false prophets, to prophesy the result *a priori* after its accomplishment has taken place;—should all this unquestionably have occurred, yet will the assured Faith of the Adept never waver;—to-day indeed the process has not succeeded, but on the seventh, or on the ninth day, it will infallibly succeed.

To this stimulus of applause, there is added another very powerful one. The human mind, left to itself without discipline or education, would neither be idle nor industrious;—were a middle state between these two discovered, that

were the proper thing for it. To remain idle altogether and do nothing is too tiresome ;—and if one has unfortunately made study his business, it is to be feared that in such a case he might learn nothing, which again is unpleasant, especially on account of its consequences. Real Thought and Speculation are troublesome and unproductive ;—truly to learn anything demands indeed an effort of attention and memory. Imagination steps in. Let a successful master once bring this power into play, —and how can he fail if he be a Mystic, since Mysticism is always sure to lay hold of the unguarded and inexperienced ?—then Imagination pursues its way without farther trouble to its possessor, quickens into life, assumes new and varied forms, and thus puts on the appearance of a vigorous activity without the smallest trouble on our part ;—bold and adventurous thoughts make their appearance in our minds without we ourselves being called on to think at all ; and study is changed into the most pleasant business in the world. And then, above all, the glorious results !—when scarcely released from school, or even while still there, to confront the most approved men in the land with brilliant thoughts, which they indeed, too well acquainted with the nature of true knowledge, have never dreamed of !—and to be able to shrug our shoulders at their momentary embarrassment on account of our absolute ignorance, as at a confession of their own weakness, and so pass on pluming ourselves on our fancied superiority !

During the course of this description we have not been ignorant, nor have we overlooked the fact, that absolutely unscientific men may probably pass the same judgment on the labours of genuine Speculation and its friends. We grant that, since they must hold all Speculation to be Mysticism,—there being absolutely nothing in existence for them but Experience,—they are perfectly right in doing so according to their own view ; and, on the other hand, since we maintain the existence of a world lying beyond all

Experience, and at the same time, and precisely on account of this *a priori* world and as a consequence of it, contend also for the existence of an Experience which must always remain Experience, so we for our part cannot fitly express in any other way the censure which is called forth by the analogous error,—that of introducing a *pretended Speculation* into the legitimate domain of Experience. Generally speaking, however, the mere expression is of little moment; but it is of moment that one understand the subject under discussion, and can venture to give a reason to him who does understand it; and to this extent, we believe that we have vindicated our pretensions, were it only by what we have said to-day. It is allowable publicly to remain silent upon such obvious folly as does not force its way into our more immediate presence; and we should not, even in this narrow circle, have wasted upon such a subject the few words which we have spoken to-day, had not the completeness of our undertaking required us to do so.

In fine, this seems to be the spirit of the particular period of our Age in which we live:—the system of mere naked Experience as the only legitimate source of Truth may be supposed to be on the decline, and on the contrary, the system of Mysticism which, by means of a pretended Speculation, seeks to dislodge Experience even from its own legitimate province, now begins to bear sway with all its revolutionary consequences, in order to inflict a fearful retribution on the Race which gave itself up to the former delusion. It is in vain to seek a remedy against this movement, for it is now a necessary tendency of the Age, and is besides equipt with all that is most attractive to the Age. Happy the wise man who can rise superior to his Age and to all Time! who knows that Time is nothing in itself, and that there is a Higher Guidance securely leading our Race, amid all its apparent wanderings, to the true end of its existence!

LECTURE IX.

THE ORIGIN AND LIMITS OF HISTORY.

THE *Scientific* constitution of the Third Age has been sufficiently described in our former lectures, partly in itself, and partly by means of antecedent and succeeding conditions. The remaining characteristics and peculiarities of any Age depend upon its *Social* condition, and especially upon the State, and are to be defined thereby. Therefore we cannot proceed with our delineation of the Third Age, until we have seen to what stage of its development the State has attained in this Age,—of course in the countries of the highest Culture,—to what extent the Absolute Idea of the State is therein expressed and realized, and how far it is not.

In none of the relations of Humanity does our Race possess less real liberty, and in none is it more hindered and obstructed, than in the constitution of the State, which being chiefly determined by the common condition of mankind, checks the activity of men of the highest wisdom, and sets limits to the realization of their plans. The political constitution of an Age is therefore the result of its earlier fortunes, whereby its present condition has been determined, which in turn determines its constitution;—hence this constitution cannot be understood in the way in which we shall endeavour here to understand

that of our own Age except through the *History* of the Age. But here we meet with a new difficulty,—this, namely:—our Age is far from being at one with itself in its view of History, and still farther from agreement with that view which we, who are guided by Reason as Knowledge, take of History, which view it cannot even understand. It is therefore unavoidably necessary that we should, in the first place, set forth our own view in a general way, and justify it, before making those applications of it which are afterwards to occupy our attention;—and to this purpose we shall devote our present lecture.

It is so much the more incumbent upon us to enter upon this exposition, inasmuch as History is itself a part of Knowledge, and ranks with Physics as the second department of Empiricism; and we have already expressed ourselves distinctly on the nature of these Sciences, while we have given only a passing glance to History. In this respect our present lecture still belongs to that part of our undertaking which comprises a picture of Scientific existence in general;—closing that division of our plan, and opening up a passage to a new portion of it.

Not by any means with the view of leading your judgment captive beforehand, but, on the contrary, that I may incite you to its more vigorous exercise, I have to intimate, that I shall here give utterance to nothing but what, in my opinion, must become evident to you at once by its own immediate clearness;—of which there may be ignorance, but with respect to which, when once announced, there can be no dispute.

I begin my definition of the nature of History with a metaphysical principle, the strict proof of which I am prevented from adducing solely by the popular nature of our present discourses, but which recommends itself directly to the natural sense of Truth in man, and without the adoption of which we could arrive at no firm foundation in the whole field of Knowledge;—with this principle,

namely:— *Whatever actually exists, exists of absolute necessity; and necessarily exists in the precise form in which it does exist; it is impossible that it should not exist, or exist otherwise than as it does.* Hence, to whatever possesses real existence we cannot attribute any beginning, any mutability, or any arbitrary cause. The One, True, and Absolutely Self-Existent Being, is that which all voices call by the name,—God. The Existence of God is not the mere foundation, cause, or anything else of Knowledge, so that the two could be separated from each other; but it is absolutely Knowledge itself: His Existence and Knowledge are absolutely one and the same thing; He exists in Knowledge, precisely as He exists in His own Being, as absolute self-sufficient Power; and thus when we say—‘His Existence is absolute,’ and—‘Knowledge has absolute Existence,’—the meaning is exactly the same. This principle, which is here announced merely in the form of a result, may be made thoroughly clear in the higher walks of Speculation. But further:—a World has no Existence but in Knowledge, and Knowledge itself is the World; and thus the World, by means of Knowledge, is the Divine Existence in its mediate or indirect manifestation; while Knowledge itself is the same Divine Existence in its direct or immediate manifestation. If therefore any one should say that the World might also not exist; that at one time it actually did not exist; that at another time it arose out of nothing; that it came into existence by an arbitrary act of God, which act He might have left undone had He so pleased;—it is just the same as if he should say, that God might also not exist; that at one time He actually did not exist; that at another time He came into existence out of non-existence, and determined Himself to be by an arbitrary act of will, which He might have left undone had He so pleased. This Being, then, of whom we now speak, is the Absolute Being, transcending all Time; and whatever

is comprehended in this Idea is only to be perceived *a priori* in the world of Pure Thought, and is invariable and unchangeable throughout all Ages.

Knowledge is, as we have said, the manifestation, utterance, and perfect representative of Divine Power. It exists therefore for itself; i.e. Knowledge becomes Self-Consciousness;—and in this Self-Consciousness it is its own peculiar, self-sustaining power, freedom, and activity because it is a manifestation of Divine Power;—and it is all this as Knowledge constantly developing itself throughout Eternity to higher inward purity, by means of its action upon a certain *Object of Knowledge*, from which this progress takes its beginning. This Object manifests itself as a *definite something* which might have been different from what it is; for this reason,—that it exists and is yet not understood in its primitive origin; and Knowledge has throughout Eternity to unfold its own inward power in the comprehension of this Object;—and in this progressive development we have the origin of Time.

This Object of Knowledge comes into view only in consequence of the previous existence of Knowledge, and thus lies within the limits of that existence as already set forth; it is therefore an Object of mere perception, and can only be understood empirically. It is the one, persistent, and abiding Object, towards the comprehension of which Knowledge must strive throughout Eternity: in this abiding and objective unity it is called Nature; and the Empiricism which is systematically directed upon it is called Physica. On this Object, Knowledge unfolds itself in a continuous succession of Eras; and the Empiricism which is systematically directed upon the fulfilment of this succession of Eras is called History. Its object is the development of Knowledge on the Unknown;—a development which at all times remains unexhausted.

Thus the Being and Existence which lies *beyond all*

Time is in no way contingent; and no theory of its origin can be given either by the Philosopher or by the Historian:—the Actual Existence in *Time*, on the contrary, appears as if it might have been otherwise, and therefore as contingent; but this appearance of contingency arises only from our ignorance; and the Philosopher may say, generally, that the Unknown, as well as the *infinite* steps towards its comprehension, exists as it does exist, only that it may be so conceived of; but he cannot, by means of such a series of conceptions, at all *define* the Unknown, or deduce it from its primitive elements, as in that case he must have comprehended Infinity itself, which is absolutely impossible. Here therefore is his limit; and should he wish to acquire knowledge in this department, he is thus plainly directed to Empiricism for it. Just as little can the Historian set forth this Unknown, in his genesis, as the origin of *Time*. His business is to point out the successive modifications of actual Empirical Existence. He must therefore assume beforehand this Empirical Existence itself, and all its possible conditions. What these conditions of Empirical Existence are, and thus, what is presupposed in the mere possibility of History, and *must be* first of all before History can even find a beginning;—this is the business of the Philosopher, who has, in the first place, to secure a firm foundation and starting-point for the Historian. To speak quite popularly on this point;—Has man been created?—then he could not have been present, at least with consciousness, at that event, or have been able to observe how he passed over from non-existence into existence; nor can he relate it as a fact to posterity. But, it is said, the Creator has revealed it to him. I answer:—In that case the Creator would have abolished the Unknown whereon the existence of man himself depends; He would thus have destroyed man again immediately after his creation; and, as the existence of the world and of man is inseparable from the

Divine Existence itself, He would at the same time have destroyed Himself;—which is entirely opposed to Reason.

As to the *origin* of the world and of the Human Race, then, neither the Philosopher nor the Historian has anything to say; for there is absolutely no such origin: there is only the One Necessary Being, raised above all Time. As to the *necessary conditions* of Actual Existence which lie beyond all Actual Existence itself, and therefore beyond Empiricism;—of them the Philosopher has to give an account; and should the Historian in his early researches touch upon such themes, he must distinctly understand that they belong not to the province of History, but to that of Philosophy,—it may be in the old simple form of narrative, in which form it is called *Myth*; and he must here acknowledge the jurisdiction of Reason, which in matters of Philosophy is the only judge, and not endeavour to sway us by the imposing word *Fact*. The fact,—often most fruitful and instructive,—is here simply that such a Myth has been.

Having thus fixed the boundaries which separate Philosophy and History, I shall now proceed, in the next place, to define generally the conditions of Empirical Existence which are presupposed in the possibility of History.

Knowledge necessarily divides itself in consciousness, into a consciousness of many individuals and persons:—a division which is strictly deduced from its first principle in the Higher Philosophy. As surely as Knowledge exists,—and this is as sure as that God exists, for it is His Existence itself,—so surely does Humanity also exist, and that in the form of a Human Race consisting of many individual members; and since the condition of the social life of men is intercourse by means of speech, this Human Race is also provided with the implement of Language. No History, therefore, should undertake to explain the origin of the Human Race in general, nor of its social life, nor of its language. Further, it is a part of the essential

vocation of Humanity that in this, its first life on Earth, it should train itself up with freedom to become an outward manifestation of Reason. But out of nothing, nothing can arise; and thus Unreason can never become Reason. Hence, in one point of its existence, at least, the Human Race must have been purely Reasonable in its primitive form, without either constraint or freedom. In one point of its existence, at least, I say; for the true purpose of its existence does not consist in *being* Reasonable, but in *becoming* Reasonable by its own freedom; and the former is only the means and the indispensable condition of the latter: we are therefore entitled to no more extensive conclusion than that the condition of Absolute Reasonableness must have been *somewhere* extant. From this conclusion we are forced to admit the existence of an original Normal People, who by the mere fact of their existence, without Science or Art, found themselves in a state of perfectly developed Reason. But there is nothing to hinder us from also admitting that there lived at the same time dispersed over the whole earth, timid and rude Earth born Savages without any Culture but what was necessary for the preservation of their mere sensuous existence;—for the purpose of the life of the Human Race is only to cultivate itself according to Reason, and it would be quite practicable to carry out this process among the Earth born Savages by means of the Normal People.

As an immediate consequence of this position, no History should attempt to explain the origin of Culture in general, nor the Population of the different regions of the Earth. The laboured hypotheses, especially on the last point, which are accumulated in books of travels, are, in our opinion, trouble and labour lost. But there is nothing from which History, as well as a certain half-philosophy, should more carefully guard itself than the altogether irrational and fruitless attempt to raise Unreason to Reason by a gradual lessening of its degree; and, given

only a sufficient range of centuries, to produce at last a Leibnitz or a Kant as the descendant of an Ourang-Outang.

✓ History takes cognisance only of the New,—the Wonderful;—that which may be contrasted with what has gone before, and what shall follow it. On this account there was no History among the Normal People, and there is no History of them. Under the guidance of their Instinct, one day passed away like another; and one individual life like all the rest. Everything shaped itself spontaneously according to order and morality. There could even be no Science or Art; Religion alone adorned their existence, and gave the simple uninformed mind a relation to the Eternal. As little could there be a History among the Earth born Savages; for with them, likewise, one day passed away like another,—with only this difference, that on one day they found food in abundance while on another they could obtain nothing; prostrated the one day from indulgence and on the next from enervation;—to awaken again, in either case, to the same unchanging round which led to no result.

Had things remained in this state; had the absolute Culture,—which however did not look upon itself as Culture but only as Nature,—remained separate from the surrounding Barbarism, then no History could have arisen; and, what is still more important, the end of the existence of the Human Race could not have been attained. The Normal People must therefore, by some occurrence or other, have been driven away from their habitations, all access to which was thenceforth cut off; and must have been dispersed over the seats of Barbarism. Now for the first time could the process of the free development of the Human Race begin; and with it, History,—the record of the Unexpected and the New,—which accompanies such a process. For now, for the first time, the dispersed descendants of the Normal People perceived with astonishment

that all things were not, of necessity, such as they were with them; but might be otherwise having indeed discovered them to be otherwise in reality; and the Earth-born, after they had been awakened to conscious intelligence, had a great deal even more wonderful to record. In this conflict of Culture with Barbarism, the germs of all Ideas and all Science,—except Religion, which is as old as the world itself, and is inseparable from the existence of the world,—unfolded themselves, as the power and means of leading Barbarism to Culture.

Far from History being able reasonably to raise her voice on the subject of her own birth, all that has now been set forth is presupposed in the mere existence of History. Inferences from a state of things amid which it has had its beginning, as to what has preceded that state, especially inferences from the Myths which are already in actual existence, and in so far have themselves become facts,—particularly when such inferences are in accordance with Logic,—should be thankfully accepted. But let us bear in mind that they are inferences and not History;—and should we desire to examine more closely the form of the inference, let us not be scared back by the bugbear—Fact. Let this be our first incidental observation; and let the second be as follows:—Every one who is capable of a survey of History as a whole,—which however is always rarer than a knowledge of its individual curiosities; and who in particular is able to comprehend what is universal, eternal, and unchanging in it, might in such a survey obtain a clear view of some of the most important problems of History;—for example, how the existence of races of men, differing so much from each other in colour and physical structure, is possible;—why it is that at all times, down even to the present day, civilization is always spread by means of foreign incomers, who encounter aboriginal inhabitants in a state of greater or lesser Barbarism;—whence arises

the inequality among men discoverable wherever History has a beginning;—and so forth.

All that we have now set forth are necessary conditions of the existence of a Human Race;—the latter, however, must absolutely be, and hence the former must have been;—so far Philosophy informs us. Now all this is not merely a general supposition, but these things must further have had a definite existence;—for example, with regard to what we have said above,—the existence of the Normal People is not a mere general supposition, but they must have existed in one particular region of the earth and in no other; although, so far as appears to us, they might have existed elsewhere; they had a language, which of course was constituted according to the fundamental laws of all language, but which possessed besides an element which appears to us as if it might have been otherwise, and therefore as an arbitrary element. Here Philosophy is at an end, because the Comprehensible is at an end; and what is Incomprehensible in the present life begins. Here accordingly Empiricism enters the field, which in this connexion is named History;—and the subordinate phenomena, which only in their general nature can be deduced from *a priori* principles, would now present themselves in their special and particular character *as facts*, without any explanation of their genesis, if they were not necessarily concealed from the view of History by other causes.

This much, however, follows from what has now been said:—History is mere Empiricism; it has only facts to communicate, and all its proofs are founded upon facts alone. To attempt to rise from such facts to Primeval History, or to argue how such or such a thing might have been, and then to take for granted that it has been so in reality,—is to stray beyond the limits of History, and produce an *a priori* History; just as the Philosophy of Nature, referred to in our preceding lecture, endeavoured to find an *a priori* Science of Physics.

The evidence of facts proceeds in the following manner: First of all, there is a fact which has come down to our own time,—which may be seen with our eyes, heard with our ears, and felt with our hands. This can be understood only on the supposition of an earlier fact no longer perceptible to us. Hence such an earlier fact is admitted as having been once perceptible. This rule, that we can accept as proved only so much of the earlier fact as is absolutely necessary for the comprehension of the now-existing fact, is to be taken strictly; for it is only to the Understanding, and by no means to the Imagination, that we can concede any value in historical evidence. Why then should we attempt to educe and define the earlier fact further than is absolutely requisite for the explanation of the present? In all Sciences, and particularly in History, it is of greater importance to understand distinctly how much we do not know than to fill up the void with fiction and conjecture. For example, I read a work which is said to be Cicero's, and till now has been universally acknowledged to be his:—this is the fact of the Present. The earlier fact to be detected herein is this:—Whether the particular Cicero who is distinctly known to us by means of other history did actually write this work. I go through the whole series of evidence lying in the interval of time between me and Cicero; but I know that herein error and illusion are possible, and this external proof of authenticity is not in itself decisive. I turn therefore to the internal characteristics: Is it the style, the mode of thinking of a man who lived at that time, who filled such a station in society, and was surrounded by such circumstances? Suppose I find these things so, then the evidence is complete:—it is not possible to conceive that this book, as it now exists, could have existed if Cicero had not written it: he was the only man who could write it thus; therefore he has written it.

Another instance:—I read the first chapters of the so-called first book of Moses, and, as must be presupposed, I

understand them. Whether it was Moses who composed them; or,—since this, from internal evidence, may be obviously impossible,—whether it was he who collected them from mere verbal tradition and placed them on record; or whether it was Ezra, or some still later writer; is of no importance to me here:—it is even of no importance to me in this case whether any such person as Moses or Ezra ever lived; nor do I care to know how this composition has been preserved;—fortunately it has been preserved, and this is the main point. I perceive by its contents that it is a Myth concerning the Normal People in opposition to another merely Earth born People; and concerning the religion of the Normal People and their dispersion; and of the origin of the Jehovah-Worship, among the adherents of which the primitive religion of the Normal People was once more to re-appear, and through them to be spread over the whole world. I conclude from the contents of this Myth that it must be older than all History, since from the commencement of the historic period down to the time of Jesus there was none able even to understand much less to invent it; and also because I find the same Myth everywhere repeated as the mythical beginning of the History of all nations;—although in a more fabulous and sensuous form. The existence of this Myth, before all other History, is the first fact of History, and its true beginning; and therefore it cannot be explained by means of any previous fact:—the contents of this Myth are thus not History but Philosophy, and a belief in it is no further obligatory on any one than as it is confirmed by his own investigations.

We have said before, that if the true end of the Existence of the Human Race was to be attained it was necessary that the Normal People should be dispersed over the seats of Barbarism: and now, for the first time, there occurred something new and remarkable, which

aroused the memory of Man for its preservation;—now, for the first time, could History, properly so called, have a beginning; for it can do no more than collect in the shape of facts, and by means of mere Empiricism, that gradual civilization of the Actual Human Race of History which is produced by the admixture of the original Culture with the original Barbarism. In this province, for the first time, the historical Art, the fundamental principle of which we have stated above, comes into play for the discovery and collection of facts; and to enable us to comprehend clearly and completely the actual condition of the Present Time, particularly in so far as it may lead us to the discovery of previous facts, as well as to perceive distinctly under the condition of what earlier facts alone the present can be understood. It is here particularly necessary to dismiss altogether the delusive notion of *probability* which, taking its rise in a feeble Philosophy, has thence spread over every other science, and especially has found a secure refuge in History. The Probable, because it is *only probable*, is for that very reason not *true*;—and why should we concede any place whatever in Science to the *untrue*? Strictly speaking, the Probable is what *would be true if* such and such principles, evidences, and facts *which are wanting*, could be produced. If we are of opinion that these absent proofs may be recovered, perhaps by the discovery of lost documents, or the digging up of hidden volumes, we may then properly enough note down these probabilities, so that their substance may not be lost, distinguishing them by this mark,—*mere probabilities*, accompanied with a notice of what is requisite to establish their truth; but we must by no means fill up the gap between them and Truth by our own too easy belief, and by the desire to prove an hypothesis which we, as Historians, choose to advance *a priori*.

The History of this gradual Culture of the Human Race, as History properly so called, is again made up of two intimately connected elements; one *a priori*, and the other *a posteriori*. The *a priori* is the World-Plan, the general features of which we have set forth in our first lecture, conducting Humanity through the Five Epochs already enumerated. Without historical information at all the Thinker may know that these Epochs, as we have described them, must succeed each other, and may also be able, in the same way, to characterize generally such of them as have not yet taken their place in History as facts. Now this development of the Human Race does not take place at once, as the philosopher pictures it to himself in thought, but, disturbed by foreign powers, it takes place gradually, at different times, in different places, and under particular circumstances. These conditions do not by any means arise from the Idea of the World-Plan, but are unknown to it; and since there is no other Idea of a World-Plan, they are an Absolute Unknown to Philosophy: and here begins the pure Empiricism of History;—its *a posteriori* element;—History in its own proper form.

The Philosopher who in his capacity of Philosopher meddles with History follows the *a priori* course of the World-Plan, which is clear to him without the aid of History at all; and the use which he makes of History is not to prove anything by it, for his principles are already proved independently of History; but only to illustrate and make good in the actual world of History, that which is already understood without its aid. Throughout the whole course of events, therefore, he selects only the instances in which Humanity really advances towards the true end of its being, and appeals only to these instances,—laying aside and rejecting everything else; and as he does not intend to prove historically that Humanity has to pursue this course, having already proved

it philosophically, he only points out, for the purposes of illustration, the occasions on which this has been visible in History. The mere Collector of Facts indeed proceeds, and ought to proceed, quite differently. But his business is not to be despised on account of its opposition to Philosophy;—it is, on the contrary, highly honourable if properly pursued. He has absolutely no support, no guide, no fixed point, except the mere outward succession of years and centuries, wholly irrespective of their significance; and it is his business to declare all that can be discovered historically in any of these Epochs of Time. He is an Annalist. Does anything of this kind escape him?—then he has transgressed the rules of his art, and must endure the reproach of ignorance or carelessness. Now in each of these Epochs, —which he distinguishes only by their succession in Time, but not by means of their essential nature,—there lie, as only the Philosopher can tell him, or the Annalist himself if he be a Philosopher may know, the most diverse elements in immediate contact and intermixture;—the remnants of original Barbarism, or of an original Culture which has passed away without communication; remnants or else foreshadowings of all the other four Epochs of Culture;—and finally the actually living and progressive Culture itself. The merely empirical Historian has to collect faithfully all these elements just as he finds them, and to place them in order beside each other: the Philosopher who uses History for the purpose which we have here in view, has only to do with the latter element,—the actually living and progressive movement of Culture,—laying aside all the rest; and thus the empirical Historian, who should judge him according to the rules of his own art, and conclude that he was ignorant of that which he had no occasion to produce, would be at fault, for it is specially to be expected of the Philosopher that he should not bring forward on every

occasion all that he knows, but only so much as bears upon the purpose in view. To make the distinction clear at once:—the Philosopher employs History only so far as it serves his purpose, laying aside everything of which he can make no use; and I announce freely, that in the following inquiry I shall employ it in this way. Such a proceeding, which would be highly culpable in the mere empirical study of History, and would indeed subvert the very nature of this science, is quite justifiable in the Philosopher; for he has already, independently of all History, proved the principles for the illustration of which he makes use of History. He should indeed deserve blame did he assert as fact that which had never taken place; but he relies upon the results of historical inquiry, of which results he employs only the most general; and it would be a great misfortune to historical inquiry itself, if so much as this were not clearly established;—but he deserves no blame if he is merely silent with respect to some things which may nevertheless have taken place. He endeavours to understand the true significance and meaning of such historical events as are of universal importance; and with regard to them he calls to mind only the *fact* of their occurrence;—the *manner* in which they took place, which doubtless implies many other facts, he leaves to the empirical Historian. Should he find that, with his perhaps limited knowledge of historical details, he may yet be able to understand and explain a fact in its connexion with the whole World-Plan much better than he who possesses a more extensive acquaintance with such details, he need not be surprised at this, for only on this account is he a Philosopher. In short, it is Necessity which guides our Race,—not by any means a mere blind Necessity, but the living, conscious, and intelligent Necessity of the Divine Life; and only after we have come under this gentle leading can we be truly free, and

of the origin and limits of history
has been said
best.

interpenetrated with Life; for beyond this there is nothing but Illusion and Unreality. Nothing is as it is, because God wills it so arbitrarily, but because He cannot manifest Himself otherwise than as he does. To acknowledge this guidance, humbly to acquiesce therein, and in the consciousness of this identity with the Divine Power to attain true Blessedness, is the business of all men; to comprehend in clear intelligence what is Universal, Absolute, Eternal, and Unchangeable in this leading of the Human Race, is the business of the Philosopher; to set forth the Actual Phenomena of the inconstant and ever-changing spheres over which with steadfast course it holds its way, is the business of the Historian;—whose discoveries are only incidentally employed by the former.

It is of course to be understood that the use which we have partly made of History already, and partly still intend to make of it, can be no other than this its philosophical use, and cannot be looked at otherwise than as we have described it to-day,—I trust clearly and distinctly. Our next task shall be to show how the Idea of the State according to Reason gradually became realized among men, and at what point of this development of the Absolute State our own Age stands. In order to confine ourselves very carefully within the boundaries of our own Science, and not to give any cause on our part for reviving the old dispute between Philosophy and History, we shall not even give out that which we have to state on this subject as ascertained historical data, but only as hypotheses and distinct questions for History, leaving it to the Historian to bring them to the test of facts, and to inquire how far they are confirmed thereby. Should our views prove merely new and interesting, they may still give rise to inquiries from which at least something also new and interesting may come forth, if not exactly that which was

hoped for;—and so our trouble shall not be wholly lost. Restricting ourselves to this modest desire, we hope that we shall not lose the countenance even of the **Historian.**

LECTURE X.

THE ABSOLUTE FORM OF THE STATE.

To show at what point of its development the State has arrived in our own Age, is our next business as announced in the last lecture. The intelligibility of the demonstration which we have to make must evidently depend upon our starting from a strictly defined conception of the State in its Absolute Form.

There is nothing, especially in the Epoch in which we live, about which more has been written, read, and spoken, than about the State: therefore in all cultivated, even if not exactly scientific society, we can reckon, almost with certainty, upon a greater amount of existing knowledge and opinion concerning the State than concerning any other subject. We must first of all declare, especially with regard to what we intend to say here upon this question, that we partly coincide with certain well-known authors but upon other and profounder principles than theirs; while we differ from them again in many important matters: and that the view of the State most prevalent among German Philosophers is not unknown to us, according to which the State ought to be almost nothing more than a juridical institution;—a view which we oppose with deliberate and well-considered determination. It is to be remembered, then, that we are

compelled to begin with some apparently uninteresting principles, concerning which, all I can ask of you at first is only to keep them in mind:—but I trust that before the end of this lecture these principles shall have become quite clear, by means of farther definitions and applications.

The Absolute State is in its form, according to our opinion, an artistic institution, intended to direct all individual powers towards the Life of the Race and to transfuse them therein; and thus to realize and manifest in individual life the general form of the Idea, as we have already sufficiently described it. Since the State cannot calculate upon the inward life and the original activity of the Idea in the minds of men,—all life in Idea being of this latter kind, as we have seen in our former lectures,—and since it rather operates outwardly upon individuals who feel no desire, but on the contrary a reluctance, to offer up their individual life for the Race, it follows that this institution must be one of constraint. For those individuals in whom the Idea has assumed a real inward life, and whose wish and desire is nothing else than to offer up their lives for the Race, no constraint is necessary and for them it disappears;—the State remains, with respect to them, only that comprehensive Unity which continually watches over the Whole, which points out and explains at all times the first and nearest purpose of the Race, and arranges the willing powers of man in their appropriate sphere of action. It is an *artistic* institution, we have said: but it is so, in the strictest sense of this word as an institution of free and self-intelligent Art, only after it has scientifically penetrated to its complete and perfect purpose in the Age of Reason as Knowledge, and to the means for the attainment of that purpose, when the Fifth Age of Reason as Art has begun. But there is also an order in Nature, that is, in the destiny of the Human Race, through which it is led towards its true end without its own know-

ledge or will; which order might be called the Art of Nature: and in this sense alone I call the State, in the first Ages of the Human Race, an *artistic* institution. What we have already set forth as the dedication of all individual powers to the purpose of the Race, is the Absolute State according to its *form*; i. e. the existence of a State at all depends simply on the dedication of the individual powers to a purpose of the Race whatever that purpose of the Race may be. It remains, however, quite undecided by this definition of the State, *how many* purposes of the Race to the attainment of which the individual power is to be dedicated can be prosecuted in particular States;—and it remains just as undecided by this definition what is *the* absolute purpose of the Race, by the disclosure of which the *material* of the State,—the true meaning and purpose of it,—might be described.

And now, after these preliminary definitions, to examine more closely the Idea which we have announced: In the first place, the State which has to direct a necessarily finite sum of individual powers towards the common purpose, must regard itself as a completed whole; and, as its common purpose is identical with that of the Human Race, it must regard the aggregate of its citizens as the Human Race itself. It is not irreconcilable with this view that it may also entertain purposes connected with others who are not numbered among its Citizens: for these purposes will still be its own, undertaken merely on its own account,—those, namely, to the attainment of which it directs the individual powers of its own Citizens;—and in every case, therefore, it devotes these powers to itself, considered as the Highest, as the Race. It is therefore the same thing whether we say, as above, that the State directs all individual powers *towards the life of the Race*; or, as here, that it directs them *towards its own life as the State*: only that this latter expression first acquires its true meaning through the former, as we shall soon see.

Once more :—the nature of the Absolute State consists herein,—that all individual powers be directed towards the Life of the Race,—in place of which Race the State puts the aggregate of its own Citizens. It therefore becomes necessary, *first*, that *all Individuals*, without exception, should be embraced and taken into equal account by the State; and *second*, that every Individual with *all his individual powers*, without exception or reserve, should be likewise taken into account. In a State so constituted, where all as Individuals are dedicated to the Race, it follows at the same time, that all the Rights which belong to them as component parts of the Race are dedicated to all the other individual members of the State. For, to what are the powers of all directed?—to the Race. But what does the State hold as the representative of the Race?—all its Citizens, without a single exception. Were there some Individuals either not taken into account at all in the common purpose, or not taken into account with all their powers, while the rest were included,—then the former would enjoy all the *advantages* of the union without bearing all the attendant *burdens*, and there would thus be inequality. Only where all without exception are taken into account, is equality the result. Consequently, in this constitution, the individuality of each absolutely disappears in the community of all; and each one receives back his contribution to the common power, strengthened by the united powers of all the rest. The purpose of the isolated Individual is his own enjoyment, and he uses his power as the means of its attainment;—the purpose of the Race is Culture, and the honourable subsistence which is the condition of Culture: in the State, each Individual employs his powers, not for his own immediate enjoyment, but for the purpose of the Race, and he receives in return the whole united Culture of the Race, and therewith his own honourable subsistence. We must guard ourselves, however, against regarding the State as if it

were dependent on this or that Individual, or on Individuals generally, and were composed of them:—almost the only way in which ordinary philosophers are able to conceive of a Whole. The State, in itself, is an unseen Idea; just as the Race has been described in our former lectures: it is—not single Individuals, but their continuous relation to each other, the living and ever-changing production of which is the work of Individuals as they exist in space. To make my idea clear by an example:—The Rulers are by no means the State, but merely Citizens, like all the rest; and there is absolutely no *individual character* in the State but that of Citizen. The Rulers, as well as all other Individuals, with all their individual powers, are taken into account in order to direct the powers of the governed,—who no more than they constitute the State,—towards the common purpose, so far as they understand it, and to enforce this purpose on all who are opposed to it. Only that result which arises from their guidance and the directed power of the governed taken together, do we call the State in the strictest sense of the word.

Only one objection is here to be anticipated; which I meet directly. It may be said: Why then are all the powers of Individuals to be taken into account in the purpose of the State? If this purpose might be attained at less cost, would it not, in that case, be sufficient to secure the desired equality that the *necessary* expenditure of power should be equally divided among All; and the free use of the *superfluous* power be left to the free will of each Individual? To which we reply:—First of all, the supposed case, that the united power of all Individuals might not be necessary for the purpose of the State, can never occur, and is impossible. Such powers of the Individual as are perhaps unknown to himself, and also such as may be known to him but are unknown or unavailable to the State, are indeed not to be taken into account in the purpose of the State; but all individual

power which is known and accessible to the State is necessary to it for the furtherance of its purpose:—its purpose is Culture, and in order to maintain the position to which a State has already attained, and to advance still further, it requires at all times the exertion of every available power;—for only through the united power of All has it attained this position. Should it not take the whole into account, it must recede instead of advancing, and lose its position in the ranks of Culture: and what would further arise out of this we shall see at another time. Secondly, I ask,—What would the Citizens do with the remaining power which should in that case be left for their free use?—Shall they remain idle and leave this power unemployed? This is contrary to every form of Culture and is in itself Barbarism; the cultivated man cannot be inactive or unemployed beyond the necessary period of rest required by his sensuous nature, and this period of rest the State in any case would have left to him. Or shall they apply this power for the advancement of their individual purposes? In a Perfect State no just individual purpose can exist which is not included in the purposes of the Community, and for the attainment of which the Community does not provide. Should it finally be said,—This power may be applied by the Individual for the purpose of his own private and undisturbed Culture;—then my answer would be,—There is no kind of Culture which does not proceed from society, that is from the State, in the strictest sense of the word; and none on which it is not incumbent to strive to return to the State again: this Culture is therefore itself a purpose of the State, and its advancement in each Individual according to his degree must have already been taken into account in the Perfect State. We shall afterwards take care that this shall not be misunderstood in its application to the Actual State: here we speak only of the Perfect State, and to it the

principle which we have laid down is applicable without any limitation.

To raise themselves with freedom to this Absolute State, as one of the conditions imposed by Reason on the Human Race, is the vocation of Mankind. This gradual elevation could take place neither in the state of Innocence among the Normal People, nor in the state of original Barbarism among the Savages.

Not among the former:—there men found themselves in the most perfect social relations, without need of any restraint or superintendence: every one acted justly and for the common advantage, spontaneously and without reflection on his own part, or on the part of any one else for him; and without this condition being first brought about either by his own skill or by any process of nature:—we have here no trace of a new genesis. Neither could this occur among the latter:—there each individual cared only for himself; and indeed only for his lower, merely animal, wants; and no one rose to the conception of any higher enjoyment. Consequently it was only in the commingling of the two original tribes of our Race, as the Actual Human Race of History, that the development of the State could begin and be carried out.

The first condition of a State, and the first essential characteristic of our idea of it, as stated above, is this: *That Freemen must at first become subject to the will and superintendence of other Freemen.* Freemen, I say, in opposition to *Slaves*: and by Freemen I mean those to whose own skill and judgment it is left to provide the means of subsistence for themselves and their families; who are accordingly sovereign heads of families, and even continue to be so after their submission to a foreign will which has other purposes in view. A *Slave*, on the contrary, is he to whom there is not left even the care for his own subsistence, but who is maintained by another, and in return becomes subject with his whole

powers to the arbitrary will of his master; who therefore cannot be the head of a family, but is a member of a foreign family, and a bondsman for life; his master having no other reason for maintaining him but that his maintenance is more profitable than his destruction. *Freemen*, I said, as such, and on the supposition that they still remain free, must subject themselves to a foreign will;—and I said so for this reason:—It belongs to the Idea of a State, that the subjected may at least themselves *become* a purpose; and this can only occur when in their subjection they still remain free within a certain sphere, and this sphere of their liberty afterwards comes within the purpose of the State when the State advances to higher Culture;—but the *Slave* as such, and in the case of his never attaining freedom, cannot himself become a purpose; he is at best, like every other animal, a mere instrument of his master's purpose; but by no means a purpose himself. In this subjection of Freemen to the oversight and rule of other Freemen, there are then two, or, if we reckon otherwise, three cases possible: and,—as this subjection is the origin of the State,—there are just as many possible fundamental forms of the State, through which it must pass towards its accomplishment; and I entreat you to observe well, and even to commit to memory, these fundamental forms, as the foundation upon which we intend to rest all our subsequent disquisitions upon this subject.

Namely,—by this subjection the general mass of individuals who have thereby come into combination, considered as a completed Whole, are either *All without exception subjected to the Whole*, that is, to the common purpose of All,—as it should be in the Perfect State; or *they are not All subjected to the Whole*. The latter case, where All are not subjected to the Whole, can only be supposed possible in this way,—as the *subjected* at least are All subjected,—that the *subjectors* have not, on

their part, subjected themselves reciprocally to the others and to the necessary purposes which are common to the others and to themselves. The subjectors have consequently subjected the others to their *own* particular purpose; which,—as it cannot be, or at least cannot be wholly, one of sensuous enjoyment—for in that case they would at once have reduced the subjected to slavery and destroyed their freedom altogether,—must necessarily be the purpose of ruling for the sake of ruling. This would be our *first* case, as it is the first form which the State assumes in Time;—namely, *the absolute inequality of the members of the State*, who are divided into the classes of Rulers and Ruled, which can never exchange their relative positions so long as this arrangement endures. It is evident here, in passing, that such a State cannot subdue its vassals *with all their powers* to its purpose, as the State can certainly do when it has a better purpose in view:—for, in so doing, it would make them perfect Slaves, and would thereby cease to deserve the name even of a nascent State. Our other case was this:—That all the individual members of the State, without exception, are subjected to the purpose of the Whole. This, again, is possible in two ways:—First, all the individual members may be only *negatively* subjected to the Whole; that is, a purpose may be secured to every one without exception, in the prosecution of which no one else dares to hinder him. Such a purpose, secured by the constitution against interference on the part of any one else, is called a *Right*: in such a constitution, therefore, every one has a Right to which all other men without exception are subjected. Equality of *Right* for all men *as Right*; but by no means identical *Rights*;—for the purposes secured to different individuals may be very different in extent, and the existing state of such relations was generally taken for the measure of Right when the dominion of Laws began. It is evident that the State which occupies this

position, since it confers Rights upon some of its Citizens which exceed the Rights of others who are nevertheless able to keep their ground, is far from subjecting all the powers of these favourites to its purpose: nay, since by these Privileges of its favourites it hinders the others in the free use of their powers, that it even wastes these powers for the purposes of Individuals; and therefore, with all its Equality of Right, is far removed from the Absolute form of the State. The case we have now described would be the *second* fundamental form of the State, and the second stage upon which our Race would find itself in its progress towards the perfect form of the State. Lastly,—that all the individual members of the State are subjected to the purpose of the Whole, may also mean, that they are not merely subjected negatively thereto, but *also positively*; so that absolutely no Individual can propose any purpose to himself, and devote himself to its furtherance, which is his own merely and not at the same time the purpose of the whole Community. It is obvious that in such a constitution all the powers of all men are taken into account for the common purpose,—this common purpose being no other than the purpose of all men without exception considered as a Race; and that therefore this constitution manifests the Absolute form of the State, and a true equality of Rights and Powers begins. This equality does not by any means exclude the distinction of Classes in society; that is, the different modes in which human power may be applied, which are left to the exclusive cultivation of Individuals, who again leave the other modes of this application of power to the exclusive cultivation of other men. But no Class, and no exclusive application of power, must be permitted, which is not dedicated to the purpose of the Whole, and which is not absolutely necessary for the Whole;—the produce of which is not actually partaken of by all other classes, and by all the Individuals who compose these classes, according

to their ability to enjoy it. This would be the *third* stage of the development of the State;—in which it would be perfected, at least according to its *Form*.

It will be found, and perhaps it may be understood at once by the more attentive and prepared auditor, that by means of this perfection of its *Form*, the State for the first time obtains possession of its true *Material*,—that is, the genuine purpose of the Human Race which has associated itself within it; and that it has still to go through many stages of its progress before its end shall be attained. We speak here in the meantime only of the *Form* of the State.

I have undertaken these preliminary inquiries in order that we may be enabled to show what point of its development the State has attained in our own Age,—in those countries, of course, where it is farthest advanced. In the meantime I may declare, that in my opinion the State, still occupied with the completion of its *Form*, has now firmly established itself on what we have described as the second stage, and endeavours to attain the third;—which latter it has even attained in part, and in part has not yet attained. Hence, that in our own Age more than at any previous time, every Citizen with all his powers, is subjected to the purpose of the State, is thoroughly penetrated by it, and so has become its instrument; and that the State endeavours to make this subjection universal and complete:—this constitutes, in our opinion, the fundamental character of the Age in its Civil Relations. What we precisely mean by this assertion, and that it is actually the case, will be most easily shown by depicting Times when it was not so; and by setting forth historically how, and by what course, it has gradually become as it now is. We reserve this inquiry, as well as some other investigations, which must precede it, for the following lectures.

Let us, however, discuss one not unimportant point of this *Material* to-day:—that of Political Freedom. Even in

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the first form of the State the Subject remained personally free: he did not become a Slave. Had all been made Slaves, then the nature of the whole institution would have been lost. In this condition, however, not even the personal freedom of the Subject was guaranteed: he might be reduced to slavery by one of the Rulers; he had therefore no Civil Freedom,—that is, as we have explained it above, *he had no Right secured to him by the constitution*: he was in fact not a Citizen but only a Subject; a Subject, however, only to a certain extent,—not being a Slave; and beyond the limits of his subjection he was free,—not through Law, but through Nature and Accident. In the second form of the State, each Individual, without exception, received back through the constitution a portion of freedom,—not exactly of arbitrary power, but of independence,—by which he compelled all other men to respect a certain purpose or Right which belonged peculiarly to him;—and every one had thus his own degree, not of mere personal liberty, but of secured and therefore *Civil Freedom*; while beyond this he was a Subject; and if the Privileges of others, by which he was restrained, were more extensive than his own,—he was more a Subject than a Citizen. In the Absolute form of the State, where all the powers of all men are called into activity for the necessary purpose of the whole community, each Individual binds all others just in so far as he is bound by them: all have equal Civil Rights or Civil Freedom; and each Individual is thus at once a complete Citizen and a complete Subject;—and, for the same reason, all are Citizens and Subjects in like manner. If we call that the Sovereign power which in reality gives its purpose to the State, then, in this last-mentioned form of the State, every Citizen will be a part of the Sovereign power in the same manner and in the same degree;—and if in this respect we bestow the title *Sovereign* upon Individuals, then the principle just laid down may also be expressed thus:—Each Individual is

entirely a *Sovereign* in respect of his necessary purpose as a member of the Race, and entirely a *Subject* in respect of the application of his individual powers:—and all are therefore both Sovereign and Subject in the same manner.

Such is the case in reference to the State, when taken in its strictest sense, as we have described it above,—i.e. as an Idea. It is a wholly different question, possessing nothing in common with the former one,—Who then shall understand and measure this purpose of the State given to it in reality, although not openly, by the Community as a whole, and, by means of this estimate, guide the power of the Citizens, and compel such as may oppose themselves thereto?—in one word, Who shall govern? Since it is impossible that any higher estimate of the purpose which has been given to the State by the Community as a whole can find a place in the State itself,—all other powers and capacities in the State being subjected to this supreme estimate and guided thereby;—it follows that this estimate is associated with external independence and freedom; and indeed with *Political Freedom*, if the Greek word from which this expression is derived may be applied to the active and efficient administration of a State. The former question would regard *the Constitution of the State*, which is and ought to be absolutely determined by Reason alone: the question now raised is directed to the *Form of Government*.

It is evident, that with respect to the latter, only two cases are possible: either all individuals without exception take part *by right*, and in a perfectly equal degree, in this estimate, and, by means of it, in the direction of all the powers of the State; and then All are partakers of Political Freedom, and are so in an equal degree:—or this estimate, and the direction consequent upon it, is given over exclusively to a certain number of individuals:—which latter case, according to our previous investigations, amounts to

nothing more than this,—that a particular Class in society is established by Art, or is met with in Nature and History, to which is committed, as its exclusive branch of the general application of power, the estimate of the purpose of the State, and the task of governing according to this estimate; while the other Classes direct their powers to something else; and all of them, in their common character as the governed, stand opposed to the Rulers. Here Political Freedom is possessed only by the Rulers; the governed are altogether without it, and, in reference to the Government, they are merely Subjects.

In the first place, the Constitution of the State, as it should be according to Reason, is not necessarily altered or abridged in any respect by such a form of Government as we have now described. The governing Class remains subject to the common purpose of the State, which is determined by the general wants of the Community; and it must apply all its powers, without exception or reserve, *directly* to the attainment of this purpose; just as the other Classes have to dedicate their labour *indirectly* to the attainment of the same purpose: hence, in regard to this purpose, it is as much subjected as the others. This Class itself, as a constituent element of the Race, is a part of the purpose of the State; and the attainment of its wants, as an element of the Race, but not as a governing Class, must likewise be secured; and the Ruler is therefore a Citizen, just as much as all the others but in no higher degree.

It is thus only the form of the *State* which is determined, and its realization absolutely required, by Reason; but by no means the form of *Government*. If the purpose of the State be understood, as clearly as is possible at the time, and all existing power be directed towards the realization of this highest conception, then is the Government right and good, whether it be in the hands of All, or in the hands of a few Individuals, or finally in those of a

single Individual:—it being understood, in this last case, that this single Individual chooses his assistants according to his own judgment, who remain subject and responsible to him. Civil Freedom, and that to an equal degree, is absolutely required for all men; but Political Freedom is, at most, only necessary for one. All the inquiries which have ever been set on foot concerning the best Government, particularly in later times, have had finally in view to find a means of restraining the all-restraining power of Government:—first of all, in order that, as an absolutely correct insight cannot be obtained by force, there may at least be the best possible insight actually applied to the Government; and, in that case, that this best possible insight shall be actually realized. How useful soever this inquiry may be in itself, and however possible the theoretical solution of the problem, which indeed may actually have been solved somewhere; yet thousands of years may pass over our Race before this solution can belong to a philosophical characterization of any Present Age. It is a fortunate and satisfactory thing for us, that in the actual position of all cultivated States, and in the whole present Stage of Culture, there are numerous urgent and constraining reasons for every Government striving to attain the clearest possible insight into the true purpose of the State, and acting at all times with all its powers, according to the best insight which it has attained.

In the pursuance of our inquiries, we shall have opportunities to refer to these reasons. Could such indications on our part, and the whole range of inquiries which we have begun to-day, contribute anything especially towards making the particular Constitution under which we live more intelligible, and thereby dearer and more valuable, to us, then would one end be attained which belongs to the purpose of these lectures.

LECTURE XI.

FARTHER DEFINITION OF THE IDEA OF THE STATE.

To determine at what stage of its development the State has arrived in the Present Age, is the problem with which we are now occupied, and to solve which we have undertaken the immediately preceding inquiries and investigations. We had first of all to declare the mere *Form* of the State; that is, what is implied in the mere general assertion of the existence of the State;—and this we have done in our last lecture. Should this investigation have appeared to some to be too speculative,—so that, on this account, it has either never been entirely clear to them, or is not now any longer wholly present to their memory,—this can only arise, in my opinion, from this,—that in their attempt to comprehend the form of the State their attention has been distributed over too large a number of Individuals, wholly different from each other in respect of their outward qualities; while at the same time it is requisite that this multitude of Individuals should be regarded as an indivisible organic Whole. For the Understanding, this business of comprehension is not rendered more difficult by the multitude and variety of these elements; but the Imagination, and still more the common power of observation which is accustomed to take cognizance only of the peculiarities of Individuals and of Classes, is easily

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ed, unless it has had a certain amount of practice beforehand. Thus, in order to make our ideas perfectly clear to those who perchance have not altogether understood our former lecture; and to bring the whole once more at one view before those to whom it may no longer be thoroughly present in memory; let us to-day illustrate our views by the example of a smaller Community, to which, although not itself a State, we may give the *form* of the State,—that being all with which we are concerned at present.

Let us suppose a union, perhaps by mutual agreement, of several natural families into one, which would thenceforward be an artificial family. The purpose of such a union could be nothing more than to acquire and preserve, as far as possible, by their common labour, the means of physical existence; and hence this union would not constitute a State,—the State not being an economical society, and having a purpose very different from the mere physical maintenance of individual life. But let us give to this family-union the general form of the State. This is only possible in the three following ways:—Either all the members of the community are bound to apply their whole time and ability to labour for the whole number of families composing it, so that they cannot occupy themselves with aught else; while, on the other hand, all without exception have an equal interest in the property and enjoyments of the whole;—there being nothing whatever belonging to the household which is not the property of all, and which would not, were the occasion to arise, actually be expended for any one. That each should apply his whole ability for all the families, I said;—meaning thereby, in so far as he possesses such ability. It is not allowable that any one should say,—‘I am stronger than all the others; I do more for the common good, and therefore I must have something more than others in the division of enjoyments;’—for the union and combination of

all into one Society is altogether *unconditional*; — that this one is the strongest is quite *accidental*; were he the weakest he would not be less cared for on that account; and were he accidentally to become weak or sick, so that he could no longer do anything for the common good, he would still be cared for in the same way. Were our supposed family-union organized in this way, it would then bear the Absolute form of the State, *as it ought to be according to Reason*,—consisting in Equal Rights for All.

Or:—the constitution of our supposed society might be thus arranged:—that perhaps,—for we may leave this point undetermined,—that perhaps all, without exception, are bound to apply all their powers for the purposes of the community; and also that there is no one to whom the participation in some portion of what has been acquired by the common labour is not secured; but that, nevertheless, only a few are admitted to partake of whatever is most precious and valuable in the produce of the common power, while the others are excluded from this enjoyment. In this case it would follow, that those who are thus excluded have laboured only *in part* for the whole community, and in part not for the whole (to which nevertheless they themselves belong), but only for the few favoured individuals; and hence that they have been, not indeed wholly, but yet in this latter respect, only means for the attainment of the purpose of these others. This arrangement would represent the second possible form of the State: Equality of *Right* for all, but not *Equal Rights*. *Finally*, we may conceive of this union of families in the following way:—that the greater number of its members labour with all their powers to acquire a permanent and fixed estate, while some neither put their own hand to the work, nor direct the labour of others, nor trouble themselves in any way whatever about the matter; but only come from time to time, and snatch from the property accumulated by the labour of the others, whatever is most

accessible and pleasing to themselves; at most taking care that the working part of the community be not wholly ruined;—but even this only by their own arbitrary choice, since no one can bind them to this foresight. This condition of the society would bear the first form of the State:—the absolute subjugation of the many to the selfish purposes of the few, and absolute extinction of Rights among all.—This would be a picture of the three possible fundamental forms of the State which we have already enumerated.

From this constitution of the *State* and the *Personal* and *Civil* Freedom which are its necessary elements, we carefully distinguished the form of *Government* and the *Political* Freedom which belongs to it. That which we have adduced on this latter subject may likewise be illustrated by our imaginary community. In the supposed family-union, all the powers therein united ought to be directed to the attainment of the common purpose. This can be secured only by one single Will assuming the guidance of the whole application of power,—determining at all times what ought to be done immediately for the purpose of the community, and what may be deferred; what must be infallibly accomplished, and what may be relinquished should sufficient time and ability be wanting for its attainment;—a Will which appoints each one his place, so that his exertions may not interrupt, but assist and cooperate with, the labours of others;—a Will, in fine, to which each individual unconditionally submits his own will in respect to the employment of his powers for the purposes of the community. Whence shall proceed this one Will which is to guide all other wills?—Either all the members of the community who have attained mature age assemble together so often as a new resolution is needed upon the common interests; all, without exception, express their opinion on the question proposed, so far as they understand it; and, after sufficient general delibera-

tion, the majority of voices decides the point,—to which decision all must thenceforward be subject in their outward actions, whatever they may think in their own minds of its justice. If the community be constituted in this way, then each has *by Right* an equal share in the direction of the common purpose,—which direction in the State is called Government; and this freedom, which with reference to the State we call *Political Freedom*, is thus *by Right* equally divided among all. *By Right*, I have said, both in the former lecture with reference to the State, and in this with reference to the supposed family-union; for should there be any one who is not possessed of any opinions upon the common good, or who, if he do possess such opinions, yet cannot express them; then he would *actually* possess little or no influence in the ultimate determination of the community; but he would not be excluded from this influence by defect of Right, but only by his own incapacity.

Or, in the second case,—the community may have made over to a committee composed of a few Individuals, or even to one Individual, the superintendence and direction of the whole;—and in this case they resign their own right of direction and judgment in the administration of Government,—but only so far as outward action is concerned, for in thought and speech they are still at liberty to do what they will,—and unconditionally subject their own practically active will to the will of their authorised committee or individual manager. In this method of prosecuting the common purpose, there is no place for what the State calls *Political Freedom*, but only the condition of subjection. Nevertheless, if all without exception have an equal share in all the advantages of the community, and if all the individual powers are directed by the best possible insight towards the common good, and not towards any private advantage, then the management of the community is perfectly legitimate; and it has lost

nothing by making over the direction to a few or even to one; but, on the contrary, has gained thereby, since many Individuals who could have contributed nothing available for the common good in the assembly, are no longer compelled to sacrifice their time in attending there, but may instead continue peaceably to practise that which they understand.

All that has been now illustrated by means of our supposed community, we had already adduced in our former lecture upon the form of the State, or upon the question, —What is implied in the mere existence of a State? But we added at that time, that the position of a particular State, or of the State at a particular Epoch of Time, is also to be determined by this inquiry,—whether, and in how far, the true purpose of all States,—or whether, and in how far, the *Material* of the State as distinguished from its *Form*,—has been attained therein? We must further discuss this *Material* of the State before we can begin the historical inquiry,—how the State has gradually attained that point of its development upon which, in our opinion, it now stands.

The purpose of the State is, as we have already shown in our last lecture, no other than that of the Human Race itself:—to order all its relations according to the Laws of Reason. It is only after the Age of Reason as Knowledge shall have been traversed, and we shall have arrived at the Age of Reason as Art, that the State can reflect upon this purpose with clear consciousness. Till then it constantly promotes this purpose, but without its own knowledge or free premeditated design; prompted thereto by the natural law of the development of our Race, even while it has a totally different purpose in view;—with which purpose of its own Nature has indissolubly bound up the purpose of the whole Race. This special and natural purpose of the State in the earlier Epochs which precede the Epoch of Reason as Knowledge, is like that of

individual men,—mere self-preservation; and, as the State exists only in the Race, the mere preservation of the Race; and, as the Race develops itself progressively, its preservation in each particular stage of that development;—in both the two last-mentioned cases without the State entertaining any clear conception of its purpose. In one word, the purpose of the State, *i.e.* to maintain itself,—and the purpose of Nature, *i.e.* to place the Human Race under such external conditions as may enable it to form itself, by its own free activity, into an express image of Reason,—wholly coincide; and while the attainment of the former is pursued, the latter is at the same time being accomplished.

Let us consider this matter in detail:—

In the intermixture of original Culture and original Barbarism,—from which intermixture alone a Human Race capable of development could arise,—the first and immediate purpose is the reclamation of the savage tribes. Again, when we arrive at the first traces of a State, and Freemen are permanently subjected to other Freemen according to a definite rule, there Culture already exists;—artificial Culture namely produced by civilization, not the original Culture of the Normal People of which we do not here speak;—and we may therefore regard the State, particularly in the most perfect form which it has assumed in any given Age, as at the same time the seat of the highest Culture of that Age. Barbarism stands directly opposed to the purposes of this Culture wherever it comes in contact with them, and constantly threatens the existence of the State; which thus finds itself, even by the necessity of its own preservation, placed in natural war with the surrounding Barbarism, and is compelled to use every effort for its overthrow,—which latter, indeed, can only be thoroughly accomplished by bringing the Barbarians themselves under the dominion of law and order, and, in so far, cultivating them. Thus, while thinking only of itself, the State pro-

notes indirectly the great purpose of the Human Race. This natural war of all States against the surrounding Barbarism is of great significance for History: it is this, almost exclusively, which introduces a living and progressive principle into History. We shall revert to this principle at another time, and therefore I entreat you to note this. Even after the general dominion of Culture has become so powerful that it has nothing more to fear from outward Barbarism,—after it is perhaps divided from this Barbarism by broad oceans,—it will nevertheless, impelled by an inward necessity, seek out those Barbarians who can no longer approach it, in order to appropriate to itself those products of their lands which they themselves do not employ, or those lands themselves; or it may be, to subdue to itself the powers of those Barbarians;—in part directly, by means of slavery,—and in part indirectly, by means of unfair and overreaching commerce. However unjust these purposes may appear in themselves, yet, by means of them, the first characteristic of the World-Plan, i.e. the general diffusion of Culture, is gradually promoted;—and thus will it continually proceed, until the whole Race which inhabits our globe shall, according to the same plan, be amalgamated into one great republic of Culture.

A second necessary purpose of the Human Race is, that surrounding Nature, which exercises an influence upon its existence as well as upon its actions, shall be wholly and completely subdued to the jurisdiction of the Understanding. No power of Nature shall prejudice or disturb the purposes of Culture, nor be able to destroy the results of such purposes; every manifestation of such power shall be ascertainable beforehand, and there shall be known and accessible means of preventing any consequent danger. It shall be possible to compel every useful power of Nature to shape itself to the uses and purposes of men. The powers of Man, again, shall be multiplied by an appropriate distribution of the necessary branches of labour among many

members, each of whom shall acquire only one branch, but acquire that one well;—these powers shall be armed with the knowledge of Nature and of Art, and with convenient implements and machinery, and thus be raised superior to every power of Nature; so that all the mere earthly purposes of man may be attained without superfluous expenditure of time or labour, and sufficient opportunity be left remaining for him to turn his attention upon inward and supersensual things. This is the purpose of the Human Race as such.

In the State, the greater the proportion of the time and power of its Citizens which it requires and must lay claim to for the purpose of its own support, and the more thoroughly it seeks to interpenetrate all its members and make them the instruments of this purpose,—the more must it endeavour to multiply and extend the means of physical life, by promoting that dominion of Man over Nature which we have already described, in order that it may thereby secure the existence of its Citizens;—it must therefore accept all the before-mentioned purposes of the Race, and assume them as its own, for the sake of its own purpose. It will consequently,—to adopt the common enumeration of these purposes,—strive to quicken Industry; to improve Agriculture; to carry to their highest perfection Manufactures, Commerce, and Machinery; and to encourage discoveries in the Mechanical Arts and in Natural Science. Let it be believed that it does all this only with the view of adding to its revenue, and of being enabled to maintain a larger army;—let even the Rulers themselves, at least for the most part, be unconscious of any higher design; it nevertheless promotes, though without its own knowledge, the purpose which we have indicated as that of the Human Race as such.

The outward purpose of this dominion of the Race over Nature is, as we have said in one of our first lectures, a

double purpose:—Either that Nature may be subjected merely to the purpose of rendering our sensuous existence more easy and agreeable,—whence arise the Mechanical Arts; or that it may be subjected to the higher spiritual wants of man, and have stamped upon it the majestic image of the Idea,—whence arises Fine Art. A State which has yet much to fear for its external existence, and requires to make great efforts in order to place even that in safety, will indeed, so soon as it attains the first glimpse of its true interest, study to promote in every possible way the Mechanical Arts, in the extended sense which we have given to them above; but since it does this merely with the view of having at command a larger surplus of the national power which it may then employ for the maintenance of its own security, it will apply this surplus of power only to that purpose, and will have little remaining for the systematic and general promotion of Fine Art, or of still higher purposes of Humanity. It is only after the State, even for the sake of its own self-preservation, has subjected Nature to the mechanical uses of its Citizens, and made these Citizens themselves, and all of them equally, its instruments in the highest possible degree;—after the whole empire of Culture has entered into such relations with that of Barbarism, and the particular States into which the former may be divided have entered into such relations with each other, that no one need any longer be anxious about his external security;—it is only after this has taken place, that the question arises,—To what should the surplus of national power, rendered superfluous by the mechanical elaboration of Nature, which surplus of power has hitherto been devoted to the security of the State, and stands entirely under the authority of the State, as all the Citizens do;—to what shall this surplus of power be applied?—and there can be no other answer given to

this question than that it should be devoted to Fine Art. During War, Art can scarcely exist, far less advance with sure step and according to a settled plan;—the time of War, however, is not limited to the period when War is actually carried on; but the general insecurity of all men with respect to each other, and the constant state of preparation for War resulting from this, is itself War; and has almost the same consequences for the Human Race as active War.] Only real, that is permanent, Peace, can be the parent of Art as we understand that word.

I said that only after the State has attained to perfect external security, the question arises, to what the surplus of national power, now no longer necessary for the purposes to which it was previously directed, should be applied. This question is also one which is obviously forced upon the State by the purposes of self-preservation; since, from such a considerable mass of power, undirected and uncomputed, and which nevertheless cannot by possibility remain wholly quiescent, nothing is to be expected but disturbances and hindrances to the State in the prosecution of its prescribed plans, and therefore the breaking up of its internal peace; and thus it is obvious that, in all those respects to which we have adverted, the State stands under a higher guidance, concealed it may be from itself; and that while, in its own belief, it is merely pursuing its special purpose of self-preservation, it is nevertheless, at the same time, promoting the higher purpose of the development of the Human Race.

For the rest:—It is only for the sake of completeness that we have introduced this latter point;—namely, how and under what external conditions the State is compelled, even in providing for its own preservation, to adopt the general and universally accessible form of Fine Art, as its own purpose: not by any means as indicating that this

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consideration belongs to the characteristics of the Present, or of any preceding Age. Should this latter assertion surprise any one who thinks of the loud talk about Art, and the promotion of Art, current in the present day even among our great men, we would entreat such an one to consider that this talk cannot have escaped us; that as little can it have escaped us that twice,—first, by a peculiar concurrence of circumstances, among which one at least can never re-appear, and a second time, from the Christian Church, there has burst forth a morning-dawn of Art, the beams of which continue to illumine our present day though with a reflected splendour; but that nevertheless the expression Fine Art, and particularly a Fine Art pervading the whole nation and every branch of its activity, has with us a signification quite different from the common one; of which meaning we have here neither time nor opportunity to give such a full account as is requisite for its proper comprehension.

Thus far, and no farther, extends the legitimate promotion of the purposes of Reason by means of the State while the latter appears to be occupied solely with the pursuit of its own purpose. The higher branches of the Culture of Reason,—Religion, Science, Virtue,—can never become purposes of the State. Not Religion:—We do not here speak of the superstitious fear of God as a Being hostile to man, which ancient nations conjured up from their own thoughts in order that they might propitiate this dreadful Being in name of the nation and so establish National Religions:—with this we have nothing to do at present. The True Religion is as old as creation, and therefore older than any State. It was one of the arrangements of that Providence which watches over the development of our Race that this True Religion should, at the proper time, reappear from out the obscurity in which it had previously lain concealed, and

spread itself over the realm of Culture; asserting even beforehand the claim that the State should have no power over it, and exacting from the Rulers, as the condition of their reception into the bosom of this Religion, the acknowledgment of their submission to God and the equality of all men in his sight; and devolving its preservation and extension upon a society in so far wholly independent of the State,—i.e. the Church. So it must necessarily remain,—for the Rulers can never shut themselves up from the need of Religion; and so will it remain to the end of Time. As little can Science ever become a purpose of the State. From this remark there is to be excluded, as an exception to the general rule, whatever Individuals, Rulers, or partakers in the Government may do on account of their own connexion with Science or Art, or their interest therein. But with respect to the regular and ordinary course of things, the more the State approaches the perfection of its Form, the more it makes its Citizens entirely the instruments of its purpose, so much the more must it be estranged from Science, strictly so called,—which is elevated far above common life and has no direct influence thereon,—and must even come to regard it as a useless expenditure of time and power, which might be more profitably devoted to the immediate service of the State; and thus the phrase 'mere Speculation' will become more and more a sure term of reprobation. It might indeed easily be proved that no one can be a thoroughly useful servant of the State, capable at all times of passing from established custom to new truth, who has not first been trained in the school of severe Science. But the insight into this truth presupposes either the possession of Science itself; or, should this be wanting, a self-denial which cannot reasonably be exacted. In this position of matters Science may consider itself fortunate enough if it be tolerated by the State; either through inconsequence, or from the hope

that the barren Speculation may, at one time or other, lead to some useful discovery; or from receiving the protection of the Church; or even that of Medicine, since every man would willingly live as long and enjoy as good health as possible.

Finally, Virtue can be no object of the State. Virtue is the constant and all-directing Good-will which strives to promote with all its power the purposes of the Human Race; and in the State particularly to promote these purposes in the way prescribed by it;—the desire and love to do this, and an unconquerable aversion to any other course of action. But the State, in its essential character of a compulsive power, calculates upon the *absence* of Good-will, and therefore upon the absence of Virtue, and upon the *presence* of Evil-will;—it supplies the want of the former, and represses the out-break of the latter, by fear of punishment. Strictly confining itself to this sphere, it has no need to calculate upon Virtue, nor to take it into account for the accomplishment of its purposes. Were all its members virtuous it would lose its character of a compulsive power altogether, and become the mere Leader, Guide, and true Counsellor of the willing.

Nevertheless the State, by its mere existence, conduces to the possibility of a general development of Virtue throughout the Human Race,—although, strictly considered, it does not expressly make this its purpose except as concealed under another form,—by the production of external good manners and morality, which indeed are yet far off from Virtue. Under a Legislation which should strictly and systematically embrace every possible crime against the outward Rights of the Citizens, and under an Administration from which actual crime could seldom or never conceal itself or escape the punishment threatened by the Law, every thought of crime, as something wholly vain and leading to nothing but certain punishment, would at once be stifled in its birth. When the Nation had lived in peace and quietness

for a series of Ages under this constitution, and new generations had been born and had grown to manhood beneath its sway, and from them again younger races had arisen; then the habit even of inward temptation to injustice would gradually disappear altogether; and men would live with each other peacefully and justly, without the outward appearance of the least Evil-will, exactly as if all were virtuous of heart;—while it might still perhaps be only Law which restrained them, although now with a silent and gentle authority; and in moments when its dominion should be cast off we might witness very different scenes.

Let us not be afraid like certain reasoners,—who also assume the name of Philosophers, and who recognize in Virtue nothing but a mere negation, and can only conceive of it as the opposite of crime,—let us not be afraid that in such a state of society Virtue should be no longer possible. If these reasoners speak of outward actions in society which shall even surpass the Law of the State, and which may perhaps spring from inward Virtue, perhaps from other motives;—then are they quite right; for, in the Perfect State the virtuous man finds everything relating to society which he himself loves and desires to do already outwardly commanded; and everything which he detests and would never consent to do already outwardly forbidden: in this State it is impossible to go beyond what is commanded, and thus it can never be determined, from the outward action itself, whether a man has done right from Love of Goodness or from Fear of Punishment,—with his own free consent or against his will. But Virtue does not need this outward recognition; it rests in its own Love of Goodness without reference to what is commanded, and in its own aversion to Evil without reference to what is forbidden; it is sufficient for itself, and is supremely blessed in its own consciousness of rectitude.

And so it must be at once admitted, that, through the

perfection of all the relations of the Human Race, and in particular through the perfection of that relation which includes within itself all the others, i.e. the State,—all voluntary Sacrifice, all Heroism, all Self-denial, in short, all that we are wont to admire in man, becomes superfluous; and only the Love of Goodness, as the one imperishable Virtue, remains. To this Love man can only raise himself with Freedom; or rather its flame will kindle spontaneously in every soul which has first eradicated from itself the Desire of Evil. The State can, at furthest, facilitate the development of this Love, inasmuch as it scares back the nascent desire of Evil into the secret depths of the breast, accords it no point of vantage, but counts it as mere idle hindrance. He in whose soul this flame of Heavenly Love is kindled, however constrained he may seem to mere outward appearance, yet in inward Freedom and independence rises even superior to the State;—the State does not give a Law to his will, but its Law accidentally accords with his will because it is a perfect Law. This Love, as it is the only imperishable Virtue, and the only Blessedness, so is it also the only True Freedom; and only through it can man rise superior to the bondage of the State, as well as to all other bondage which oppresses and confines him here below. Happy is it for Mankind that they have not to wait for the slowly advancing perfection of the State in order to attain this Love; but that in all Ages, and under all circumstances, every Individual of our Race may freely raise himself to its possession!

LECTURE XII.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE.

As a preparative to the solution of the problem with which we are more immediately occupied,—What point of its development has the State attained in our own Age?—we have shown, in our last two lectures, though only in the abstract and by speculative reasoning, what the State, both in its Form and its Material, really is; and through what stages and elements of progress it gradually advances towards its perfection. This delineation, which must have been somewhat tedious in itself, acquired an interest from the purpose we had in view;—this, namely, to render what is to follow thoroughly intelligible to you. We have now to give life to this general picture, by summoning to your recollection the actual events of History;—with the view of enabling you to discover for yourselves what is new, original, and peculiar in the constitution and government of existing States; and thus, wherein the political character of our Age, as distinguished from all other Ages, consists. We have already sufficiently explained the nature of our view and treatment of History in a special lecture; out of which lecture we find it necessary here to remind you of only one thing,—namely, that our remarks upon History do not lay claim to the character of historical principles themselves, but are

merely designed to open up questions and problems for proper historical investigation. And we add, as a new and farther limitation, that we shall confine ourselves to the simple and obvious traces of civilization which have come down to us; employing only our own History,—that of civilized Europe, as the existing domain of Culture; passing by other adjoining civilizations, which may indeed have had a common origin with our own, but which cannot now be referred back to such an origin and have no direct influence upon ourselves;—for example, the civilizations of China and of India.

We have already set forth as the beginning of all social combination, the occurrence of this fact;—namely, *that Freemen became subject, to a certain extent and in a certain respect, to the will of other Freemen.* How and in what way has this subjugation been brought about?—this is the first question which here forces itself upon our notice. This question is intimately connected with that respecting the origin of inequality among men, which has become so famous in our own day, and which we shall by no means solve in the way in which it has been solved by a writer who has gained great celebrity on this account.*

According to our system,—which we have already set forth, and which may be fully proved in the strict domain of Philosophy,—we find an original inequality among men, and indeed the greatest possible inequality; namely, between the Normal People existing as a pure manifestation of Reason on the one hand;—and the wild and savage Races of Barbarism on the other. In what way these primitive ingredients of our Human Race were first mingled together, no History can inform us; for the very existence of a History presupposes such an intermixture as having already taken place. In this

* Rousseau.

condition of intermixture, even the descendant of the Normal People—the partaker of their primitive Culture—first became aware of the demand upon him for an entirely new *Cultivation*, not necessarily included in that primitive *Culture*;—namely, the cultivation of the power of imparting his Culture to others, and thus creating for himself an extensive field of influence and activity. It does not follow that all such descendants of the Normal People made equal progress in this new art, or were even capable of so doing; but each individual would develop this art in himself as his own character might permit: as little does it follow that those who remained behind in this progress, and could not so easily lay aside their innocence and simplicity, were on that account worse than those who found it easy to enter into the crooked byways of corrupt and depraved Races, or to employ force against them;—but it does follow that the latter, and not the former, would be the Counsellors, Leaders, and Governors, and that with the free consent and good-will of the former, who in such a state of things would not grudge them this privilege, but would willingly retire into silence and obscurity.

An outward circumstance should be mentioned here, which, in our opinion, is of the greatest importance in History—the possession of metals, and the art of their most suitable application:—of *metals*, I say, and I beg that you will not suppose that I mean gold alone. How the knowledge of these metals first arose, and how they were first brought forth from the bowels of the earth and changed into the new and unexpected forms imposed upon them by art;—with this inquiry, in our opinion, no History need trouble itself; such knowledge undoubtedly existed anterior to all History, and from the very beginning of the world, as a possession of the Normal People; which possession, after the intermixture with Barbarism, the skilful knew how to employ wholly otherwise than the simple. The

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value which these metals would acquire by their durability, by their usefulness in strengthening the feeble powers of man, and by the difficulty of discovering them; and in particular, the dreadful importance which they would acquire in the hands of those who first converted them into destructive weapons, is sufficiently apparent in itself. Indeed these metals are found to be, from the very commencement of History, the most universally coveted commodities; they are even to the present day the most highly prized things which the civilized man can bring to the savage; and the perfecting of arms, and the fabrication of newer and more efficient instruments of murder out of these metals, is an actual phase of development in our whole History!

By means of these two principles, there could now ensue the subjugation, under one or more leaders, of the inhabitants of those countries throughout which the Normal People were in the first instance dispersed, unmixed with the Barbarians at the outset although surrounded by them. Whether they were at first united for the purposes of active warfare only against the wild animals, or against the Savages not as yet subjected to the purposes of Culture; still this union could occur only on the supposition of the need of such a warfare. The Ruler would not be under the necessity of expending any peculiar care on the maintenance or preservation of his subjects, who being themselves descended from the cultivated race could provide for their own support had they only external peace: as little would he be called upon to make large demands upon their energies and labour, since their union had only a temporary and easily attainable purpose in view. Soon, however, this simple relation became more complex. The power of governing others, possessed by the Ruler,—of legislating for them, particularly of legislating for them through the agency of others, became an object of ambition, and in proportion as the capacities of those who

were at first willing and obedient subjects were developed, they must have begun to regard with envious eyes the power of government exercised over them by other men. Thus communities united by common descent, and inhabiting a common country, separated themselves from the general mass, and, when fortune favoured them, sometimes even attained a dominion over the whole.

In this manner had the State, in our opinion, its beginning in Central Asia, as the cradle of the historical existence of the Human Race. He who first subjected the will of other Freemen to his own in this quarter of the World, may indeed have been, according to a well-known tradition, a mighty hunter; but the troops of men once assembled, were afterwards employed for other purposes than the chase. At a later time, Assyrians, Medes, Persians, and other nations whose names are unknown to us, made their appearance upon this stage, and one after another assumed the sovereignty over their former Rulers, as well as over their former companions in servitude. It is only of these governing nations and of their chief leaders that History makes mention: of the subdued, and those who never attained to sovereignty,—of their knowledge, their domestic relations, their manners, their Culture,—she is silent; their existence passed away in obscurity, unnoticed by Political History. That these nations, however, may have been essentially not worse, but probably far superior to their conquerors, is proved,—by the history of civilization among the Jews who for the first time during their dispersion among these people were emancipated from their former rude superstition and elevated to better conceptions of God and of the Spiritual World;—by that of the Greeks who acknowledge that they have received the sublimest elements of their philosophy from these countries;—and finally, by the history of Christianity which, according to a previous remark, ascribes to itself not a Jewish but an Asiatic origin. The greatest share

in the public undertakings, as well as the honour arising from them, fell to the lot of the governing people; the members of the subdued nations being generally excluded from all participation in the government; but the ruling power was still far from being even thoroughly acquainted with all the powers of the governed, and still farther from being able to lay claim to their services without limitation or forbearance. That the so-called great King of the Persians, the ruler of this immense territory and of these countless nations, was yet almost wholly unaided by them is evident from the long series of years which were requisite to complete the armament against Greece; and still more from the disgraceful result of that expedition.

This condition of things was, in our opinion, the first form of the State:—*The subjugation of free nations for certain purposes of a governing nation*;—not as yet a complete subjugation proceeding upon any regular and fixed rule; but only as suggested by the pressure of necessity, the facility of enforcing it, or the accidental presence of a satrap or a pacha; in other respects combined with perfect freedom or at all events with anarchy in their other relations on the part of the governed people:—or in one word, **DESPOTISM**; the essential nature of which does not consist in mere barbarity of conduct, but only in the existence of a governing race, and of subdued nations excluded from participation in the government and, with reference to the means of their subsistence, left wholly to themselves; whose participation in the burdens of this relation is determined only by caprice and not by rule, as is also the case with the direction of civil policy and legislation; there being consequently no established law whatsoever:—Despotism, as this relation still exists in Europe, under the eye of the observer, in the Turkish Empire which, amid the general progress of surrounding nations, remains to this moment in the very earliest Epoch of the development of the State.

In Europe, originally the seat of Barbarism, the State had its commencement in efforts for the accomplishment of another object. Here it was not whole masses of the descendants of the Normal People who became intermixed with the savage Races, but only a few individuals banished from the realm of Culture already existing in Asia, perhaps with few followers and without hope of return; among whom I shall call to mind only Cecrops, Cadmus, Pelops,—many other names being now lost to History. Well skilled in all the Arts and Sciences of the ancient oriental world, provided with unwrought metals, with arms and implements of husbandry, perhaps with useful seeds, plants, and domestic animals,—they landed first on the coasts which at a later period bore the name of Greece, amid imbecile Savages who with difficulty maintained their existence, who *perhaps* had not yet abandoned cannibalism, and who, according to historical narrative, had *certainly* not yet abandoned human sacrifices;—in exactly the same way as an English Colony at the present day might, with better intentions, make a permanent settlement in New Zealand. By gifts; by the communication of many advantages, and instruments whereby the means of subsistence might be more easily acquired; by the storing up of food for all from one harvest to another;—these colonists attracted the Savages and gathered them around themselves; by their means erected towns, and in these held them together; introduced more humane manners, and established customs which gradually assumed the character of laws; and thus imperceptibly became their rulers. As these strangers came accompanied only by their own families, or at all events by few attendants, they could neither superintend nor unite around them large masses. Moreover there came, from time to time, other emigrants like themselves, who in the same manner founded states in other localities; and thus it happened that in this, the first cultivated region of Europe, there arose,

not a great and widely extended empire as in Asia, but a number of small neighbouring states. It was impossible for them to avoid engaging in war with those Savages who made inroads upon their borders and disturbed their undertakings; those who could not be expelled would be forced into servitude, and thus Slavery in this region may have arisen.

The free subjects of these new States were, even from the commencement, treated with kindness, and afterwards carefully instructed and trained; not, as in Asia, under the government of a dominant race, but for the most part under that of a single foreign family, whose lives were at all times open to the inspection of their subjects:—these subjects would doubtless not be blindly satisfied with all the demands and arrangements of their Rulers, but would examine for themselves how these tended to the general welfare; and therefore the Ruler would be under the necessity of maintaining towards them a circumspect and upright course of conduct. And out of these circumstances there arose, for the first time, that keen sense of Right, which in our opinion is the true characteristic of the European nations, in contrast with the religious submissiveness to authority which is peculiar to the Asiatica.

These governing families at length lost their authority over the remoter public undertakings, or they died out, or were banished; and thus, since the ideas of Right were already pretty generally diffused, Republics naturally arose in place of the previous petty Monarchies. We have nothing here to do with the form of Government, or the Political Freedom of these States. In the popular political belief of the Greeks, the essential was confounded with the accidental, and the end with the means; King and Tyrant were synonymous words, and the memory of their ancient ruling families was only regarded with terror:—a confusion which has even come down to

us, their latest political descendants, and against which we have here guarded ourselves by the preceding distinctions. This, I say, does not concern us at present:—what the Greeks sought, and what they obtained, was *Equality of Right* for all Citizens. In a certain sense, we might even say *Equality of Rights*, for there was no race favoured by the constitution more than another;—but there existed a great inequality of power, which indeed arose only by accident and not by the constitution of the State, but which nevertheless the State could not remedy;—and in so far there did not exist Equality of Rights.

In this way, that which we have set forth as the second stage in the development of the State,—*Equality of Right for all*,—has arisen in Europe; not by a previous passage through the first stage, that of Despotism, but only because the State began its existence in Greece under other conditions than those amid which it first appeared in Central Asia.

In a still wider circle and under the most interesting circumstances, was this condition of Equality of Right developed in the second country of Europe which became civilized,—namely, in Italy. Here, in our opinion, the first founders of civilization were not individual families, as in the early history of Greece, but actual Colonies;—that is, assemblages of many families from Ancient Greece. Where these Colonies remained by themselves, as occurred in Southern Italy, forming exclusive States out of elements furnished by their own people, they were but a mere continuation of Grecian existence, and had nothing new about them; and on that account have no place in our inquiry. But where these Colonies mingled with the savage native tribes and joined with them in the formation of States, as occurred in Central Italy, wholly new phenomena necessarily ensued. By exactly the same means which were employed by the

individual emigrants in Greece, and which enabled them gradually to assume the government in that country, did the whole race of the Colonists here acquire authority and power among the Savages with whom they associated themselves;—and whatever political arrangements these Colonists might have introduced among themselves, there arose nevertheless, so far as the natives were concerned, an Aristocratic Government. The ancient manners and even the original language of the country were changed by the new comers. The Colonists became the ruling Tribe just as we found ruling Nations in Central Asia. Here also, as in Asia, an extensive empire might have arisen, had not new Colonies arrived while yet the first Colonists had scarcely been able to cultivate sufficiently for their purposes the natives who had been already subdued, and these new Colonies again subjugated other sections of the original inhabitants. So long as the Aristocracy were not forced to dwell too closely under the eye of their subjects; so long as they were not urged by necessity to lay upon the latter burdens which were beyond their strength, and these latter were not compelled by the same necessity to resist them,—matters might remain in this position. As soon as these conditions were at an end, a strife between the two parties was inevitable. In one of the States composed of these two ingredients in the population of Central Italy—in Rome, namely—the conditions under which alone this state of things was tolerable first disappeared. We here lay aside the consideration that at first Rome was governed by Kings: these Kings always belonged to the Aristocratic races who were scattered over the whole of Central Italy; they were in fact the heads of the Aristocracy, and fell as soon as they attempted aught against it. Thus much however is clear, that in Rome there were from the first two leading classes of Citizens:—the Patricians, or descendants of the Aristocratic colonist-races, and the

Plebeians, or descendants of the aboriginal inhabitants of Italy. These two most dissimilar ingredients we see crowded together within the narrow limits of a city, constantly exposed to the observation of each other, and shut up from the possibility of extension on any side by the universal and well-deserved hatred of the neighbouring States;—in this emergency, the Aristocracy firmly combining amongst themselves, and desirous of living at the expense of the People whom they treated like slaves;—this People, on the other hand, rising against them, but yet, with the true European national sense of Right, not desiring the subjugation of the oppressors, but only Equal Rights and Equal Laws;—the Aristocracy, again, in need of the strength of these People for the defence of the State against outward enemies, and hence conceding, under the pressure of necessity, what, when the necessity was past, they would willingly have recalled:—and thus arising a struggle of several centuries duration between these two parties; which began with the Aristocracy declaring all affinity with the families of the People to be a degrading contamination, and refusing to the People, by denial of the privileges of the Auspices, all portion in the sympathy of the Gods; and ended by this same Aristocracy sharing the possession of the highest dignities of the State with men from the ranks of the People, and being compelled to admit that these offices were as beneficially and ably filled by the latter as by themselves. Nevertheless the Aristocracy could not for many centuries forget their former Privileges, and neglected no opportunity of again overreaching the People; who, on the other hand, scarcely ever failed to find the means of protection:—and this endured until all power fell into the hands of a single individual, and both combatants were at once and in like manner subdued. In this contest, prolonged for many centuries, between the effort for Equal Rights

maintained with the greatest ability, and the claims of Privilege sustained with no less ability, there arose a proficiency in civil legislation and in the internal and external administration of the State, and an almost perfect comprehension of all the possible expedients by which the laws might be evaded, such as were possessed by no nation before the Romans; so that we ourselves have still much to learn from them in this department.

Here, too, we have *Equality of Right* secured in the most skilful manner; but as yet no *Equal Rights*; partly on account of the restless struggles of the Aristocracy, and partly on account of accidental circumstances, which the constitution was unable to remove.

We remarked in a former lecture that the State regards itself as the exclusive realm of Culture, and in this character stands in natural warfare with Barbarism. So long as Humanity received but a one-sided Culture in different States, it was to be expected that each particular State should deem its own Culture the true and only civilization, and regard that of other States as mere Barbarism, and their inhabitants as Savages;—and thus feel itself called upon to subdue them. In this way a war might easily arise between the three great States of the ancient world which we have mentioned; and indeed a real and typical war,—a war of subjugation. In the first place, with respect to the Grecian States;—they at an early period constituted themselves as Greeks,—that is, as a nation united together by definite views of Civic and Political Rights, by a common language, feasts and oracles, and by means of a national confederacy and national Rights universally recognised among themselves,—constituted themselves as Greeks, I say, into a peculiar realm of Culture from which they excluded all other nations under the name of Barbarians. If, notwithstanding this confederacy, they allowed themselves to engage in war with each other, still these wars

were conducted in a manner different from those against the Barbarians;—they were prosecuted with moderation and forbearance, and never to the extinction of either State. If, at a later period, the two Republics who occupied the first rank in Greece were divided even in their policy towards foreign nations, and made war on each other on that account; still the Greeks were again united in one purpose by the Macedonian Hero, so as to play out their own peculiar part in the drama of World-History. Their Culture was wholly for the State and its purposes,—Legislation, Government, War by land and sea,—and in this they unquestionably far excelled their natural opponents in Asia. Among the latter, however, the true Religion lay concealed, unknown perhaps to the ruling nation themselves; and to this the Greeks were never able to attain. What it was in particular which entitled the predominant nation of the East,—the Persians,—to arrogate for themselves a superiority over the Greeks at the time when this antagonism broke forth into open rupture, is not quite clear; but it is certain that they did regard the latter as Barbarians, i.e. as a people far inferior to themselves in the arts of political existence and the science of their application; and indeed it would not otherwise have occurred to them to attempt the subjugation of Greece.

Invasion followed on the part of the Greeks, and the Asiatic dominion was destroyed;—a conquest which must have been easily accomplished by the first nation of actual Citizens, over an empire wherein there was properly but one race possessed of true freedom and enjoying real citizenship; while the rest were mere subjects, to whom, after the fall of their leaders who fought only for their own dominion, it might be a matter of indifference into whose hands the supreme authority fell, which they in their own person were wholly unaccustomed to exercise.

In the meantime the acquired supremacy of the Greeks

in Asia did not produce those farther revolutionary consequences which might have been anticipated;—the spirit of the conquerors, which alone might have been capable of holding together this immense empire and of moulding it according to the Grecian Ideal, forsook its ancient abode, and the victorious generals divided the conquered countries as a spoil among themselves. As each had an equal right, or want of right, to the whole, there arose endless wars between these new kingdoms, with alternate expulsions and restorations of the reigning families, leaving little time for the cultivation of the arts of peace, and producing universal enervation. The old common Fatherland was, at the same time, depopulated by the emigration of its young and warlike manhood to the military service of these Kings, and thus rendered powerless for its own undertakings;—so that after all, the commencement of the supremacy of the Greeks was also the beginning of their fall. Scarcely a single significant result of this event has found a place in World-History, excepting this: that thereby the Greek Language was spread over all Asia;—a circumstance which greatly helped the subsequent diffusion of Christianity throughout Asia, and from thence into other lands;—further, that in consequence of this squandering of strength and energy in internal wars, the conquest and peaceful occupation of all these countries was made an easy matter for the Romans.

It was these Romans who united in one State the Culture which had now been produced by the intermixture of different races, and who thereby completed the period of Ancient Time and closed the simple course of Ancient Civilization. With respect to its influence on Universal History, this nation, more than any other, was the blind and unconscious instrument for the furtherance of a higher World-Plan, since it had formed itself, as indicated above, into a most fit and proper

instrument for that purpose. These Romans had no thought of diffusing Culture by means of the subjugation of other nations:—mindful of their own obscure beginning, they were scarcely conscious of their real superiority in the art of government, which indeed was of slow and gradual development; nay, with simple and true-hearted candour they styled themselves Barbarians, and were ever ready to adopt, so far as their own circumstances admitted, the arts and manners of foreign nations with whom they became acquainted. At first the pressure of the neighbouring Italian States and nations, and then the fear of the advancing power of the Carthaginians, had made them able warriors; while by their internal quarrels they had acquired in great perfection, even at an earlier period, that policy which enabled them to direct and order their military power. After victory had freed them from uneasiness on account of foreign enemies, their own leaders began to seek war for its own sake. In order that they might be enabled to distinguish themselves, and rise above the crowd; to replenish their treasuries exhausted by feasts given to the toiling people; to withdraw the attention of the Citizens from the constant internal machinations of the Aristocracy, by directing it towards foreign affairs, triumphal processions, and captive monarchs, war soon came to be prosecuted without intermission and as a matter of necessity; for only by external war could internal peace be secured. After the conquest of the realms of Ancient Culture by the Romans,—new conquests among the Barbarians being far more difficult to accomplish,—there remained no other means of preservation for the State than the subjugation of both the contending parties to the dominion of a single power. It could be no difficult task for the Romans to subdue the enfeebled nations of the former Macedonian monarchy who were united by no permanent tie to their Rulers; and Ancient Greece, no less enfeebled,

would fall into the arms of the conquerors all the more readily that they spared its inhabitants everything which they valued,—even their vanity.

By means of this universal dominion of the Romans, there were spread abroad over the whole civilized world—Civil Freedom, participation in Civil Rights for all free-born men, Justice according to a fixed law, Financial Administration upon settled principles, actual care for the existence of the people, milder and more humane manners, respect for the customs, the religion, and the ways of thinking of other nations:—all this in constitutional theory at least, although these principles might sometimes be repudiated in the actual administration of Government.

This was the fulness, the maturity of Ancient Civilization:—*a state of Right*, at least in form; to which Humanity must first be raised before a new development could begin. Scarcely, however, had Humanity attained this state, than this new development appeared. The True Religion of the Normal People, hitherto preserved in an obscurity which concealed it from the eye of History, now came forth to the open day, and spread itself almost unimpeded over the realm of Culture which was now fortunately embraced in one single State. It was among the first maxims of this State to take no note of the religious opinions of subject nations; and thus it was impossible that it should thoroughly understand this Religion, and foresee the consequent fate which awaited itself. Had not the new Religion been accidentally placed in antagonism to the worship offered to the statues of the Emperors, it might undoubtedly have long remained unnoticed by the State.

In the contest which arose upon this ground the new Religion finally attained even the outward victory, and became the predominant Religion of the State. But as the State did not produce the Religion, nor the Religion

give birth to the State, it remained a foreign ingredient in the Constitution, which was never penetrated by its spirit. It was necessary that this Religion should itself become the creative principle of a new State; and hence the old Constitution, which was incapable of assuming a new form, must be destroyed; elements, which apparently for this very purpose had lain concealed in darkness far removed even from the eye of History, must now come into play; for thus only could the new Creation, of which we have hereafter to speak, enter on its appointed work.

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LECTURE XIII.

INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY ON THE STATE.

THE one True Religion, or Christianity, must and ought to become the creative and governing principle of a new State:—this we announced at the close of our last Lecture. Such was the actual course of events, and thereby arose an entirely New Era. ✓

Before commencing the inquiry for which we have thus opened the way, and upon which we are now to enter, we must first of all direct your attention to one remark of the highest importance in any historical survey; namely, that it is only by a very slow and tardy course that the great events of History develop themselves and become visible in their results. The historical inquirer who, with regard to such an event, does not know how to anticipate experience, and to supply what is wanting in foresight by means of the laws of human development, possesses only fragments torn from their connexion which he can never understand, being without a knowledge of the organic whole to which they belong. This is the case with the whole History of Modern Times, the true principle of which is the manifestation of Christianity. That the Old Time has passed away, and that we stand above its grave amid an intricate and wonderful concourse of new elements, any one may observe by merely opening his eyes;—but what

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this concourse of elements may signify, and to what it may tend, cannot be understood by mere external observation, but only by deeper insight. According to our opinion, which we have already frankly declared in another place, Christianity has never yet attained a general and public existence in its purity and truth; although it has, at all times, attained a true life here and there in individual minds. But this is not inconsistent with the assertion which we also make, that it has had an active and efficient life in History, in preparing the way for itself and in bringing about the conditions necessary to its public existence. He who possesses a mere historical knowledge of this preliminary activity, but is ignorant of its real nature and tendency, necessarily confounds the accidental with the essential and the means with the end; and he can never arrive at a true comprehension even of this preliminary activity itself. The part which Christianity has to play in the History of the World,—for of this only have we now to speak,—is not yet concluded; and whoever cannot enter into the meaning of the whole vast Drama should not presume to pass any judgment upon it. In like manner, to avail ourselves of a kindred example, the part which has been assigned to the Reformation in human History, of which we have already had occasion to speak in a very limited connexion, is by no means concluded.

After this preliminary remark, the application of which will soon become apparent, let us now proceed to our task. Christianity itself must and ought to become the governing or creative principle of the State as exemplified in a New Era. We must, in the first place, answer this question,—In what way can Christianity accomplish this, and on what ground does it rest its claim to do so? I reply,—Its operation may be regarded in a double aspect:—it is partly *absolute*, as that of true and genuine Christianity; and partly *contingent*, determined by the position of things

amid which it strives at first to raise itself to purity and perfectness. In the first place, as respects the former view of the activity of True Religion;—this Religion is precisely similar to the Love of Goodness which we have described at the close of a former lecture; which Goodness appears to the religious sense as the immediate work of God within us; while we, in the accomplishment of this work, are regarded as the instruments of God. We formerly remarked that this Love of Goodness sets itself entirely free even from the Perfect State, and raises itself completely above all compulsive Authority; and for the same reasons this may also be said of the True Religion. That which the God-devoted man may not do on any consideration, is indeed also outwardly forbidden in the Perfect State; but he has already cast it from him in obedience to the Will of God without regard to any outward prohibition. That which alone this God-devoted man loves and desires to do, is indeed outwardly commanded in this Perfect State; but he has already done it in obedience to the Will of God. If, then, this religious frame of mind is to exist in the State and yet never to come into collision with it, it is absolutely necessary that the State should at all times keep pace with the development of the religious sense among its Citizens, so that it shall never command anything which True Religion forbids, or forbid anything which she enjoins. In such a state of things, the well-known principle, that we must obey God rather than man, could never come into application; for in that case man would only command what God also commanded, and there would remain to the willing servant only the choice whether he would pay his obedience to the command as that of human power, or as the Will of God which he loves before all things else. From this perfect Freedom and superiority which Religion possesses over the State arises the duty of both to keep themselves absolutely separate, and to cast off all imme-

mediate dependence on each other. Religion must never lay claim to the compulsive power by which the State enforces its purposes, for Religion, like the Love of Goodness, exists inwardly and invisibly in the heart, and never appears in outward actions, which, although in accordance with the Law, may yet have proceeded from other motives altogether;—while the State can order only the visible actions of men. Religion is Love, while force is the instrument of the State; and nothing can be more perverse than the desire to enforce Love by outward constraint. On the other hand, the State must never attempt to use Religion for the furtherance of its purposes; for in so doing, it would place reliance upon an element which is not within its power, and which on that account might not fulfil its expectations; in which case it would have calculated falsely and thus have failed in its purpose;—it must be able of itself to enforce what it commands, and must command nothing but what it is able to enforce. This is the *negative* influence of Religion on the State, or rather the negative reciprocal influence of both on each other:—that by the existence of the first, the State is confined within its own proper limits, and both are strictly separated from each other.

In the view of True Religion, and in particular of Christianity, Humanity is the one, visible, efficient, living, and independent existence of God; or, if the expression be not misunderstood, the one manifestation and effluence of that Existence;—a beam from the Eternal Light, which divides itself, not in reality but only to mere earthly vision, into many individual rays. Therefore all which truly belongs to this Humanity is, according to this doctrine, essentially one and identical throughout; and is in all its elements destined in the same way lovingly to return to its Original and therein to be blessed. This vocation, thus set before man by Religion, must not be disturbed or hindered by the State; which must therefore

allow to all men, and—as the administrator of the purposes of the Human Race—must provide for all men, equal access to the existing sources of the Culture by which they may be prepared for this vocation. This is only possible by the establishment of an Absolute Equality of all men in *Personal* as well as *Civil Freedom*; in respect of *Rights* as well as *Right*. Thus the same purpose which belongs to the State as such, it receives anew from the hands of Religion; and this is the *positive* influence of Religion on the State,—not that it gives a new purpose to the State, which would be inconsistent with the separation from each other which we have already required, but that it summons up deeper sympathies in aid of the purpose which already belongs to the State, and impels it more powerfully towards the attainment of that purpose. Both of these developments, indeed,—that of the true Religious sense, as well as that of Political order,—only proceed by slow and gradual movements, and to a certain extent keep pace with each other; but there is nothing to prevent the former, at least in Individuals, from preceding and partly guiding the latter.

Such is the case with this relation when the State is considered only in itself and in relation to its own Citizens. But should it happen that several independent and sovereign States were to arise within the circle of the one True Religion; or, what is the same thing, that the one State of Culture and of Christianity were broken up into a Christian Republic of Nations, in which individual States should be, not indeed constrained, but incessantly observed and judged by the others;—then there would be found laid down in the Christian Doctrine a universally applicable Canon for the determination of what is praiseworthy, what tolerable, and what censurable, in the intercourse of one State with another, as well as in the conduct of private Citizens;—and the otherwise absolute Monarch, even after he had silenced his own subjects, would still, in any sense

of honour dwelt within him, have to stand in dread of the testimony and judgment of neighbouring States, and of posterity whose opinion will be guided by that judgment; or, should he even have cast aside this feeling, he would still have to fear the consequences of the loss of general confidence. Thus there would arise by means of this Religion a Public Opinion throughout the whole realm of Culture, and in it, a Sovereignty of no mean importance over Sovereigns, which would leave them at full liberty to do good, while it would often effectually restrain the desire of wrong-doing.

Such is the influence of Christianity on the State, when this Religion and its influence are considered *absolutely*. Another influence is that which this Religion may exercise *contingently*, determined by the conditions of the time amid which it, as yet, only strives to attain an independent existence and fitting sphere of action. This contingent influence, which it did actually exercise and in part does exercise even to the present day, was determined by the condition of the men upon whom it was first directed. At that time the superstitious dread of the Godhead as a hostile being, as well as the feeling of personal sinfulness, weighed more heavily and universally than at any other upon the inhabitants of civilized countries; and there existed a secret looking towards the East, and particularly towards Judea, whence some means of atonement and expiation were expected to arise. Many circumstances in History prove this:—for example, the attachment to Oriental Mysteries which was so generally diffused even in Rome itself; and the immense treasures which found their way from all parts of Asia, and even from Europe, to the temple at Jerusalem. Christianity, as we have shown in the proper place, is no method of atonement and expiation: Man can never disunite himself from the Godhead;—and in so far as he *fancies* himself so disunited he is a *Nonentity*, which on

that very account cannot sin, but on whose forehead the imaginary brand of Sin is placed that he may thereby be directed to the True God. In the hands of such Ages, however, Christianity was necessarily changed into a means of atonement and expiation, and assumed the form of a New Covenant with God; because these Ages had no need of a Religion, and indeed no capacity for receiving one, except in this shape. And thus that Christian System which, when I formerly spoke of this subject, I called a degenerate form of Christianity, and the authorship of which I ascribed to the Apostle Paul, was also a necessary product of the whole spirit of that Age as directed upon Christianity; and that this man and no other should have first given expression to that spirit was quite accidental; for had he not done so every one who had not risen superior to his Age by the intimate transfusion of his spirit in True Christianity would have done the same; as every one does, even to the present day, who has filled his mind with these pictures, and who dreams of such a mediation between God and men as necessary, and cannot even conceive of the contrary.

After Christianity had assumed this form, and particularly after the external act of initiation—Baptism—had become a mysterious purification from Sin, whereby the disciple was immediately released from the eternal punishment consequent thereon, and without farther effort obtained access to heaven; it could not but follow that the administrators of this rite should acquire the highest reputation among men; that the guardianship of this purity, which they had conferred by means of the sacrament, should likewise devolve upon them; and that thus no human occupation should be exempt from a jurisdiction, criticism, and guidance exercised by them under this pretence. When this superstition at last laid hold of the Roman Emperors themselves and the

highest officers of their State, these too necessarily fell under the general discipline of the Ecclesiastics, who were consequently incited to exercise their office towards these persons with a special and notorious zeal, which necessarily produced the most pernicious consequences on the authority and freedom of the Government. These Ecclesiastics themselves were by their mental tendencies shut out from any sound political views; and had scarcely any other conception of the things of this world than as means for the propagation of their faith, and the maintenance of what they called its purity;—they were therefore incapable either of wisely guiding the Rulers whom they had deprived of freedom, or of governing in their room; and thus nothing else could ensue but the total enervation and final destruction of the Kingdoms in which they held sway.

Should there ever again arise a State to which this pernicious influence might prove innocuous, and which should be able to repel its insidious advances; then must such a State be itself established upon Religion, in order thereby to counteract an influence which was able only to destroy whatever existed without its aid. In consequence of this necessity of returning to the original and native principles of the State, Religion was also compelled to fall back upon her own principles and to reform herself within her own domain. She was obliged, in the first place, to succeed in converting the elements of which the new State was composed, in order that both Citizens and Rulers might be her own spiritual creation. In this business of conversion she had not, as formerly, to do with superstitious, terrified men, who, full of hereditary dread of the Gods, were ready upon any terms to throw themselves into her bosom; for similar causes would again have produced similar effects: but she had to do with those who in their open character and simple relations,—for it is only the complexity of relations produced by partial Culture

which gives birth to great crimes, the horror of inward sinfulness and dread of the Gods;—who, I say, in their open character and simple relations, had not hitherto much concerned themselves about the Divinity, and in particular, were very far from fearing Him. The conversion of such men gave to the Church, in her old character of an expiator of Sin and a propitiator of God, a wholly new task;—this namely, artificially to excite among this second class that superstitious fear of God, and need of an atonement, which she had found already existing among her first converts. Unquestionably this latter was a much more difficult business, and,—with the exception of single individuals who may have felt peculiarly conscious of sin, and certain epochs which may have been particularly favourable to the dominion of the Ecclesiastical Power,—it has never been, in my opinion, so perfectly and so universally accomplished among the nations of modern Europe as it was in the Roman Empire; for proof of which the student may examine in particular the history of the Byzantine Monarchy, in which the Ecclesiastical Power played its part throughout a long series of years. In Modern Europe the religious superstition at all times enjoyed the privilege of unwearied preaching, and was freely admitted to the community as a foreign ingredient; but it never struck its root so deeply in the heart, and whenever a more powerful interest arose it was shaken off. The whole course of Modern History proves this; and particularly the Age since the Reformation, in which the national character of Modern Europe has developed itself more freely. The Church has indeed almost ceased to preach this doctrine; and even where it still does so it is without fruit for no one lays it to heart.

It was farther necessary that the fundamental elements of the New State should bear the general European National Characteristic,—a keen sense and love of Right

and Freedom,—in order that they might not return to Asiatic despotism, but willingly admit the principle of Equality of Right for All, which had been previously developed among the Greeks and Romans. They would have to combine with this general characteristic the special feature of a delicate sense of Honour, in order that they might be accessible to the legitimate influence of Christianity upon Public Opinion which we have already pointed out. Precisely such elements as we have described were found among the Germanic Races, as if they had been expressly reserved for this great purpose. I mention only these; for the devastating inroads of other Races had no enduring results; and those kingdoms of other origin, which are incorporated with the Republic of Nations now existing in Europe, have for the most part received Christianity and Culture by means of the Germanic tribes. These Germanic tribes,—who were apparently of similar descent to the Greeks, and must have held intercourse with them at an earlier period as a strict examination of the respective languages might incontestably prove,—occupied approximately the same stage of Culture in their forests as the Greeks in their Heroic Age. Many a Hercules, Jason, or Theseus, may there have assembled around them bands of willing associates, and achieved wonderful adventures with them, unnoticed by History. Their worship was simple as their manners, and they were seldom disturbed by scruples about their moral worthiness. Independence, freedom, and universal equality, had become natural to them by the usage of centuries. To fix the regards of all men by bold and hazardous enterprises, and after death to live in the songs of after times, was the aim of the more noble among them;—faithfulness even unto death, on the part of the free follower towards his leader, was the glory and honour of others;—and any breach of faith was universally regarded as so insup-

portable a disgrace that even the younger and stronger, when they forfeited the freedom they had staked, voluntarily surrendered themselves to the older and feebler winner, and even to sale into the bonds of slavery. These were the elements out of which Christianity had to build up its new State. If, in addition to this, it happened accidentally that several races of similar descent established new States at the same time, and upon the same foundation of Christianity and the Ancient Empire, these States would even by that common descent be bound more closely to each other than to foreign nations; and the most favourable circumstance which could possibly arise, both for Religion and the State, was when Religion attained a central point in external political power, and that power obtained an independent territorial possession. Not, as formerly, seating herself in authority within the Empire, and incessantly controlling the government;—it was now the business of this Central Power to hold together from without the various States of the One Empire of Christianity, and to become the Arbiter between them;—she was now, by her actual position, rather the Guardian of the rights of nations than, as formerly, the Head of internal government. Since that time it had become of much greater importance to Religion that the Empire of Christianity should be divided, and all the parts of it maintained in equal and independent power, because in these circumstances her aid would be needed;—than that it should again return to the form of One State, which event, had it occurred among these still partially untamed spirits, would likely have brought with it dangerous consequences even to the Spiritual Power itself. So it actually happened;—and, under the protection of this power, individual Christian States were enabled to develop themselves according to their separate character, and with a considerable degree of freedom; and the Christian Republic of Nations, which

arose and was maintained by means of this Power, was further extended and enlarged, partly by the armed conquest of single States from the dominion of Non-Christianity, partly by peaceful conquest, by means of conversion of new Empires to Christianity, and by the consequent subjugation of these to the Central Spiritual Power.

The fundamental principles of this Christian Empire were, and for the most part are to the present day, the following: First, with respect to the Rights of Nations:—A State, because it is a Christian State, has a right of existence in its actually present condition; it is possessed of a perfectly independent Sovereignty, and no other Christian State, the Spiritual Central Power in its own peculiar office excepted, may demand a voice in the arrangement of its internal affairs. All Christian States stand towards each other in the position of reciprocal recognition and of original peace:—of *original* peace, I say; that is, there can no war arise with respect to the existence of a State, although war may well arise as to the fortuitous modifications of that existence. By this principle, a war of extermination between Christian States is strictly prohibited. Not so as regards Non-Christian States;—these, according to the same principle, have no recognised existence, and they not only *may*, but *ought to be*, expelled from the circle of Christian dominion. The Church gives them no peace; and should such a peace be conceded by Christian powers, this could only happen from necessity, or because the Christian principle is extinguished and other motives have taken its place. Secondly, with respect to Civil Rights:—Before God all men are free and equal;—in every Christian State all men without exception must have the means and opportunity conceded to them of devoting themselves to God, and in this respect at least be assured of Personal Freedom; and from this there readily follows

complete Personal Freedom, and the principles that no Christian can be a slave and that a Christian soil confers Freedom. On the other hand, according to the same principle, the Non-Christian or Heathen, may legitimately be made a slave.

An outward event, of too much importance to be passed over in silence, served to urge this Christian Republic of Nations into closer union with each other, to compel them to regard themselves as members belonging to one Whole, to pursue common interests, and to commence new undertakings in their common character as a Christian Republic. In Asia which, except that it probably had been the abode of the Normal People, had otherwise done nothing for Humanity save the production of the True Religion, there arose a second and younger branch of this True Religion,—namely, Mohammedanism,—obviously from one and the same source as Christianity, but by no means admitting the entire abrogation of the Ancient Covenant with God; hence accepting from Judaism whatever was applicable to its own condition, and thus bringing along with it the germ of its gradual corruption and final ruin, and rejecting the inexhaustible source of outward perfection which Christianity contains within itself. Zealous in proselytism like Christianity; expert at the sword, by which from the first it had spread itself abroad; vainly arrogating a superiority over Christianity on account of a distinction of little importance in itself, this namely, that it distinctly declared the Unity of God a doctrine which was essentially pre-supposed in Christianity, and that it was not wholly imbued with such gross superstition as the Christianity of the Time; lastly, dogmatically inculcating Despotism, and that mute and unquestioning submission which is peculiar to the East, as its political principles;—this Mohammedanism waged war with Christianity and proved a victorious assailant. Besides extinguishing Christianity altogether in a consider-

able extent of territory, and establishing itself as the dominant Religion, there was yet a circumstance connected with these triumphs which made them peculiarly painful to Christianity,—namely, that among the countries thus lost, there was that Land especially to which Christianity owed its birth, and towards which the romantic piety of the new Christians devoutly turned its regards. To indignation succeeded a burning desire of action; and with a free enthusiasm like what might have animated them in their native forests,—not as Citizens of this State or of that, but only as Christians,—hosts of the Germanic tribes precipitated themselves upon that Land to win it back from Saracen domination. However unsatisfactory may have been the result of these undertakings; whatever evil may have been said of the Crusades by critics who have never been able to forget their own Age, and to transplant themselves into the spirit of other times so as to obtain a complete survey of the whole; they still remain an ever-memorable manifestation of power on the part of a One united Christian World as such, wholly independent of the individuality of the several States into which it was broken up. The knowledge of many important peculiarities of these enemies, as well as observation of the crimes of which they were themselves accused, and accused others in return, was no unimportant fruit of the undertaking.

At a later period Mohammedanism, which had already in the early times of the Christian State penetrated into those countries which seemed to be set apart as the exclusive possession of Christianity, namely into Europe, and had been driven thence in feebleness, now reappeared there on another and more dangerous side, and amid a new nation,—the Turks,—with the undisguised purpose of its gradual conquest and subjugation. Then awoke again, for the last time, at least in discourses and public writings, the idea of Christians

forming but One State and possessing one common interest; until, at last, the dreaded enemy, involved in the meshes of European policy, grew old in itself and began its course of decay towards internal dissolution.

These are, in my opinion, the external conditions under which the Christian State-system of Modern Europe has begun and continued its development. How the true State-Constitution develops itself in individual States under these outward conditions, hindered or furthered by them; how it has received within itself, and further cultivated, whatever it has found already existing in the world; we shall see in the future lectures;—if we may venture to hope that these inquiries continue to possess an interest for you, and can still attract and hold together the remaining body of our accustomed hearers.

LECTURE XIV.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE IN MODERN EUROPE.

It was Christianity which assembled together the social elements of a New Age, and wrought out their spiritual regeneration;—it was the administrators of this Christianity, now become a Politico-Spiritual Central Power, who upheld the New State, now broken up into a Republic of Nations, in this condition of separation; who ordered the reciprocal relations of Individual States, and even constrained them by outward motives to coalesce into one acting power; and under whose protection each particular State enjoyed and exercised its independence, and the liberty of developing its own resources and of acquiring new strength.

The nations of Modern Europe,—partly because they could never be thoroughly penetrated by the principle upon which the authority of the Spiritual Power depended,—i.e. that to it the office of Mediator between God and men belonged,—partly on account of their original and hereditary love of political independence;—these nations, I say, could only submit to this guardianship so long as the individual States were still occupied in strengthening their own internal authority, and, amid the daily pressure of conflicting elements, could not attain a distinct consciousness of their own strength.

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This internal conflict was stimulated by a peculiarity in the earlier constitution of the Germanic Races, as well as by their national character, and it was carefully maintained and employed by the Spiritual Central Power, which was well acquainted with the conditions of the influence of that peculiarity. The firmest and only permanent relation among these otherwise inconstant and ever-changing masses was unquestionably, in the case of the Germanic Races, the personal connexion between the willing and faithful Follower and the Leader to whom he had freely attached himself.

The Germanic conquerors and founders of States were essentially such Leaders, and in their loyal Followers, personally devoted to them in life and death, the true strength and efficiency of their hosts consisted, to which other wandering masses only attached themselves. Pledged to the maintenance of their Followers, the conquerors bestowed lands upon them, and transferred to the possession of the land that bond which had previously been a mere personal agreement; so that the reciprocal obligations of both the parties to this covenant afterwards even became hereditary. The former voluntary and personal bond became a permanent political bond, and the Feudal System arose. But this state of things could not continue. The Germanic nations might indeed subject themselves voluntarily out of admiration for the personal superiority of their Leaders, but their love of independence could not brook a political subjugation. The vassals struggled to acquire this independence; the Rulers opposed them with the aid of recognised authority; and the Spiritual Central Power, supported in like manner, sought to hold the balance between both parties, and thus to perpetuate the struggle, and therewith the necessity of its mediation, and the internal insufficiency of the individual States. This struggle ended, the outer rampart of its empire would be thrown

down. There were two ways in which the struggle might come to a close:—either by the overthrow of the vassals, as occurred in one of the leading States of Christendom (France); or by the defeat of the ruling power, as occurred in another leading State (Germany.) If we suppose that in the latter case considerable masses remained united, so that the former vassals now associated themselves into States and could bind their vassals in turn, a complete resolution of the strife did not ensue. In the latter country, the Church - Reformation united itself as by a miracle with these victorious beginnings, and those who struggled for emancipation received in it a new confederate, whom they knew well how to employ against the power of the Empire which desired their subjugation; and against the Spiritual Power, which did not indeed desire their subjugation, but looked with as little favour on their complete independence.

The *political* principles of this Reformation, in so far as they were directed against the influence of the Spiritual Central Power, found admission even in quarters where they should not have been employed against the highest power of the State, and where the *dogmatic* principles of the Reformation were rejected. And in this way the political influence of that Spiritual Central Power was brought to a close, and it retained only its dogmatic and disciplinary Ecclesiastical sway in those places to which the Church-Reformation did not extend.

By means of this complete reform of the realm of Culture, its bond of union as the one and undivided Christian Republic received an entirely new foundation and support, as well as new modifications. This union was no longer clearly recognised and distinctly acted upon as a principle; but it, as well as the fundamental conceptions which proceeded from it, and which we have set forth in our last lecture, became rather a dim instinct, —an accustomed supposition, made and acted upon without

distinct consciousness;—and it passed from the guardianship of the Church to that of Public Opinion, of History, and of Authors in general.

In the first place:—There is a necessary tendency in every cultivated State, to extend itself generally, and to include all men within the unity of its Citizenship. Such is the case in Ancient History. In Modern Times a barrier was opposed to this tendency by the internal weakness of the States, and by the Spiritual Central Power, whose interest it was that the Realm of Culture should remain divided. As the States became stronger in themselves and cast off that foreign power, the tendency towards a Universal Monarchy over the whole Christian World necessarily came to light; and this so much the more since it was but one common Culture which had developed itself in the different States, though with various modifications. In reference to these particular modifications they had all received only a partial cultivation; and in such a state of partial culture, as we have already remarked, each State is tempted to consider its own civilization as the best, and to imagine that the inhabitants of other countries would esteem themselves very fortunate were they but Citizens of its Realm.

This tendency towards Universal Monarchy, as well as the conquest of other Christian States, was rendered so much the easier in this realm of Christendom inasmuch as the manners and customs of the European Nations and their Political Constitutions are almost everywhere alike. Besides there are one or two Languages which are common to the cultivated classes among all nations, while those which are not so generally known may, in case of necessity, be easily acquired. On this account the conquered, finding themselves in nearly the same position under their new government as under the old, have little interest in the question who shall be their ruler; and thus the conquerors can in a short time, and with

little trouble, recast the new provinces in the form of the old, and use the former as freely as the latter. Through the Reformation, indeed, many forms of the one essentially indivisible Christianity have arisen; and among these, in part, a most hostile aversion. Against this source of distraction, however, each State has the easy remedy of peaceful Toleration and equal rights to all; and thus once more, as formerly in the Heathen Roman Empire, Religious Toleration and accommodation in particulars to the manners of other nations, have become an excellent means of making and maintaining conquests; while at the same time, the union of several creeds in one political body efficiently promotes the purpose which, in our former lecture, we have described as the absolute purpose of Christianity,—the complete separation of Religion from the State,—since the State must thus become neutral and indifferent towards all creeds.

This tendency towards a Christian-European Universal Monarchy has shown itself successively in the several States which could make pretensions to such a dominion, and, since the fall of the Papacy, it has become the sole animating principle of our History. We by no means seek by this assertion to determine whether this notion of Universal Monarchy has ever been distinctly entertained as a definite plan;—the Historian may even lead a negative proof, and attempt to show that this thought has never attained a clear and distinct acceptance in any individual mind, without our principle being thereby overthrown. Whether clearly or not,—it may be obscurely,—yet has this tendency lain at the root of the undertakings of many States in Modern Times, for only by this principle can these undertakings be explained. Many States, already powerful in themselves, and indeed the more on that account, have exhibited a marked desire for yet more extensive dominion, and have constantly sought to acquire new provinces by intermarriage, treaty, or conquest;—not

from the realms of Barbarism, which would give another aspect to the business, but within the empire of Christianity itself. To what purpose did they propose to apply this accession of power, and to what purpose did they actually apply it when it was attained? To acquire yet more extensive possessions. And where would this progress have had an end, had matters but proceeded according to the desire of these States? Only at the point where there was nothing more left to satiate the desire of acquisition. Although no individual Epoch may have contemplated this purpose, yet is this the spirit which runs through all these individual Epochs, and invisibly urges them onward.

Against this desire of aggrandizement, the less powerful States are now compelled to contrive means for their own preservation;—one condition of which is the preservation of other States, in order that the power of the natural enemy may not be increased by the acquisition of any of these States to the prejudice of the rest:—in one word, it becomes the business of the less powerful States to maintain a Balance of Power in Christendom. ‘What we ourselves cannot acquire, no other shall acquire, because his power would thereby obtain a disproportionate addition;’ and thus the care of the greater States for their own preservation is at the same time the protection of the weaker communities:—or, ‘If we cannot hinder others from aggrandizing themselves, then we must also secure for ourselves a proportionate aggrandizement.’

No State, however, strives to maintain this Balance of Power in the European Republic of Nations, except on account of its being unable to attain something still more desirable; and because it cannot yet realize the purpose of its individual aggrandizement, and the idea of Universal Monarchy which lies at the foundation of that purpose:—whenever it becomes more powerful it surely embraces this design. Thus each State either strives to attain this Universal Christian Monarchy, or at least to acquire the power

of striving after it;—to maintain the Balance of Power when it is in danger of being disturbed by another; and, in secret, for power that it may eventually disturb it itself.

This is the natural and necessary course of things, whether it be confessed or not,—whether it be even recognised or not. [That a State, even when taken on the very point of warfare, should solemnly assert its love of peace and its aversion to conquest, is nothing;—for, in the first place, it must make this averment and so hide its real intention if it would succeed in its design; and the well-known principle, ‘Threaten war that thou mayest have peace,’ may also be inverted in this way—‘Promise peace that thou mayest begin war with advantage;’—and, in the second place, it may be wholly in earnest with this assurance at the time, so far as it knows itself: but let the favourable opportunity for aggrandizement present itself and the previous good resolution is forgotten.] And thus, in the ceaseless struggles of the Christian Republic do weak States gradually raise themselves first to an equality, and then to a superiority, of power; while others which before had boldly strode onwards to Universal Monarchy, now contend only for the maintenance of the Balance of Power; and a third class, who perhaps have formerly occupied both of these positions, and still remain free and independent with respect to their internal affairs, have yet, in their external relations, and as regards their political power in Europe, become mere appendages to other and more powerful States. And so, by means of these vicissitudes, Nature strives after, and maintains, an equilibrium, through the very struggles of men for superiority.

A less powerful State, simply because it is less powerful, cannot extend itself by foreign conquest. How then shall it attain any considerable importance within this necessary limitation? There is no other means possible but the cultivation of internal strength. Should it not even acquire a single foot of new ground, yet if its ancient soil

be better peopled, more rich in all human purposes,—then, without gaining territory, it has gained *men* as the strength and muscle of its State; and should they have come to it from other States, it has won them from its natural rivals. This is the first peaceful conquest, with which each less powerful State in Christian Europe may commence to work out its own elevation;—for the Christian Europeans are essentially but one people; recognise this common Europe as their one true Fatherland; and, from one end of it to the other, pursue nearly the same purposes, and are actuated by similar motives. They seek Personal Freedom, — Justice, and Laws under which all men shall be equal, and by which all shall be protected without exception or favour; they seek opportunity to earn their subsistence by labour and industry; they seek Religious Toleration for their creeds; Mental Freedom,—that they may think according to their own religious and scientific opinions, express these openly, and form their judgments thereby. Where any one of these elements is wanting, thence they long to depart; where these are secured to them, there they gladly resort. Now all these elements already belong to the necessary purposes of the State as such:—in the present position of individual States towards each other, these purposes are also forced upon it by necessity, and by the care for its own preservation; for the fear of subjugation compels it to self-aggrandizement, and it has, at first, no other means of aggrandizement than that which we have pointed out.

But there is another way by which the State may attract to itself, if not the men of neighbouring States, yet the powers of these men, and may make these powers tributary to itself; and this method plays too important a part in Modern History to be passed over in silence. It consists in a State monopolizing universal Commerce, acquiring exclusive possession of commodities which are generally sought for, and of money, the universal medium

of exchange;—thenceforward determining prices for the rest of the world, and so compelling the whole Christian Republic of Nations to pay for those wars which it has from time to time undertaken *against* the whole Christian Republic for the purpose of maintaining this superiority; and to defray the interest of a National Debt contracted for the same purpose. It might possibly be found upon calculation, that when the inhabitant of a country thousands of miles distant has paid for his daily meal, he has spent one-half or three-fourths of the produce of his day's labour for the purposes of this foreign State.—I mention this method, not for the purpose of recommending it; for its success is founded only on the imbecility of the rest of the world, and it would return with fearful retribution upon its inventors were this imbecility removed; but I mention it only in order to point out the remedy against it. This remedy consists in rejecting the use of these commodities; in ceasing to think that the wealth of this State is the only wealth; and in believing that a State which has made itself independent in a mercantile respect can make wealth of what it pleases. But upon this point there is a veil over the eyes of the Age which it is impossible to remove; and it is in vain to waste words on the subject.

When a less powerful State has in the first place acquired internal strength by the methods which we have pointed out; and perhaps thereby become sufficiently powerful to attempt foreign conquest; and, it may be, has succeeded in this undertaking; it then encounters a new difficulty:—it has entirely destroyed the previous Balance of Power, and the order of things then existing; and the new-comer excites the jealousy and distrust of other States more strongly than those powers with which they are already familiar. It must henceforward be always on its guard, maintain its energies in a state of constant readiness and efficiency, and leave no means unemployed to add at least to its internal strength when no favourable opportunity presents itself

for outward expansion. With reference to external affairs, it is a part of this policy to take the weaker neighbouring States under its protection, and thereby make its interest in its own preservation likewise theirs, so that, in possibly succeeding wars, it may be able to calculate upon their power as well as its own. With reference to internal affairs, there are likewise other cares which belong to this policy,—besides the methods which we have already pointed out, of attracting new dwellers to the country, and retaining its old inhabitants;—namely, the care for the preservation and increase of the Human Race, by encouraging marriage and the rearing of children, by sanitary regulations, &c.,—the promotion of the dominion of man over Nature, which we have already sufficiently described, by the systematic and progressive improvement of Agriculture, Manufactures, and Commerce, and by the maintenance of the necessary equilibrium between these three branches of Industry; in short, by all that may be comprehended in the idea of Political Science, when that idea is thoroughly understood. Those who deride such endeavours under the name of *Economy*, have only looked upon the outward vesture, and have not penetrated to the essential nature and true meaning of these forms of Industry. Among other questions, this one too has been proposed:—Whether the population of a State may not become too large? In our opinion, the indolent and unproductive Citizen is at all times, and in every state of the population, superfluous and unnecessary; but when, with a growing population, Agriculture, Manufactures, and Commerce also increase in suitable proportions to each other, then the country can never have too many inhabitants; for the productiveness of Nature, when systematically cultivated, may be regarded as inexhaustible.

All these measures are, as we have shown above, the proper and natural purposes of the State;—in the present Political System, however, they are even forced upon it by

necessity. It is quite possible that, in what we have now set forth, we may have merely described that which existing States, who lay claim to high culture, actually do and practise; but we have set it forth with a new significance. We have seen that these things are not done by mere chance, but that these States are compelled to them by necessity; and we have thereby pointed out the guarantee which we possess that they must continue to do these things, and to do them more and more thoroughly, if they would not lose their place in the onward throng of Nations, and be finally vanquished and overthrown.

Finally, there is, in the present Political System of Europe, another purpose given to the State by the same necessity,—namely, that establishment of Equal Rights for all men which has never yet been realized in the world, and the gradual abolition of those social inequalities which still exist in Christian Europe as remnants of the Feudal System. I touch upon this subject in my present position without fear; I believe that I should do wrong to the honourable assembly whom I address were I to harbour the slightest doubt of their willingness to have this subject discussed. Who is there among us who thinks himself superior to the People, who, even with such distinctions, has not, directly or indirectly, reaped advantage from them? It is right that we should accept whatever is offered to us by our Age, but we ought also to be content at all times to relinquish Privileges which the Age can no longer confer.

The necessity which is thus imposed on the State arises in the following way:—Compelled, constantly and regularly, to call forth and appropriate as much of the power of its less favoured citizens as they can devote to it consistently with their own personal freedom and subsistence, it cannot, when there is need of still greater effort, exact more from them than it has already received. There remains no other way of escape from the difficulty, than to call upon the

Privileged Orders and Classes. Although this may occur at first only in a passing emergency, the desire to command, at all times and by right, the power which it has once commanded, will easily be excited; and the way to its accomplishment, once discovered, will be readily found again. Add to this, that even the unprivileged members of the State would render more efficient service to it if they were not forced to be subservient to the Privileged Orders. A State which constantly seeks to increase its internal strength, is thus forced to desire the gradual abolition of all Privileges, and the establishment of Equal Rights for all men, in order that it, the State itself, may enter upon its own true Right,—*to apply the whole surplus power of all its Citizens, without exception, for the furtherance of its own purposes.* The truest and most fruitful view of these Privileges, would thus, in our opinion, be the following:—They are a public treasure, committed by the infant State, which neither required to employ its whole powers nor knew how to employ them, to the hands of its more cultivated members, to be freely employed by them, according to their best judgment, for the promotion of free Culture. The more fully and efficiently this purpose has been carried out, the more is the internal strength of the State gradually increased through the services of these privileged members, and the longer may they be left in possession of the trust which they so faithfully administer. But should a time arrive when this free Culture must give place to an Artificial Civilization proceeding according to Laws; and when the State must undertake the direct administration, by its own hands, of this capital hitherto deposited with them; then it must demand restitution of these Privileges, but in such a manner that no sudden overthrow of existing relations may ensue, — and therefore a *gradual* restitution. The truly Free and Noble will readily make this sacrifice as an offering on their

country's altar: those who need to be compelled to this restitution only prove thereby that they have never been worthy to hold the trust committed to them.

To preclude the possibility of any misconception on this point, I shall at once set forth the highest principle of my views upon the Equality of Human Rights. The common trivial theory supposes the State to have been preceded by an imaginary lawless state of Nature in which mere force was the master;—the stronger appropriating all that fell within their grasp, and the weaker going away empty. The results of this state of lawlessness are afterwards confirmed by Law, which makes that just which in itself was absolutely unjust; and the State exists only for the purpose of protecting the powerful in the enjoyment of their hoards by whatever means these may have been accumulated, and of preventing those who went away empty from the division from ever acquiring any possession. Apart from the fact that this view is wholly unhistorical, at least so far as regards Modern History, and that according to this view, all right of property has arisen out of the *previous* establishment of the State; it is also opposed to Reason, and its opposition to Reason is very obvious in the expression which we have given to it above. Every man *as such* has a right to the possession of property; this right is equal in all men; whatever is convertible into property ought therefore *by Right* to be equally divided among all; and it is the gradual accomplishment of this Equal Division of that which Nature and Accident have divided unequally, towards which, under the guidance of Nature itself, the State is impelled by necessity and by the care for its own preservation.

All that I have now set forth in detail is that *gradual interpenetration of the Citizen by the State* which I have laid down as the political characteristic of our Age; and it is now your business to determine whether such is the actual

state of things at least in those countries where the State has attained the highest degree of Culture, *i.e.* the greatest internal strength, and the greatest amount of commanding influence upon the Christian Republic of Nations. We have explained unequivocally enough, and so as to place our meaning beyond the reach of misconception, that this interpenetration of the Citizen by the State, and the changing of his whole outward activity into an instrument of the State, is not here made the subject of censure, as it has been by a certain visionary scheme of unrestricted freedom, which sometimes calls itself Philosophy; but, on the contrary, we have shown it to be a necessary purpose of the State and of Nature. We do indeed desire Freedom, and we ought to desire it;—but true Freedom can be obtained only by means of the highest obedience to Law. How it necessarily arises therefrom, we have, I think, clearly shown on two different occasions, in the course of these lectures. And we have not forgotten to show likewise, that the State having once obtained possession of the National Power,—a possession which indeed it will never relinquish,—it will yet not always employ this Power for the narrow and exclusive purpose of its own preservation,—a purpose imposed on it only by the faults of the time;—but when that Endless Peace shall be born to which we must surely come at last, it will then direct it towards worthier aims.

The most cultivated State in the European Republic of Nations is in every Age without exception the most active and enterprising; and each State strives most energetically in that Epoch of its existence when it is no longer under the necessity of struggling to maintain its relative position among other Nations, but now rather endeavours to acquire sufficient strength itself to direct and modify, or even at pleasure to destroy, the general Balance of Power; the latter power being impossible without the former;—and these efforts will be the

more profitable for the advancement of Culture the less such a State is favoured by accident, and the more it on that account requires, and continues to require, the exercise of the sagacious policy of increasing and strengthening its internal resources. A State which has yet anxiously to struggle for the maintenance of Equilibrium must be deficient in internal Freedom and Independence, and in all its proceedings must be too frequently under the necessity of taking into consideration the purposes of neighbouring States. A State which feels itself in possession of secure and undisputed Superiority easily becomes careless; surrounded by enterprising competitors it gradually loses its superiority; and it may perhaps require the discipline of grievous disasters to bring it back to the care of its own interests.

In these collective peculiarities of our Age lies the guarantee which Nature herself has given us for the continued excellence of our Governments, and the compulsion which, without our assistance, she exercises for our advantage over the constraining powers of Government.

Throughout Christian Europe almost every independent State now pursues its purpose with all the energy it possesses, and the means both of internal and external aggrandizement are not unknown. In this general struggle of Powers, it is necessary that no advantage should be allowed to escape, for in that case some neighbour would surely seize upon it at once, and besides depriving us of it would assuredly employ it against us;—that no single maxim of good Government, and no possible branch of Administration should be overlooked, for it is also a maxim of our neighbour to take every possible advantage of our neglect. In this contest that State which does not move onwards falls behind, and declines more and more, until at length it loses its Political Independence altogether, becomes in the first place a mere make-weight to some other State in the general Balance of Power, and is ultimately broken up into

provinces under the dominion of Foreign States. Every Political Error carries with it the punishment of ultimate ruin unless the neighbouring States are equally unwise; and the State that would not meet destruction must avoid such Errors.

But should it be unwise and fall into Error? I ask, in return, where then is the Fatherland of the truly cultivated Christian European? In general it is Europe;—in particular it is that State in Europe which occupies the highest rank of Culture. The State which commits a fatal Error must indeed fall in course of time, and therefore cease to hold this rank. But although it falls and must fall,—nay, on this very account,—others arise, and among them one especially which now occupies the rank which the other held before. Let then mere Earth-born men, who recognise their Fatherland in the soil, the rivers, and the mountains, remain Citizens of the fallen State,—they retain what they desire, and what constitutes their happiness;—the Sun-like Spirit, irresistibly attracted, will wing its way wherever there is Light and Liberty. And in this cosmopolitan frame of mind we may look with perfect serenity on the actions and the fate of Nations, for ourselves and our successors, even to the end of Time.

LECTURE XV.

PUBLIC MORALITY OF THE PRESENT AGE.

WE begin this lecture with a remark, which properly closes the inquiry we brought to a termination in our last address, and opens that which we have to enter upon to-day, and is thus the point of transition from the one to the other;—a remark, the import of which we have all along tacitly assumed, but which we now desire clearly and distinctly to set forth.

From Christianity we have deduced the whole character of Modern Time, and the form and manner of the development of this character. But everything which becomes the *Principle* of Phenomena is, on that very account, lost in the *Phenomena* themselves; becomes invisible to mere outward sense, and is only recognisable to the piercing eye of reflection. Thus in so far as Christianity has become a true *Principle*, it is no longer present in clear consciousness to the men of the Age; on the contrary, that which they regard as Christianity has, precisely on that account, never become a Principle, nor is it truly accepted and received into the inward, essential, and peculiar Life of the Age. Christianity was to us synonymous with the One True Religion; and we carefully distinguished it from the various accidental modifications which this True Religion received

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at the time of its first appearance in the world. In so far as the consequences of these accidental modifications have taken firm root in the actual condition of the Human Race,—and we have already shown how far this has taken place in the existing Constitution of the European Republic of States,—in so far are their true sources no longer known or recognised, and that is frequently ascribed to chance which is the result of Christianity.

It could not be otherwise with those relations of the Human Race which lie beyond the jurisdiction of the State. To mention that which ranks highest among these after Religion,—*Science*;—and to instance that branch of it which has at all times had the most powerful influence on the form of the whole domain of Science, and has, tacitly, at least, and apparently with justice, assumed the legislative function in that domain,—*Philosophy*;—by what has the love of Philosophy in modern times been kindled but by Christianity? what has been the highest and ultimate task of Philosophy but thoroughly to explore and even to rectify the Christian Doctrine?—by what means has Philosophy, in all its shapes, acquired its most wide-spread influence, and, emerging from the narrow circle of its own disciples, flowed forth over the whole Human Race, but by means of the Symbols of Religion and in the communication of this Religion to the People? In all Modern Times the present history of Philosophy has been the future history of Religious Symbols. Both proceed in the same course towards a higher purity and an original harmony; and the Religious Teacher is thus the permanent Interpreter between the learned and the unlearned Public. Thus has the whole of Modern Philosophy *directly*, and by means of it the whole form of Science *indirectly*, been the creation of Christianity;—and this is also the case with other elements of civilization;—so that it may be found that the One Permanent and Immutable Element in the perpetual current of Modern Time is Christianity.

in its pure, unchangeable form ; and that this alone shall remain so to the end.

In pursuance of the plan which we have formerly indicated, we have to-day to set forth the character of the General and Public Manners of the Present Age. After what has been previously said, you will not be surprised if here again we revert to Christianity, as the principle of all Public Manners in Modern Times.

In the first place, what is meant by Manners ? and in what sense do we use this word ? To us, and according to our opinion, in every intelligible use of language, it signifies, —*the accustomed Principles which regulate the mutual intercourse and reciprocal influence of men, and which have become a second nature throughout the whole domain of Culture, but on that very account are not distinctly recognised in Consciousness.* The *Principles*, we have said ;—and therefore by no means the *fortuitous actual course of conduct*, determined, it may be, by mere accidental circumstances ; but, on the contrary, that *concealed Principle of conduct* which always remains the same, the existence of which we always presuppose in Man whenever left to his own instincts, and from which we can, with so much apparent certainty, calculate beforehand the course of conduct which will be its necessary result. *The Principles*, I said, *which have become a second nature, but on that very account are not distinctly recognised in Consciousness* :—and hence there are to be excepted from this definition, all those impulses and motives influencing the general course of conduct which are founded upon Freedom,—the inward impulse of Morality, as well as the outward motive of Law ;—whatever Man must first consider and then freely resolve upon does not fall within the category of Manners. In so far as a fixed standard of Manners may be ascribed to an Age, in so far as it is to be regarded as an unconscious instrument of the Spirit of the Time.

We have already ascribed to the introduction of the Equality of all Men before the tribunal of Right, and before a Legislation which should discover with certainty every transgression and with equal certainty inflict the threatened punishment,—which Legislation has only been introduced in Modern Times through the influence of Christianity,—we have ascribed, I say, to such a Legislation a most important and highly beneficial influence upon the Manners of the Citizens. Were every inward temptation to injustice towards others,—so we casually expressed ourselves,—were every such inward temptation crushed, even in its birth, by the consciousness that no other result could follow this course but certain punishment and loss, then would the People gradually lose the habit of even entertaining thoughts of injustice, or of exhibiting such desires even by the most trifling outward manifestation:—all would appear virtuous; although it were yet only the menaces of Law which scared back evil desire to the most secret recesses of the heart; the remembrance of these menaces would have become a part of the Manners of the People, and thus it would have likewise become a part of such Manners to give way to no thought of injustice. These Manners, as merely restraining from evil but not as yet impelling towards good behaviour, would be *negatively* good; i.e. they would not be Bad Manners,—and their production would be the negative influence of Legislation, and through it of Christianity, upon Public Morality.

This influence of Legislation upon Manners is necessary and infallible:—If in no case any advantage is to be expected from injustice, but at all times only loss and detriment?—then no one, if he but love himself and seek his own welfare, can desire to be unjust. Should this influence upon Manners fail to show itself to the anticipated extent in actual and really efficient Legislation, then we should have to inquire whether this defect does

not arise from some existing uncertainty as to the execution of the Law ; either because the guilty may with great probability hope to remain undiscovered, or because the course of Justice and of Judicial Inquiry and Evidence is intricate and obscure, and presents many opportunities of escape. In this case, the subject of temptation might thus argue with himself:—‘Ten others, or more perhaps around me, have done this thing and go unpunished; why should I, the eleventh, be discovered?’—or thus: ‘I myself have done this thing already ten times; let me venture it again this eleventh time. Should I unfortunately be discovered, I have already the gain of ten to set against the loss of one;’—and no exception could be taken to this mode of reckoning. In the first case, the probability of no accusation being made would indicate a want of strict surveillance despite the good Legislation; in the second case, the hope of escaping conviction, even should an accusation take place, would indicate a deficiency in the requisite number of acute and sharp-sighted judges. In both cases, our next task would be to discover the cause of this deficiency; for example,—whether it did not arise out of the necessity which we have already described of the State employing all its powers directly for its *outward* protection; and whether such a State, were the augmentation of its Police or the improvement of its system of Judicial Inquiry demanded of it, would not be forced to lament its inability to provide the means for the accomplishment of these purposes. In this case, it would be necessary to represent to such a Government that *inward* security and strength is yet more important than *outward*, and that the former is the firmest foundation for the latter; that the means for the attainment of the former must first be provided, before there should be any question of the latter condition: and should we not dare to make these representations to the State, and were still less able to enforce our views upon its attention, it were at least

much to be desired that internal disorder, carried to the highest extreme, and the frustration of its most cherished and well-considered schemes by means of this disorder, should force it to return to the path of Wisdom.

It may be remarked, with reference to Judicial Procedure, that whatever respect may be due to the endeavour absolutely to prevent the possibility of an innocent person being convicted, and although this endeavour must never cease to be made; yet the opposite duty,—to take care that no guilty person remain undiscovered and unpunished,—is by no means a less important task; that there is nothing to hinder the solution of both;—nay, that without the solution of the latter that of the former cannot be attained, but on the contrary that, in such a case, the State would be found hindering and obstructing the accomplishment of its own purposes.

At this point, I, as an individual, have nothing further to say, but you yourselves must judge how far this influence of Legislation upon Manners has actually proceeded in Europe, and particularly in those parts of Europe where the State is most thoroughly cultivated; wherein the defect, if defect there be, consists; and thus in what direction the New Age must proceed in its onward course.

But be it as it may with this influence of Legislation upon the negative side of Public Morality, yet Public Manners, wherever they exist, in turn exert a powerful influence upon the State, and upon the mode and form of its Legislation. This, which we shall immediately prove, being presupposed, it is obvious that a course of action thus directed, adopted by the State in its Legislation, is itself but a part of the Morality of the Age, since it proceeds solely from the Manners of the Citizens, and is determined by them and not by Legislation as such; and,—since in that case it does not even restrain the State from injustice, such injustice being already wholly inconsistent with Legislation, but only guides this Legislation

into a different course,—it thus becomes the *positive* Morality of the State. Positive Good Manners, however, consist herein, that in every individual we recognise and honour the representative of the Human Race. This Morality, I said, is made possible for the State, in the way of its Legislation, by means of the *negative* Good Manners of its Citizens. Thus, we may lay down the following as the permanent fundamental principle of Criminal Legislation:—The more certain it is that punishment will follow crime, and the more the Manners of the Nation are formed upon this certainty, so much the milder and more humane may punishment itself be made. This amelioration, however, is not on account of the transgressor, for whom as such the State has no ulterior regard; but it is on account of the Race whose image he still bears in his person.

For example:—He who is accustomed to consider this matter not superficially, but in its profounder aspects, will unquestionably admit that an individual may become so dangerous to society that it is impossible for the State thoroughly to protect society from his aggressions without removing him from the world. It will, however, be likewise admitted—unless indeed we were to proceed upon the barbarous Mosaic principle,—‘an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth,’—it will, I say, be admitted that the State ought to adopt this method only in cases of extreme necessity, and where there is actually no other course available; for the transgressor still remains a member of the Race, and as such possesses the right to live as long as he can for the purpose of self-improvement. But admitting this course to be necessary in particular cases, yet for the Government to employ a pompous ceremonial in the execution of the condemned, to sharpen the agonies of death by torments, to expose the remains of the dead in a disgusting public spectacle, is at most only to be justified where the great mass of the Nation stand in need of such frightful

exhibitions, in order that they may be rendered less prone to deeds of horror upon other occasions. In a cultivated Age, not addicted to bloodshed, it would, in our opinion, be sufficient if the death-judgment were only pronounced in public, but carried into effect in secrecy and silence; and thereafter, the body left open to inspection, so that any one who desired to do so might convince himself that the sentence had been actually completed. In short, the more civilized a People becomes, the punishment of death, and generally all punishments, must become milder and less frequent among them.

This gradual amelioration of Criminal Legislation, we have said, is rendered possible to the State, by means of the improvement of Manners among the People. But, after this possibility has been created, what shall move and impel the State actually to realize that which has thus merely become possible? I answer: The general opinion of Europe, as well as, in particular, the voice of its own Citizens. Until it has become a part of Public Manners to recognise and honour in each individual man the representative of the Race, the People are yet disposed to deeds of violence, and must be held in check by means of severe and, in part, terrible punishments. After this principle has entered into Public Manners, and consequently deeds of violence have become less frequent, it can no longer be endured that any one who bears the human form, whatever offence he may have committed, should be tortured as an exhibition to the crowd; the civilized man turns away his eyes with horror from the spectacle, and the whole world despises, as barbarous, a Government and a Nation which still sanctions such enormities;—and thus the Government is impelled by its own love of honour, as well as that of the Nation, to keep its Criminal Legislation in harmony with the Spirit of the Time, and in so doing itself to adopt Good Manners.

And here once more we have attained a point where I must appeal to your own judgment, and leave it to yourselves to compare the Past with the Present in this respect, to determine at what point our own Age has arrived, and in what direction it must now proceed onwards.

The inquiry which we have thus brought to a close, has afforded us an opportunity of ascertaining and pointing out in what *positive* public Good Manners consist. They consist in habitually regarding each individual, without exception, as a member of the Race, and in desiring to be so regarded by him; in treating him as possessing that character, and in desiring to be so treated by him in return. To regard and to be regarded, to treat and to be treated in return, I have said;—for both are inseparably united, and he who does not desire the latter will not fulfil the former condition. He to whom it is a matter of indifference what others think of him, and how they treat him, in those matters as to which no course of duty is prescribed by the Law, far from accepting their judgment as the judgment of the Race, despises them and casts them from him as worthy of no consideration. It is indeed unquestionably true, that any one by his own bad conduct may place others in such a position that they can entertain towards him no feeling save that of most profound contempt, and they would be quite justified in doing so;—but this contempt must not be an original habit of mind; it must be called forth and deserved, and in that case clear conviction takes the place of mere habit.

The chief feature in our conception of Good Manners as above set forth is this,—that every individual, without exception, merely as such, and on account of his bearing the human form, ought, in the event of his not having forfeited this character by his own misdeeds, to be recognised as a member and representative of the Race;—or, in other words, that the Original Equality of all men ought to be the predominant and fundamental idea in all our inter-

course with our fellow-men. Now this Equality of all men is the peculiar principle of Christianity; hence the universal but unconscious dominion of this Christianity, and its acceptance as the essential actuating principle of public life, would be also the foundation of Good Manners, or rather would itself be Good Manners. The *unconscious* dominion, I have said;—that is, when it should be no longer publicly proclaimed, 'Christianity teaches this or that;'—but when the PRINCIPLE should itself possess a true and living existence within the minds of men, and manifest itself in all their actions.

Now, this presupposed principle has assuredly had a recognised existence in the world since the origin of Christianity, and no man acts in opposition to it because no man has power to do so. 'Before God we are all Equal,' says many a one,—and he readily admits that in *another life* we shall actually be placed upon an Equality, because this is a matter beyond his control,—who nevertheless himself relies upon the inequality of men in *this life*, maintains this inequality with all his power, and endeavours to draw from it the greatest possible advantage to himself. The principle of Equality must therefore be applied to the earthly relations of men, if it is to become the source of true, active Good Manners among them. This can only be effected through the influence of the Perfect State which penetrates all men in the same manner, each in his own place, and employs them all as its instruments. Thus it is not the mere ideal dominion of Christianity, but the dominion which it acquires by means of the State, and which is realized in the State, which is true Good Manners; and the idea of such Good Manners may now be further defined in this way:—Each Individual is recognised as a member of the Race when we regard him as an instrument of the State, and desire to be so regarded by him; when we treat him as such, and desire to be so treated by

him in return. We must desire to be so regarded and so treated by him, I have said ; but we are not entitled to expect or demand from him any error in this judgment, and therefore we must actually be, and desire to be, instruments of the State, and that to the same extent as he, although it may be in another sphere.

The complete interpenetration of all its members by the State, and therewith the Equality of all men in the State, is first effected by means of the perfect conformity of the Rights of all ; and thus perfect Good Manners consist in the supposition of this Equality of Rights, as at least something which ought to come to pass, and which must come to pass ;—in acting towards every man as if this must be the case, and likewise in desiring to be treated in return upon this supposition, and not otherwise. It is thus clear that Inequality of Rights is the true source of Bad Manners ; and the tacit assumption that we must continue in this state of Inequality is itself Bad Manners.

To make this clear by farther explanation : In the first place, there stand opposite to each other in Society the opulent and cultivated Citizen-class, and the Privileged Classes. Among the former, it is Bad Manners, either, on the one hand, to set too high a value on the distinctions of the latter, and, going beyond those ordinary conventional forms of respect which every reasonable man concedes, to put on a slavish, submissive, and cringing behaviour towards the Privileged Classes ; or, on the other hand, enviously to grudge them the distinctions which they enjoy, to indulge in bitterness of expression towards them, and to represent these distinctions in false and hateful colours, either from real antipathy, or from want of mature reflection. These forms of Bad Manners on the one part, naturally produce other forms of Bad Manners on the other ; either by the Privileged Classes not spurning the unseemly homage with fitting indignation, but satisfying themselves with holding in little

esteem those who by their own conduct invite contempt; or by strictly repulsing every approach of the other Class, and carefully shutting themselves up from such contact in a system of narrow exclusiveness.

How shall these two estranged Classes of the same State now peacefully reunite and harmonize in one and the same system of Good Manners? The most advantageous means of attaining that end would be, that they should be bound together by Knowledge; and indeed that the Citizen-class should first find themselves in possession of this Knowledge, and that the communication of it should proceed from them. Were it at first to be an acquisition of the Privileged Classes, it might be feared that they would seek to retain exclusive possession of it, and so appropriate, in addition to the accidental distinctions of fortune, the far more important superiority of true worth. Of the Citizen, educated by the light of true Knowledge, it may be expected that he will rightly understand and appreciate the real meaning and value of these distinctions of the Privileged Classes,—perchance as we have set these forth in our preceding lecture,—and just upon that account will be as far from over-estimating as from grudging them. The Educated Man of the Privileged Classes, would acquire a new, peculiar, and personal value, which would powerfully dispose him to open his eyes to the light which true Knowledge throws upon his fortuitous and hereditary Privileges. To both, the distinctions which exist between them in matters of small moment would readily disappear before their Equality in those higher Privileges upon which they set supreme value.

Both Classes, now united by this tie, still stand opposed in society to the great mass of the People who are engaged in mechanical and manual labour, and who on that account are almost universally without that perfect instruction of which they stand in need. This large Class feels the oppression of its daily toil; it sees that the

Higher Classes in their copious and comfortable enjoyment of life do not participate in its mechanical labours :—but how these have also their labours and toils in other spheres, how they are useful and necessary for the general welfare, and even indispensable for the People themselves; and in particular, what important advantages are secured to the community by its own labour;—all this it does not know, and cannot comprehend. Under these circumstances it cannot be but that Bad Manners should become a second nature to the Lower Classes, prompting them to regard the Higher Classes as oppressors who live upon their toil, and to look upon every proposition which comes to them from that quarter as an attempt to gain some new advantage over them. There is no other way by which these Lower Classes may be assisted, or their Bad Manners improved, except by their attaining a living conviction that they are not made subservient to the arbitrary will of an individual, but to the Community as a Whole; and even this only in so far as that Whole needs their services; and that all their Fellow-Citizens, without exception, to whatever Class they belong, stand in the same position:—but, in order that they may arrive at this conviction, it is necessary that this should actually be the case; for it is in vain to indulge the hope of deceiving the Lower Classes in matters which affect their interests. Hence either Equality of Rights must be actually introduced; or else the Privileged Classes must constantly, publicly, and before the eyes of all men, act as if this Equality were introduced. This condition of things must be brought distinctly under the notice of the Lower Classes, and be made evident to them by their Teachers, who are the mediators between them and the Higher Classes, and who ought to be well acquainted with their language and ways of thinking;—in one word, the People ought to receive instruction, and indeed fundamental, solid, and convincing instruction, not in Religion only, but also regarding the State, its purposes and its laws.

To make my views clear by a distinct example: The great proprietor must be able thus to speak to his dependants, or to enable their Teachers thus to speak for him, and that with truth, calling to witness the daily testimony of their own eyes:—'Although I possess as much as hundreds or perhaps thousands of you do together, yet I cannot, on that account, either eat, drink, or sleep, for a hundred or a thousand. The undertakings in which you see me daily engage; the experiments on a great scale with new methods of husbandry; the introduction, from distant lands, of new and nobler races of animals, new plants, new seeds; the study of their proper treatment which, being hitherto unknown, has now to be patiently sought out;—these demand great immediate outlay, and the means of defraying the loss consequent upon possible failure. You cannot afford to do this, and hence it is not required of you: but that wherein I am successful you may learn from me, and imitate; what proves unsuccessful you may avoid, for I have already encountered the risk for you. From my herds there will gradually extend to yours those nobler races of animals already domesticated with me; from my fields there will be propagated to yours those more profitable fruits already inured to the climate, with the art of their cultivation already acquired and tested at my expense. It is true that my granaries are plentifully filled with stores of every kind; but to whom among you who stood in need of aid have they ever been closed?—who among you all has ever been in difficulty and I have not succoured him? What you do not require shall, at the first signal given by the State, flow forth freely to any province of our Fatherland that may feel the iron hand of want. Grudge me not the gold which I receive;—it shall be so expended as I have hitherto expended, before your eyes, all that ever I had; there shall not be, with my will, a single farthing of it applied without some gain to the cause of Human Culture.

Moreover, if the State shall require my money for the pay of its armies or the support of its provinces; or the division of my goods for the maintenance of a larger population; I shall be ready at all times to deliver them up into its hands. I promise you, you shall not see me shrink from my duty. Should the State not require this sacrifice at my hands, and should I leave my possessions to my children; then I have educated them so that they shall use these possessions as I have used them, and shall teach their successors to act as I have acted, even to the end of time.'

Such is public and universal Good Manners. How far such Manners have attained dominion in our own Age, in those countries where the State and its Citizens have attained the highest point of Culture, in comparison with earlier Ages; in what respects the Age is yet defective, and how our Race must next proceed forward to higher attainments;—this I leave to the judgment of those among you who have opportunities of making observations upon this matter, and I do so the more readily that I myself have not possessed such opportunities, particularly as regards the relation of the Cultivated Classes to the People, for a long series of years,—and in certain countries have never possessed them at all. I had nothing more to do than to set forth in general the principles upon which such a judgment ought to proceed. Briefly to recount these once more:—Herein consists the true vocation and worth of Man,—that he, with all he is, has, and can do, should devote himself to the service of the Race;—and since, and in so far as, the State determines the form and mode of the service which this Race does actually need, that he should devote himself to the service of the State. In what mode, chosen by himself, or assigned to him by the State, each man may do this, is of little moment, but only *that he do it*: and each one is to be honoured not according to the mode in which he performs this service, but

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according to the extent to which he performs it in the mode assigned to him. Even he who may not have performed it at all, or may have performed it most imperfectly, is yet to be respected at least as one who ought to perform it, who can perform it, and who perhaps one day will perform it; and he is to be treated according to this view. So also no one can lay claim to the honour and respect of others upon any other ground than this, and no pretension can justly be made to any value or influence with others, save only in this respect. Thus would the influence of the distinction of Classes in Society upon the conduct of those Classes towards each other be wholly extinguished, and all the Citizens of the State, and at last the whole Human Race, be united in equal and reciprocal esteem, and in a mode of conduct founded upon this esteem; because such conduct would spring from a common source in which all partake in the same manner and in the same degree.

LECTURE XVI.

PUBLIC RELIGION OF THE PRESENT AGE.

ACCORDING to the plan which we laid down in an early part of these lectures, we have to-day to set forth the principles whereon this question may be answered:—‘At what point of development does the Present Age stand with reference to *Public and General Religion*?’

We have already, for a considerable time, regarded the True Religion, or Christianity,—which two expressions we avowedly hold to be synonymous,—as the peculiar and ultimate ground of all the phenomena by which our Age is characterized; and, in this view, the whole character of the Age is nothing else than this its ascertained standing-point in respect of Religion. The question which we have proposed has therefore either been already answered by all which we have previously said; or if it has not been so answered, and still demands a special solution, then we must here use the word Religion in a sense different from that in which we have hitherto employed it.

The latter is the case:—Hitherto we have regarded the True Religion as the *concealed principle* of phenomena; to-day we have to speak of it, not in this sense, but as itself an independent and substantial existence. Hitherto having represented it as the *principle* of phenomena, we have, on that very account, also represented it as an *un-*

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conscious principle, and in this connexion we have called by the name of Religion, not that which men put forth in public professions, but that which has become their very inmost Life,—the root and spring of all their speech and action. To-day we have to consider this Religion as it reveals itself in clear consciousness; for the independent existence of Religion is no outward matter, and reveals itself in no outward manner, but is an inward consciousness, and indeed a wholly self-sufficing and self-comprehending consciousness.

In this sense the word Religion is also employed in the common judgment which the Age passes upon itself with reference to its religious condition,—in the well-known and almost universal lamentations over the decay of Religion, especially among the people. It might well be imagined that the mere existence of such lamentations was itself a refutation of the complaint,—for do not the complainers, in the very act of lamentation, manifest their respect and love for Religion?—were it not that their complaints are accompanied by certain suspicious assumptions, from which it appears to follow that it is not their own Irreligion which they deplore, and that it is not for themselves, but for others, and especially for the people, that they desire a revival of Religion: behind which desire there may perhaps lurk some interested purpose. Be this as it may, let us examine these complaints, and with this examination carry forward our own inquiry.

Without anticipating the results of your own observation, we may lay it down as certain, that whatever necessarily follows in regard to Public Religion from the principles of the Age will unquestionably be found truly represented and manifest in the phenomena of the time. Now, we have shown in passing, in our previous lecture, that the principles from which the Public Religion of an Age proceeds, are to be found in the Scientific, and particularly in the Philosophical character of the *pre-*

ceding Age. In the schools of Philosophy and Science, the popular teacher, the popular author, and the public opinion of the cultivated classes, are formed, and through these channels the influences of the schools spread themselves abroad, by teaching and example, among the People. The Philosophico-scientific character of the Third Age has been already set forth at the commencement of these lectures;—this, namely,—*to accept nothing as really existing or obligatory but that which it can understand and clearly comprehend*,—in which the Age is right; and further,—*to connect therewith mere empirical and sensuous Experiences as its sole measure of the Comprehensible*,—in which the Age is wrong. It is quite clear, that by means of the prevalence of these principles everything mysterious and incomprehensible must be banished from Religion; and—since the fear of God, as well as the means of propitiating him, are founded on the Incomprehensibility and Unsearchableness of the Divine Counsels, and we can therefore be made acquainted with these means only by direct Revelation,—that everything awful in Religion, as well as blind faith and unquestioning obedience in its concerns, must wholly disappear. An Age, therefore, which is formed upon those principles, and thoroughly penetrated by them, will no longer be moved by the fear of God, nor employ any ostensible and pretentious means of propitiating him.

But is this fear of God, and these efforts to propitiate him by means of mysterious devices,—are these Religion and Christianity? By no means:—they are Superstitions, remnants of Heathenism which have mixed themselves up with Christianity, and have not yet been wholly thrust out from it;—and these remnants are wholly destroyed by the Philosophy of the Age wherever it has free play. Along with them True Christianity itself is, not indeed destroyed,—for except in individuals it has never yet attained a public and recognised exis-

tence,—but the Age is thereby rendered incapable of comprehending True Christianity or of introducing it into the world.

Does any one lament this downfall of Superstition as the decay of Religion?—then he violates the true use of language, and laments over that in which he ought to rejoice, and which is indeed a brilliant proof of the advancement of our Age. On what account, then, are these lamentations made? Since the thing which has fallen has nothing in itself to recommend it, it must be only the outward consequences of its fall that are deplored. In so far as these lamentations do not proceed from the priests themselves,—(in this connexion we may call them priests without fear of misapprehension),—whose grief at the loss of their dominion over the minds of men we can well understand,—but from the politicians, then they may be resolved into this, that Government has thereby become more difficult and expensive. The fear of the Gods was an excellent resource for an imperfect Government; it was a convenient thing to watch the doings of the subjects through the eyes of the Divinity, where the Government either could not or would not exercise this surveillance itself; the Judge was spared the exercise of his own sagacity and penetration, when, by threats of relentless damnation, he could induce the accused to communicate to him willingly the information he desired to possess; and the Evil Spirit performed, without reward, the services for which, at later times, Judges and Police had to be paid.

To declare frankly what we clearly perceive to be true, let us here say that, even if the maintenance of such a method of facilitating Government were allowable, which it is not, yet this increase of the burden of Government is no evil, but a precious good in which Humanity at large must sooner or later become partaker. Government itself is an Art founded on the laws of Reason, which ought not to be prosecuted at random, but must, on the contrary,

be rightly and fundamentally studied;—but to this fundamental study we are only impelled by necessity, and only at a time when Government can no longer be carried on by superficiality.

Thus the philosophical and scientific sense of the Age overthrows Superstition when it is thoroughly recognised and understood; but cannot as yet establish True Religion in its place in distinct Consciousness. Hence in such an Age, there is no longer to be found any clear and distinct conception of a Super-sensual world, either true or false.

Suppose then that such is actually the case,—that these inferences are confirmed by observation, which here again I leave to yourselves to follow out,—would it necessarily follow, because the Super-sensual is nowhere *clearly comprehended*, that the *indistinct feeling* of the Infinite, and the struggling and striving after its attainment no longer exist; in one word, that with Religion itself, the sense of Religion, or Religious Feeling, has likewise disappeared? By no means. It may be laid down as an incontestable principle, that where even Virtue and Good Manners still prevail,—philanthropy, the charities of social life, sympathy, benevolence, domestic order, the faithful and self-sacrificing attachment of husband and wife, parents and children,—there Religion still exists whether recognised or not; and there the capacity still exists for its attaining a full and conscious being. Such a people can indeed no longer entertain those Superstitions whose empire has passed away; but let the attempt be made to awaken in them clear and true Ideas of Religion, and it will soon be seen that they will be moved by these as by nothing else. And has not this, in fact, occasionally occurred in Modern Times?—and has it not been remarked upon such occasions that men of all Classes, who seemed to be dead to every other spiritual influence, have been attracted and aroused by this? Very far, therefore, from

joining in the lamentations over the decay of Religion in our Age, I hold this rather to be the character of the Age, —that it would be more ready than any other to receive and appreciate True Religion when presented to it. The empty and ineffectual babble of Free-thinking has had time enough to utter itself in all possible ways;—it has uttered itself and we have listened to it;—and on this side there is nothing *new* and nothing *better* to be said than what has been said already. We are weary of it; we feel its emptiness and its perfect nothingness with reference to that Feeling of the Eternal which can never be wholly uprooted from our souls. This Feeling remains, and urgently demands its rightful exercise. A more manly Philosophy has since then attempted to silence this Feeling by asserting the claims of another,—that of Absolute Morality,—under the name of the Categorical Imperative. Many powerful minds have accepted this principle, and rested satisfied with it: but this can endure only for a time, for precisely on account of a kindred feeling being cultivated does that which is unsatisfied feel more strongly the want of its satisfaction. Let Truth at last present itself to such a mind;—then, just because it has been inactive, and has already passed through so many errors, will it the more keenly discern and the more cordially accept the Truth which is now offered to its view. That such Truth will one day present itself to the public mind we may securely predict; for it is already prepared in the secret workshops of Philosophy although still in the obscurity of formula,—and already exists in the primitive records of Christianity although as yet not understood. How, and by what means it shall be introduced into the world we must leave to Time, looking forward with quiet confidence, and not expecting to see the harvest ready for the reaper while as yet the seed is but being sown.

Wherein, then, does this True Religion consist? Perhaps I shall be able to describe it most clearly if I show what it

accomplishes, and if I do this by declaring what it does not accomplish. All previous outward forms of Christianity have had the effect of bringing Mankind, and in particular Nations and States, thus far:—that they have done many things which they would otherwise have left undone, and have left undone many things which otherwise they would have done; and in particular Superstition has constrained its subjects to abandon many pernicious, and to adopt many useful, practices. In one word: these outward forms of Christianity lie at the bottom of many phenomena and events which would otherwise never have occurred. It is not so with inward True Religion; it does not come forth into the world of outward Appearance, and impels man to no outward act which he would not otherwise have done. But it completes his own internal being, makes him wholly at one with himself, and intelligible to himself, thoroughly Free and Blessed:—in one word, it perfects his dignity.

Let us consider the highest which man can possess in the absence of Religion; I mean, *Pure Morality*. He obeys the Law of Duty in his breast, absolutely because it is a Law unto him; and he does whatever reveals itself as his Duty, absolutely because it is Duty. But does he therein understand himself?—does he know what this Duty, to which at every moment he consecrates his whole existence, really is in itself and what is its ultimate aim? So little does he know this, that he declares loudly it *ought* to be so absolutely *because* it ought; and makes this very impossibility of comprehending and understanding the Law,—this absolute abstraction from the meaning of the Law, and the consequences of the deed,—a characteristic mark of genuine obedience. In the first place, let not the impudent assertion be here repeated, that such an obedience without regard to consequences, and without desire for consequences, is in itself impossible and opposed to Human Nature. What does the mere sensuous Egoist,

who is himself but a half man, what does he know of the power of Human Nature? That it is possible can be known only by its actual accomplishment in ourselves; and before its possibility is recognised in this way, and man has elevated himself in his own person to Pure Morality, he can have no entrance whatever into the domain of True Religion; for Religion also annexes no visible consequences to individual acts of Duty.—So much for the refutation of that portion of error which arises from the calumnious slander of Pure Morality.

Again, he who faithfully obeys the Law of Duty, as such, does not understand the ultimate aim of this Law. It is clear,—since he, notwithstanding this ignorance, maintains an unvarying and unconditional obedience; since, further, the Law of Duty, although not understood, speaks forth constantly and invariably within him,—that this want of comprehension causes no difference in his actions;—but it is another question whether such a want of comprehension is consistent with his dignity as a rational being. He does not indeed any longer follow the concealed law of the Universe nor the blind impulses of Nature, but a conception,—and in doing so he acts, thus far, a nobler part. But this conception itself is not clear to him, and, with reference to it, he himself is blind; his obedience therefore remains but a blind obedience;—he is led on by a nobler instinct indeed, but still with bandaged eyes. But if this position be inconsistent with the dignity of Reason, as it unquestionably is, and if there lie in Reason itself a power and therefore an impulse to penetrate to the meaning of the Law of Duty, then will this impulse be a source of constant disturbance and dissatisfaction to him, and if he still continue to hold by blind obedience, he will have no other course than to harden himself against this secret desire. However perfect may be his conduct,—that is, his outward and apparent existence,—there is still

at the root of his inward being, discord, obscurity, and bondage, and therefore a want of absolute dignity. Such is the position even of the purely Moral Man, when regarded by the light of Religion. How displeasing, then, as seen by this light, must be the condition of him who has not even attained to True Morality, but as yet only follows the impulses of Nature. He too is guided by the Eternal Law of the Universe; but to him it neither speaks in his own language nor honours him with speech at all, but leads him on with dumb compulsion as it does the plant or the animal; employs him like an unreasoning thing, without consulting his own Will in aught, and in a region where mere mechanism is the only moving power.

Religion discloses to Man the significance of the one Eternal Law which, as the Law of Duty, guides the free and noble, and, as the Law of Nature, governs ignoble instruments. The Religious Man comprehends this Law, and feels it living within himself, as the Law of the Eternal development of the One Life. How each individual moment of our Earthly Life is comprehended in that Eternal development of the one original Divine Life he cannot indeed understand, because the Infinite has no limit and therefore can never be embraced by him; but that every one of these moments does absolutely lie contained within this development of the One Life he can directly perceive and clearly recognise. What was the Law of Duty to the Moral Man, is to him the *inward* movement of the One Life directly revealed as Life; what is the Law of Nature to others is to him the unfolding of the *outward* and apparently dead substratum of that One Life.

This one clearly recognised Life now becomes thoroughly established in the Religious Man, reposing upon itself, sufficient for itself, and blessed in itself;—dwelling there with unspeakable Love; with inconceivable rapture bathing his

whole being in the original fountain of all Life, and flowing forth with him, and inseparable from him, in one eternal stream. What the Moral Man calls Duty and Law,—what is this to him? The most spiritual bloom of Life,—his element in which alone he can breathe. He wills and can do nothing else than this;—all else is to him misery and death. To him the commanding "*Thou shalt*" comes too late; before it can command he has already resolved, and cannot resolve otherwise. As all external Law vanishes before Morality, so before Religion the internal Law also disappears; the Lawgiver in our breast is silent, for Will, Desire, Love, and Blessedness, have already superseded the Law. The Moral Man often finds it difficult to perform his Duty; the sacrifice of his deepest desires and his most cherished feelings is demanded of him. He performs it notwithstanding:—it *must* be done; he subdues his feelings, and stifles his agony. The question, Wherefore is there need of this suffering, and whence arises this struggle between the desires which have been implanted in him and the commands of a Law from which he cannot escape?—this question he dares not permit himself to entertain; he must offer himself up with mute and blind obedience, for only under the condition of such obedience is the offering genuine. For the Religious Man this question has been once and for ever solved. That which thus strives against our Will, and which is so unwilling to die, is imperfect Life; which, even because it is Life, struggles for continued existence, but must cease to be as soon as its place is occupied by a higher and nobler Life. 'Those desires which I must sacrifice,' thinks the Religious Man, 'are not my desires; they are desires which are directed against me and my higher existence; they are my foes which cannot be destroyed too soon. The pain which they cause is not my pain, but the pain of a nature which has conspired against me; it is not the agonies of death, but the pangs of a

new birth which will be glorious beyond all my expectations.'

It would be unworthy of our picture of Religion were we still specially to repeat and insist that to it there is no longer anything displeasing and deformed in the world, but that all things there, without exception, are to it a source of the purest Blessedness. Whatever exists, *as* it exists and *because* it exists, labours in the service of the Eternal Life, and in the system of this development so it must be. To desire, wish, or love anything otherwise than as it is, would be either to desire no Life at all, or else to desire Life in a less perfect manifestation.

Religion elevates him who is devoted to her service above Time as such, above the Transient and the Perishable, and puts him in immediate possession of Eternity. On the one original Divine Life his eye reposes; there his love is rooted; whatever seems to be beyond this one original Life, is not beyond it but within it, and is merely a temporary form of its development according to an absolute Law which likewise lies within itself; he sees all things only in and through this one original Life, and in every individual life he sees the whole Infinite Universe of Being. His view is thus always the view of the Eternal, and what he sees, he sees as Eternal and in the Eternal: nothing can truly *be* which is not, even on that very account, *Eternal*. Every fear of perishing in death, every effort to discover an artificial proof of the immortality of the soul, lies far beneath him. In every moment of his existence he has immediate possession of the Eternal Life with all its Blessedness; and he needs no argument or inference to prove the truth of that which he possesses in ever-present consciousness. There is no more striking proof that the knowledge of the True Religion has hitherto been very rare among men, and that in particular it is a stranger in the prevailing systems, than this, that they universally

place Eternal Blessedness beyond the grave, and never for a moment imagine that whoever will, may here, and at once, be Blessed.

This is the True Religion. What we maintained above,—that this Religion never comes forth in outward manifestation, nor reveals itself in external results, but is only the perfection of man's inward being,—this has been thoroughly confirmed by our delineation. The Religious Man, indeed, does all those things without exception which the Law of Duty enjoins; but he does them not as a Religious Man, for he was already bound to do them, independently of all Religion, as a purely Moral Man;—as a Religious Man, he does the same things, but he does them with a nobler, freer inspiration. We must, however, necessarily pass through Pure Morality before we can attain Religion; for Religion is the Love of the Divine Life and Will, and he who obeys this Will reluctantly can never love it. By Morality we are first trained to obedience; and from habitual obedience Love arises as its sweetest fruit and reward.

But how shall our poor perplexed and harassed Human Race ever attain this Religion, and by its means be brought into this haven of secure repose? Some conditions which must previously be brought about we can easily indicate. In the first place, the Civil condition of the State and its internal and external peace must be firmly established. The empire of Good Manners must have commenced; the State must have no longer to struggle with its own necessities, or to impose them on its Citizens; this is necessary in order that quiet and leisure may be obtained. According to what we have said in our previous discourses, all this has already come to pass by means of Christianity as the fundamental principle of modern times; and in that same principle we have the assurance that this progress will still continue, and be carried out into farther and yet more perfect results. In

this respect Christianity itself, by means of its external relations, has fashioned and prepared the world on which it is destined to burst forth with all its inward and essential nobleness; and our whole view of modern times has thus acquired a new significance, and the keystone has been placed on the completed structure of our inquiry.

In this state of order and tranquillity Mankind, or at least a large portion of them, must necessarily elevate themselves, in the first place, to Pure Morality. At this point, the power of the State, and the unconscious influence of Christianity in its external relations, come to an end. The State, as we have already seen, can impel its Citizens to *negative* Good Manners by means of Legislation and Government, and to *positive* Good Manners by means of the establishment of Equal Rights for all; and it may thus remove the most powerful obstacles to the development of Pure Morality; but it cannot impel them to this Morality itself, for the source of this lies within themselves, in their own minds, and in their own free will.

How much less then does it lie within the power of the State again to raise the great mass of its Citizens, or at least a large portion of them, from this generally diffused Morality to the higher dignity of True Religion. Whatever may be done in future times for the diffusion of this True Religion by great men whose hearts may be powerfully animated by its presence,—whatever these may do as individuals,—the State, as such, must never propose this purpose to itself; for its efforts would unavoidably prove abortive, and produce something quite different from the end desired. Indeed, I may add that no State will propose this purpose to itself, for the maxim which we have now laid down will one day be universally recognised.

How then shall an impulse arise by which Mankind may be moved to the acknowledgment and diffusion of True Religion? I answer, in the same way that all progress in Religious Knowledge has hitherto been brought about;

by Individual Men, who, although as yet but partially and imperfectly, have still by one point or other of Religion been attracted, animated, and inspired, and have possessed the gift of communicating their inspiration to others. Such, in the beginning of modern times, were the Reformers:—such, in later days, when almost the whole of Religion was placed in the maintenance of orthodox systems of Theology, and the inward Religion of the heart was cast forth and neglected, were the so-called Pietistic Teachers, who gained an unquestionable victory; for what is the whole modern Theology, which would reduce the Bible to the level of its own shallow and superficial understanding, but a corruption of the view of the Pietists, retaining the contempt which these Teachers entertained for the orthodox systems of Theology, but casting aside the holiness of Feeling by which they were guided? And so in our own Age, when it has somewhat recovered and composed itself from the manifold errors with which it has been perplexed and harassed, will Inspired Men arise and bring to it that of which it stands in need.

We have finished the task which we proposed to ourselves:—we have delineated, briefly and succinctly as was our purpose, the Characteristics of the Present Age contemplated from those essential principles which belong to all Time. There remains nothing further for us to do but to add a conclusion to the whole. Permit me, for this purpose, to invite you here once again.

LECTURE XVII.

CONCLUSION.

IN the preceding Lectures we have delineated the Present Age as a necessary part of the great World-Plan on which the Earthly Life of our Race is arranged, and have endeavoured to disclose its secret significance; we have sought to understand the phenomena of the Present by means of this Idea, to bring them forth as the necessary results of the Past, and to predict their immediate consequences in the Future;—and if we have succeeded in this our undertaking, we have then understood our Age. We have been engaged in these contemplations without thought of ourselves or of our own position. Speculation warns every inquirer, and with good reason, against this self-forgetfulness. To show the justice of this warning in our own case:—Should our view of the Present Age prove to have been a view taken from the standing-point of this Age itself, should the eye which has taken this view have been itself a product of the Age which it has surveyed, then has the Age borne witness to itself and such testimony must be set aside; and so far from having explored its significance, we have only added to the number of its phenomena a most superfluous and unproductive one. Whether this has been our position or not, can only be determined by a retrospect of our previous inquiry; and this retrospect can

only be accomplished by placing our inquiry before us as itself a phenomenon of Time, and indeed of that Age in which it has occurred, namely,—the Present.

But however indispensable it is, in every mental occupation, that we should not lose sight of ourselves, it is yet most difficult to do this, particularly to do it aloud; that is, to speak of ourselves. Not indeed that I should find any serious difficulty in speaking of *me*, the particular individual who now addresses you. In the Introductory Lecture, when I first sought to combine and establish this audience, I spoke without hesitation of myself, what I believe no one has ever taken amiss, and what I do not regret having spoken; but now, at the conclusion of my task, I know not how to utter one word respecting myself which shall be worthy of utterance. The question is not of me; it is not I who have desired to think and to inquire:—had *my* thought or inquiry been a matter of any moment, I could have accomplished that without saying aught to any one on the subject; but from such self-contemplation no result for the world could ensue; for what the Individual thinks, or does not think, constitutes no event for his Age;—but it is *We*, as one company devoted to this purpose, and borne on to unity of thought in absolute forgetfulness of our own individual persons, (as we have often before given outward manifestation of this unity of thought, and do so now)—it is *We* who have desired to think and to inquire;—and it is to this *we*, and by no means to myself, that I refer when I speak of this mental retrospect of ourselves, and of the difficulty of accomplishing it aloud and in public speech. So much in that case strives for utterance which each of us would more fitly think for himself, that an incautious man might be misled into touching upon subjects which modesty would rather leave untouched, and into urging upon the attention considerations which are offensive to the cultivated mind,—not on their own account, but because they are spoken on the suppo-

sition that those to whom they are addressed cannot make them for themselves. As I have hitherto, I believe, kept myself free from this sort of eloquence,—which indeed is permitted only to one class to which I do not belong,—I hope I shall continue to avoid it, even to the end.

I have said that we shall to-day take a retrospect of our previous inquiry, and of the theory which has been its result—our theory not *mine* as I have already explained;—especially in order that we may be assured that this theory is not itself a product of the Present Age, the influence of the Age upon us being hidden from our view. To this end I maintain, that this theory is assuredly no product of our own Age—if, *in the first place*, it be not a product of any Age whatever, but lies beyond all Time; and also (since in that case it might prove absolutely empty and without significance, and so disappear in mere vacuity and nothingness)—if, *in the second place*, it become the root and principle of living vitality in a New Age.

In the first place, that we may be able to determine whether our now completed theory does actually lie beyond all Time, let us inquire what has been the nature of this theory, considered in its essential elements, and to what chief department of human thought it has belonged? I answer:—It was a Religious Theory; all our contemplations were Religious contemplations, and our view of things, and the eye which embraced that view, were Religious.

According to the thought which, directly or indirectly, distinctly or obscurely, has animated all our previous discourses, and, in our last discourse especially, has been considered on all sides;—according to this thought, I say, RELIGION consists in regarding and recognising all Earthly Life as a necessary development of the one, original, perfectly good and perfectly blessed Divine Life. Now, it is first of all quite clear that this view

does not consist in the mere perception or contemplation of life, or of anything else, and that it cannot arise from such perception or contemplation. By the most careful observation of phenomena we can go no further than to know that so and so is the case, but by no means to reject or disallow this as mere appearance, and to seek a higher significance behind it. The Religious mode of thought can thus never be the result of mere observation of the world, since, on the contrary, this mode of thought rests on the imperative maxim—not to accept this world and all Earthly Life in it as in itself true and real existence, but to assume another Higher Existence superior to the world. This maxim must be developed in the mind itself, as an essential element originally implanted there;—and no man can ever arrive at this truth by mere empirical observation, since it entirely abolishes empirical observation as the highest and decisive test of reality. It is clear that this maxim stands in direct opposition to the principle which we have indicated as that which guides the thought of our Age; that this thought can never attain to it; and that, by means of the very first supposition of something higher than the World, we raise ourselves above such an Age and cease to be its product. In short, not mere observation, but Pure Thought, in itself and by itself, is the first element of Religion. In the language of the schools:—Metaphysic, that is, the Super-sensual, is the element of Religion. From the beginning of the world down to the present day Religion, whatever shape it may have assumed, has been Metaphysic; and he who despises and derides Metaphysic,—that is, everything *a priori*,—either knows not what he means, or else he despises and derides Religion.

Are we set free from this limitation and bondage in the Apparent?—then the next step towards the attainment of True Religion is our second maxim:—To place the foun-

dation of the world neither in Chance, which in other words is to accept a foundation of the world and yet not to accept it; nor in blind Necessity, which in other words is to accept an absolutely inconceivable and dead foundation of the world, and of all the life in the world; nor yet in a living, but evil, capricious, and man-hating Cause, as Superstition has done at all times in a greater or less degree;—but in the One, absolutely and unchangeably good, Divine Existence. We said that our first maxim,—not to accept Apparent Existence in Time as in itself true and real, but to assume a Higher Existence beyond it,—must be developed within the mind itself; and even so our second maxim,—to regard this Higher Existence as Life, and as a good and Blessed Life,—must likewise be developed in the mind itself as an inherent element originally implanted there. At most, we can only receive help from without by the communication of such thoughts from others with the invitation to test them by our own sense of Truth; by which, if it be but rightly interrogated, and if the mass of preëxisting errors and prejudices be not too powerful, they will doubtless be confirmed. There is no logical means by which this insight may be forced upon man, for even the dullest and rudest form of mere Egoism is consistent in itself, and he who determines with stiff-necked obstinacy to abide there cannot be compelled to quit it.

In a word,—as we have already clearly set forth in our last Lecture,—In the view of Religion, all the phenomena of Time, without exception, are regarded as necessary and progressive developments of the One, Ever-blessed, Original Divine Life, and hence each individual phenomenon is regarded as the necessary condition of a higher and more perfect life in Time which shall arise from it. Now,—and this is to be particularly remarked,—this one, essentially abiding and unchanging view of Religion, is itself divided *in its form*, and assumes a double aspect. Namely,

—we may either possess only a general insight into the *fact*, that, since all life manifested in Time can be nothing else than a development of the Divine Life, so also the particular phenomenon which may be in question is necessarily a development of this Divine Life:—the *fact*, I say, that such is the case, without any conception of *how* and *in what way* it is so; and this form of Religion we may name the **RELIGION OF REASON**, which lies beyond all understanding and all conception, although its clearness and certainty do not on that account suffer the slightest abatement:—The Religion of Reason, we style it, for it is the mere acceptance of the *fact*, without comprehension of the *manner of the fact*. Or, in the second place, we may understand and conceive *how* and *in what way* the phenomenon in question may be the development of a Higher Life;—the more perfect development which is to proceed from it may present itself to sight, and the phenomenon in question may then be recognised, clearly and distinctly, as the necessary foundation from which the actual progression has arisen;—and this latter form of Religion may be named the **RELIGION OF THE UNDERSTANDING**. These two forms embrace the whole domain of Religion; the Religion of Reason encompassing both its extremities, while the Religion of the Understanding occupies the centre. How each individual Human Being as such, and his particular fortunes, connect themselves with the Eternal,—this, as the *lower* extremity of the domain of Religion, cannot be comprehended; and as little, how this whole present and introductory Life of our Race is related to the infinite series of Future Life and determined thereby,—as little, I say, can this, as the *higher* extremity of the domain of Religion, be comprehended by us; but that they are altogether good and necessary for the Perfect Life, is distinctly apparent to the Religious Man. On the other hand, the significance of this first Earthly Life of the Race, considered in itself and apart from all

other Life, and as the Life of the Race not individual Life,—this, as the *middle* sphere of this domain of Religion, may be conceived and has been conceived by us; and on the same ground, it may be conceived how each of the necessary Epochs of this Earthly Life is related to the whole, and what is the particular significance of each in itself. Here, therefore, lies the domain of the Religion of the Understanding;—and this domain we have traversed in our inquiry, putting forward the Epoch in which we live as its clearest and most intelligible point.

The question, What has been the nature of our inquiry, is answered. What we have done is this:—we have raised ourselves into the domain of Religion by that way which is the most easy and accessible to our Age,—the way of Understanding. So surely as our inquiry has been a Religious inquiry, it has been no product of our own Age but has transcended all Ages and all Time; so surely as it has applied itself especially to the dominant principle of our own Age, it has raised itself from the level of this particular Age above all Time. The greatest obstacle to reflection is when a man no longer hesitates or stumbles at anything, no longer wonders at anything, and no longer seeks any explanation of surrounding phenomena. Of all the wonders that surround a man in this condition of indifference, whatever touches him however slightly because it has a direct influence on his own personal weal or woe, is that which lies nearest to him among the events of the Time. But what cultivated mind has not sometimes at least pondered in astonishment over those wonderful phenomena, demanded the meaning of them, and earnestly longed for a solution of its questionings? Without allowing ourselves to be occupied with trifles, which often fall within the domain of the absolutely unintelligible, or even when they are intelligible lead to nothing great, we have considered and characterized the Age broadly and as a whole; but

so that none of the members of this assembly will be apt to find anything passed over which specially interests him. We have characterized it in a rational and religious frame of mind, regarding all things as necessary parts of the whole, and as securely leading to nobler and more perfect results.

Thus there can be no doubt that our inquiry has transcended the limitations of Time. But this alone does not satisfy us. That it is no product, no favourite opinion, no mere prejudice of our Age, is well:—but is it not perhaps a mere nonentity, a deceptive show, a dream disappearing in the empty void of Time, and having no existence in True and Real Time? We have now to set forth the principles upon which this second question must be answered.

To this empty void of Time belongs everything which is adopted for the purpose of mere pastime, or, what is the same thing, for the satisfaction of curiosity founded upon no earnest desire of knowledge. Pastime is but an empty waste, interposed between times devoted to serious occupations. At the opening of these Lectures I undertook nothing more than that I should occupy your thoughts for a few hours of this winter in a manner neither unseemly nor disagreeable:—more I could not promise reckoning on myself alone; and to promise even this unconditionally was itself a hazard, for communication upon my part presupposed the power of receiving such a communication upon yours, and a definite communication presupposed a definite degree and form of this receptive power. If you have taken me altogether at my own word in this matter, then you may now congratulate yourselves that you have, in the course of this winter, got rid of sixteen or seventeen hours of idleness by means of a new amusement which has at least proved good, profitable, and wholesome;—and against this I have nothing to say. But in this case, it is quite certain that these

sixteen or seventeen hours have been to you not true but mere empty and vacant Time.

To True and Real Time belongs everything which becomes the necessary principle, foundation and cause of new and hitherto non-existent phenomena in Time; for the first characteristic of true Life is to create other Life from itself. That which by means of these inquiries might become such a principle was the ruling tendency and practice of contemplating all things without exception from the Religious point of view. Now it is impossible that this principle should have been implanted within us, for the first time, by means of the contemplations which have occupied us for a few hours of this winter. In the first place, we have already remarked that this principle cannot be communicated to man from without, but must have its root originally within his own being, and has actually such an inward existence in all men without exception;—and in the second place, we have not been able to avail ourselves of nearly the whole of the means which might have been employed to awaken and call forth this principle. The whole artificial training of the school, the systematic rise and overthrow of each objection, the gradual upturning of every branch of error by the roots; further, the profound and lengthened course of study, and the artificial development of the power of thought, which are presupposed in these things;—all these could not here be employed; and thus, the Religious Sense could not here be implanted, nor even for the first time awakened and called forth. It was presupposed that this Religious Sense had already made its appearance, and manifested its genial and invigorating influence in all the minds who have taken part in our inquiries, and only slumbered under the concealment of the numerous and incessant occupations and distractions of life and its every-day occurrences. To this sense, asleep but not dead, we were able confidently to appeal,

just as each of you might have done for himself, had he had time and aptitude for meditation on matters of this description. It became my business to apply a portion of my time to the production and adjustment of such a discourse as each of you might have addressed to himself, and which he must actually address to himself at last, testing it by his own sense of Truth, if it is really to be addressed to him at all. At most, I could thus only lend some assistance to my hearers, by removing the opposition between their spiritual condition at the time when the Religious Sense first developed itself within them, and that in which they now stand; by separating distinctly and forcibly this Religious Sense itself, which is at all times essentially one and the same, from the casual and diverse limitations which surrounded its first development, and planting it, beyond these limitations, into their present state of mental culture.

There is, in the first place, one good criterion by which we may arrive at a preliminary solution at least of the question we have proposed,—Whether the considerations which we have here set forth have been mere empty verbiage, or intellectual conceits, serviceable at most to pass away an idle hour?—or whether they have come home to something already living within ourselves?—this, namely,—if we have been conscious that our own long-cherished presentiments and feelings have here been distinctly spoken forth, and that we ourselves had previously thought of the matter almost exactly as it has been here expounded;—then we may be sure that something already living within us has been touched. This, I say, is but a preliminary and even but a partially decisive criterion. It is indecisive on the following account:—one man may cordially assent to it in whom only a fugitive scientific or æsthetic pleasure has been excited, which indeed may manifest itself in a more consistent view of the world, or in more inspired productions

of Art, but can never enter into the inmost recesses of the mind:—another man may gainsay it, because he goes to its consideration full of scientific prejudices, who does nevertheless give his assent to it at bottom,—and he may gainsay it the more vehemently the more he is irritated and chagrined by the secret harmony which reigns between his own mind and that which, according to his theory, must be error;—but, his whole character and mode of thinking being penetrated with this harmony, his conduct stands in opposition to his theory, until at last this theory itself, no longer receiving any nourishment from the heart, fades and falls away like withered leaves.

But the sure and perfectly decisive criterion whether something already living within us has here been touched, and that so powerfully that it can never again fall back into slumber,—for in that case the present awakening would again need a new revival which could never be anticipated with certainty, the present being worthless but for the future awakening, without which it would disappear in mere empty Time;—the sure and perfectly decisive criterion of this question, I say, is this:—Whether the Life which has thus been called forth do ceaselessly extend itself, and become the source and foundation of New Life.

In our last lecture, we have clearly shown that True Religion does not manifest itself outwardly, and does not impel man to any course of external conduct which he would not otherwise have adopted, but that it only completes his true Inward Being and dignity. It is neither an action, nor an incentive to action, but insight:—it is LIGHT, and the One True Light, which bears within it all Life and all the forms of Life, and pervades their innermost substance. Once arisen, this Light flows on spontaneously for ever, spreading itself forth without term or limit;—and it is as idle to *bid* it shine as it would be

to address such a command to the material sun when it stands in the noon-day heavens. It does this without our bidding; if it shine not, then it has not arisen. At its uprising darkness, and the brood of spectres and phantasms which are born of darkness, vanish of themselves. It is in vain to say to darkness,—‘Let there be Light!’—no Light can come forth from it, for there is none within it. As vain is it to say to man lost in the ‘transitory and Perishable,—‘Raise thine eyes to the Eternal!’—he has no eye for the Eternal;—his eye is itself transitory and perishable, and reflects only the Transitory and Perishable. But let the Light itself burst forth, then the darkness becomes visible, retires, and draws off like shadows across the field. The darkness is the thoughtlessness, the frivolity, the fickleness of men. Where the Light of Religion has arisen, there is no longer need to warn men against these things, or to struggle against them;—they have already vanished, and their place is no longer known. Are they still there?—then the Light of Religion has assuredly not arisen, and all warning and exhortation is in vain.

Thus,—the proposed criterion being applied in the first place *negatively*,—the answer to the question, Whether these contemplations in which we have been engaged have belonged to vacant or to True Time? must depend upon this,—Whether thoughtlessness, frivolity, and fickleness, have disappeared from our Life, and continue to disappear therefrom more and more?

Pure thoughtlessness,—that is, mute and blind surrender of ourselves to the stream of phenomena, without even entertaining the thought of any unity or foundation therein,—is mere Animalism, and thereby possesses a certain conformity to Nature which we must allow to have its value. It is seldom that man is so fortunate as to possess it. Those questionings after unity still present themselves and demand their reply. He who

cannot enter upon the inquiry, has no alternative but to harden himself against this impulse, and assume, of his own will, as his true wisdom and the ruling maxim of his life, that absolute thoughtlessness which Nature has denied him as a natural condition. There is no lack of distinguished appellations under which this maxim may be entertained:—Common Sense of Mankind, Scepticism, Struggle against Fanaticism and Superstition, &c. According to these doctrines, the animal is the true Philosopher and Sage; folly belongs to man, and consists in demanding a foundation and a reason of the visible. This folly the wise man subdues as well as he can, and thus by art brings himself back to the condition of the beast. But should these maxims, with all their distinguished appellations, prove unable to subdue this impulse which demands a secure foundation for our knowledge, then other means are sought to put it to silence. We pretend to rally ourselves on making this effort, and to laugh at ourselves for indulging in this folly, while it is in truth the effort itself which we try to make ridiculous, in order that we may thereby take revenge upon ourselves for having suffered this impulse to surprise and lay hold of us, and also in order that others may not believe us capable of such weakness. We fly from no society more willingly than from our own; and that we may never be left alone with ourselves we endeavour to fill up with mere amusement every portion of time unemployed by those occupations which already keep us from ourselves. This condition is unnatural. Children may by nature desire play because their powers are not yet ripe for earnest employment:—but when grown men can do nothing but play, then this is not for the sake of play itself, but because there is something else which they would willingly forget. ‘Does an earnest thought come in thy way, which thou wouldst not entertain? Let it alone and pursue the

path thou hast begun! This, however, thou doest not, but turnest thyself against it, and summonest up all the resources of thy wit to cover it with ridicule. Wherefore give thyself this trouble? For this cause:—thou canst not bear the presence of this thought in its original and earnest form; thou hast no rest till thou hast clothed it in another and to thee more acceptable shape.' Fickleness and frivolity are unerring signs,—and the more so the greater their degree,—that there is something gnawing within the heart from which we would willingly escape; and just upon that account they are proofs which cannot be mistaken that the noble nature which they disguise is not wholly dead. He who can cast a searching glance into such souls must feel the deepest commiseration for their state, and for the atmosphere of lies in which they live. They would make all men believe that they are in the highest degree happy and contented, seeking from others the confirmation of that which they themselves know to be false, and with a most sorrowful laughter at their own efforts making themselves appear even worse than they really are.

Have these follies wholly disappeared from our minds? do we no longer shun earnest reflection, but now begin to love it above all things else?—then our contemplations have assuredly belonged not to vacant but to True Time.

Has the Light of Religion arisen within us?—then it not only dispels the previous darkness, but it has also had a true and real existence within us before it could dispel the darkness;—now it spreads itself forth until it embraces our whole world, and thus becomes the source of New Life. In the beginning of these lectures we have traced everything great and noble in man to this,—that he lose his own personal existence in the Life of the Race; devote his own Life to the purposes of the Race; labour, endure, suffer, and if need be die, as a sacrifice to the Race. In this view it was always deeds,—always

that which could manifest itself in outward and visible appearance, to which we looked. In this way it was necessary for us to open our communication with the Age. Now, ennobled by our progress from this point of view, as I foretold, we use this language no longer. The one thing truly noble in man, the highest form of the one Idea which has become clear within him, is Religion;—but Religion is nothing external,—it never clothes itself in any outward manifestation; but it completes the Inward Life of Man, it is Spiritual Light and Truth. The true course of action is now disclosed of itself, for Truth cannot act otherwise than according to Truth; but this true course of action is no longer a sacrifice, no longer demands suffering and endurance, but is itself the manifestation and effluence of the highest inward Blessedness. He who, although with reluctance and in conflict with internal darkness, yet acts according to Truth, let him be admired and let his heroism be extolled: he upon whom this Inward Light has arisen has outgrown our admiration and our praise; there is no longer any doubt, opposition or contradiction in his Being, but all is the one, clear, ever-flowing Fountain of Truth.

Formerly we expressed ourselves in the following language:—‘As when the breath of Spring enlivens the air, the strong and fixed ice, which but a moment before imprisoned each atom within itself, and shut up each neighbouring atom in similar isolation, now no longer maintains its rigid bondage, but flows forth in one free, animated, and glowing flood; so does the Spirit-World ever flow at the breath of Love, and is and abides in eternal communion with the mighty Whole.’ Let us now add:—‘This atmosphere of the Spirit-World, its creating and combining element, is LIGHT—this originally: Heat, if it do not again evaporate, but bear within itself an element of endurance, is but the first manifestation of this Light. In the darkness of mere earthly vision, all things stand divided from each other; each individual thing isolated by means of

the cold and unilluminated matter in which it is embraced. But in this darkness there is no unity. The Light of Religion arises!—and all things burst forth and rush towards each other in reciprocal order and dependence, and float on together, as a united whole, in the One, Eternal, and All-embracing flood of Light.

This Light is mild, gently refreshing, and wholesome to the eye. In the twilight of mere earthly vision the dim shapes which crowd in confusion around us are feared and therefore hated. In the Light of Religion all things are pleasing and shed around them calmness and peace. In it all unlovely shapes disappear, all things float in the glowing ether of Love. Not that man submits himself to the law of a high and unchangeable Fate;—in Religion there is no Fate, but only Wisdom and Goodness, to which man is not compelled to submit himself, but which embrace him with Infinite Love. In these contemplations in which we have been engaged, this joyful and friendly view ought to have spread itself over our own Age, and over the whole Earthly Life of our Race. The more closely this mild influence has embraced us, the deeper it has penetrated all our thoughts and aspirations,—in a word, the more we have attained to peace with the whole world, and joyful sympathy with every form of existence, the more sure may we be, and the more confidently may we affirm, that our contemplations have belonged not to vacant, but to True Time.

This Light spreads itself forth by its own native energy, and widens the sphere of its influence, until at last it embraces our whole world. As when the earthly light breaks forth in one point, the shadows retire, the limits of day and night are separated, and darkness itself becomes visible though not the particular objects which it veils; so is it with the Light of Religion. In one sphere, in the sphere of our Earthly Life, this Light ought already to have arisen upon us. Has

it truly arisen upon us?—then do we already know, firmly and surely, that also beyond this sphere Wisdom and Goodness reign, because nothing else can possibly attain dominion;—but we do not understand *how* they rule there, nor what are the purposes which they there unfold. Penetrated with firm and immovable conviction and insight with respect to the *fact*, there remains to us beyond this sphere, and with reference to the *manner of the fact*, only Faith. The one sphere is illumined by clear and intelligible Light; the farther region is also surrounded by Light, but obscurity still rests upon the supersensual objects which it contains. But this Light, thus intelligible and clear in itself, does not remain shut up in its original limits, but, as its own brightness increases, it lays hold of the nearest surrounding phenomena, and from these again proceeds to those beyond; the sphere of the Religion of the Understanding is extended, and embraces one portion after another of the realm of Faith. If, therefore, we shall gradually attain to a clearer and clearer understanding of that one thing which alone is worth understanding,—the plans of Divine Wisdom and Goodness—then is this a certain proof that our contemplations have belonged not to vacant, but to True Time.

In one word, only our future growth in inward Peace and Blessedness, as well as in inward Understanding, can furnish the proof that the doctrine which has been here set forth is True, has been truly accepted by us, and has attained an actual Life within us.

You see that this proof does not show itself outwardly; that no one of us can answer for the other, but each only for himself and from his own soul; and indeed that each can do this best when he answers only within his own soul. You see that in no case can these questions be answered to-day or to-morrow, but that the answer must be deferred for a quite indefinite period of time. You see that here to-day, standing at the conclusion of our labours, we yet

cannot know whether we have accomplished something or nothing; and that upon this subject we can only appeal to the consciousness of our honest intention, if we are able to lay claim to such an intention, and must pass over from the region of Understanding to that of Faith and Hope.

And suppose that we could answer these questions, and answer them in accordance with our own wishes;—what, even in that case, were this assembly in comparison with the populous city in which we stand? and what were this city in comparison with the whole realm of culture?—a drop of water, perhaps, in a mighty stream. Would not this drop of water, animated by a new Life-element,—if indeed it were really so animated,—would it not mingle with the stream, and disappear in it, so that scarcely a single trace of the superadded element should remain? Here again we have nothing left us but the Hope that if it be Truth which we have here announced, and if it have assumed a form intelligible to our Age, this same Truth, in the same form, though without our knowledge, shall also, elsewhere and through other organs, make itself manifest to the Age; so that many drops in this great stream may be interpenetrated by the same Life-element, and gradually combining, at last communicate their mutual vitality to the whole.

Let us cherish this Hope, and with this joyful anticipation before us, let us part.—Farewell!

THE WAY
TOWARDS
THE BLESSED LIFE
OR
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION

LECTURES
DELIVERED AT BERLIN
1806.

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CONTENTS.

LECTURE I.

Life is Love ; and hence Life and Blessedness are in themselves one and the same. Distinction of the True Life from mere Apparent Life. Life and Being are also one and the same. The True Being is for ever at one with itself and unchangeable ; the Apparent, on the contrary, is changeable and transitory. The True Life loves this One Being, or God ; the Apparent loves the Transitory, or the World. This Apparent Life itself exists, and is maintained in Existence, only by aspiration towards the Eternal ; this aspiration can never be satisfied in the mere Apparent Life, and hence this Life is Unblest ; the Love of the True Life, on the contrary, is continually satisfied, and hence this Life is Blessed. The element of True Life is Thought.

LECTURE II.

The present subject is at bottom Metaphysic, and more especially Ontology ; and this is to be here set forth in a popular way. Refutation of the objections of the impossibility and unadvisableness of such an exposition,—by the necessity there is for attempting it,—by investigation of the peculiar nature of the popular discourse in opposition to the scientific,—and by the practical proof that since the introduction of Christianity this undertaking has at all times been actually accomplished. Great hindrances which exist in our own day to the communication of such Knowledge,—partly because its strictly determinate *form* is opposed both to the propensity towards arbitrary opinion and to the mere want of opinion which calls itself scepticism ;—partly because its *substance* seems strange and monstrously paradoxical ;—and finally, because unprejudiced persons are led astray by the objections urged by perverse fanaticism. Genetic exposition of this species of fanaticism. The accusation of Mysticism which may be expected from these fanatics against our doctrine noticed. The true object of this and similar accusations.

LECTURE III.

Solution of the problem how—since Life must be an organic whole—a part of this necessary Life may yet be wanting in Actual Life, as is the case, according to what we have held above, in the Apparent Life,—by the remark that the Spiritual Life develops itself in Reality only gradually and, as it were, by stages; illustrated by the striking example that the great masses of mankind refer the thought of outward objects to sensible perception of such objects, and know no better than that all our Knowledge is founded on experience. What, in opposition to this thought of outward objects, which after all is not founded on perception, is true and proper Thought; and how this is distinguished in its Form from mere Opinion, with which, in reference to its sphere of activity, it coincides.

Actual application of this Thought to the highest elements of Knowledge, from which we have these results:—Being, in itself, (*Seyn*) neither has arisen, nor has anything in it arisen, but it is absolutely One and Simple in its Essence; from it we have to distinguish its Ex-istence (*Daseyn*) which is necessarily Consciousness of Being. This Consciousness, being also necessarily Self-consciousness, cannot, either in its essence or in the special determinations of its actual existence, be genetically deduced from Being (*Seyn*) itself; although it may be understood generally that this its actual determinate Ex-istence is essentially one with the essential Nature of Being.

LECTURE IV.

Exposition of what is essential to the Blessed Life, and what is only conditionally necessary. The answer to the question:—"How, since Being (*Seyn*) ex-ists as it is in itself, namely as One, yet in this its Ex-istence (*Daseyn*) or Consciousness, Multiplicity may nevertheless find place?"—only conditionally necessary. Answer to the question, The "aa," or characterization by means of opposition, which arises from the distinction that takes place only in Ex-istence, is an absolute opposition and the principle of all other division. This "aa," or act of characterization, presupposes an abiding Being that is characterized, whereby that which in itself is the inward Divine Life is changed into a determinate World. This World is characterized or formed by means of this "aa,"—Reflexion—which is absolutely free and independent,—without any end or limit to the process.

LECTURE V.

Principle of a new division in Knowledge, not proceeding immediately on the Object, but only on the Reflexion of the Object, and hence giving only different views of the One abiding World; which latter division

is nevertheless intimately connected with the first, and interpenetrated by it. This division, and hence the diverse views of the World which result from it, are five-fold. The first and lowest, being that of the prevalent Philosophy, in which reality is attributed to the World of Sense, or Nature. The second, in which reality is placed in a Law of Order in the Existing World addressed to Freedom;—the stand-point of Objective Legality, or of the Categorical Imperative. The third, which places reality in a new Creative Law addressed to Freedom, producing a New World within the Existing World;—the stand-point of the Higher Morality. The fourth, which places reality in God alone and in His Ex-istence;—the stand-point of Religion. The fifth, which clearly discerns the Manifold in its outgoings from the One Reality;—the stand-point of Science. The True Religious Life, however, is not possible as a mere view, but exists only in union with an Actual Divine Life, and without this union the mere view is empty Fanaticism.

LECTURE VI

Proof of our previous assertion, that this Doctrine is likewise the Doctrine of pure Christianity, as contained in the writings of the Apostle John. Reasons why we especially appeal to this Evangelist. Our hermeneutical principle. In John we have to distinguish that which is true, absolutely and in itself, from that which is true only from his temporary point of view. The first is contained in the Introduction to his Gospel, up to verse 5. Estimate of this Introduction, not as the unauthoritative opinion of the Evangelist, but as the immediate doctrine of Jesus. Exposition of it. The view that possesses a mere temporary validity is the, not metaphysical but merely historical, proposition that the Divine Existence, in its original purity and without any individual limitation, has manifested itself in Jesus of Nazareth. Explanation of the difference of these two views, and of their union, likewise and expressly according to the Christian Doctrine. Estimate of this historical dogma. Comprehension of the substance of the whole Gospel from this point of view, in an answer to the questions:—What does Jesus teach respecting himself and his relation to God?—and what respecting his followers and their relation to him?

APPENDIX TO LECTURE VI

Farther explanation of the distinction drawn in the preceding lecture between the Historical and Metaphysical, in relation to the fundamental dogma of Christianity.

LECTURE VII.

More thorough delineation of the mere Apparent Life from its fundamental principle. A complete exposition of all the possible modes of man's Enjoyment of himself and of the World is requisite for the de-

monstration of the Blessedness of the Religious Life. Of these there are five,—the five modes of viewing the World, already enumerated, being also so many modes of its Enjoyment;—of which, in consequence of the exclusion of the Scientific stand-point, four only come under consideration here. Enjoyment in any form, as the satisfaction of Love, is founded on Love;—Love, however, is the Affection of Being. Sensuous Enjoyment, and the Affections which are produced by means of fancy, in the first stand-point. The Affection of Reality in the second stand-point,—viz. Law, is a commandment, from which proceeds a judgment, which in itself would be disinterested, but which, being associated with the interest of man in his own personality, is changed into the mere negation of self-contempt. This mode of thought annuls all Love in man, but even on that account it exalts him above all want. Stoicism, as mere Apathy, in relation to Happiness and Blessedness.

LECTURE VIII

More profound exposition of our Doctrine of Being. Everything that arises from mere Ex-istence, as such, comprehended under the name of Form. In Reality, Being is absolutely inseparable from Form, and the Existence of the latter is itself founded in the inward necessity of the Divine Nature. Application of this principle to the first portion of Form,—Infinity. Application of it to the second portion of Form,—the five-fold division previously set forth. This gives a free and independent Ego as the organic central-point of all Form. Exposition of the nature of Freedom. Affection of the Ego for its personal independence, which necessarily disappears as soon as the individual stand-points of mere possible Freedom are destroyed by perfect Freedom;—and thus again the presence or absence of this Love of Self gives us two completely opposite modes of viewing and enjoying the World. From the former arises, in the first place, the impulse towards Sensuous Enjoyment, as the Love of a Self, determined in a particular way by means of outward objects; and, in the second place, from the stand-point of Legality, the Love of mere formal Freedom after the renunciation of the Love of objective self-determination. Characterization of the Love from which a Categorical Imperative arises. Through the annihilation of that Love of Self the Will of the Ego is brought into harmony with the Will of God; and there arises therefrom, in the first place, the stand-point, previously described as the third, of the Higher Morality. Relation of this mode of thought to outward circumstances, particularly in contrast with the superstition of sensuous desire.

LECTURE IX.

The New World which the Higher Morality creates within the World of Sense is the immediate Life of God himself in Time;—it can only be

felt in immediate consciousness, and can only be characterized in general by the distinctive mark that each of its Forms is a source of pleasure solely on its own account, and not as a means towards any other end. Illustrations by the examples of Beauty, of Science, &c., and by the phenomena presented by a natural Genius for these. This Life nevertheless strives after an outward result; and so long as the desire for this result is still mixed up with the joy arising from the deed itself, even the Higher Morality is not exempt from the possibility of pain. Separation of these by the stand-point of Religion. Foundation of Individuality. Each Individual has his own special portion in the Divine Life. The first fundamental Law of Morality and of the Blessed Life:—that each should devote himself wholly to this portion. General external characterization of the Moral-Religious Will, in so far as this comes forth from its inward Life into outward Manifestation.

LECTURE X.

Comprehensive view of the whole subject from its deepest stand-point. Being, which is projected forth from itself in the form of the independent Ego as the necessary Form of Reflexion, is, beyond all Reflexion, united with Form by Love alone. This Love is the creator of the abstract conception of God;—is the source of all certainty;—is that which, in Life, embraces the Absolute, immediately and without modification by Conception;—is that by which Reflexion, which in its Form contains only the possibility of infinity, is extended into an Actual Infinity;—finally, is the source of Science. In living and actual Reflexion this Love manifests itself immediately in the phenomenon of Moral Action. Characterization of the Philanthropy of the Moral-Religious Man. Delineation of his Blessedness.

LECTURE XI.

General application of the subject. Hindrances to a thorough communication between the speaker and hearer:—the want of thorough devotion of mind;—so-called Scepticism;—the surrounding influences of the Age. Deeper characterization of these influences by the principle of the mutual acceptance of all men as miserable sinners (Modern Humanity.) How the good and upright man may rise superior to these influences.

LECTURE I.

THE TRUE LIFE AND THE APPARENT LIFE.

THE Lectures which I now commence have been announced under the title of "The Way towards the Blessed Life." Following the common and customary view, which no one can rectify unless he first accommodate himself to it, I could not avoid thus expressing myself; although, according to the true view of the matter, the expression "Blessed Life," has in it something superfluous. To wit:—Life is necessarily blessed, for it is Blessedness; the thought of an unblessed life, on the other hand, carries with it a contradiction. Death alone is unblessed. Thus, had I expressed myself with strict precision, I should have named my proposed lectures "The Way towards Life, or the Doctrine of Life"—or, viewing the idea on the other side, "The Way towards Blessedness, or the Doctrine of Blessedness." That, nevertheless, not nearly all that seems to live is blessed, arises from this—that what is unblessed does not really and truly live, but, for the most part, is sunk in Death and Nothingness.

Life is itself Blessedness, I said. It cannot be otherwise; for Life is Love, and the whole form and power of Life consist in Love and spring from Love. In this I have given utterance to one of the most profound axioms of knowledge; which nevertheless, in my opinion, may at

once be made clear and evident to every one, by means of really earnest and sustained attention. Love *divides* that which in itself is dead as it were into a two-fold being, holding it up before its own contemplation;—creating thereby an Ego or Self, which beholds and is cognizant of itself, and in this personality lies the root of all Life. Love again *reunites* and intimately binds together this divided personality, which without Love would regard itself coldly and without interest. This latter unity, with a duality which is not thereby destroyed but eternally remains subsistent, is Life itself; as every one who strictly considers these ideas and combines them together must at once distinctly percieve. Further, Love is satisfaction with itself, joy in itself, enjoyment of itself,—and therefore Blessedness; and thus it is clear that Life, Love, and Blessedness, are absolutely one and the same.

I said further, that not everything which seems to be living does really and truly live. It follows that, in my opinion, Life may be regarded from a double point of view, and is so regarded by me;—that is, partly as regards Truth, and partly as regards Appearance. Now it is clear, before all things, that this latter merely Apparent Life could never even become apparent, but must remain wholly and entirely non-existent, were it not, in some way or other, supported and maintained by the True Life—and, since nothing has a real existence but Life, did not the True Life, in some way or other, enter into the Apparent Life and be commingled with it. There can be no real Death, and no real Unblessedness; for, were we to admit this, we should thereby attribute to them an existence; while it is only the True Being and Life that can have existence. Hence all incomplete existence is but an admixture of the dead with the living. In what way this admixture generally takes place, and what, even in the lowest grades of life, is the indestructible representative of the True Life, we shall sometimes declare. It is further to be remarked, that Love

is the actual seat and central-point even of this merely Apparent Life. Understand me thus:—the Apparent can shape itself into manifold, infinitely varied, forms; as we shall soon perceive more clearly. These various forms of the Apparent Life have all a common life, if we use the language of Appearance; or, they all appear to have a common life, if we use the language of Truth. But if again the question should arise:—By what is this common life distinguished in its various forms; and what is it that gives to each individual the peculiar character of his particular life?—I answer:—It is the love of this particular and individual life. Show me what thou truly lovest, what thou seekest and strivest for with thy whole heart when thou wouldst attain to true enjoyment of thyself,—and thou hast thereby shown me thy Life. What thou lovest, in that thou livest. This very Love is thy Life,—the root, the seat, the central-point of thy being. All other emotions within thee have life only in so far as they tend towards this one central-point. That to many men it may be no easy matter to answer such a question, since they do not even know what they love, proves only that they do not in reality love anything; and, just on that account, do not live because they do not love.

So much, in general, as to the identity of Life, Love, and Blessedness. Now for the strict discrimination of the True Life from the mere Apparent Life.

Being.—I say again,—Being and Life are one and the same. Life alone can possess independent existence, of itself and through itself; and, on the other hand, Life, so surely as it is Life, bears with it such an existence. It is usual for men to conceive of Absolute Being as something fixed, rigid and dead;—philosophers themselves, almost without exception, have so conceived of it, even while they declared it to be Absolute. This arises only from the thinker himself bringing to the contemplation of Being not a living but a mere dead conception. Not in Being, as it is in and

for itself, is there Death; but only in the deadly gaze of the dead beholder. That in this error is to be found the original source of all other errors, and that through it the world of truth and the whole spiritual universe is for ever shut out, we have proved in another place,—at least to those who were capable of accepting the proof; here, the mere historical statement of the principle must be sufficient.

On the other hand, as Being and Life are one and the same, so are Death and Nothingness one and the same. But there is no real Death and no real Nothingness, as we have already said. There is, however, an Apparent Life, and this is the mixture of life and death, of being and nothingness. Hence it follows, that the Apparent, so far as regards that in it which makes it mere Appearance, and which is opposed to the True Being and Life, is mere Death and Nothingness.

Further:—Being is throughout simple, not manifold; there are not many beings, but only One Being. This principle, like the former, contains an idea which is generally misunderstood, or even wholly unknown, but of the evident truth of which any one may convince himself, if he will only give his earnest attention to the subject for a single moment. We have here neither time nor intention to undertake, with our present audience, those preparatory and initiative steps which the mass of men need in order to render them capable of such earnest reflection.

We shall here bring forward and employ only the results of those premises; and these results will recommend themselves to your natural sense of truth without need of argument. With regard to the profounder premises, we must content ourselves with stating them clearly and distinctly, and so securing them against all misconception. Thus, with reference to the principle we have last adduced, our meaning is the following:—Being alone *is*; nothing else *is*; not, in particular, a something which is not Being, but which lies outside of all Being;—an assumption, this latter, which, to

every one who understands our words, must appear a manifest absurdity, but which nevertheless lies, dim and unrecognised, at the bottom of the common notion of Being. According to this common notion, something which in and through itself neither is nor can be, receives from without a superadded existence,—which thus is an existence of nothing;—and from the union of these two absurdities, all truth and reality arise. This common notion is contradicted by the principle we have laid down: Being alone *is*,—i.e. that only which is by and through itself—*is*. We say further: This Being is simple, homogeneous, and immutable; there is in it neither beginning nor ending, no variation or change of form, but it is always and for ever the same, unalterable, and persistent Being.

The truth of this proposition may be briefly shown thus:—Whatever is, in and through itself, that indeed *is*, and *is perfect*.—once for all existing, without the possibility of either abatement or increase.

And thus we have opened the way towards an insight into the characteristic distinction between the True Life, which is one with Being; and the mere Apparent Life, which, in so far as it is mere appearance, is one with Nothingness. Being is simple, unchangeable, ever the same; therefore the True Life is also simple, unchangeable, ever the same. Appearance is a ceaseless change, a continual floating between birth and decay; therefore the mere Apparent Life is also a ceaseless change, ever floating between birth and decay, hurried along through never-ending alternations. The central-point of all Life is Love. The True Life loves the One, Unchangeable, and Eternal; the mere Apparent Life attempts to love the Transitory and Perishable,—were that capable of being loved, or could such love uphold itself in being.

That object of the Love of the True Life is what we mean by the name God, or at least ought to mean by that name; the object of the Love of the mere

Apparent Life—the transitory and perishable—is that which we recognise as the World, and which we so name. The True Life thus lives in God, and loves God; the mere Apparent Life lives in the World, and attempts to love the World. It matters not on what particular side it approaches the world and comprehends it;—that which the common view terms moral depravity, sin, crime, and the like, may indeed be more hurtful and destructive to human society than many other things which this common view permits or even considers to be praiseworthy;—but, before the eye of Truth, all Life which fixes its love on the Temporary and Accidental, and seeks its enjoyment in any object other than the Eternal and Unchangeable, for that very reason, and merely on account of thus seeking its enjoyment in something else, is in like manner vain, miserable, and unblessed.

The True Life lives in the Unchangeable; it is thus capable neither of abatement nor of increase, just as little as the Unchangeable itself, in which it lives, is capable of such abatement or increase. In each moment of Time it is *perfect*,—the highest possible Life; and throughout Eternity it necessarily remains what it is in each moment of Time. The Apparent Life lives only in the Transitory and Perishable, and therefore never remains the same in any two successive moments; each succeeding moment consumes and obliterates the preceding; and thus the Apparent Life becomes a continuous Death, and lives only in dying and in Death.

We have said that the True Life is in itself blessed; the Apparent Life necessarily miserable and unblessed. The possibility of all pleasure, joy, blessedness, or by whatever word we may express the general consciousness of Well-being, is founded upon love, effort, impulse. To be united with the beloved object, and molten into its very essence, is Blessedness; to be divided from it, cast out from it, while yet we cannot cease to turn towards it with longing aspiration, is Unblessedness.

The following is the essential relation of the Apparent, or of the Actual and Finite, to Absolute Being, or to the Infinite and Eternal. That which we have already indicated as the element which must support and maintain the Apparent, and without which it could not attain even the semblance of Existence, and which we promised soon to characterize more distinctly, is the *aspiration towards the Eternal*. This impulse to be united with the Imperishable and transfused therein, is the primitive root of all Finite Existence; and in no branch of this existence can that impulse be wholly destroyed, unless that branch were to sink into utter nothingness. Beyond this aspiration upon which all Finite Existence rests, and by means of it, this existence either attains the True Life, or does not attain it. Where it does attain it, this secret aspiration becomes distinct and intelligible as Love of the Eternal:—we learn what it is that we desire, love, and need. This want may be satisfied constantly and under every condition;—the Eternal surrounds us at all times, offers itself incessantly to our regards; we have nothing more to do than to lay hold of it. But, once attained, it can never again be lost. He who lives the True Life has attained it, and now possesses it evermore, whole, undivided, in all its fullness, in every moment of his existence; and is therefore blessed in this union with the object of his Love, penetrated with a firm, immovable conviction that he shall thus enjoy it throughout Eternity, and thereby secured against all doubt, anxiety, or fear. Where the True Life is not attained, that aspiration is not felt the less, but it is not understood. Happy, contented, satisfied with their condition, all men would willingly be; but wherein they shall find this happiness they know not; what it is that they really love and strive after they do not understand. In that which comes into immediate contact with their senses, and offers itself to their enjoyment,—in the World,

they think it must be found; because to that spiritual condition in which they now find themselves there is really nothing else existing—but the World. Ardently they betake themselves to this chase after happiness, eagerly appropriating, and devoting themselves to, the first best object that pleases them and promises to satisfy their desire. But as soon as such an one returns into himself, and asks, "Am I now happy?" he is loudly answered from the depths of his own soul, "O no, thou art as empty and necessitous as before." They now imagine that they have been mistaken in their choice of an object, and throw themselves eagerly into another. This satisfies them as little as the first:—there is no object under the sun or moon that will satisfy them. Would we that any such object should satisfy them? By no means:—that nothing finite and perishable can satisfy them;—this is precisely the one tie that still connects them with the Eternal and preserves them in existence:—did they find any one earthly object that should fill them with perfect satisfaction, then were they thereby irretrievably thrust forth from the Godhead, and cast out into the eternal death of Nothingness. And thus do they fret and vex away their life;—in every condition thinking that if it were but *otherwise* with them it would be *better* with them, and then, when it has become otherwise, discovering that it is not better;—in every position believing that if they could but attain yonder height which they descry above them, they would be freed from their anguish, but finding nevertheless, even on the attained height, their ancient sorrow. In riper years, perchance, when the fresh enthusiasm and glad hopefulness of youth have vanished, they take counsel with themselves, review their whole previous life, and venture to draw therefrom some definite conclusion;—it may be, to acknowledge that no earthly good whatever can give them satisfaction:—And what

do they now? They determine perhaps to renounce all faith in happiness and peace; blunting or deadening, as far as possible, their still inextinguishable aspirations; and then they call this insensibility the only true wisdom, this despair of all salvation the only true salvation, and their pretended knowledge that man is not destined to happiness, but only to this vain striving with nothing and for nothing, the true understanding. Perchance they renounce only their hope of satisfaction in this earthly life; but please themselves with a certain promise, handed down to them by tradition, of a Blessedness beyond the grave. Into what a mournful delusion do they now fall! Full surely, indeed, there lies a Blessedness beyond the grave for those who have already entered upon it here, and in no other form or way than that by which they can already enter upon it here, in this present moment; but by mere burial man cannot arrive at Blessedness,—and in the future life, and throughout the whole infinite range of all future life, they would seek for happiness as vainly as they have already sought it here, if they were to seek it in aught else than in that which already surrounds them so closely here below that throughout Eternity it can never be brought nearer to them,—in the Infinite. And thus does the poor child of Eternity, cast forth from his native home, yet surrounded on all sides by his heavenly inheritance which his trembling hand fears to grasp, wander with fugitive and uncertain step throughout the waste, everywhere labouring to establish for himself a dwelling-place, but happily ever reminded, by the speedy downfall of each of his successive habitations, that he can find peace nowhere but in his Father's house.

Thus, my hearers, is the True Life necessarily Blessedness itself; and the Apparent Life necessarily Unblessedness.

And now consider with me the following:—I say, the element, the atmosphere, the substantial form—if this latter expression may be better understood—the element, the

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atmosphere, the substantial form of the True Life, is THOUGHT.

In the first place, no one surely will be disposed, seriously, and in the proper meaning of the words, to ascribe Life and Blessedness to anything which is not conscious of itself. All Life thus presupposes self-consciousness, and it is self-consciousness alone which is able to lay hold of Life and make it an object of enjoyment.

Thus then :—The True Life and its Blessedness consists in a union with the Unchangeable and Eternal : but the Eternal can be apprehended only by Thought, and is in no other way approachable by us. The One and Unchangeable is apprehended as the foundation of ourselves and of the world, and this in a double respect :—partly as the cause whereby all things have come into existence, and have not remained in mere nothingness; partly that in Him, and in His essential nature—which in this way only is conceivable to us, but in all other ways remains wholly inconceivable—is contained the cause why all things exist *as they are* and in no other way. And thus the True Life and its Blessedness consists in Thought; that is, in a certain definite view of ourselves and the world, as proceeding from the essential, self-contained Divine Nature :—and therefore a Doctrine of Blessedness can be nothing else than a Doctrine of Knowledge, since there is absolutely no other doctrine but a Doctrine of Knowledge. In the mind,—in the self-supporting life of Thought,—Life itself subsists, for beyond the mind there is no true Existence. To live truly, means to think truly, and to discern the truth.

Thus it is :—let no one be deceived by the invectives which, in these later godless and soulless times, are poured forth on what is termed speculation. It is a striking characteristic of these invectives that they proceed from those only who know nothing of speculation ;—no one who does know it has inveighed against it. It is only to the highest

flight of thought that the Godhead is revealed, and it is to be apprehended by no other sense whatever;—to seek to make men suspicious of this mental effort, is to wish to cut them off for ever from God and from the enjoyment of Blessedness.

Wherein should Life and the Blessedness of Life have their element if they had it not in Thought? Perhaps in certain sensations and feelings, with reference to which it matters not to us whether they minister to the grossest sensual enjoyments or the most refined spiritual raptures? How could a mere feeling, which by its very nature is dependent on circumstance, secure for itself an eternal and unchangeable duration?—and how could we, amid the obscurity which, for the same reason, necessarily accompanies mere feeling, inwardly perceive and enjoy such an unchangeable continuance? No: it is only the light of pure Knowledge, thoroughly transparent to itself, and in free possession of all that it contains, which, by means of this clearness, can ensure its unalterable endurance.

Or, shall the Blessed Life consist in virtuous conduct and behaviour? What the profane call virtue,—i.e. that a man pursue his calling or occupation in a legitimate way, give other men their due, and perhaps bestow something on the poor:—this virtue will, hereafter as hitherto, be exacted by law, and prompted by natural sympathy. But no one can rise to True Virtue, to god-like, creative action, whence arises everything True and Good in this world, who does not lovingly embrace the Godhead in clear comprehension; while he who does so embrace it will thus act without either formal intention or positive reward, and cannot act otherwise.

We do not here, by any means, promulgate a new doctrine regarding the spiritual world, but this is the old doctrine which has been taught in all ages. Thus, for example, Christianity makes Faith the one indispensable condition of True Life and Blessedness, and rejects, as worthless and

dead, everything without exception that does not spring from this Faith. But this Faith is the same thing which we have here named Thought:—the only true view of ourselves, and of the world, in the One Unchangeable Divine Being. It is only after this Faith,—i.e. this clear and living Thought,—has disappeared from the world that men have placed the conditions of the Blessed Life in what is called virtue, and thus sought a noble fruit on a wild and uncultivated stem.

To this Life, the general characteristics of which have been set forth in this preliminary sketch, I have here promised to point you the way;—I have pledged myself to show you the means by which this Blessed Life may be attained and enjoyed. This instruction may be comprised in a single remark, this namely:—It is not required of man that he should create the Eternal, which he could never do;—the Eternal is in him, and surrounds him at all times;—he has but to forsake the Transitory and Perishable with which the True Life can never unite, and thereupon the Eternal, with all its Blessedness, will forthwith descend and dwell with him. We cannot win Blessedness, but we may cast away our wretchedness; and thereupon Blessedness will forthwith of itself supply the vacant place. Blessedness, as we have seen, is unwavering repose in the One Eternal; wretchedness is vagrancy amid the Manifold and Transitory; and therefore the condition of *becoming* blessed is the return of our love from the Many to the One.

That which is vagrant amid the Manifold and Transitory is dissolved, poured forth, and spread abroad like water; because of its desire to love this and that and many things besides, it really loves nothing; and just because it would be everywhere at home, it is nowhere at home. This vagrancy is our peculiar nature, and in it we are born. For this reason the return of the mind to the One Eternal, which never arises by the common view of things but must be brought about by our own effort, appears as *concen-*

tration of the mind, and its indwelling in itself;—as *earnestness*, in opposition to the merry game we play amid the manifold diversities of life;—and as *profound thoughtfulness*, in opposition to the light-hearted thoughtlessness which, while it has much to comprehend, yet comprehends nothing thoroughly. This profound and thoughtful earnestness, this strict concentration of the mind, and its indwelling in itself, is the one condition under which the Blessed Life can approach us; but under this condition it approaches and dwells with us surely and infallibly.

It is certainly true, that, by this withdrawal of our mind from the Visible, the objects of our former love fade from our view, and gradually disappear, until we regain them clothed with fresh beauty in the æther of the new world which rises before us; and that our whole previous life perishes, until we regain it as a slight adjunct to the new life which begins within us. But this is the destiny inseparable from all Finite Existence; only through death does it enter into life. Whatever is mortal must die, nothing can deliver it from the power of its own nature; in the Apparent Life it dies continually; where the True Life begins, in that one death it dies for ever, and for all the unknown series of future deaths which in the Apparent Life may yet lie before it.

I have promised to show you the way towards the Blessed Life! But with what applications, and under what images, forms, and conceptions, shall such instruction be addressed to this age, in these circumstances? The images and forms of the established religion, which say the same things which alone we can say here, and which say them besides in the same way in which alone we can say them here, because it is the most fitting way,—these images and forms have been first of all emptied of their significance, then openly derided, and lastly given over to silent and polite contempt. The propositions and syllogisms of the philosophers are accused of being pernicious to the country and the nation, and sub-

versive of sound sense, and that before a tribunal where neither accuser nor judge appears;—and this might be endured:—but what is worse, every one who will believe it is told beforehand that he can never understand these propositions and syllogisms;—with this object, that he may not accept the words in their natural sense and as they stand, but seek behind them for some peculiar and hidden meaning;—and in this way misconception and confusion are sure to arise.

Or, even were it possible to discover forms and applications by means of which we might communicate such instruction, how should we awaken a desire to receive it,—here, where it is universally taught, and now with greater applause than ever, that despair of all salvation is the only possible salvation;—that the faith that mankind are but the sport of an arbitrary and capricious God is the only true wisdom;—and where he who still believes in God and Truth, and in Life and Blessedness therein, is laughed at as an inexperienced boy who knows nothing of the world?

Be this as it may, we have yet courage in store; and to have striven for a praiseworthy end, even if it be in vain, is yet worth our labour. I see before me now, and I hope still to see here, persons who have partaken in the best culture which our age affords. First of all, women, to whom, by the social arrangements of mankind, has been assigned the task of caring for the minor external wants, and also for the decorations of human life,—an employment which, more than any other, distracts the mind and draws it away from clear and earnest reflection,—while, by way of compensation, wise nature has implanted in them warmer aspirations towards the Eternal, and a more refined perception of it. Then I see before me men of business, whose calling drags them, every day of their lives, through many and varied details, which are, indeed, connected with the Eternal and Unchange-

able, but so that not every one can discover, at the first glance, the link that unites them. Lastly, I see before me young scholars, in whom the form in which the Eternal is destined to pervade their being still labours in the preparation of its future abode. While, with reference to this latter class, I may perhaps venture to flatter myself with the hope that some of my suggestions may contribute towards that preparation, with reference to the two former classes, I make far more modest pretensions. I ask them only to accept from me what they might doubtless have acquired for themselves independent of my help, but which I acquire with less labour and by a shorter path.

While all these are disturbed and divided by the multifarious objects to which their thoughts must be applied, the philosopher pursues, in solitary silence and in unbroken concentration of mind, his single and undeviating course towards the Good, the Beautiful, and the True; and has for his daily labour that to which others can only resort at times for rest and refreshment after toil. This fortunate lot has fallen upon me among others; and therefore I now propose to communicate to you here, so far as I myself possess it and understand how to communicate it to you, whatever may be so appropriated from my speculative labours, intelligible to the general mind, and conducive to the attainment of the Good, the Beautiful, and the Eternal.

LECTURE II.

REFUTATION OF OBJECTIONS TO POPULAR
METAPHYSICAL TEACHING.

STRICT order and method will, naturally and without farther care on our part, arise throughout the whole subject-matter of the discourses which I here propose to address to you, as soon as we shall have made good our entrance within its boundaries and set our foot firmly on its domain. As yet we are still occupied with this last-mentioned business; and with regard to it, the chief thing we have now to do is to acquire a clearer and freer insight into the essential principles which were set forth in our last lecture. In our next lecture we shall go over once again that which we have already said; proceeding however from a different starting-point, and employing a different language.

For to-day I entreat you to enter with me on the following preliminary considerations:—

We wish to acquire a *clear* insight, I said:—clearness, however, is only to be found in depth; on the surface there never lies aught but obscurity and confusion. He, therefore, who invites you to clear knowledge, must necessarily invite you to descend with him into the depths of thought. And thus I will by no means deny, but rather openly declare at the outset, that I have already in my previous lecture touched upon the deepest foundations and elements of all

knowledge, beyond which there is no knowledge; and that in my next lecture I propose to set forth these same elements,—or, in the language of the schools, the profoundest Metaphysics and Ontology,—in a different and indeed in a popular way.

Against such an undertaking as the present two objections are commonly urged,—either that it is *impossible* to treat these subjects in a popular way, or that it is *unadvisable* to do so,—the latter objection being sometimes made by philosophers who would willingly make a mystery of their knowledge; and I must before all things answer these objections, in order that in addition to the difficulties of the subject itself I may not besides have to combat an aversion to it on your part.

In the first place, as regards the *possibility* :—I indeed do not know whether any philosopher whatever, or in particular myself, has ever succeeded or ever shall succeed in elevating, by way of popular instruction, those who either will not or cannot study philosophy systematically to the comprehension of its fundamental truths. But, on the other hand, I do know, and perceive with absolute certainty, the two following truths :—*First*, that if any man do not attain to insight into these elements of all knowledge,—the artistic and systematic development of which alone, but not their substance, has become the exclusive property of scientific philosophy,—if any man, I say, do not attain to insight into these elements of all knowledge, then such a man can likewise never attain to *Thought*, and to a true inward independence of spirit, but remains enthralled within the limits of mere *Opinion*, and, during his whole life, is never a proper individual mind, but only an appendix to other minds; he wants an organ of the spiritual sense and that the noblest of them all :—that, therefore, the assertion, that it is neither possible nor advisable to elevate those who cannot study philosophy systematically to an insight into the nature of the spiritual world by some other means, is just

equivalent to this, that it is impossible that any one who has not studied in the schools should ever attain to true Thought and spiritual independence; the school alone, and nothing but the school, being the sole progenitor and nursing mother of mind;—or that, even were it possible, it would not be advisable ever to give spiritual freedom to the unlearned, but that these should always remain under the guardianship of pretended philosophers, a mere appanage to their sovereign understanding. For the rest, the distinction which we have here touched upon between true *Thought* and mere *Opinion* will become perfectly clear and distinct at the beginning of our next lecture.

Secondly, I know and perceive, with like certainty, the following:—that it is only by means of Thought, proper, pure, and true thought, and absolutely by no other organ, that man can approach the Godhead and the Blessed Life which proceeds from the Godhead, and can bring them home to himself;—that therefore the assertion that it is impossible to communicate profound truth in a popular way is equivalent to this,—that only through a systematic study of philosophy is it possible for man to elevate himself to Religion and its blessings, and that every one who is not a philosopher must remain forever shut out from God and his kingdom. In our argument everything depends upon the principle that the True God and the True Religion are to be approached and comprehended only by pure Thought; and we must often dwell upon this principle and endeavour to make it evident on all sides. Religion does not consist in that wherein it is placed by the common mode of thought,—namely in this, that man should believe, be of opinion, and rest satisfied, because no one has the hardihood to assert the opposite,—his belief resting wholly on hearsay and outward assurance,—that there is a GOD:—this is a vulgar superstition by which, at most, a defective police system may be remedied, while the inward nature of man

remains as bad as before, and indeed frequently is made worse, since he forms this God after his own image, and in him only manufactures a new prop for his own corruption. But herein Religion does consist, that man in his own person and not in that of another, with his own spiritual eye and not through that of another, should immediately behold, have, and possess God. This, however, is possible only by means of pure, independent Thought, for only through this does man assume true and real personality, and this alone is the eye to which God can become visible. Pure Thought is itself the Divine Existence; and, on the other hand, the Divine Existence, in its immediate essence, is nothing else than pure Thought.

Besides, to look at this matter historically, the assumption that absolutely all men without exception may come to the knowledge of God, as well as the effort to raise them all to this knowledge, is the assumption and the effort of Christianity; and, since Christianity is the developing principle and peculiar characteristic of modern time, this assumption and this effort form the peculiar spirit of the Age of the New Testament. Now the two expressions,—to elevate all men without exception to the knowledge of God,—and, to communicate to mankind at large the deepest elements and foundations of knowledge in another way than that of systematic instruction,—mean strictly and entirely one and the same thing. It is clear, therefore, that every one who does not wish to return to the ancient times of Heathendom must admit not only the possibility, but the irremissible duty, of communicating to men the profoundest principles of knowledge in a generally comprehensible form.

But,—to close this argument for the possibility of a popular exposition of the profoundest truth with the most decisive proof, that of facts:—Has then this knowledge,—which we have undertaken, by means of these lectures, to unfold in those who as yet have it not, and to strengthen.

and purify in those who already possess it,—has it never until our time been present in the world, and do we pretend now to introduce something wholly new and hitherto nowhere discoverable? We would not wish to think that this latter had even been said of us; but, on the contrary, we maintain that this knowledge, in all its clearness and purity, which we can by no means surpass, and in every age from the origin of Christianity downwards, although for the most part unrecognized, and even persecuted by the dominant church, has yet, here and there, secretly ruled the minds of men and disseminated itself abroad. On the other hand, we do not hesitate to say that the method of clear, consecutive, systematic, and scientific deduction, by which we for our part have attained to this knowledge, has in former times, not indeed in respect of trial, but certainly in respect of success, been unknown in the world; and that, under the guidance of the spirit of our great forefathers, it has been for the most part our own work. If, then, this scientific, philosophical insight was before wanting, in what way did Christ, or—since, in his case, some will assume for it a miraculous, supernatural origin, which I will not here dispute,—in what way did Christ's Apostles,—in what way did all those who, from their time down to our own, have possessed this knowledge,—in what way did they actually acquire it? Among the former, as among the latter, there were many very unlearned persons, wholly ignorant of philosophy or even opposed to it; the few among them who meddled with philosophy at all, and with whose philosophy we are acquainted, so philosophized that it is easy for the educated man to perceive that it was not to their philosophy that they owed their insight. But to say, that they did not obtain that insight by way of philosophy, is just to say, that they did obtain it in a popular way. Why then should that which has been possible heretofore, in an unbroken sequence for nearly two thousand years, be now impossible? Why

should that which was possible with very imperfect aids, at a period when general enlightenment was nowhere to be found in the world, be no longer possible now when the needful aids have been perfected, and, at least in philosophy, the requisite enlightenment exists? Why should that which was possible when religious faith and natural understanding were yet at variance to a certain extent, become impossible now that they have been reconciled to each other, and, forgetting their former disunion, pursue in friendship one and the same end?

That which follows most decisively from all these considerations is the duty incumbent upon every man who is penetrated by this higher knowledge to exert all his powers to communicate that knowledge, wherever possible, to the whole brotherhood of humanity; presenting it to each individual in that form in which it is most accessible to him; never debating with himself, nor wavering in doubt, whether or not it may succeed, but labouring as if it must of necessity succeed; and after each completed effort, rising with new and fresh vigour as if nothing had yet been attained;—and, on the other hand, the duty of each individual who is not yet in possession of this knowledge, or who does not possess it in fitting clearness and freedom and as an ever-present possession, to devote himself wholly and unreservedly to the instruction thus offered to him, as if it were destined for him especially, and belonged to him, and must of necessity be understood by him; not fearfully and timidly exclaiming “Ah! shall I indeed understand it?” or, “Do I then understand it rightly?” Understand it *rightly*, in the sense of perfect comprehension, would be saying much;—in this sense, these lectures may perhaps be understood fully only by such as could themselves have spoken them. But it will have been understood, and that *not erroneously*, by every one who, moved by these discourses, is elevated above the common view of the world, and inspired with exalted sentiments and

resolves. The reciprocal obligation to both these duties lies at the foundation of the contract we entered into at the beginning of these lectures. I will unweariedly search for new forms, applications, and combinations, as if it were impossible to make myself fully intelligible to you :—do you on the other hand, that is, you who seek instruction here—for to the others I willingly limit myself to counsel—do you proceed with earnestness and courage to the business, as if you had to understand me by hints or half words only ;—and in this way I believe that we shall agree well together.

These considerations on the possibility and necessity of a generally comprehensible exposition of the deepest elements of knowledge acquire a new significance and convincing power, when we examine more strictly the peculiar and characteristic distinction between the Popular and the Scientific discourse ;—a distinction which, so far as I am aware, is virtually unknown, and which, in particular, lies wholly concealed from those who talk so readily of the possibility and impossibility of popular expositions. The Scientific discourse eliminates truth from among the errors which surround and oppose it on all sides and in every form ; and, by demolition of these opposing views as error and as impossible to true thought, shows the truth as that which alone remains after their exclusion, and therefore as the only possible truth :—and in this separation of opposites, and elucidation of the truth from the confused chaos in which truth and error lie mingled together, consists the peculiar and characteristic nature of the Scientific discourse. By this method truth emerges before our eyes out of a world full of error. Now it is obvious that the philosopher, before such sifting of truth, before he could either project or begin it, and therefore independent of scientific proof, must already possess truth. But how could he attain possession of it except by the guidance of a natural sense of truth which

exists in him with higher power than in his contemporaries?—and in what other way, then, has he at first attained it but by the unartificial popular way? To this natural sense of truth, which is thus seen to be the starting-point even of scientific philosophy, the Popular discourse addresses itself immediately without calling aught else to its aid,—setting forth the truth, and nothing but the truth, purely and simply, as it is in itself and not as it stands opposed to error,—and calculates upon the spontaneous assent of this natural sense of truth. This discourse cannot indeed *prove* anything, but it must certainly be *understood*; for intelligence itself is the only organ whereby we can apprehend its import, and without this it cannot reach us at all. The Scientific discourse presupposes in the hearer an entanglement in the meshes of error, and addresses itself to a diseased and perverted spiritual nature;—the Popular discourse presupposes an open and candid mind, and appeals to a healthy, although not sufficiently cultivated, spiritual nature. After all this, how can the philosopher entertain a doubt that the natural sense of truth in man is sufficient to lead him to the knowledge of truth, since he himself has attained to that knowledge by this means and no other?

But notwithstanding that the comprehension of the deepest truths of Reason, by means of a popular exposition, is possible,—notwithstanding further that this comprehension is a necessary purpose of humanity towards the attainment of which every power ought to be directed,—we must nevertheless acknowledge that there are, in the present age, greater hindrances to the accomplishment of this purpose than have existed at any previous time. In the first place, the very form of this higher truth,—this strictly determinate, settled, absolutely unchanging and unchangeable form,—comes into collision, and that in a two-fold manner, with the hesitating modesty which this age—has not indeed in itself but yet—would exact from every one who undertakes

to deal with it. It is not to be denied that this knowledge assumes itself to be true, and alone true, and true only in the sharp and complete precision in which it is thus announced,—and everything opposed to it, absolutely and without exception or mitigation, to be false;—that therefore it seeks, without forbearance, to subdue all weak partialities, all vagrant fancies, and wholly disdains to enter into any treaty or compromise with the other side. The men of these days are offended at this severity, as if they were thereby grievously ill-treated;—they would be deferentially saluted, and consulted as to whether they will lend their sanction to such a matter; would make conditions on their side, and there should be some elbow-room left for their tricks of legerdemain. Others are dissatisfied with this form of truth, because it requires them at once to take their part for or against, and to decide on the instant yes or no. For they are in no haste to know for certain about that which nevertheless is alone worth knowing, and would willingly suspend their judgment in case it should afterwards turn out to be wholly otherwise; and besides it is very convenient to conceal their want of understanding under the fashionable and high-sounding name of Scepticism, and to allow mankind to believe that there, where in fact they have been found wanting in power to comprehend that which lies clear before them, it has been their superior acuteness and penetration which has disclosed to them certain unheard-of, and to all other men inaccessible, grounds for doubt.

Again, there is a hindrance to the successful issue of our undertaking in this age, in the monstrously paradoxical, strange, and unheard-of appearance of our doctrine, since it turns into falsehood precisely those things which the age has hitherto prized as the most precious and sacred results of its culture and enlightenment. Not as if our doctrine were in itself new and paradoxical. Among the Greeks, Plato held the same faith. The Johannean Christ said precisely the same things which we teach and prove, and

even said them in the same language which we here employ ; and in these very times, and among our own nation, our two greatest Poets have given expression to the same truth in manifold applications and under many forms. But the Johannean Christ has been superseded by his less spiritual followers ; and Poets, it is thought, desire only to utter fine words and to produce musical sounds.

That this ancient doctrine, which has thus been renewed from age to age down even to these later times, should yet seem so wholly new and unheard-of to this age, arises in this way. After the revival of learning in Modern Europe, and particularly since, by means of the Church Reformation, the examination of the highest religious truth was freely laid open to the mind, there gradually arose a philosophy which made the experiment whether the books of Nature and of Knowledge, which were to it unintelligible, might not assume a meaning when read backwards ; whereby indeed everything without exception was taken out of its natural position, and set head downwards. This philosophy took possession, as every prevalent philosophy necessarily does, of all the avenues of public instruction,—catechisms, schoolbooks, public religious discourses, literature. All our youthful culture fell within this period. There is thus no wonder that, after the unnatural had become to us natural, Nature herself should seem to us unnatural ; and that, after we had been accustomed to see all things upside-down, we should imagine them to be inverted when we beheld them restored to their true position. This indeed is an error which will disappear with the age which produced it ; for we, who explain death by life, the body by the soul,—and not the reverse as these moderns do,—we are the true followers of the Ancients ; only that we see clearly what remained dark to them ; while the philosophy which we have alluded to above is not even an advance in time, but only a ludicrous interlude, a petty appendix to thorough barbarism.

Lastly, those who might perchance of themselves overcome the two hindrances now pointed out, may yet be scared back by the hateful and malignant objections urged by the fanatics of perversity. It may indeed be wondered at that such perversity, not satisfied with being in its own person perverse, should besides exhibit a fanatical zeal for the maintenance and diffusion of the same perversity in others. Yet even this may be readily explained, and in this way. When these fanatics had reached the years of reflection and self-knowledge, and had examined themselves and their own inward being, and found nothing there but the impulse towards personal, sensuous, well-being, had not felt the slightest desire either to discover within themselves, or to acquire from without, anything but what they found there,—they have then looked around upon their fellow-men, observed them, and fancied that neither was there anything to be met with in them higher than this same impulse towards personal, sensuous, well-being. Hereupon they have satisfied themselves that in this consists the essential nature of humanity; and having cultivated this nature in themselves with unremitting care and to the highest possible perfection, they have necessarily become in their own eyes the most preëminent and distinguished among men, since they were conscious of being virtuosi in those things wherein the worth of humanity consists. Thus have they thought and acted throughout life. But should it appear that they have been mistaken in the major proposition of their syllogism,—if in others of their species there has been manifested something else, and in this case something undeniably higher and more divine than the mere impulse towards personal, sensuous, well-being,—then they who had hitherto held themselves to be men of distinguished preëminence would be found to belong to a lower race, and instead of as before esteeming themselves higher than all others, they would be compelled thenceforward to despise and reject themselves. They cannot do otherwise than angrily oppose

this conviction of a higher nature in man, which brings only disgrace to them, and all phenomena which confirm this conviction; they must necessarily do everything in their power to keep such phenomena at a distance from themselves, and even to suppress them altogether; they struggle for life,—for the most delicate and innermost root of their life,—for the possibility of self-endurance. All fanaticism, and all its angry exhibitions, from the beginning of the world down to the present day, have proceeded from this principle:—"If my opponent be right, then am I a miserable man." Where this fanaticism can wield fire and sword, with fire and sword it assails its detested adversary; where these instruments are beyond its reach, it has still the tongue left,—which, if it do not kill the foe, is yet frequently able to cripple his activity and influence with others. One of the most favourite and customary tricks of tongue-fence among these fanatics is this:—to give to the thing which is hateful only to them, a name which is hateful to all men, in order thereby to decry it and render it suspected. The existing store of such tricks and nicknames is inexhaustible, and is constantly enriched by fresh additions; and it would be in vain to attempt here any complete enumeration of them. I shall notice only one of the most common of these odious nicknames,—i.e. the charge that this doctrine which we teach is *Mysticism*.*

* "Above all, the mysticism of Fichte might astonish us. The cold, colossal, adamantine spirit, standing erect and clear, like a Cato Major among degenerate men; fit to have been the teacher of the Stoas, and to have discoursed of Beauty and Virtue in the groves of Academe! Our reader has seen some words of Fichte's: are these like words of a mystic? We figure his motionless look, had he heard this charge of mysticism! For the man rises before us, amid contradiction and debate, like a granite mountain amid clouds and wind. Ridicule, of the best that could be commanded, had been already tried against him; but it could not avail. What was the wit of a thousand wits to him? The cry of a thousand choughs assaulting that old cliff of granite: seen from the summit, these, as they winged the midway air, showed scarce so gross as beetles, and their cry was seldom even audible."—CARLYLE.

Observe, in the first place, with reference to the form of this accusation, that should any candid unprejudiced person answer:—"Well, let us suppose that it is Mysticism, and that Mysticism is an erroneous and dangerous thing; let him for that very reason bring forward his doctrine, and we will hear him: if it is erroneous and dangerous, this will come to light when the opportunity is given;"—these fanatics must reply, in accordance with the peremptory decision by which they believe they have got rid of us;—"There is nothing more to hear;—Mysticism has long ago, for some generations back, by the unanimous voice of all our literary Councils, been decreed to be heresy and placed under excommunication."

Further—to proceed from the form of this accusation to its substance;—What then is this Mysticism which they lay to our charge? We shall not indeed receive a distinct answer to this question from them:—for as they never possess a clear idea, but only think about high-sounding phrases, so in this case they have no conception answering to their words;—we must therefore help ourselves. There is, unquestionably, a view of spiritual and sacred things which, although correct in the main, is nevertheless afflicted with a grievous infirmity, and thereby rendered impure and noxious. In my lectures of last year,* I took occasion, in passing, to delineate this view, and I may perhaps find it necessary this season to return to the subject. This view, which in part is certainly a much perverted one, is properly distinguished from the true *religious* view by the name of Mysticism;—I myself am wont to make this distinction, employing the names just mentioned; and from this Mysticism my doctrine is far removed, and indeed wholly opposed to it. Thus, I say, do I regard the matter. But what would the fanatics? The distinction I have mentioned is

* "Characteristics of the Present Age," Lecture VIII.

completely concealed from their eyes, as well as from the eyes of that philosophy which they follow;—according to their unanimous resolutions, their criticisms, their discussions, their favourite works, and all their public manifestations without exception,—which he who can may examine for himself, and the others may believe me upon trust,—according to these unanimous resolutions, it is always the True Religion, the Knowledge of God in spirit and in truth, which they call Mysticism, and against which, in fact, under this name, they hurl their anathema. Their warnings against this doctrine, as Mysticism, therefore, mean nothing else than what may be thus paraphrased:—“Yonder they will tell you of the existence of a spiritual world, revealed to no outward sense, but to be apprehended only by pure thought:—you are lost if you allow yourselves to be persuaded of this, for there is absolutely no existence but that which we can grasp with our hand, and we have nothing else to care for; all else are mere abstractions from the substantial realities we can handle, with no substance in themselves, but which these enthusiasts confound with palpable reality. They will tell you of the reality, the inward independence, the creative power of thought:—you are lost to real life if you believe them; for there is nothing really existing but, in the first place, the stomach, and then that which supports it and supplies it with food; and it is only the gases that have their birth in it which these dreamers call ideas.” We admit the whole accusation, and willingly confess, not without joyful and exulting feelings, that, in this sense of the word, our doctrine is indeed Mysticism. With these we have therefore no new controversy to begin, but find ourselves in the old controversy, never to be solved or reconciled; *i.e.*—*they say* that all Religion—*truly* it may be said of the vulgar superstition we have before alluded to—is something in the highest degree objectionable and pernicious, and must be extirpated from the earth, root and

branch ; and so the matter remains with them,—while we say that True Religion is something in the highest degree blessed, and that which alone gives true existence, worth, and dignity to man, here below and throughout eternity ; and that every power must be put forth in order that this Religion may, wherever it is possible, be made known to all men ; this we recognise with absolute certainty, and thus the matter remains on our side.

Meanwhile, that these persons should rather choose to say "That is Mysticism," than, as they ought to say, "That is Religion," arises, among other causes which do not belong to our present subject, from the following :—They desire by this language, in *the first place*, imperceptibly to induce a fear that, by means of this our doctrine, there may be introduced intolerance, desire of persecution, insubordination, and civil disturbance ; or that, in one word, this doctrine is dangerous to the State :—*secondly and chiefly*, they wish to create alarm, in those who may enter upon inquiries like the present, as to their continuance in possession of a sound mind, and to give them to understand that in this way they may come at last to see ghosts in broad daylight—which would be a very great misfortune indeed. As to the first, the danger to the State :—they lay hold of the wrong name for that from which danger may be feared, and they doubtless calculate quite securely that no one will be found to discover the change ; for neither that which they call Mysticism—the True Religion—nor that which we call by that name, has ever been known to persecute, to show intolerance, or to stir up civil commotion ;—throughout the whole history of Churches, heresies, and persecutions, the persecuted party have ever occupied a proportionally higher, and the persecutors a lower position ; the latter fighting, as we said above, for life. Not intolerance, desire of persecution, insubordination toward the State, belong only to that spirit by which they themselves are animated, the fanaticism of perversity ; and, if it were other-

wise advisable, I would willingly have the fetters struck off this very day from the enslaved, that it might be seen what course they would take. As to the second object of solicitude, the preservation of a sound mind:—this depends in the first instance on physical organization; and against influences of this kind, even the shallowest inanity, the lowest vulgarity of soul, is by no means a safe-guard;—hence there is no occasion to throw ourselves into such a refuge in order to escape the threatened danger. So far as I know, or have known, even those who live amid those investigations of which we now speak, and find in them their uninterrupted daily labour, are by no means exposed to these distractions, see no ghosts, and are as healthy, in mind and body, as others. If, sometimes in life, they do not what most other men in their place would have done, or do what most other men in the same place would have left undone, it is not because they are deficient in acuteness to perceive the possibility of the one course of action, or the consequences of the other,—as those who, in their place, would certainly have done otherwise cannot refrain from thinking,—but for other reasons. If there must always be diseased spiritual natures, who as soon as they quit their housekeeping books, or whatever other morsel of reality gives employment to their faculties, forthwith fall into the mazes of error, let such remain by their housekeeping books!—but I trust that the general rule may not be taken from them, who, it is to be hoped, are the smaller number and are certainly of the lower species; nor, because there are feeble and diseased creatures among men, the whole human race be treated as if they were feeble and diseased. That we have interested ourselves in the deaf, dumb, and blind, and have invented a way whereby instruction may be communicated to them, is deserving of all thanks;—from the deaf and dumb, namely, and the blind. But if we were to make this method of instruction the universal plan of education for persons without these defects, because such persons may

encounter deaf, dumb, and blind people, and we should thus be sure that we had provided for all; if he who can hear should, without regard to his hearing, be made to talk by the same laborious process as the deaf and dumb, and require to learn to detect the words upon the lips; and he who can see should, without regard to his seeing, be taught to read the letters by the touch;—this would deserve little thanks indeed from those who are without defect, although such an arrangement would certainly be adopted as soon as the direction of public instruction should be made dependent on the opinion of the deaf and dumb and the blind.

These are the preliminary suggestions and considerations which I have thought it advisable to communicate to you to-day. Eight days hence I shall endeavour to set forth, in a new light and upon a new side, the foundation-principles of these lectures, which are at the same time the foundation-principles of all knowledge;—and to this I respectfully invite you.

LECTURE III.

**DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM THE COMMON MODE OF
THOUGHT:—DEFINITION OF BEING (*SEYN*)
AND EX-ISTENCE (*DASEYN*.)**

IN the first of these lectures we maintained that not every-thing which seems to be living does really and truly live ; and in the second we said that a large portion of mankind, throughout their whole Life, never attain to true and proper Thought, but remain within the limits of mere Opinion. It might well be, and indeed it has already become obvious from other remarks which we made on that occasion, that the phrases Thought and Life—Thought-lessness and Death, mean precisely one and the same thing ; we have already shown that Thought is the element of Life, and consequently the absence of Thought must be the source of Death.

An important difficulty stands in the way of this assertion, to which I must now direct your attention, namely the following :—If Life be an organic whole, determined by one universally efficient law, then it seems at first sight impossible that any one part appertaining to Life should be absent where the others are present ; or that any one individual part should exist without all the parts proper to Life, and consequently without Life itself as a whole, in its complete organic unity. In solving this difficulty, we shall also

be able to exhibit to you clearly the distinction between true Thought and mere Opinion, which was the first business for to-day as announced in our last discourse, before we proceed to the fulfilment of our other purpose in this lecture, namely, to begin our mutual application of pure Thought itself to the elements of all Knowledge.

The supposed difficulty is thus solved :—Wherever spiritual Life is to be found, everything, without exception, that belongs to this Life, follows wholly and unreservedly, according to the established law of its being :—but all this, which follows with absolute, and as it were mechanical, necessity, does not necessarily enter into consciousness ; it is there indeed, a Life according to the law, but not our Life, not the Life which is properly and peculiarly ours. Our Life is only that part of the Life according to the law which we embrace in clear consciousness, and, in this clear consciousness, love and enjoy. “ Where Love is, there is individual Life,” we said once ;—Love, however, exists only where there is clear consciousness.

The development of this Conscious Life—which in these lectures is all to which we shall give the name of Life—within the whole mass of Life which has an existence according to the law, proceeds precisely like that of physical death. As this, in its natural progress, begins at first in the remoter members, those farthest removed from the central seat of life, and from them spreads itself gradually to the inward parts, until at last it reaches the heart ; so does the spiritual Life, filled with consciousness, love, and enjoyment of itself, begin at first in the extremities and remoter outworks of Life, until it also, with God's good pleasure, reaches the true foundation and central point of all. An ancient philosopher maintained that the animals had arisen from the earth ; “ as happens,” he added, “ even to the present day in miniature, since every spring, particularly after a warm rain, we may observe frogs, for example, in whom

some particular part, perhaps the fore-feet, may be quite perfectly developed, while the other members still remain a rude and undeveloped clod of earth." The half-animals of this philosopher, although they scarcely afford sufficient evidence of what they were designed to prove, yet present a very striking illustration of the spiritual Life of ordinary men. The outward members of this Life are indeed perfectly formed and warm blood flows through the extremities; but when we look to the heart, and the other nobler organs of life,—which in like manner are there, and must necessarily be there since otherwise even the outward members themselves could not have been,—these organs, I say, are found to be still un sentient clods—frozen rocks.

I shall, first of all, convince you of this by a striking example; to which, although I shall express myself with strict precision, I must yet require your particular attention, on account of the novelty of the observation. We see, hear, feel—outward objects; and *along with this seeing, &c.*, we also *think* these objects, and are conscious of them by means of our inward sense; just as we are conscious, by the same inward sense, of our seeing, hearing, and feeling of these objects. I hope that no one who is possessed even of the commonest power of reflection will maintain that he can see, hear, or feel an object without being at the same time inwardly conscious both of the object itself, and of his seeing, hearing, or feeling of it;—that he can see, hear, or feel anything definite without consciousness. This co-existence, this inseparability of the outward, sensible *perception* and the inward thought or *conception*,—this *co-existence*, I say, and nothing more than this, lies in practical self-observation or the fact of Consciousness; but this fact of consciousness does by no means contain,—and I beg you to note this well,—this fact of consciousness does by no means contain any *relation* between these two elements,—the outward Sense and

the inward Thought,—a relation of the one to the other,—it may be as Cause and Effect, or as Essential and Accidental. If any such relation between the two be assumed, this is not in consequence of practical self-observation, and it does not lie in the fact of consciousness:—this is the first thing that I beg of you to understand and keep in mind.

Now, in the second place, should such a relation be assumed upon some other ground than that of self-observation,—which other possible ground we put in the place of consciousness,—should such a relation between the two elements be, upon such a ground, supposed and accepted,—then it appears, at first sight, that the two elements, as co-existent and inseparable from each other, must be held to be of equal rank; and thus the inward thought may as well be regarded as the foundation, the essential,—and the outward perception as the superstructure, the accident,—as the reverse; and in this way an insoluble doubt would necessarily arise between the two suppositions, which would for ever prevent any final decision respecting the assumed relation. Thus, I say, it is at first sight;—but should any one look deeper into the matter, then,—inasmuch as the inward consciousness embraces even the outward sense itself,—since we are conscious of the seeing, hearing, or feeling, but can by no means, on the other hand, see, hear, or feel our consciousness,—and thus, even in the immediate fact, consciousness assumes the higher place:—then, I say, such an one would find it much more natural to make the internal Consciousness the chief thing, and the external Sense the subordinate thing; to explain the latter by the former; to control and try the latter by the former;—and not the reverse.

Now how does the common mode of thought proceed in this matter? To it, the outward Sense is, without further inquiry, the first thing, the immediate touchstone of truth:—whatever is seen, heard, or felt, that *is*, just because it is

seen, heard, or felt. The Thought, or inward consciousness of the object, comes afterwards, as a mere formal addition which is scarcely to be noticed at all, and is quite willingly dispensed with if it do not force itself upon our observation; and a thing is never seen or heard because it is thought, but it is thought because it is seen or heard, and that under the guidance and control of this seeing and hearing. The perverse and absurd modern philosophy referred to in our last lecture as the peculiar organ and voice of common opinion, comes forward and unblushingly declares:—"Outward sense is the only source of reality, and all our knowledge is founded upon experience alone;"—as if this were an axiom to which no one would presume to offer a single objection. How is it that this common mode of thought, and its guardians, have so easily set aside the causes of doubt which we have just noticed, and even the positive grounds for the adoption of the opposite view, as if they had not even an existence? Why does the opposite view, which, even at the first glance, and as yet without any deeper investigation, recommends itself as much more natural and probable,—that the whole outward Sense, and all its objects, are founded upon Thought alone, and that a sensible perception is possible only in Thought, and as something thought, as a determination of the general consciousness, but by no means in itself and separated from consciousness,—I mean, the view that it is not true that we see, hear, and feel absolutely, but only that we are conscious of seeing, hearing, feeling,—why does this view which we profess, and which we recognise with absolute certainty to be the only right one, while we also clearly perceive its opposite to be a palpable absurdity,—why does this view, or even the possibility of it, remain wholly concealed from the common mode of thought? It may easily be explained:—The judgment of this mode of thought is the necessary expression of its actual degree of

life. For those who cannot go beyond this mode of thought, Life dwells, in the meantime, only in outward Sense, the remotest extremity of the nascent spiritual Life; in outward Sense they have their whole round of being, their most vital existence; in it alone they feel, love, and enjoy; and, of necessity, where their heart is there is their faith also:—in Thought, on the contrary, Life does not spring forth before them directly as living flesh and blood, but seems rather a formless mass; and therefore Thought appears to them to be a vague and uncertain mist, belonging neither to themselves nor to the matter in hand. Should they ever come so far as to attain a more intense existence in Thought than in seeing or hearing, and to feel and enjoy in it more keenly than in Sense, then would their judgment also be different from what it is.

Thus is Thought, even in its lowest manifestation, degraded and made of no account by the common view of things, because this common view does not place the seat of its Life in Thought,—has not even extended its spiritual feelers thus far. Thought in its lowest manifestation, I said;—for that, and nothing more, is this thought of external objects, which has an antitype, a competitor for truth, in an outward sensible perception. Thought, in its high and proper form, is that which creates its own purely spiritual object absolutely from itself, without the aid of outward sense, and without any reference whatever to outward sense. In ordinary life this mode of thought presents itself when, for example, the question arises with regard to the origin of the World, or of the Human Race; or regarding the internal laws of Nature; where, in the first case, it is clear that at the creation of the world, and before the appearance of the human race, there was no observer present whose experience could be cited; and, in the second case, the question is not regarding specific phenomena, but regarding that in which all individual phenomena coincide; and that which

is to be evolved is not any visible event, but a mental necessity, which not only *is*, but *is thus*, and cannot be otherwise:—that is, an object proceeding entirely from Thought itself:—which first point I beg of you thoroughly to understand and recognise.

In matters pertaining to this higher Thought, the adherents of the common view proceed after this wise:—they let others invent, or, where they are possessed of greater power, they invent for themselves, by means of vagrant and lawless thought, or, as it is called, fancy, one out of many possible ways in which the actual fact in question may have arisen;—in the language of the schools they make an hypothesis:—they then consult their desire, fear, hope, or whatever may be their ruling passion for the time, and, should it assent, the fiction becomes established as a firm and unalterable truth. One of the many possible ways, I said; and this is the leading characteristic of the proceeding we have described:—but it is necessary that this expression should be correctly understood. For, in itself, it is not true that anything whatever is possible in many different ways; but everything that is, is possible, actual, and at the same time necessary, only in one perfectly fixed and definite way:—and herein, indeed, lies the fundamental error of this proceeding, that it assumes many different possibilities, from which it proceeds to select one for adoption, without being able to verify this one by anything but its own caprice. This proceeding is what we call *Opinion*, in opposition to true *Thought*. Opinion, like Thought itself, possesses as its domain the whole region lying beyond sensuous experience; this region it fills with the productions of fancy, either of others or its own, to which desire alone gives substance and duration; and all this happens simply and solely because the seat of its spiritual Life is as yet no higher than in the extremities of blind desire or aversion.

True Thought proceeds in a different way in filling up

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this super-sensual region. It does not invent, but spontaneously perceives,—not one possibility among many,—but the one and only possible, actual, and necessary mode; and this does not seek its confirmation in a proof lying beyond itself, but it contains within itself its own confirmation; and, as soon as it is conceived, becomes evident to Thought itself as the only possible and absolutely certain Truth, establishing itself in the soul with an immovable certainty and evidence that completely destroys even the possibility of doubt. Since this certainty, as we have said, attaches itself at once to the living act of Thought in its immediate vitality, and to this only, it follows that every one who would become a partaker in this certainty, must himself, and in his own person, think the Truth, and cannot commit to any other the accomplishment of this business in his stead. Only this preliminary remark I desired to make before proceeding, as I now do, to our mutual application of true Thought to the highest elements of Knowledge.

§ The first task of such Thought is *to conceive of Being in itself with strict exactitude*. I approach this conception thus; I say:—Being (*Seyn*), proper and true Being, does not arise, does not proceed, does not come forth out of nothingness (*Nichtseyen*). For everything which thus arises, you are compelled to assume a previous causal being, by virtue of which the other at first arose. If you hold that at some earlier period this second being has itself arisen in its turn, then you are again compelled to assume a third being by virtue of which the second arose; and should you attribute a beginning to the third, then you are compelled to assume a fourth,—and so on for ever. You must, in every case, at last arrive at a Being that has not thus *arisen*, and which therefore requires no other thing to account for its being, but which *is* absolutely through itself, by itself, and from itself. On this Being, to which you must at last ascend from out the series of created

things, you must now and henceforward fix your attention; and then it will become evident to you, if you have entered fully with me into the preceding thoughts, that you can only conceive of the true Being as a Being by itself, from itself, and through itself.

In the second place I add:—that within this Being nothing new can arise, nothing can alter its shape, nor shift nor change; but that as it is now, so has it been from all eternity, and so it endures unchangeably in all eternity. For, since it is through itself alone, so is it,—completely, without division, and without abatement,—all that, through itself, it can be and must be. Were it at any time to become something new, then must it either have been previously hindered, by some being foreign to itself, from becoming this something; or it must become this something new through the power of a being foreign to itself, which now for the first time begins to exert an influence upon it:—both of which suppositions stand in direct contradiction to its absolute independence and self-sufficiency. And thus it will become evident to you, if you have thoroughly comprehended these thoughts, that Being can be conceived of only as absolutely One not as Many; only as a self-comprehending, self-sufficient, and absolutely unchangeable Unity.

By this course of thought—and this is my third point—you arrive *only* at a Being (*Seyn*) enclosed, concealed, wholly comprehended, in itself;—you do not, by any means, arrive at an Ex-istence (*Daseyn*; *)—I say at an Ex-istence, manifestation, or revelation of this Being. I am most anxious that you should understand this at once;

* The English language does not contain terms by which the opposition of the German "*Seyn*" and "*Daseyn*" can be expressed with the distinctness of the original. "Being" and "Ex-istence" are here adopted as the nearest approach to a correct translation that our language admits of, although the awkwardness of the expression is obvious, and the strict philosophical meaning here attached to those terms is unknown in their common use.—*Tr.*

and you will undoubtedly do so when you have strictly considered the conception of Being as now set forth, and have so become conscious in yourselves of what is contained in this thought, and what is not contained in it. The natural illusion which may obscure your minds against the desired insight, I shall very soon examine.

To explain this more fully:—You perceive that I distinguish Being (*Seyn*)—essential, self-comprehended Being—from Ex-istence (*Daseyn*), and represent these two ideas as opposed to each other,—as not even directly connected with each other. This distinction is of the weightiest importance; and only through it can clearness and certainty be attained in the highest elements of Knowledge. What Ex-istence (*Daseyn*) really is, will best be made evident by actual contemplation of this Ex-istence. I say, therefore:—Essentially and at the root the Ex-istence of Being is the consciousness or conception of Being; as may be made clear at once in the use of the word “*is*” when applied to any particular object,—for example, to this wall. For, what is this “*is*” in the proposition, “*The wall is?*” It is obviously not the wall itself and identical with it; it does not even assume that character, but it distinguishes the wall, by the third person, as independent; it thus only assumes to be an outward characteristic of essential Being, an image or picture of such Being,—or, as we have expressed it above, and as it is most distinctly expressed, the immediate, outward Ex-istence of the wall,—*as its Being out of its Being*. (It is admitted that the whole of this experiment demands the most subtle abstraction and the keenest inward observation; and it may be added, as the proof, that no one has thoroughly performed the task, to whom it has not become evident that the whole, and particularly the last expression, is perfectly exact.)

The common mode of thought, it is true, is not wont to remark this distinction; and it may well be that what I

have now said may seem to many something wholly new and unheard of. The reason of which is, that their love and affection are attracted directly to the object itself, and to it exclusively, and are wholly occupied with it, so that they have no time to tarry by the "is," or to consider its significance, and thus it is wholly lost to them. Hence it usually happens that, leaping over the Ex-istence (*Daseyn*), we believe that we have arrived at Being (*Seyn*) itself; while nevertheless we forever remain in the fore-court, in the Ex-istence.—and this common delusion may render the proposition which we have submitted to you above, at first sight, dark and unintelligible. In our present inquiry, however, everything depends on our comprehending this proposition at once, and henceforth giving it due attention.

We said that the Consciousness of Being, the "is" to the Being, is itself the Ex-istence (*Daseyn*):—leaving out of sight, in the meantime, the supposition, founded on appearance, that Consciousness may be only one among other possible forms, modes, and kinds of Ex-istence; and that there may be many other, perhaps an infinite variety of, such forms, modes, and kinds of Ex-istence. This supposition, however, must now be dismissed:—in the first place, because we here desire not to accumulate mere *opinions*, but truly to think; and secondly, with reference to its consequences,—for with such a possibility remaining, our union with the Absolute, as the only source of Blessedness, could never be attained; but there would rather be placed, between the Absolute and us, an immeasurable chasm as the true source of all Unblessedness.

We have therefore to make it manifest to you in thought,—which is our fourth point—that the Consciousness of Being is the *only possible* form and mode of the Ex-istence (*Daseyn*) of Being; and, consequently, is itself immediately and absolutely this Ex-istence of Being. We conduct you to this insight in the following way:—Being (*Seyn*)—as such, as Being, as abiding, unchangeable Being, without in

any respect laying aside its absolute character and intermingling or blending itself with Ex-istence—must ex-ist. Hence it must be distinguished from, and opposed to, Ex-istence; and indeed—since besides the absolute Being (*Seyn*) itself there is nothing else whatever but its Ex-istence (*Daseyn*)—this distinction and opposition must be manifest in the Ex-istence (*Daseyn*) itself; and this, more clearly expressed, is equivalent to the following:—Ex-istence (*Daseyn*) must apprehend, recognise, and image forth itself as mere Ex-istence: and, opposed to itself, it must assume and image forth an absolute Being (*Seyn*), whose mere Ex-istence it is; it must thus, by its own nature, as opposed to another and an absolute existence, annihilate itself:—which is precisely the character of mere representation, conception, or Consciousness of Being, as you have already seen in our exposition of the “*is*.” And thus it is clear, if we have succeeded in making these ideas thoroughly intelligible to you, that the Ex-istence of Being must necessarily be—cannot be other than—a Consciousness of itself—of Ex-istence—as a mere image or representation of Absolute, Self-existent Being.

That such is the case, and that Knowledge* or Consciousness is the absolute Ex-istence (*Daseyn*),—or, as you may now rather wish to say,—the manifestation and revelation of Being (*Seyn*), in its only possible form:—this may be distinctly understood and seen by Knowledge itself, as we all, I assume, have now seen it. But—and this is our fifth point—this Knowledge can, by no means, in itself, understand or see *how* itself arises, and how *from out* the inward, self-comprehending Being (*Seyn*) an Ex-istence (*Daseyn*), manifestation or revelation of itself can proceed;—as indeed we have expressly seen when dealing

* The reader will observe that in this and the succeeding lectures the word “Wissen,” which is here rendered by “Knowledge,” is used in the sense of “Cognition,” to express the *conscious act of Knowing*, and not either the object or the result of that act.—Tr.

with our third point, that such a sequential evolution lies wholly beyond our view. The reason of this is, that Ex-istence, as we have already shown, cannot *be* without apprehending, recognising, and assuming *itself*, because such self-conception is inseparable from its nature; and thus Knowledge, by the very absoluteness of its Ex-istence, and its dependence on that Ex-istence, is cut off from all possibility of passing beyond it, or of conceiving and tracing itself prior to that Ex-istence. It *is*, for itself and in itself, and so far well;—but wherever it is, it finds itself already there in a certain determinate mode, which it must accept just as it is presented to it, but which it can by no means explain, nor declare how and whereby it has become so. This unchangeably determined mode of the Ex-istence of Knowledge, which can be apprehended only by immediate comprehension and perception, is the essential and truly real Life of Knowledge.

But notwithstanding that this true and real Life of Knowledge cannot explain the definite mode in which it has arisen, it is yet susceptible of a general interpretation; and we may understand and perceive with absolute certainty *what it is* according to its essential inward nature;—which is our sixth point. I lead you to this insight thus:—What we set forth above as our fourth point,—that Ex-istence is necessarily Consciousness—and all that is involved in that principle, follows from mere Ex-istence as such, and the conception of such Ex-istence. Now, this Ex-istence (*Daseyn*) itself *is*, resting and reposing on itself alone;—prior to any conception of itself, and inseparable from every such conception, as we have just proved;—and this its being, its reality, which can only be immediately perceived, we have called its Life. Whence has it then this being, so completely independent of anything arising from its conception of itself,—nay, rather preceding that conception, and first rendering it possible? We have said:—It is the living and efficient Ex-istence of the Absolute itself

which alone has power *to be* and *to exist*, and beside which nothing *is*, nor truly *exists*. Now, as the Absolute can *be* only through itself, so also can it *exist* only through itself; and as *it*, in its very self, and nothing else in its stead, must exist,—since indeed nothing out of it has power either to be or to exist,—so does it *exist* even as it *is* in itself, complete, undivided, without diminution, without variability or change, as Absolute Unity, as it is in its own inward and essential nature. Thus the actual Life of Knowledge *is*, at bottom, the essential Being of the Absolute itself and nothing else; and between the Absolute or God, and Knowledge in its deepest roots, there is no separation or distinction, but both merge completely into one.

And thus we have already attained a point from which our previous propositions become clearer, and light spreads over our future way. That any living Ex-istence should be wholly cut off from God,—all living Ex-istence, as we have seen, being necessarily Life and Consciousness, and the dead and unconscious having no place in Ex-istence,—that any living Ex-istence should be wholly cut off from God, is already guarded against, and is absolutely impossible; for only through the Ex-istence of God in it is it maintained in Ex-istence, and were it possible that God should disappear from within it, then would it thereby itself disappear from Ex-istence. In the lower grades of spiritual life, this Divine Ex-istence is seen only through obscure coverings, and amid confused phantasmagoria, derived from the organ of the spiritual sense through which man looks upon himself and upon Being; but to gaze upon it bright and unveiled, as indeed the Divine Life and Ex-istence, and to bathe our whole being in this Life with full enjoyment and love,—this is the True and unspeakably Blessed Life.

It is ever, we said, the Ex-istence (*Daseyn*) of the Absolute and Divine Being (*Seyn*) that “*is*” (ex-ists)

in all Life;—by which expression “all Life,” we here mean the universal Life according to the law spoken of at the beginning of this lecture, which in this respect cannot be otherwise than as it is. In the lower grades of the spiritual life of man, however, that Divine Being (*Seyn*), as such, does not reveal itself to Consciousness; but in the true central-point of spiritual life, that Divine Being, in its own express nature, does reveal itself to Consciousness; as, for example, I assume that it has revealed itself to us. Now, that it reveals itself as such to Consciousness, can mean nothing else than that it assumes the form which we have already seen to be the necessary form of Ex-istence and Consciousness,—that, namely, of an image, representation, or conception, which gives itself out only as a conception, and not by any means as the thing itself. Immediately, in its true essential nature, and without any image or representation, it is at all times present in the actual life of man, only unperceived; and it continues there present as before, after it has been perceived; only it is then, besides, recognised in an image or representation. This representative form is the essential nature of Thought;—and in particular the Thought we are here considering bears, in its sufficiency for its own support and confirmation (which we call its internal evidence), the character of Absoluteness; and thereby approves itself as pure, true, and absolute Thought.—And thus it is made evident on all sides, that only in pure Thought can our union with God be recognised.

We have already said, but must yet again expressly inculcate it upon you, and commend it to your earnest attention, that as Being (*Seyn*) is One and not Manifold, and as it is at once complete in itself, without variation or change, and thus an essential and absolute Unity,—so also is Ex-istence (*Daseyn*) or Consciousness—since it only exists through Being, and is only the Ex-istence of Being,—likewise an absolute, eternal, invariable, and unchanging

Unity. So it is, with absolute necessity, in itself;—and so it remains in pure Thought. There is nothing whatever in Ex-istence but immediate and living Thought:—*Thought*, I say, but by no means a *thinking substance*, a dead body in which thought inheres,—with which *no*-thought, indeed a *no*-thinker is full surely at hand:—Thought, I say, and also the real Life of this Thought, which at bottom is the Divine Life; both of which—Thought and this its real Life—are molten together into one inward organic Unity; like as, outwardly, they are one simple, identical, eternal, unchangeable Unity. Nevertheless, opposed to this latter outward Unity, there arises in Thought the *appearance* of a Manifold, partly because there are many thinking subjects, and partly on account of the infinite series of objects upon which the thought of these subjects must eternally proceed. This appearance arises even to pure Thought and the Blessed Life in it, and Thought itself cannot forbid the presence of this appearance; but in no way does pure Thought believe in this appearance, nor love it, nor attempt to find enjoyment in it. On the other hand, the lower life, in all its inferior grades, believes in every appearance of this Manifold and in the Manifold itself,—runs forth in vagrant dissipation upon this Manifold and seeks in it for peace and enjoyment of itself, which nevertheless it will never find in that way. This remark may, in the first place, explain the picture which we drew in our first lecture of the True Life and the Apparent Life. To the outward eye, these two opposite modes of Life closely resemble each other; both proceed upon the same common objects, which are perceived by both in the same way;—inwardly, however, they are very different. The True Life does not even believe in the reality of this Manifold and Changeable; it believes only in its own unchangeable and eternal source in the Divine Unity;—with all its thought, its love, its obedience, its self-enjoy-

ment, for ever lost in and blended with that Unity:—the Apparent Life, on the contrary, neither knows nor comprehends any Unity whatsoever, but even regards the Manifold and Perishable as the true being, and is satisfied with it as such. In the second place, this remark imposes upon us the task of setting forth the true ground why that which, according to our doctrine, is *in itself* absolutely One, and remains One in True Life and Thought, does nevertheless *in an appearance*, which we must yet admit to be permanent and indestructible, become transmuted into a Manifold and Changeable;—the true ground of this transmutation, I say, we must at least set forth, and distinctly announce to you, although the clear demonstration of it may be inaccessible to popular communication. The exposition of this ground of the Manifold and Changeable, with the farther application of what we have said to-day, shall form the subject of our next discourse, to which I now respectfully invite you.

LECTURE IV.

CONDITIONS OF THE BLESSED LIFE:—DOCTRINE OF
BEING:—MANIFESTATION OF THE ONE DIVINE
BEING IN CONSCIOUSNESS AS A MANIFOLD
EXISTENCE, OR WORLD.

LET us begin the business of to-day with a survey of our purpose in these discourses, as well as of what has now been accomplished for that purpose.

My position is this:—Man is not destined to misery, but he may be a partaker in peace, tranquillity, and Blessedness, here below, everywhere, and for ever, if he but will to be so. This Blessedness, however, cannot be superadded to him by any outward power, nor by any miracle of an outward power; he must lay hold of it for himself, and with his own hands. The source of all misery among men is their vagrancy in the Manifold and Changeable;—the sole and absolute condition of the Blessed Life is the apprehension of the One Eternal Life with inward love and enjoyment; although we indeed apprehend this Unity only in a picture or representation, and cannot in reality ourselves attain to or transform ourselves into it.

The proposition which we have thus laid down, I would now, in the first place, bring home to your minds in clear insight, and thoroughly convince you of its truth. We here

aim at instruction and enlightenment, which alone have enduring value; not at a mere fugitive emotion or awakening of the fancy, which for the most part passes away without leaving a trace behind it. For the attainment of this clear insight, which we here strive to reach, the following steps are indispensably requisite:—*First*, that we should conceive of Being (*Seyn*) as absolutely by and through itself alone, as One, invariable, and unchangeable. This conception of Being is by no means an exclusive possession of the schools; but every Christian who in his childhood has received a sound religious education has even then, in the Christian Doctrine of the Divine Nature, become acquainted with our conception of being. *Secondly*, another requisite for this insight is the conception that we, the thinking beings, with respect to what we are in ourselves, are by no means this Absolute Being; but that we are nevertheless, in the innermost root of our existence, inseparably connected with it, since otherwise we should have no power to exist at all. Now, this latter conception may be more or less clear, particularly in regard to the mode of our relation to the Godhead. This conception we have set forth in the greatest clearness with which, in our opinion, it can be invested in a popular discourse, thus:—Besides God, there is truly and in the proper sense of the word no other Ex-istence whatever but—Knowledge; and this Knowledge is the Divine Ex-istence (*Daseyn*) itself, absolutely and immediately; and, in so far as we are this Knowledge, we are ourselves, in the deepest root of our being, the Divine Ex-istence. All other things that appear to us as Ex-istences—outward objects, bodies, souls, we ourselves in so far as we ascribe to ourselves a separate and independent Being—do not truly and in themselves exist; but they exist only in Consciousness and Thought, as that of which we are conscious, or of which we think, and in no other way whatever. This, I say, is the clearest expression by which, in my opinion, this conception

can be popularly communicated to men. But should any one be unable to understand even this expression,—yea, should he even be unable to apprehend or conceive anything whatever regarding the mode of this relation, yet would he not thereby be excluded from the Blessed Life, nor even hindered in any way from entering upon it. On the other hand, according to my absolute conviction, the following are indispensable requisites to the attainment of the Blessed Life:—(1.) That we should have fixed principles and convictions respecting God and our relation to him, which do not merely float in our memory, without our partaking of them, as something we have learned from others; but which are really true to us, living and active in ourselves. For even in this does Religion consist:—and he who does not possess such principles, in such a way, has no Religion, and therefore no Being, nor Ex-istence, nor true Self at all; but he passes away, like a shadow, amid the Manifold and Perishable. (2.) Another requisite to the Blessed Life is that this living Religion within us should at least go so far as to convince us entirely of our own Nothingness in ourselves, and of our Being only in God and through God; that we should at least *feel* this relationship continually and without interruption; and that, even although it should not be distinctly expressed either in thought or language, it should yet be the secret spring, the hidden principle, of all our thoughts, feelings, emotions, and aspirations. That these things are indispensable requisites to a Blessed Life, is, I say, my absolute conviction; and this conviction is here set forth for the benefit of those who already assume the possibility of a Blessed Life, who stand in need of it, or of confirmation in it, and who therefore desire to receive guidance in the way towards it. Notwithstanding this, we can not only frankly admit that a man may make shift without Religion, without True Ex-istence, without inward peace and Blessedness, and assure himself of coming off well

enough without these, as indeed may be true; but we are also ready freely to concede to such a man all possible honour and merit which, without Religion, he may be able to acquire. We embrace this opportunity, frankly to confess that, neither in the speculative nor in the popular form of our doctrine, can we constrain any man, or force our convictions upon him; nor would we wish to do so even if we could.

The definitive result of our former lecture, which we intend to follow out to-day, was this:—God not only *is*, in himself and contained within himself, but he also *ex-ists*, and manifests himself; and this his immediate Ex-istence (*Daseyn*) is necessarily Knowledge:—this latter necessity being seen and apprehended in Knowledge itself. In this his Existence (*Daseyn*) he *ex-ists*,—as is also necessary and may in like manner be seen to be necessary,—he *ex-ists*, I say, as he *is* absolutely in himself, in his own Being (*Seyn*), without changing in aught by his passage from Being (*Seyn*) to Ex-istence (*Daseyn*), without any intervening division or other separation between these two states. God *is* in himself One and not Many; he *is* in himself identical, the same, without change or variation; he *ex-ists* precisely as he *is* in himself, and therefore he necessarily *ex-ists* as One, without change or variation;—and as Knowledge, or we ourselves, are this Divine Ex-istence, so also in us, in so far as we are this Divine Ex-istence, there can be no variation or change, neither multiplicity nor variety, neither division, difference, nor opposition.—So must it be, and otherwise it cannot be:—therefore it is so. X

But in *Reality* we nevertheless find this multiplicity and variety, these divisions, differences, and oppositions of Being, and in Being,—which in *Thought* are clearly seen to be absolutely impossible; and hence arises the task of reconciling this contradiction between our perceptions of Reality and pure Thought; of showing how these opposing judgments may consist with each other, and so both prove true; and,

in particular, of solving this problem by making it clearly evident whence, and from what principles, this Multiplicity arises in the simple Unity of Being.

In the first place, and before everything else, let us ask :—Who is it that raises the question as to the source of the Manifold, and seeks such an insight into this source as may enable him to see the Manifold in its first outgoings, and thus obtain a knowledge of the *mode* of the transition ? It is not firm and unwavering Faith. Faith briefly disposes of the matter thus:—“There is absolutely but the One, Unchangeable and Eternal, and nothing besides Him; hence all that is fleeting and changeable full surely is *not*, and its seeming appearance is but an empty show;—this I *know*, whether I can explain this appearance or not; my assurance is neither strengthened in the one case, nor weakened in the other.” This Faith reposes immovably in the *fact* of its insight, without feeling the want of the *mode*;—it is content with the “That” without asking for the “How.” Thus, for example, in the Gospel of John, Christianity does not answer this question at all; it does not even once touch it, or only wonders at the presence of the Perishable, having this firm Faith and assurance that only the One *is*, and that the Perishable *is not*. And thus any one amongst us who is a partaker in this Faith does not raise the question; hence he does not need our answer to it, and it may even be a matter of indifference to him, as regards the Blessed Life, whether he comprehend our answer to it or not.

But this question is raised by those who have hitherto either believed only in the Manifold and have never risen even to a presentiment of the One, or else have wandered to and fro between both views, uncertain in which of the two they should establish themselves and which reject altogether; and these can only by means of an answer to this question attain the insight which is necessary to the development of the Blessed Life. For such I must answer

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the question, and for them it is necessary that they should comprehend my answer.

Thus then stands the matter:—In so far as the Divine Ex-istence (*Daseyn*) is immediately its own living, and efficient *Ex-isting* (*daseyen*),—ex-isting, I say, indicating thereby an act of Ex-istence,—it is wholly like to the inward essential Being (*Seyn*), and is therefore an invariable, unchanging Unity, altogether incapable of Multiplicity. Hence the principle of opposition cannot—(I have here, be it remembered, a double purpose: partly to present to some of you, for the first time and in a popular way, the Knowledge in question; partly, for others among you who have already acquired this Knowledge in the scientific way, to combine into one single beam and centre of light that which they have formerly seen in separate individual rays; and I therefore now express myself with the strictest precision),—the principle of opposition, I say, cannot fall immediately within this act of the Divine Ex-istence, *but must lie beyond it*; but this, however, in such wise that the outward opposition shall be evident as immediately connected with the living act and necessarily flowing from it;—not by any means as establishing an interval between God and us, and so irrevocably excluding us from him. I conduct you to an insight into this principle of Multiplicity thus:—

1. Whatever the Absolute Being (*Seyn*) or God is, that he is wholly and immediately by and through himself;—among other things, he ex-ists, manifests and reveals himself;—thus he is also this Ex-istence (*Daseyn*),—and here is the important point,—thus he is also this Ex-istence by and through himself, and only in his immediate and self-subsistent Being,—that is, in immediate Life and reality. In this his act of Ex-istence he is present with his whole power of ex-isting; and only in this, his efficient and living act, does his immediate Ex-istence consist:—and in this respect it is complete, one and unchangeable.

2. Being (*Seyn*) and Ex-istence (*Daseyn*) are here wholly blended together and lost in each other; for to his Being, by and through himself, his Ex-istence belongs, and can have no other foundation or source whatever; while, on the other hand, to his Ex-istence belongs everything that appertains to his inward and essential Being or Nature. The whole distinction, set forth in our former lecture, between Being (*Seyn*) and Ex-istence (*Daseyn*), and their independence of each other, is thus seen to be only for us, and only a result of our limitation; and by no means to have any place, immediately and of itself, in the Divine Ex-istence.

3. I said further, in the preceding lecture, that *in and to mere Ex-istence itself*, Being (*Seyn*) cannot be blended with Ex-istence (*Daseyn*), but that they must be distinguished from each other; so that Being may be apprehended as Being, and the Absolute as Absolute. This distinction,—this “as,”—this characterization of the elements to be distinguished, is in itself an absolute division, and the principle of all subsequent division and multiplicity, as may be shortly made evident to you in the following way:—

(a.) In the first place, the “as,” or characterization of the two elements, does not immediately give their Being (*Seyn*);—it gives only *what* they are, *i.e.* their description and character;—it gives them in representation, and indeed gives a mixed picture or representation of both, in which they reciprocally interpenetrate and determine each other, since the one can be apprehended and characterized only by means of the other, as *not* being that which the other is;—the other again being distinguished as *not* being that which the former is. In this distinction we have the genesis of Knowledge and Consciousness; or, what is the same thing, representation, description, and characterization, mediate

perception and recognition by means of character and sign; and in this distinction lies the peculiar and fundamental principle of Knowledge. It is purely a relation:—a relation of two things, however, does not lie wholly in either the one or the other, but between the two; it is a *third* element, as is shown in the peculiar nature of Knowledge as something wholly distinct from Being.

(b.) This distinction occurs in Ex-istence (*Diseyn*) itself and proceeds from it; and as the distinction does not embrace its object immediately, but only the form and character of the object, so Ex-istence does not apprehend itself immediately in this distinction,—that is, in Consciousness,—but only a picture or representation of itself. It does not conceive of itself immediately as it is; but it conceives of itself only within the limitations which are set to conception by the absolute nature of conception itself. Popularly expressed, this is the following:—We conceive of ourselves only in part, and that not as we really are in ourselves; and the cause that we do not conceive of the Absolute does not lie in the Absolute itself, but in the conception which cannot even conceive of itself. Were it able to conceive of itself, then would it be able to conceive of the Absolute, for in its own Being, beyond the limitations of conception, it is itself the Absolute.

(a.) Thus it is in Consciousness, as a distinction, that the primitive essence of the Divine Being and Ex-istence suffers a change. What then is the one absolute and invariable character of this change?

Consider the following:—Knowledge, as a distinction, is a characterization of the thing distinguished; every characterization, however, is in itself an assumption of the fixed and abiding Being and Presence of that which is characterized. Thus, by the act of con-

ception, that which in itself is the immediate living Divine Life, and which we have previously so described, becomes a present and abiding substance:—the schools would add, an *objective* substance, but this arises from the other and not the reverse. Thus, it is the living Divine Life that is changed; and a present and abiding substance is the *form* which it assumes in that change;—in other words, the change of immediate Life into a present and abiding substance is the fundamental character of that change which is imposed upon Ex-istence by Consciousness. This abiding Presence is the characteristic of that which we call the World; hence Consciousness is the true World-creator, by means of the change of the Divine Life into a present substance which is involved in the essential character of conception;—and only to consciousness and in consciousness is there a World, as the necessary form of Life in Consciousness;—but beyond conception,—that is, truly and in itself,—there is nothing, and in all Eternity there can be nothing, but the Living God in his own fulness of Life.

(1.) The World is thus manifest, in its fundamental character, as proceeding from consciousness; and this consciousness again is nothing but the “*as*,”—the characterization of the Divine Being and Ex-istence. But does not this World in conception, and the conception of it, assume again a new form?—I mean necessarily so, and with a necessity that may be made manifest?

In order to answer this question, consider with me the following:—Ex-istence (*Daseyn*) apprehends itself, as I said above, only in representation, and with a character distinguishing it from Being (*Seyn*). This it does solely of and through itself and by its own power; and this power of self-observation is manifest in all concentration, attention, and direc-

tion of thought to a particular object;—in the language of science this independent self-apprehension of consciousness is named reflexion, and thus we shall in future name it. This direction of the power of Ex-istence and Consciousness arises from the necessity for an “*as*,”—a characterization of Ex-istence; and this necessity rests immediately on God’s living act of Ex-istence. The foundation of the independence and freedom of Consciousness is indeed in God; but even on that account, because it is in God, do that independence and freedom truly exist, and are not an empty show. Through his own Ex-istence, and by its essential nature, God throws out from himself a part of his Ex-istence,—that is, such part of it as becomes self-consciousness,—and establishes it in true independence and freedom:—which point, as that which solves the latest and deepest error of speculation, I would not here pass over.

Ex-istence apprehends itself by its own independent power:—this was the first thing to which I wished to draw your attention here. What then arises in this apprehension? This is the second thing to which I now desire to direct your thoughts. As soon as it distinctly looks upon itself, in its own present existence, there arises immediately, in thus turning its attention forcibly upon itself, the perception that it is *this* or *that*,—that it bears *this* or *that* character;—and thus—here is the general expression of the result which I entreat you to notice—thus, in reflexion upon itself, does Knowledge, by itself and in virtue of its own nature, give birth to a division in itself; since in this act there is apparent to Knowledge, not only Knowledge itself, which would be one, but, at the same time, Knowledge as *this* or *that*, with *this* or *that* character or attribute, which adds a second element to the first, and that one arising from the first;

—so that the very foundation of reflexion is thus divided into two separate parts. This is the essential and fundamental law of reflexion.

(α) Now the first and immediate object of absolute reflexion is Ex-istence itself; which, according to the necessary form of Knowledge, as before explained, has been changed from a living Life into an abiding substance or World:—thus the first object of absolute reflexion is the World. By reason of the essential form of reflexion which we have just set forth, this World must separate and divide itself in reflexion; so that the World, or the abiding Ex-istence in the abstract, may assume a definite character, and the abstract World reproduce itself in reflexion under a particular shape. This, as we said, lies in reflexion itself as such;—reflexion, however, as we have also said, is in itself absolutely free and independent. Hence, were this reflexion inactive, were there nothing reflected,—as in consequence of this freedom might be the case,—then there would be nothing apparent; but were reflexion infinitely active, were there an endless series of its acts,—reflexion upon reflexion,—as through this freedom might as well be the case,—then to every new reflexion the World would appear in a new shape, and thus proceed throughout an Infinite Time, (which is likewise created only by the absolute freedom of reflexion,) in an endless course of change and transmutation, as an Infinite Manifold. As Consciousness in the abstract was seen to be the World-creator; so here, the free act of reflexion is seen to be the creator of Multiplicity, and indeed of an infinite Multiplicity, in the World; while the World, nevertheless, notwithstanding this Multiplicity, remains the same, because the abstract conception in its fundamental character remains One and the same.

(f.) And now to combine what we have said into one view;—Consciousness,—that is we ourselves,—is the Divine Ex-istence (*Daseyn*) itself, and absolutely one with it. This Divine Ex-istence apprehends itself and thereby becomes Consciousness; and its own Being (*Seyn*)—the true Divine Being—becomes a World to it. In this position what does this Consciousness contain? I think each of you will answer:—“The World and nothing but the World.” Or does this Consciousness also contain the immediate Divine Life? I think each of you will answer:—“No;”—for Consciousness must necessarily change this immediate Divine Life into a World; and thus, Consciousness being supposed, this change is also supposed as accomplished; and Consciousness itself is, by its very nature, and therefore without being again conscious of it, the direct completion of this change. But now, where is that immediate Divine Life which, in its immediateness, is itself Consciousness;—where has it vanished, since, according to our own admissions, rendered clearly necessary by our previous conclusions, in this its immediateness it is irrevocably effaced from Consciousness? We reply:—It has not vanished, but it is and abides there, where alone it can be, in the hidden and inaccessible Being (*Seyn*) of Consciousness, which no conception can reach;—in that which alone supports Consciousness, maintains it in Ex-istence, and even makes its Ex-istence possible. In Consciousness the Divine Life is inevitably changed into an actual and abiding World:—further, every actual Consciousness is an act of reflexion; the act of reflexion, however, inevitably divides the One World into an infinite variety of shapes, the comprehension of which can never be completed, and of which therefore only a finite series enters into Consciousness. I ask:—Where then abides the One

World, in itself perfect and complete, the counterpart and representative of the likewise perfect and complete Divine Life?—I answer:—It abides there, where alone it is,—not in any individual act of reflexion, but in the one, absolute, fundamental form of conception; which thou canst never reproduce in actual, immediate Consciousness, but only in Thought raising itself above Consciousness;—just as thou canst likewise reproduce in the same Thought the still farther removed and more deeply hidden Divine Life. Where then,—in this stream of actual reflexion, and its world-creation, flowing on for ever through ceaseless changes,—where then abides the One, Eternal and Unchangeable Being (*Seyn*) of Consciousness which is manifested in the Divine Ex-istence (*Daseyn*)? It does not enter into this stream of change, but only its type, image, or representation, enters therein.

As thy physical eye is a prism in which the light of the sensuous world, which in itself is pure, simple and colourless, breaks itself upon the surfaces of things into many hues,—while nevertheless thou wilt not maintain on that account that the light is in itself coloured, but only that, to thine eye, and while standing with thine eye in this state of reciprocal influence, it separates itself into colours,—although thou still canst not *see* the light colourless, but canst only *think* it colourless; to which thought alone thou givest credence when the nature of thy seeing eye becomes known to thee:—so also proceed in the things of the spiritual world and with the vision of thy spiritual eye. What thou seest, that thou art: but thou art it not as thou seest it, nor dost thou see it as thou art it. Thou art it, unchangeable and pure, without colour and without shape. Only reflexion,—which likewise thou thyself art, and which therefore

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thou canst never put away from thee,—only this causes it to separate before thee into innumerable rays and shapes. Know therefore that it is not in itself thus broken up, and formed, and invested with a multiplicity of shapes, but that it only seems so in this thy reflexion, thy spiritual eye, by which alone thou canst see,—and in reciprocal influence with this reflexion. Raise thyself above this Appearance, which in Reality can as little be obliterated as the colours from before thy physical eye,—raise thyself above this Appearance to true Thought, let thyself be penetrated by it, and thou wilt henceforward have faith in it alone.

So much as has now been said may, in my opinion, be contributed through the medium of a popular discourse to the solution of the question:—Whence,—since Being in itself must be absolutely One, without change or variation, and is evident to Thought as such,—whence arises the mutability and change which is nevertheless encountered by actual Consciousness? Being, in itself, is indeed One, the One Divine Being; and this alone is the true Reality in all Ex-istence, and so remains in all Eternity. By reflexion, which in actual Consciousness is indissolubly united with Being, this One Being is broken up into an infinite variety of forms. This separation, as we said, is absolutely original, and in actual Consciousness can never be abolished nor superseded by anything else; and therefore the special forms which by this separation are imposed upon absolute Reality, can subsist and become manifest only in actual Consciousness, and only by close observation of Consciousness;—and they are by no means discoverable *a priori* to pure Thought. They are simple and absolute Experience, which is nothing but Experience; which no Speculation that understands itself will ever attempt or desire to set aside; and in each particular thing the substance

of this Experience is that which absolutely belongs to it alone and is its individual characteristic,—that which in the whole infinite course of Time can never be repeated, and which can never before have occurred. But the general properties or attributes of these forms which are thus imposed upon the One Reality by its separation in Consciousness,—with reference to which attributes corresponding classes and species arise,—these may be discovered by a *priori* investigation of the different laws of reflexion, as we have already set forth its one fundamental law;—and a systematic philosophy ought to do this, and must do it, in a complete and exhaustive manner. Thus may Matter in Space,—Time,—a fixed system of Worlds,—how the substance of Consciousness, which in itself can be but One, divides itself into a system of separate and apparently independent individuals,—thus, I say, may these and all things of this kind, be deduced with perfect clearness from the laws of reflexion. But these investigations are more needful to the attainment of a fundamental insight into particular Sciences than to the development of a Blessed Life. They belong to the scientific teaching of Philosophy as its exclusive property; and they are neither susceptible of popular exposition nor do they stand in need of it. Here, therefore, at this indicated point, lies the boundary line which divides strict Science from popular teaching. We have, as you see, arrived at that limit; and it may therefore be anticipated that our inquiry shall now gradually descend to those regions which, at least with respect to their objects, are familiar to us, and which we have even sometimes touched upon already.

Besides the division, which we have set forth in to-day's lecture, of the World which arises in Consciousness from out the Divine Life, into a World of infinite variety and change with reference to its form, by means of the fundamental law of reflexion; there is yet another division,

inseparably bound up with the first, of the same World, not into an Infinite but into a Five-fold form, with reference to the possible modes of viewing it. We must set forth this second division, at least historically, and make you acquainted with it, which shall be done in our next lecture. It is only after these preparatory investigations that we shall be capable of comprehending for the first time the essential nature, as well as the outward manifestations, of the truly Blessed Life; and, after we have so comprehended it, of seeing clearly that there is indeed true Blessedness within it, and what that Blessedness is.

LECTURE V.

FIVE-FOLD DIVISION IN THE POSSIBLE VIEW OF THE
 WORLD:—THE STANDPOINTS OF SENSE,—OF
 LEGALITY,—OF THE HIGHER MORALITY,
 —OF RELIGION,—OF SCIENCE.

ACCORDING to what we have now seen, Blessedness consists in union with God, as the One and Absolute. We, however, in our unalterable nature, are but Knowledge, Representation, Conception; and even in our union with the Infinite One, this, the essential form of our Being, cannot disappear. Even in our union with him he does not become our own Being; but he floats before us as something foreign to, and outside of, ourselves, to which we can only devote ourselves, clinging to him with earnest love;—He floats before us, as in himself without form or substance, without, on our part, a definite conception or knowledge of his inward essential nature, but yet as that through which alone we can think or comprehend either ourselves or our World. Neither after our union with God is the World lost to us; it only assumes a new significance, and, instead of an independent existence such as it seemed to us before, it becomes only the appearance and manifestation, in Knowledge, of the Divine Life that lies hidden within itself. Comprehend this once more as a whole:—The Divine Ex-istence (*Daseyn*),

—his Ex-istence, I say, which, according to the distinction already laid down, is his Manifestation and Revelation of himself,—is absolutely through itself, and of necessity, LIGHT:—namely, inward and spiritual Light. This Light, left to itself, separates and divides itself into an infinite multiplicity of individual rays; and in this way, in these individual rays, becomes estranged from itself and its original source. But this same Light may also again concentrate itself from out this separation, and conceive and comprehend itself as One, as that which it is in itself,—the Ex-istence and Revelation of God; remaining indeed, even in this conception, that which it is in its form,—Light; but yet in this conception, and even by means of this very conception, announcing itself as having no real Being in itself, but as only the Ex-istence and Self-Manifestation of God.

In our last two lectures, and more especially in the last of all, we made it our especial business to investigate this passage of the One, only possible, and unchangeable Being into another, and that other a manifold and changeable Being: so that we might be enabled to penetrate to the very transition-point of this change, and see its outgoing with our own eyes. We found the following:—In the first place, through the essential character of Knowledge, as a mere picture or representation, Being, which subsists independently of that Knowledge, and which in itself and in God is pure activity and Life, is changed into a determinate and abiding being, or into a World. In the second place, besides this distinction, the World which, to mere abstract Knowledge, is simple and indivisible, is, by the fundamental law of reflexion, which is inseparable from all actual Knowledge, further characterized, formed, and moulded into a particular World, and indeed into an infinitely varied World, flowing onward in a never-ending stream of new and changing forms. The insight thus to be attained was, in our opinion, indispensably neces-

sary not only to Philosophy but also to Blessedness; at least where the latter dwells in man, not as a mere instinct or obscure faith, but desires to be able to render an account to itself of its own origin and foundation.

Thus far we had proceeded in our last lecture; and we intimated at its conclusion, that with this division of the World into an infinite multiplicity of forms, founded on a fundamental law of all reflexion, there was inseparably connected another division which we should, at this time, if not critically educe, at least historically set forth and describe. I do not here approach this new and second division, in its general character, more deeply than thus. In the first place, in its essential nature, it is different from the division which we set forth in our last lecture and have now again described, in so far as the latter immediately separates and divides the World itself which, in virtue of the essential form of Knowledge, arises from out the Divine Life; while, on the contrary, that which we have now to consider does not immediately separate and divide the object itself, but only separates and divides reflexion on the object. The one is a separation and division in the object itself; the other is but a separation and division in the view taken of the object,—not, as in the former case, revealing to us objects different in themselves, but only different modes of viewing, apprehending, and understanding the one abiding World. In the second place, it is not to be forgotten that neither of these two divisions can assume the place of the other, and that therefore they cannot supplant or supersede each other; but that they are inseparable, and are therefore to be found together wherever reflexion, whose unchangeable forms they are, is to be found;—and that therefore the results of both inseparably accompany each other and always proceed hand in hand. The result of the first division is, as we have shown in our previous lecture,—Infinitude;—the result of the second is, as we also stated,—a Quintitude;—and therefore the result

of the inseparability of these two divisions is this,—that this Infinity, which in itself remains entire and cannot be thrown off, may yet be regarded in a Five-fold manner; and on the other hand, that each of the five possible views so taken of the World again divides the One World into an Infinite multiplicity of forms. And thus you may comprehend what we have now said in a single glance:—To the spiritual vision, that which in itself is the Divine Life becomes a *thing seen*,—that is, a complete and present Ex-istence, or a World:—which was the first point. This vision is always an act, named reflexion; and by means of this act, partly as relating to its object, the World, and partly as relating to itself, that World is divided into an infinite Quintentity, or, what is the same thing, into a five-fold Infinity:—which was the second point. In order that we may, in the next place, proceed to the consideration of the second of these divisions, which is the proper object of to-day's lecture, let us now make, with regard to it, the following general remarks:—

This division, as we have said, presents no distinction in the object itself, but only a distinction, difference, and variety, in the view taken of the object. It seems to force itself upon the mind that this difference, not in the object itself but only in the view taken of the object—the object itself meanwhile remaining the same—can arise only from the obscurity or clearness, the depth or shallowness, the completeness or incompleteness of the view thus taken of the one unchanging World. And this is certainly the case: or,—to connect this with something that I said before, illustrating the one expression by the other, and thus rendering both more intelligible,—the five modes of viewing the World, now spoken of, are the same as those progressions which, in the third lecture, I named the various possible stages and grades of development of the inward Spiritual Life,—when I said that the progress of this free and conscious Spiritual Life, which in a peculiar sense belongs to

us, follows the same course as the progress of Physical Death, and that the former as well as the latter begins in the remotest members, and thence only gradually advances to the central-point of the system. What I named the outworks of the Spiritual Life, in the figure which I then employed, are, in our present representation of the matter, the lowest, darkest, and shallowest of the five possible modes of viewing the World; what I then named the nobler parts, and the heart, are here the higher and clearer, and the highest and clearest, of these modes.

But notwithstanding that, according to our former simile as well as our present representation, it is only after he has rested for a time in a low view of the World and its significance, that Man, in the ordinary course of life and according to general law, raises himself to a higher; yet, in the first place, it is not on that account to be denied, but on the contrary to be expressly held and maintained, that this manifold view of the World is a true and original distinction, at least in the capacities possessed by men of comprehending the World. Understand me thus:—those higher views of the World have not their origin in Time, nor so that they are first engendered and made possible by views wholly opposed to them; but they subsist from all Eternity in the unity of the Divine Existence, as necessary determinations of the One Consciousness, even although no man should comprehend them; and no one who does comprehend them can invent them, or produce them by mere thought, but he can only perceive them, and appropriate them to himself. In the second place, this gradual progress is only the ordinary course of things, and only the general law, which however is by no means without exception. Some favoured and inspired men find themselves, as it were by miracle, without their own knowledge and through mere birth and instinct, placed at once on a higher standpoint from which to survey the World; and these are as little understood by those around them,

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as they, on their part, are able to understand their contemporaries. Thus it has been, since the beginning of the world, with all Religious Men, Sages, Heroes, and Poets; and thus has everything great and good in the world arisen. On the other hand, there are individuals, and, where the contagion has become very dangerous, whole ages with few exceptions, that by the same inexplicable instinct of nature are so imprisoned and rooted in the lowest view of things, that even the clearest and most evident instruction cannot induce them to raise their eyes even for a moment from the earth, and to apprehend anything whatever but that which they can directly lay hold of with their hands.

So much in general as to the distinction we have indicated in the modes of viewing the World; and now to set forth the separate modes of this distinction.

The First, lowest, shallowest, and most confused mode of viewing the World, is that wherein that only is regarded as the World, and actual existence therein, which is perceptible to outward SENSE;—as the highest, true, and self-sufficient existence. This view has been already sufficiently depicted in these lectures, particularly in the third, and, as it seems to me, clearly enough characterized; and on that occasion its worthlessness and superficiality were made abundantly evident, although only by a glance at its surface. We admitted that this view was nevertheless that of our philosophers, and of the age that is formed in their schools; but we showed at the same time that this view by no means proceeds from their logic—since the very nature and possibility of logic directly gives the lie to such a view—but from their love. We cannot pause any longer at this point, for in these lectures we must proceed far beyond this, and therefore we must leave some things behind us as for ever abolished. Should any one, persisting in the testimony of his senses, continue to say:—“But these things are obvi-

ously there, really and truly, for I see them there, and hear them,"—then let such an one know that we are not even disturbed by his confident assurance and inflexible faith; but that we abide by our categorical, invincible, and absolutely literal:—"No, these things *are not*, precisely because they may be seen and heard,"—and that we can have nothing more to say to such a person, as one wholly incapable of understanding or instruction.

The Second view, proceeding from the original division in the modes of viewing the World, is that wherein the World is regarded as a LAW OF ORDER and of equal rights in a system of reasonable beings. Let this be understood exactly as I have said it. A Law, and indeed an ordering and equalizing Law addressed to the freedom of many, is to this view the peculiar, self-subsistent Reality;—that by which the World arose, and in which it has its root. Should any one here wonder how a Law, which indeed, as such an one would say, is only a relation—a mere abstract conception,—can be regarded as an independent existence, the wonder of such an one can proceed only from his inability to comprehend anything as real except visible and palpable matter; and thus he also belongs to that class to whom we have nothing to say. A Law, I say, is to this view of the World the first thing;—that which alone truly *is*, and through which everything else that exists first comes into existence. Freedom and a Human Race is to it the second thing;—which exists only because a Law that is addressed to freedom necessarily assumes the existence of freedom and of free beings; and in this system the only foundation and proof of the independence of man is the Moral Law that reveals itself within him. A Sensible World, finally, is to it the third thing;—and this is only the sphere of the free action of man, and only exists because free action necessarily assumes the existence of objects of such action. As to the sciences that arise out of this view,—it

may lay claim not only to Jurisprudence, as setting forth the legal relations of men, but also to the common doctrine of Morals, which merely goes the length of forbidding injustice between man and man, and merely rejects whatever is opposed to Duty whether forbidden by an express law of the State or not. Examples of this view of the World cannot be adduced from common life, which, rooted in matter, does not raise itself even thus far; but, in philosophical literature, Kant is the most striking and consequential example of this view, if we do not follow his philosophical career farther than the Critique of Practical Reason;—the peculiar character of this mode of thought, as we have expressed it above,—namely, that the reality and independence of man are evidenced only by the Moral Law that rules within him, and that only thereby does he become anything in himself,—being expressed by Kant in the same words. We ourselves, too, have pointed out and investigated this view of the world, never indeed as the highest, but as the foundation of a Doctrine of Jurisprudence and a Doctrine of Morals in our treatment of these subjects; and have there, as we are conscious, set it forth not without energy:—and there can therefore be no lack of examples, in our own age, of this second view of the World, for those who take a closer interest in what has now been said. For the rest, the purely moral inward sentiment—that man ought to act only in obedience to, and for the sake of, the Law—which also enters into the sphere of this Lower Morality, and the inculcation of which has not been forgotten either by Kant or by us, does not belong to our present subject, where we have to do only with objective beliefs.

One general remark, which is of importance for all our subsequent points of view, as well as for this, I shall adduce here as the place where it may be made with the greatest distinctness. This, namely:—In order to have a firm standpoint for any view of the World, it is

necessary that we should place the real and independent being and root of the World in one definite and unchangeable principle, from which we may be able to educe the others as only partaking in the reality of the first, and only assumed by reason of it; just as we have already, when speaking of the second view of the World, educed the Human Race as a second element, and the Sensible World as a third, from the law of Moral Order as the first. But it is by no means allowable to mix and intermingle realities; and, it may be, to assign to the Sensible World whatever is supposed to belong to it, at the same time not denying to the Moral World any of its rights;—as is sometimes attempted by those who, having got quite confused, would get rid of these questions altogether. Such persons have no settled view whatever, and no fixed direction of their spiritual eye, but they continually turn aside amid the Manifold. Far better than they, is he who holds firmly by the World of Sense, and denies the reality of everything else but it; for although he may be as short-sighted as the others, yet he is not at the same time so timid and spiritless. In a word:—a higher view of the World does not tolerate the lower beside it; but each higher step abolishes the lower as an absolute and highest standpoint, and subordinates it to itself.

The Third view of the World is that from the standpoint of the True and HIGHER MORALITY. It is necessary that we should render a very distinct account of this standpoint, which is almost wholly unknown to the present age. To it also, as well as to the second of the views we have now described, a Law of the Spiritual World is the first, highest, and absolute reality; and herein these two views coincide. But the Law of the third view is not, like that of the second, merely a *Law of Order*, regulating present existence; but rather a *Creative Law*, producing the new and hitherto non-existent, even within the circle of that which already exists. The former is merely negative,—

abolishing the opposition between diverse free powers, and establishing equilibrium and peace in its stead; the latter desires to inform the powers, thus lulled to rest, with a new life. We may say that it strives, not like the former after the mere *form* of the Idea but after the *qualitative* and *real* Idea itself. Its object may be briefly stated thus:—it seeks, in those whom it inspires, and through them in others, to make Humanity in deed, what it is in its original intention,—the express image, copy, and revelation of the inward and essential Divine Nature. The process of deduction, by which this third view of the World arrives at reality, is therefore the following:—To it, the only truly real and independent being is the Holy, the Good, the Beautiful;—the second is Humanity, as destined to be the manifestation of the first;—the ordering Law in Humanity, as the third, is but the means of bringing it into internal and external peace for the fulfilment of this its true vocation;—and finally, the World of Sense, as the fourth, is only the sphere both of the outward and inward, the lower and higher, Freedom and Morality;—only the sphere of Freedom, I say,—that which it is to all the higher points of view, and thus remains, and can never assume to itself any other reality.

Examples of this view in human history can be seen only by him who has an eye to discover them. Through the Higher Morality alone, and those who have been inspired by it, have Religion,—and in particular the Christian Religion,—Wisdom and Science, Legislation and Culture, Art, and all else that we possess of Good and Venerable, been introduced into the world. In Literature, except scattered among the Poets, there are to be found but few traces of this view:—among the ancient Philosophers, Plato may have had some presentiment of it; among the moderns, Jacobi sometimes touches upon this region.

The Fourth view of the World is that from the standpoint of RELIGION; which, since it arises out of the third

view which we have just described, and is conjoined with it, must be characterized as the clear knowledge and conviction that this Holy, Good, and Beautiful, is by no means a product of our own spirit, light, or thought, or of any other knowledge which in itself is nothing, but that it is the immediate manifestation in us of the inward Divine Nature as LIGHT;—his expression, his image, wholly, absolutely, and without abatement, in so far as his essential Nature can come forth in an image or representation. This, the Religious view, is that same insight for the production of which we have prepared the way in our previous lectures, and which now, in the connexion of its principles, may be thus more precisely and definitely expressed:—(1.) God alone is, and nothing beside him:—a principle which, it seems to me, may be easily comprehended, and which is the indispensable condition of all Religious insight. (2.) But while we thus say "God is," we have an altogether empty conception, furnishing absolutely no explanation of God's essential Nature. From this conception, what could we answer to the question:—What then is God? The only possible addition we could make to the axiom, —this, namely, that he *is* absolutely, of himself, through himself, and in himself,—this is but the fundamental form of our own understanding applied to him, and expresses no more than our mode of conceiving him; and even that negatively and as we *can not* think of him,—that is, we mean only that we cannot educe his being from another, as we are compelled by the nature of our understanding to do with all other objects of our thought. This conception of God is thus an abstract and unsubstantial conception; and when we say "God is,"—he is to us essentially nothing; and, by this very expression itself, is made nothing. (3.) But beyond this mere empty and unsubstantial conception, and as we have carefully set forth this matter above, God enters into us in his actual, true, and immediate LIFE;—or, to express it more

strictly, we ourselves are this his immediate Life. But we are not conscious of this immediate Divine Life; and since, as we have also already seen, our own Ex-istence—that which properly belongs to us—is that only which we can embrace in consciousness, so our Being in God, notwithstanding that at bottom it is indeed ours, remains nevertheless for ever foreign to us, and thus, in deed and truth, *to ourselves* is not our Being;—we are in no respect the better of this insight, and remain as far removed as ever from God. We know nothing of this immediate Divine Life, I said;—for even at the first touch of consciousness it is changed into a dead outward World, which again divides itself into a five-fold form according to the point of view from which we regard it. Although it may be that it is God himself who ever lives behind all these varied forms, yet we see him not, but only his garment; we see him as stone, plant, animal, &c. or, if we soar higher, as Natural Law, or as Moral Law:—but all this is yet not He. The form for ever veils the essence from us; our vision itself conceals its object; our eye stands in its own light. I say unto thee who thus complainest:—“Raise thyself to the standpoint of Religion, and all these veils are drawn aside; the World, with its dead principle, disappears from before thee, and the God-head once more enters and resumes its place within thee, in its first and original form, as LIFE,—as thine own Life, which thou oughtest to live, and shalt live. Still the one, irreversible form of Reflexion remains,—the Manifold variety in thee of this Divine Life, which in God himself is but One; but this form troubles thee not, for thou desirest it not nor lovest it; it does not mislead thee, for thou art able to explain it. In that which the Holy Man does, lives, and loves, God appears, no longer surrounded by shadows nor hidden by a garment, but in his own, immediate, and efficient Life; and the question which is unanswerable from the mere empty and un-

substantial conception of God,—“What is God?”—is here answered:—“He is that which he who is devoted to him and inspired by him *does*.” Wouldst thou behold God face to face, as he is in himself? Seek him not beyond the skies; thou canst find him wherever thou art. Behold the life of his devoted ones, and thou beholdest him; resign thyself to him, and thou wilt find him within thine own breast.”

This, my friends, is the view of the World and of Being from the standpoint of Religion.

The Fifth and last view of the World is that from the standpoint of SCIENCE. Of Science, I say,—One, Absolute, and Self-complete. Science thoroughly comprehends all these points of the transition of the One into a Manifold, and of the Absolute into a Relative, in their order and in their relations to each other; being able, in every case, and from each individual point of view, to carry back that Multiplicity to its primitive Unity, or to deduce from the original Unity that Multiplicity of form:—as we have laid before you the general characteristics of such Science in this and our two preceding lectures. Science goes beyond the insight into the *fact* that the Manifold is assuredly founded on the One and is to be referred to it, which is given to us by Religion,—to the insight into the *manner* of this fact; and to it that becomes a genetic principle which to Religion is but an absolute fact. Religion without Science is mere Faith although an immovable Faith;—Science supersedes all Faith and changes it into sight. Since we do not, however, put forward this Scientific standpoint as properly belonging to our present inquiry, but only refer to it for the sake of completeness, it is sufficient at present to add the following respecting it:—Science is not indeed a condition of the Divine and Blessed Life; but nevertheless the demand that we should realise this Science, in ourselves and in others, falls within the domain of the Higher

Morality. The true and complete Man ought to be thoroughly clear in himself; for universal and complete clearness belongs to the image and representative of God. But, on the other hand, no one can make this demand upon himself to whom it has not already been made without his own aid, and has thereby itself become already clear and intelligible to him.

We have yet to make the following remarks on the five points of view which we have now indicated, and thus to complete our picture of the Religious Man.

Both the last-mentioned points of view, the Scientific as well as the Religious, are only percipient and contemplative, not in themselves active and practical. They are merely inert and passive moods, which abide within the mind itself; not impulses moving towards action, and so bursting forth into life. On the contrary, the third point of view, that of the Higher Morality, is practical, impelling towards action. And now I add:—True Religion, notwithstanding that it raises the thought of those who are inspired by it to its own region, nevertheless retains their life firmly within the domain of action, and of right moral action. The true and real Religious Life is not alone percipient and contemplative, does not merely brood over devout thoughts, but is essentially active. It consists, as we have seen, in the intimate consciousness that God actually lives, moves, and perfects his work in us. If therefore there is in us no real Life, if no activity and no visible work proceed forth from us, then is God not active in us. Our consciousness of union with God is then deceptive and vain, and the empty shadow of a condition that is not ours; perhaps the vague but lifeless insight that such a condition is possible, and in others may be actual, but that we ourselves have, nevertheless, not the least portion in it. We are expelled from the domain of Reality, and again banished to that of vain and empty conception. The latter is mere fanaticism and idle dreaming,

because there is no reality answering to it; and this fanaticism is one of the faults of that system of Mysticism which we have elsewhere described and contrasted with the True Religion:—it is by living activity that the True Religious Life is distinguished from this fanaticism. Religion does not consist in mere devout dreams, I said:—Religion is not a business by and for itself, which a man may practise apart from his other occupations, perhaps on certain fixed days and hours; but it is the inmost spirit that penetrates, inspires, and pervades all our Thought and Action, which in other respects pursue their appointed course without change or interruption. That the Divine Life and Energy actually lives in us, is inseparable from Religion, I said. But this does not depend upon the sphere in which we act, as may have become evident from what we said when speaking of the third point of view. He whose knowledge extends to the objects of the Higher Morality, if he be animated by Religion, will live and act in this sphere, because this is his peculiar calling. But to him who has only a lower vocation, even it may be sanctified by Religion, and will receive thereby, if not the material, yet the form of the Higher Morality;—to which nothing more is essential than that we should recognise and love our vocation as the Will of God with us and in us. If a man till his field in this faith, or practise the most unpretending handicraft with this truthfulness, he is higher and more blessed than if, without this faith, if that were possible, he should confer happiness and prosperity upon mankind for ages to come.

This then is the picture—the inward spirit of the true Religious man:—He does not conceive of his World, the object of his love and his endeavour, as something for him to enjoy,—(not as if melancholy and superstitious fear caused him to look upon enjoyment and pleasure as something sinful but—) because he knows that no mere pleasure can yield him true joy. He conceives of it as a World of

Action,—his World,—in which alone he lives and can live, and find enjoyment of himself. This Action again he does not will for the sake of a result in the World of Sense;—he is in no respect anxious about the result or no-result that may ensue, for he lives only in Action, as Action;—but he wills it, because it is the Will of God in him, and his own proper portion in Being. And so does his Life flow onwards, simple and pure, knowing, willing, and desiring nothing else than this,—never wandering from this centre, neither moved nor troubled by aught external to itself.

Such is his Life. Whether this be not of necessity the most pure and perfect Blessedness, we shall inquire at another time.

LECTURE VI.

EXPOSITION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE JOHANNEAN
 GOSPEL:—ITS ACCORDANCE WITH
 OUR OWN DOCTRINE.

OUR whole Doctrine, as the foundation of all that we have yet to say at this time, and generally of all that we can say at any time, is now clearly and distinctly set forth, and may be surveyed at a single glance. There is absolutely no Being and no Life beyond the immediate Divine Life. According to the essential and irreversible laws of Consciousness,—laws which are founded in the very nature of Consciousness itself,—this Being is veiled and darkened in Consciousness, by manifold concealments;—but, freed from these disguises, and modified only by the form of Infinity, it reappears in the life and actions of the God-inspired man. In his actions it is not man who acts;—but God himself, in his primitive and inward Being and Nature, acts in man and fulfils his work through man.

I said, in one of the first and introductory lectures, that this doctrine, however new and unheard of it may seem to this age, is nevertheless as old as the world;—and that, in particular, it is the doctrine of Christianity, as this, even to the present day, lies before our view in its purest and most excellent record, the Gospel of John; and that this doctrine is there set forth with the very same images and expres-

sions which we here employ. It may be well, in many respects, to make good that statement, and to this purpose we shall devote the present lecture. It will be understood, even without a special declaration on our part, that we by no means intend to *prove* our doctrine, or even to add to it an outward support, by demonstrating this harmony between it and Christianity. It must already, by what we have previously said, have proved itself, and that with absolute evidence,—and it needs no further support. And in the same way must Christianity, as in harmony with Reason, and as the pure and perfect expression of this Reason, beyond which there is no truth,—so, I say, must Christianity prove itself, if it is to lay claim to validity and acceptance. It is not by philosophers that you need fear to be led back again into the chains of blind authority.

In my lectures of last winter,* I have distinctly announced the grounds upon which I regard the Apostle John as the only teacher of true Christianity:—namely, that the Apostle Paul and his party, as the authors of the opposite system of Christianity, remained half Jews; and left unaltered the fundamental error of Judaism as well as of Heathenism, which we must afterwards notice. For the present the following may be enough:—It is only with John that the philosopher can have to do, for he alone has respect for Reason, and appeals to that evidence which alone has weight with the philosopher—the internal. “If any man will do the will of him that sent me, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.” But this Will of God, according to John, is that we should truly believe in God, and in Jesus Christ whom he hath sent. The other promulgators of Christianity, however, rely upon the external evidence of Miracle, which, to us at least, proves nothing. Further, of the four Gospels, only that of John contains what we seek and

* “Characteristics of the Present Age,” Lecture VII.

desire,—a Doctrine of Religion; while, on the contrary, the best that the others offer to us, without completion and explanation by John, amounts to nothing more than Morality;—which to us has but a very subordinate value. As to the assertion that John had the other Evangelists before him, and only intended to supply what they had omitted, we shall not here inquire into it;—should that be the case, then, in our opinion, the supplement is the best part of the whole, and John's predecessors had passed over that precisely which was of essential importance.

As to the principle of interpretation which I apply to this as well as to all the other authors of the Christian Scriptures, it is the following:—So to understand them as if they had really desired to say something, and, so far as their words permit, as if they had said what is right and true:—a principle that seems to be in accordance with justice and fairness. But we are wholly opposed to the hermeneutical principle of a certain party, according to which the most earnest and simple expressions of these writers are regarded as mere images and metaphors, and thus explained and re-explained away, until the result is a flat and insipid triviality such as these interpreters might themselves have discovered and brought forward. Other means of interpretation than those contained in themselves seem to me inadmissible in the case of these writers, and particularly in the case of John. Where, as in the case of the profane authors of classical antiquity, we can compare several contemporary writers with each other, and all of them with a preceding and succeeding republic of letters, there is room for the employment of external aids. But Christianity, and particularly John, stands alone and isolated, as a wonderful and inexplicable phenomenon of Time, without precedent and without true succedent.

In the substance of the Johannean doctrine, which we have to set forth, we must carefully distinguish between

that in it which is true in itself, true absolutely and for all time, and that which has been true only for the standpoint of John and the Jesus whom he announces, and for their time and circumstances. This latter, too, we shall faithfully set forth; for any other mode of interpretation than this is not only dishonest, but leads to perplexity and confusion.

The portion of the Gospel of John which must necessarily attract our attention at the very outset, is the dogmatic introduction which occupies a part of the first chapter;—as it were the preface. Do not regard this preface as a special and arbitrary philosopheme of the author himself,—a speculative prelude to his historical narrative, of which, holding only to the facts themselves, we may, according to the proper intention of the author, adopt whatever opinion we please;—as some appear to regard this proem. It is much rather to be considered in relation to the whole Gospel, and to be understood only in that connexion. Throughout the whole Gospel, the author represents Jesus as speaking of himself in a certain manner, which we shall afterwards advert to; and it is without doubt the conviction of John that Jesus did speak precisely in this way and in no other, and that he had heard him thus speak;—and it is without doubt his earnest desire that we should believe him in this. Now the preface explains how it was possible that Jesus *could* think and speak of himself as he did; and it is therefore necessarily assumed by John that not only he himself, and according to his own mere personal opinion, so regarded Jesus and would so interpret him, but that Jesus had likewise regarded himself in the same way in which he is here depicted. The preface is to be taken as the essence, the general standpoint, of all the discourses of Jesus;—it has, therefore, in the view of the author, the same authority as these discourses themselves. In the sight of John, this preface is not his

own doctrine but that of Jesus, and indeed is the spirit, the innermost root, of the whole doctrine of Jesus.

Having thus clearly set forth this not-unimportant point, let us proceed, by the following preliminary remark, to the subject itself.

The notion of a creation, as the essentially fundamental error of all false Metaphysics and Religion, and, in particular, as the radical principle of Judaism and Heathenism, arises from ignorance of the doctrine which we have previously laid down. Compelled to recognise the absolute unity and unchangeableness of the Divine Nature in itself, and being unwilling to give up the independent and real existence of finite things, they made the latter proceed from the former by an act of absolute and arbitrary power; whereby, in the first place, the fundamental conception of Godhead was utterly destroyed, and an arbitrary power established in its room,—an error that ran through the whole of their religious system; and, in the second place, Reason was for ever perverted, and Thought changed into a dream of fancy; for of such a creation it is impossible even to conceive rightly in Thought—what can properly be called Thought—and no man ever did so conceive of it. In relation to the Doctrine of Religion, in particular, the supposition of a creation is the first criterion of the falsehood,—and the denial of such a creation, should it have been set up by any previous system, is the first criterion of the truth,—of such a Doctrine of Religion. Christianity, and especially the profound teacher of it of whom we now speak, John, stood in the latter position;—the existing Jewish Religion had set up such a creation. “In the beginning God *created*”—thus do the sacred books of this Religion commence:—“No,”—in direct contradiction to this, and setting out with the very same words, in order more distinctly to mark the contradiction, but instead of the second and false expression giving the truth in its place,—“No,” said John—

"In the beginning,"—in the same beginning that is there spoken of,—that is, originally and before all time, God did not create, for no creation was needed, but there *was* already;—"In the beginning *was* the Word, . . . and through him are all things made that are made."

In the beginning was the *Word*,—in the original text, the *Logos*; which might also be translated Reason, or,—as nearly the same idea is expressed in the book called the Wisdom of Solomon,—Wisdom; but which, in our opinion, is most exactly rendered by the expression "the Word," as it also stands in the oldest Latin version, doubtless in consequence of a tradition of the disciples of John. What then, according to the view of our author, is this *Logos* or *Word*? Let us not reason too nicely about the expression, but rather candidly note what John says of this *Word*:—the predicates applied to a subject usually determine the nature of the subject itself, especially when they are applied to that subject exclusively. He says,—that the *Word* was in the beginning; that the *Word* was with God; that God himself was the *Word*; that the *Word* was in the beginning with God. Was it possible for him to express more clearly the doctrine which we have previously taught in such words as the following:—As besides God's inward and hidden Being in himself (*Seyn*), which we are able to conceive of in Thought, he has an *Ex-istence* (*Daseyn*), which we can only practically apprehend; so this *Ex-istence* necessarily arises through his inward and absolute Being itself;—and his *Ex-istence*, which is only by us distinguished from his Being, is, in *itself* and in *him*, not distinguished from his Being; but this *Ex-istence* is originally, before all time, and independently of all time, with his Being, inseparable from his Being, and itself his Being:—the *Word* in the beginning,—the *Word* with God,—the *Word* in the beginning with God,—God himself the *Word*,—and the *Word* itself God? Was it possible for him to set forth more distinctly and forcibly the

ground of this proposition :—that in God, and from God, there is nothing that arises or *becomes* ; but that in him there is but an “*Is*,”—an Eternal Present; and that whatever has Existence must be originally with him, and must be himself! “*Away with that perplexing phantasm!*”—might the Evangelist have added, had he wished to multiply words; “*away with that phantasm of a creation out of God of something that is not in himself, and has not been eternally and necessarily in himself!—an emanation in which he is not himself present but forsakes his work; an expulsion and separation from him that casts us out into desolate nothingness, and makes him our arbitrary and hostile lord!*”

This “*Being with God*,” or, according to our expression, this his *Ex-istence*, is farther characterized as the *Logos* or Word. How was it possible more clearly to declare that it was his spiritual expression, his Revelation and Manifestation, clear and intelligible in and to itself?—or, as we have given utterance to the same idea, that the immediate *Ex-istence* (*Daseyn*) of God is necessarily Consciousness, partly of itself, partly of God?—for which proposition we have adduced the clearest proof.

If this be now evident in the first place, then there is no longer the slightest obscurity in the assertion contained in verse 3, that “*all things are made through him; and without him is not anything made that is made, &c.;*” and this proposition is wholly equivalent to that which we propounded :—that the World and all things exist only in Consciousness,—according to John, in the Word,—and only as objects of conception and Consciousness, as God’s spontaneous expression of himself;—and that Consciousness, or the Word, is the only Creator of the World, and, by means of the principle of separation contained in its very nature, the Creator of the manifold and infinite variety of things in the World.

In fine : I would express these three verses in my own

language thus:—The Ex-istence (*Daseyn*) of God is original and undervied like his Being (*Seyn*);—the latter is inseparable from the former, and is indeed in all respects the same as the former:—this Divine Ex-istence, in its substance, is necessarily Knowledge;—and in this Knowledge alone has a World, and all things present in the World, arisen.

In like manner the two succeeding verses are now clear to us. In him, in this immediate Divine Ex-istence, was Life,—the deepest root of all living, substantial Existence, which nevertheless remains for ever concealed from view; and in actual men this Life is Light, or conscious Reflexion; and this one, eternal, primitive Light shines for ever in the Darkness of the lower and obscure grades of Spiritual Life, maintains these in existence, itself unseen, and the Darkness comprehends it not.

So far as we have now proceeded in our interpretation of the poem to the Johannean Gospel, we have met only with what is absolutely and eternally true. At this point begins that which possesses validity only for the time of Jesus and the establishment of Christianity, and for the necessary standpoint of Christ and his Apostles;—namely the *historical*, not in any way *metaphysical* proposition, that this absolute and immediate Existence of God, the Eternal Knowledge or Word, pure and undefiled as it is in itself, without any admixture of impurity or darkness, or any merely individual limitation, manifested itself in a personal, sensible, human existence,—namely, in that Jesus of Nazareth, who at a certain particular time appeared teaching and preaching in the land of Judea, and whose most remarkable expressions are here recorded,—and in him, as the Evangelist has well expressed it, became flesh. As to the difference, as well as the agreement, of these two standpoints,—that of the absolutely and eternally true, and that which is true only from the temporary point of view of Jesus and his Apostles,—it

stands thus. From the first standpoint, the Eternal Word becomes flesh, assumes a personal, sensible, and human existence, without obstruction or reserve, in all times, and in every individual man who has a living insight into this Unity with God, and who actually and in truth gives up his personal life to the Divine Life within him,—precisely in the same way as it became incarnate in Jesus Christ. This truth, which, be it observed, speaks only of the *possibility* of being, without reference to the *means* of its actual attainment, is neither denied by John nor by the Jesus to whose teachings he introduces us; but, on the contrary, they insist upon it everywhere in the most express terms, as we shall afterwards see. The peculiar and exclusive standpoint of Christianity, which has validity only for the disciples of that system, looks to the *means* of attaining this True Being, and teaches us thus regarding them;—Jesus of Nazareth, absolutely by and through himself, by virtue of his mere existence, nature or instinct, without deliberate art, and without guidance or direction, is the perfect sensible manifestation of the Eternal Word, as no one whatever has been before him; while those who become his disciples are as yet not so, since they still stand in need of its manifestation in him;—they must first become so through him. This is the characteristic dogma of Christianity, as a phenomenon of Time, as an institution for the religious culture of man,—in which dogma, without doubt, Jesus and his Apostles believed:—set forth purely, brightly, and in the highest sense, in the Gospel of John, to whom Jesus of Nazareth is indeed the Christ, the promised Saviour of Mankind, but only in virtue of this Christ being to him the Word made flesh;—in Paul and the others, mixed up with Jewish dreams of a Son of David, an abolisher of an Old Covenant, and a mediator of a New. Everywhere, but particularly in John, Jesus is the first-born, and only-begotten Son of the Father, not

as an emanation or anything else of that kind,—these irrational dreams arose only at a later period,—but in the sense above explained, in eternal unity and equality of nature; and all other men can become children of God only mediately through Jesus, and by means of a transformation into his nature. Let us, in the first place, distinctly recognise this; for otherwise we shall partly interpret Christianity dishonestly, and partly not understand it at all, but only be led into perplexity and confusion. Let us, therefore, at least endeavour rightly to apprehend and judge of this point of view, which must of course remain open to every one, although we ourselves have no intention of making use of it here. With reference to this matter, then, I remark—(1.) An insight into the absolute unity of the human existence with the Divine is certainly the profoundest knowledge that man can attain. Before Jesus, this knowledge had nowhere existed; and since his time, we may almost say down even to the present day, it has been again as good as rooted out and lost, at least in profane cognition. Jesus, however, was evidently in possession of this insight; as we shall incontestably find, were it only in the Gospel of John, as soon as we ourselves attain it. How then came Jesus by this insight? That any one coming after him, when the truth had already been revealed, should again discover it, is not so great a wonder; but how the first discoverer, separated from centuries before him and centuries after him by the exclusive possession of this insight, did attain to it,—this is an exceeding great wonder. And so it is in fact true, what is maintained in the first part of the Christian Dogma, that Jesus of Nazareth is, in a wholly peculiar manner attributable to no one but him, the only-begotten and first-born Son of God; and that all ages, which are capable of understanding him at all, must recognise him in this character. (2.) Although it be true, that in the present day, a man may re-discover

this doctrine in the writings of Christ's Apostles, and for himself and by means of his own conviction recognise it as the Truth;—although it be true, as we likewise maintain, that the philosopher, so far as he knows, discovers the same truths altogether independently of Christianity, and surveys them in a consequentiality and universal clearness in which they are not delivered, to us at least, by means of Christianity;—yet it nevertheless remains certain, that we, with our whole age and with all our philosophical inquiries, are established on and have proceeded from Christianity; that this Christianity has entered into our whole culture in the most varied forms; and that, on the whole, we might have been nothing of all that we are, had not this mighty principle gone before us in Time. We can cast off no portion of the being that we have inherited from earlier ages; and no intelligent man will trouble himself with inquiries as to what would be, if that which is had not been. And thus also the second part of the Christian Dogma,—that all those who, since Jesus, have come into union with God, have come into such union with God through him, and by means of his union with God,—is likewise unquestionably true. And thus it is confirmed in every way, that, even to the end of Time, all wise and intelligent men must bow themselves reverently before this Jesus of Nazareth; and that the more wise, intelligent and noble they themselves are, the more humbly will they recognise the exceeding nobleness of this great and glorious manifestation of the Divine Life.

So much to guard the view of Christianity which possesses but temporary validity against false and unfair judgment where this may naturally be anticipated;—but by no means to force this view upon any one who either has not directed his attention to the historical side of the matter, or who, even if he have investigated that side of it, has been unable to discover there what we think we have found. Therefore, by what we have now said, we by no means wish

to be understood as joining ourselves to the party of those Christians to whom things have a value only on account of the name they bear. The Metaphysical only, and not the Historical, can give us Blessedness; the latter can only give us understanding. If any man be truly united with God, and dwell in him, it is altogether a matter of indifference how he may have attained that union; and it would be a most useless and perverse employment, instead of living in that high relation itself, to be continually conning over our recollections of the way toward it. Could Jesus return into the world, we might expect him to be thoroughly satisfied if he found Christianity actually reigning in the minds of men, whether his merit in the work were recognised or forgotten; and this is, in fact, the very least that might be expected from a man who, while he lived on earth, sought not his own glory but the glory of him who sent him.

Now that, by means of distinguishing these two stand-points, we possess the key to all the expressions of the Johannean Jesus, and the certain means of referring back whatever is clothed in a merely temporary form to its original source in pure and absolute Truth, let us comprise the substance of these expressions in the answer to these two questions:—(1.) What does Jesus say of himself regarding his relation to the Godhead?—and (2.) What does he say of his disciples and followers regarding their relation, in the first place to himself, and then, through him, to the Godhead?

Chap. I. verse 18—"No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him:"—or, as we have said: The essential Divine Nature, in itself, is hidden from us; only in the form of Knowledge does it come forth into manifestation, and that altogether as it is in itself.

Chap. V. verse 19—"The Son can do nothing of him-

self, but what he seeth the Father do; for what things soever he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise:"—or, as we have expressed it, his separate independent life is swallowed up in the life of God.

Chap. X. verses 27, 28—"My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me: and I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, neither shall any pluck them out of my hand."—Ver. 29. "My Father who gave them me, is greater than all; and none is able to pluck them out of my Father's hand." Who is it then, it may be asked, who holds and keeps them,—Jesus or the Father?—The answer is given in verse 30: "I and my Father are one:"—the same thing said in the two identical statements. His life is my life, and mine is his; my work is his work, and his is mine;—precisely as we have expressed ourselves in our preceding lecture.

So much for the clearest and most convincing passages. The whole Gospel speaks in the same terms on this point, uniformly and with one voice. Jesus speaks of himself in no other way than this.

But further, how does Jesus speak of his followers, and of their relation to him? He constantly assumes that, in their actual condition, they have not the true life in them, but, as he expresses it in Chap. III. with reference to Nicodemus, must receive a wholly different life, as much opposed to their present life as if an entirely new man should be born in their stead:—or,—where he expresses himself most forcibly,—that they have not, properly speaking, either existence or life, but are sunk in death and the grave, and that it is he who must first give them life.

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On this point, consider the following decisive passages:—

Chap. VI. verse 53—“Except ye eat my flesh and drink my blood” (this expression will be afterwards explained), “ye have no life in you:”—Only by means of thus eating my flesh and drinking my blood is there aught in you;—without this there is nothing.

Chap. V. verse 24—“He that heareth my word,” &c., “hath eternal life, and is passed from death unto life.”—Verse 25—“The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and they that hear shall live.” The dead! Who are these dead? Those who are to lie in their graves till the last day? A coarse, crude interpretation;—in Scriptural language, an interpretation according to the flesh, and not according to the spirit. The hour was even then: they themselves were the dead who had not yet heard his voice, and even on that account were dead.

And what is this life that Jesus promises to give his followers?

Chap. VIII. verse 51—“Verily, verily, I say unto you, If a man keep my word, he shall never see death,”—not as dull expositors take it;—“he shall indeed once die, only not for ever, but he shall again be awakened at the last day,”—but “he shall never die:” as the Jews actually understood it, and attempted to refute Jesus by an appeal to the death of Abraham, while he justified their interpretation by declaring that Abraham, who had seen his day, — who had, doubtless through Melchisedek, been initiated into his doctrine,—was actually not dead.

Or yet more distinctly,—

Chap. XI verse 23—"Thy brother shall rise again. Martha" (whose head was filled with Jewish notions) "saith unto him, I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day." No, said Jesus—"I am the Resurrection and the Life:—he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth, and believeth in me, shall never die." Union with me is union with the Eternal God and his Life, and the certain assurance thereof; so that in every moment of time, he who is so united with me, is in complete possession of Eternity, and places no faith whatever in the fleeting and deceptive phenomena of a birth and a death in Time, and therefore needs no re-awakening as a deliverance from a death in which he does not believe.

And whence has Jesus this power of giving Eternal Life to his followers? From his absolute identity with God. Chap. V. v. 26—"As the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself."

Further,—in what way do the followers of Jesus become partakers of this identity of his Life with the Divine Life? Jesus declares this in the most manifold and varied ways, of which I shall here adduce only the most clear and forcible,—that which, precisely on account of its absolute clearness, has been the most completely unintelligible and offensive, both to his contemporaries and to their descendants even to the present day. Chap. VI verses 53-55—"Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life. For my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed." What does this mean? He explains himself at v. 56—"He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him," or, reversing the expression, He that dwel-

leth in me and I in him, he hath eaten my flesh, &c. To eat his flesh, and drink his blood, means—to become wholly and entirely he himself;—to become altogether changed into his person without reserve or limitation;—to be a faithful repetition of his personality;—to be transubstantiated with him,—i.e. as he is the Eternal Word made flesh and blood, to become his flesh and blood, and—what follows from that, and indeed is the same thing—to become the very Eternal Word made flesh and blood itself;—to think wholly and entirely like him, and so as if he himself thought, and not we;—to live wholly and entirely like him, and so as if he himself lived in our life. As surely as you do not now attempt to drag down my own words, and reduce them to the narrow meaning that Jesus is only to be imitated as an unattainable pattern, partially and at a distance, as far as human weakness will allow, but accept them in the sense in which I have spoken them,—that we must be transformed into Christ himself,—so surely will it become evident to you that Jesus could not well have expressed himself otherwise, and that he actually did express himself excellently well. Jesus was very far from representing himself as that unattainable ideal into which he was first transformed by the spiritual poverty of after-ages; nor did his Apostles so regard him:—among the rest Paul, who says:—“I live not, but Christ liveth in me.” Jesus desired that he should be repeated in the persons of his followers, in his complete and undivided character, as he was in himself; and indeed he demanded this absolutely, as an indispensable condition of discipleship:—Except ye eat my flesh, &c., ye have no life whatever in you, but ye abide in the graves wherein I found you.

Only this one thing he demanded: not more, and not less. He did not, by any means, propose to rest satisfied with the mere historical belief that he was the Eternal Word made flesh,—the Christ,—for which he gave himself

out. He certainly did demand, even according to John, as a preliminary condition,—only to secure attention to, and acceptance of his teachings—he did demand Faith, that is, the previous admission of the possibility that he might be indeed this Christ; and he even did not disdain to facilitate and strengthen this admission by means of striking and wonderful works which he performed. But the final and decisive proof, which was first to be made possible through the preliminary admission or Faith, was this:—that a man should actually do the will of him who had sent Jesus,—that is, in the sense we have explained, should eat his flesh and drink his blood, whereby he should then know of the doctrine, that it was from God, and that he spake not of himself. As little is his discourse of faith in his expiatory merits. According to John, Jesus is indeed a Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world; but by no means one who with his blood appeases an angry God. He takes them away:—According to his doctrine, man does not exist at all out of God and him, but is dead and buried; he does not even enter into the Spiritual Kingdom of God:—how then can this poor, non-existent shadow introduce dissension into this Kingdom, and disturb the Divine Plan? But he who is transformed into the likeness of Jesus, and thereby into that of God,—he no longer lives himself, but God lives in him;—but how can God sin against himself? Thus has he borne away and destroyed the whole delusion of sin, and the dread of a Godhead that could feel itself offended by men. Finally, if any man in this way should repeat the character of Jesus in his own person, what then, according to the doctrine of Jesus, is the result? Thus does Jesus, in the presence of his disciples, call upon his Father:—Chap. XVII. verse 20—“Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word; that they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they

also may be one in us."—One—in us. Now, according to this consummation, all distinctions are laid aside; the whole community—the first-born of all, with his more immediate followers, and with all those who are born in later days—here merge together into one common source of all life—the Godhead. And thus, as we have maintained above, does Christianity, assuming its purpose to be attained, again fall into harmony with the Absolute Truth, and itself maintain that every man may and ought to come into unity with God,—and himself, in his own person, become the Divine Ex-istence, or the Eternal Word.

And thus it is proved that the doctrine of Christianity, even in the system of images under which it represents Life and Death, and all that flows therefrom, is in strict harmony with that doctrine which we have set forth to you in our previous lectures, and have combined into one single view at the beginning of to-day's discourse.

In conclusion, listen once more to that with which I closed my last lecture, but now in the words of the same Apostle John.

Thus he combines, doubtless with reference to his Gospel, the practical results of the whole: Epistle I. Chap. I.—“That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the Word of Life.” Do you observe how anxious he is to appear, not as having given forth his own thoughts in his Gospel, but as the mere witness of what he had seen? “That which we have seen and heard declare we unto you, that ye also”—in spirit and on the foundation of the last words we have quoted from Jesus—“may have fellowship with us; and truly our fellowship”—ours, the Apostles, as well as yours, the newly converted—“is with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ. . . . If we say that we have fellowship with him, and walk in dark-

ness"—if we think that we are united with God while yet the Divine Energy does not burst forth in our lives—"we lie, and do not the truth"—we are but dreamers and fanatics.—"But if we walk in the Light, as he is in the Light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ the Son of God"—not, in the theological sense, his blood shed for the remission of our sins, but his blood and mind entered into us,—his Life in us—"cleanseth us from all sin," and raiseth us far above the possibility of sin.

APPENDIX TO LECTURE VI.

THE HISTORICAL AND THE METAPHYSICAL IN
CHRISTIANITY.

THAT the fundamental doctrine of Christianity, as a special institution for the development of Religion in the human race :—i.e. that in Jesus Christ, for the first time, and in a way predicable of no other man, the eternal Ex-istence (*Daseyn*) of God has assumed a human personality; and that all other men can attain to union with God only through him, and by means of the repetition of his whole character in themselves :—that this is a merely historical, and not in any way a metaphysical proposition, we have already said in the text—(page 388.) It is perhaps not superfluous to point out here, still more clearly, the distinction upon which this declaration is founded; since I am not entitled, in the case of the general public to whom it is now presented, to make the same assumption as in the case of the majority of my immediate hearers,—that they are familiar with this distinction through my other teachings.

If we take these expressions in their strict signification, the Historical and the Metaphysical are directly opposed to each other; and that which is really historical is, on that very account, not metaphysical—and the reverse. The Historical, and what is purely historical in every possible

phenomenon, is that which may be apprehended as simple and absolute Fact, existing for itself alone and isolated from everything else,—not explained or deduced from a higher source:—the Metaphysical, on the contrary, and the metaphysical element in every particular phenomenon, is that which necessarily proceeds from a higher and more comprehensive law, and which may be deduced from that law, and therefore cannot be comprehended as simple fact; and, strictly speaking, can only by means of a delusion be regarded as fact at all, since in truth it is not apprehended as fact, but only in consequence of the Law of Reason that rules within us. The latter element of the phenomenon never extends to its actuality, and the actual phenomenon again is never wholly exhausted in it; and therefore in all actual phenomena these two elements are inseparably combined.

It is the fundamental error of all pretended science that does not recognise its own boundaries,—in other words, of the transcendental use of the understanding,—that it is not satisfied to accept the fact, simply as a fact, but must indulge in metaphysical speculation concerning it. Since, on the supposition that what such a Metaphysic labours to refer to a higher law is in truth simply actual and historic, there can be no such law, at least none accessible to us in the present life, it follows, that the Metaphysic we have described, arbitrarily assuming that such an explanation is to be found here,—which is its first error,—must then have recourse to its own invention for such an explanation, and fill up the chasm by an arbitrary hypothesis,—which is its second error.

With regard to the case now before us,—the primitive fact of Christianity is accepted as historical, and simply as fact, when we say, what is evident to every man, *that* Jesus knew what he did know before any one else knew it, and that he taught and lived as he did teach and live;—without desiring to know further *how* all this was possible,

which according to established principles, not however to be communicated here, cannot be ascertained in this life. But the same fact is metaphysicized by the transcendental use of the understanding, soaring beyond the fact itself, when we attempt to comprehend it in its primitive source, and to this end set up an hypothesis as to how the individual Jesus, as an individual, has emanated from the essential Divine Nature. As an individual, I have said;—for how humanity as a whole has come forth from the Divine Nature may be comprehended, and has, I hope, been made intelligible by our preceding lectures; and is, according to us, the theme of the introduction to the Johannean Gospel.

Now to us, who regard the matter only historically, it is of no importance in which of these two ways the above-mentioned principle is received by any one else, but only in what way it was accepted by Jesus himself, and his Apostle John, and how they authorized others to accept it; and it is certainly the most important element in our view of the matter, that Christianity itself, as represented by Jesus, has by no means accepted that principle metaphysically.

We retrace our argument to the following propositions:—

(1.) Jesus of Nazareth undoubtedly possessed the highest perception, containing the foundation of all other Truth, of the absolute identity of Humanity with the Godhead, as regards what is essentially real in the former. Upon this merely historical proposition, every one to whom the following evidence is to prove anything whatever, must first of all come to an understanding with me; and I entreat you not to hurry over this point. In my opinion, no one who has not previously attained, by another way, to the knowledge of the One Reality, and who does not possess this knowledge in living activity within him, will readily discover it where I, having

first passed through this condition, have found it. But if any one have already fulfilled this condition, and thereby created for himself the organ by which alone Christianity may be comprehended, then he will not only clearly re-discover this fundamental truth in Christianity, but he will also discern a high and holy significance spread over the other, often apparently singular, expressions of these writings.

(2.) The mode and manner of this knowledge in Jesus Christ, which is the second point of importance, may be best characterized by contrast with the mode and manner in which the speculative philosopher arrives at the same knowledge. The latter proceeds upon the problem, which in itself is foreign to Religion, and even profane in its sight, and which is imposed upon him merely by his desire of knowledge,—to explain Existence. Wherever there is a learned public, he finds this problem already proposed by others before him, and he finds fellow-labourers in its solution both among his predecessors and his contemporaries. It can never occur to him to regard himself as in any respect singular or conspicuous on account of the problem becoming clear to him. Further, the problem, as a problem, appeals to his own industry, and to the personal freedom of which he is clearly conscious; and being thus clearly conscious of his own personal activity in its solution, he cannot, on that very account, regard himself as inspired.

Suppose, finally, that he succeed in the solution, and that in the only true way,—by means of the Religious Principle; his discovery still proceeds upon a series of preparatory investigations, and in this way it is to him a natural result. Religion is but a secondary matter to him, and is not regarded by him purely and solely as Religion, but only as the solution of the problem to which he has devoted his life.

It was not so with Jesus. In the first place, he did not

set out from any speculative question, which could be solved only by a Religious Knowledge attained at a later period, and only in the course of the investigation of that question; for he explained absolutely nothing by his Religious Principle, and deduced nothing from it; but he presented it, alone and by itself, as the only thing worthy of knowledge, passing by everything else as undeserving of notice. His Faith, and his conviction, never allowed the question to arise as to the existence of finite things. In short, they had no existence for him;—only in union with God was there Reality. How this Non-Entity could assume the semblance of Being, from which doubt all profane speculation proceeds, did not even excite his wonder.

As little had he his knowledge by outward teaching and tradition; for with that truly sublime sincerity and openness which are evident in all his expressions,—and here I venture to assume on the part of my reader that he has acquired an intuitive perception of this sincerity by means of his own personal possession of that virtue and by a profound study of the life of Jesus,—he would in that case have said so, and directed his disciples to the sources of his own knowledge. It does not follow, because he himself indicated the existence of a truer religious knowledge before Abraham, and one of his apostles distinctly referred to Melchisedek, that Jesus had any connection with that system by direct tradition; but it might readily happen that he should re-discover, in his study of Moses, that which was already present in his own mind; since it is evident from numerous other instances that he had an infinitely more profound comprehension of the writings of the Old Testament than the scriptural students of his day and the majority of those of our own; while he likewise proceeded, as it appears, upon the sound hermeneutical principle, that Moses and the Prophets really desired to say something and not nothing.

To say that Jesus did not receive his knowledge either by means of his own speculation, or by communication from without, is equivalent to saying that he had it as part of his own existence,—that it was to him primary and absolute, without connexion with any other element whatever ;—purely through Inspiration, as we coming after him, and in contrast with our own knowledge, may express it, but as he himself never could express it. And what knowledge had he in this way? That all Being is founded in God alone; and consequently, what immediately follows from this, that his own Being, with this knowledge and in this knowledge, had its foundation in God, and proceeded directly from him. What *immediately* follows, I say :—for to us certainly the latter is an inference from the universal to the particular, since we must first renounce our existing personal *Ego*, as the particular in question, and merge it in the universal: but it was by no means so,—and this I entreat you to remark as the chief point,—it was by no means so with Jesus. In him there was no intellectual, questioning, or learning *Self* to be renounced, for in this knowledge his whole spiritual self was already swallowed up. His Self-consciousness was at once the pure and absolute Truth of Reason itself; self-existent and original,—the simple fact of consciousness :—by no means, as with us, genetic, arising from another preceding state, and hence no simple fact of consciousness, but an inference. In that which I have thus endeavoured to express with the utmost precision and distinctness must have consisted the peculiar personal character of Jesus Christ, who, like every other true individuality, can have appeared but once in Time, and can never be repeated therein. He was the Absolute Reason clothed in immediate Self-consciousness; or, what is the same thing,—Religion.

(3.) In this absolute Fact, Jesus reposed with his whole being, and was entirely lost therein; with regard to it, he

could never think, know, or say anything else but that he knew it was so in very deed; that he knew it immediately in God, and that he also knew this in very deed—that he knew it immediately in God. As little could he point out to his disciples any other way to Blessedness than that they should become like as he was; for that his way of life was the source of Blessedness he knew in himself; but he knew not this Blessed Life in any other shape than in himself, and as his own way of life, and therefore he could not otherwise describe it. He knew it not in the abstract and universal conception in which the speculative philosopher knows it and can describe it; for he did not proceed upon such conceptions, but only on his own self-consciousness. He received it only historically; and he who receives it as we have explained above, receives it in like manner, and, as it seems to us, after his example, only historically thus:—there was such a man, at such and such a time, in the land of Judea;—and so far well. But he who desires to know further, through what arbitrary arrangement of God, or inward necessity in God, such an individual was possible and actual, steps beyond the fact, and desires to metaphysicize that which is merely historical.

For Jesus such a transcendentalism was simply impossible; for to this end it would have been requisite for him to distinguish himself, in his own personality, from God, represent himself as thus separate, wonder over himself as a remarkable phenomenon, and propose to himself the task of solving the problem of the possibility of such an individual. But it is precisely the most prominent and striking trait in the character of the Johannean Jesus, ever recurring in the same shape, that he knows nothing of such a separation of his personality from his Father, and that he earnestly rebukes others who attempt to make such a distinction; that he constantly assumes that he who sees him sees the Father, that he who hears him hears the Father, and that he

and the Father are wholly one; and that he unconditionally denies and rejects the notion of an independent personality in himself, when accused of undue self-assertion by those who misunderstood his words. To him Jesus was not God, for to him there was no independent Jesus whatever; but God was Jesus and manifested himself as Jesus. Such self-contemplation, and wonder over one's-self, were very far removed,—I will not say from a man like Jesus, with reference to whom the very acquittal from such a charge would be something like blasphemy,—but from the whole realism of the ancient world; and the faculty of constantly looking back upon ourselves to see how it stands with us, and of feeling over again our feelings and the feeling of our feelings, and so to explain ourselves and our remarkable personality psychologically, even to tediousness, was reserved for the moderns;—with whom, on that very account, it can never be well until they are satisfied to live simply and plainly, without desiring to live their life over again in its various possible forms; leaving it to others, who have nothing better to do, if they find it worth their while, to marvel over this life of theirs, and to render it intelligible.

LECTURE VII.

FIVE MODES OF MAN'S ENJOYMENT OF THE WORLD
 AND HIMSELF:—SENSUOUS ENJOYMENT,
 LEGALITY, STOICISM.

OUR theory of Being and Life is now completely laid before you. It has been shown, not by any means as a proof of this theory, but merely as a collateral illustration, that the doctrine of Christianity on these subjects is the same as our own. With reference to this latter view, I have here only to ask permission to make such further use of the evidence that has been brought forward, as sometimes to employ an expression or an image from the Christian Scriptures, in which are to be found most admirable and significant images. I shall not abuse this liberty. I am not ignorant that in this age we can enter no circle at all numerous among the cultivated classes, in which there shall not be found some one in whom the mention of the name of Jesus, or the use of scriptural expressions, excites unpleasant feelings, and the suspicion that the speaker must be either a hypocrite or a fool. It is wholly opposed to my principles to find fault with any one on this account:—who can know how much he may have been tormented with these matters by meddling zealots, and what irrational things may have been forced upon him as Scripture doctrine? But on the other hand, I know that in every cultivated society,

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and specially in that which assembles here, there are to be found other individuals, who love to fall back upon these associations, and, with them, upon the feelings of early youth. Let both these classes here reciprocally accommodate themselves to each other. I shall say all that I have to say, in the first place in ordinary language:—let those to whom scriptural images are offensive, content themselves with the first expression, passing over the second altogether.

The living possession of the theory we have now set forth,—not the dry, dead, and merely historical knowledge of it,—is, according to our doctrine, the highest, and indeed the only possible, Blessedness. To demonstrate this is our business henceforward; and this marks out the second leading division of these lectures, which has also been separated from the first by the episodic inquiry to which the immediately preceding lecture was devoted.

Clearness is always increased by contrast. Since it is now our aim to comprehend thoroughly the True and Bliss-giving mode of Thought, and to depict it to the life, it will be well to characterize, more profoundly and distinctly than in our first lecture, that superficial and unblessed mode of Existence which is directly opposed to the former, and which we, in common with Christianity, call a Non-Existence, Death, or living Burial. We have formerly characterized this false mode of Thought, in opposition to the true, as vagrancy in the Manifold, contrasted with retirement and concentration in the One; and this is, and remains, its essential characteristic. But instead of directing our attention, as we did formerly, more to the manifold outward objects among which it is dissipated, let us now consider, without any reference whatever to the object, how this mode of Thought is *in itself* an open, shallow superficiality,—a broken fountain whose waters run waste on all sides.

All inward spiritual energy appears, in immediate Con-

sciousness, as a concentration, comprehension, and contraction of the otherwise distracted spirit into one point, and as a persistence in this one point, in opposition to the constant natural effort to throw off this concentration, and to become once more diffused abroad. Thus, I say, does all inward energy appear; and it is only in this concentration that man is independent, and feels himself to be independent. Beyond this condition of self-contraction, he is dispersed and melted away as before; and that not according to his own will and purpose (for any such effort is the opposite of dispersion—concentration), but just as he is moulded and formed by lawless and incomprehensible chance. In this latter condition, therefore, he has no independence whatever; he exists, not as a substantial reality, but as a fugitive phenomenon of Nature. In short, the radical image of spiritual independence, in Consciousness, is an ever self-forming and vitally persistent geometric point; just as the radical image of dependence and of spiritual nonentity is an indefinitely outspreading surface. Independence draws the world into an apex; dependence spreads it out into a flat extended plane.

In the former condition only is there power, and the consciousness of power; and hence in it only is a powerful and energetic comprehension and penetration of the World possible. In the second condition there is no power: the Spirit of Man is not even present and at home in the comprehension of the World, but, like Baal in the ancient narrative, he has gone upon a journey, or is meditating, or is asleep: how can he recognise himself in the object, and distinguish himself from it? He fades away, even from himself, in the current of phenomena; and thus his world pales before him, and instead of the living Nature, over against which, by way of contrast, he should set his own life, he beholds but a gray spectre, a misty and uncertain shape. To such may be applied what an ancient Prophet said of the idols of the heathen:—"They

have eyes, and see not; and have ears, and they hear not." They, in fact, see not with seeing eyes; for it is a wholly different thing to comprehend, in the eye and in the mind, the visible object in its definite limitations, so that from henceforward we may be able at any moment voluntarily to recall it before the spiritual eye precisely as it had been seen at first,—under which condition alone any one can truly say he has seen it,—and to have a shadowy and formless appearance floating before us in vague uncertainty until it disappears altogether, leaving behind it no trace of its existence. He who has not yet attained to this vivid comprehension of the objects of Outward Sense may rest assured that he is yet a far way off from the infinitely higher Spiritual Life.

In this weary, superficial, and incoherent condition a multitude of oppositions and contradictions lie quietly and tolerantly beside each other. In it there is nothing discriminated and separated, but all things stand upon an equality, and have grown up intermingled with each other. They who live in it hold nothing to be true and nothing false; they love nothing and hate nothing. For, in the first place, to such recognition as they might hold by for ever, to love, to hate, or to any other affection, there belongs that very energetic self-concentration of which they are incapable; and, secondly, it is likewise requisite to such recognition or affection that they should separate and discriminate the Manifold, in order to choose therefrom the particular object of their recognition and affection. But how can they accept anything whatever as established truth, since they would thereby be constrained to cast aside and reject, as false, all other possible things that are opposed to it;—to which their tender attachment to both alike will by no means consent? How can they love anything whatever with their whole soul, since they would then be under the necessity of hating its opposite, which their universal love and tol-

eration will not permit? They love nothing, I said; and interest themselves in nothing,—not even in themselves. If they ever propose the questions to themselves:—"Have I then right on my side, or have I not?—am I right, or am I wrong? what is to become of me, and am I on the way to happiness or to misery?"—they must answer: "What matters it to me; I shall see what becomes of me, and must accommodate myself to whatever happens,—time will show the result." Thus are they despised, cast aside, and rejected of themselves; and thus even their most immediate owners, they themselves, need not trouble themselves about them. Who else shall ascribe to them a higher value than they claim for themselves? They have resigned themselves to blind and lawless chance, to make of them whatever chance may bring forth.

As the right mode of thought is in itself right and good, and needs no good works to exalt its value,—although such good works will never indeed be wanting,—so is the mode of thought which we have now described, in itself worthless and despicable, and there is no need of any particular malignancy being superadded to it to make it worthless and despicable; and thus no one need here console himself with the idea that though in this condition he nevertheless does nothing evil, but perhaps, according to his notions, even does what he calls good. This is indeed the very sinful pride of this mode of thought, that these men think they could sin if they would, and that we must accord them great thanks if they refrain from doing so. They mistake:—they can do nothing whatever, for they do not even exist, and there are no such realities as they imagine themselves to be; but, in their stead, there lives and works blind and lawless chance; and this manifests itself, just as it happens, here as an evil and there as an outwardly blameless phenomenon,—without the phenomenon, the mere impress and shadow of a blindly operative

power, on that account deserving, in the first case blame, or in the second case praise. Whether they shall prove to be noxious or beneficent phenomena, we can know only from the result, and it is of no importance. We know assuredly that, in any case, they shall be without inward Spiritual Life, in a state of vague incoherence and uncertainty; for that which rules within them, the blind power of Nature, can manifest itself in no other way,—this tree can bear no other fruit.

That which renders this state of mind incurable, which deprives it of all incitement towards a better, and closes it against instruction from without, is the almost total incapacity which is associated with it, to apprehend in its true sense, even historically, anything that lies beyond its own mode of thought. They would think that they had cast off all love of humanity, and had done the most grievous injustice to an honourable man, were they to assume that, however singularly he might express himself, he could mean, or wish to mean, anything else than—that which they mean and say; or were they to ascribe to any communication from other men any other purpose than to repeat before them some old and well-known lesson, so that they might be satisfied that the speaker had thoroughly learned it by rote. Let a man guard himself as he may by means of the most distinctly marked antagonisms,—let him exhaust all the resources of language to choose the strongest, most striking, and most convincing expression,—as soon as it reaches their ear it loses its nature, and becomes changed into the old triviality; and their art of dragging down everything to their own level is triumphant over all other art. Therefore are they in the highest degree averse to all powerful and energetic expressions, and particularly to such as strive to enforce comprehension by means of images; and, according to their law, those expressions must everywhere be selected that are most vague, indefinite, and far-fetched, and on that very

account most powerless and insipid, under pain of appearing to be unpolished and obtrusive. Thus, when Jesus spoke of eating his flesh and drinking his blood, his disciples found it a hard saying; and when he mentioned the possibility of a union with God, the Jews took up stones and cast them at him. They are always in the right; and since nothing whatever can or ought to be said at any time but that which they already express in their language in this way or that, whence then the surprising effort to express this same thing in another fashion, whereby there is only imposed upon them the superfluous labour of translating it back again into their own speech?

This delineation of spiritual Non-Existence, or, to use the image of Christianity, of the Death and Burial of a living body, has been here introduced, partly in order to set forth the Spiritual Life more clearly by contrast, and partly because it is itself a necessary element in that description of man, in his relation to Well-Being, which it is our next duty to undertake. As a guide to this description, we possess, and shall employ, those five standpoints in man's view of the World which we set forth in our fifth lecture;—or, since the standpoint of Science is excluded from popular discourses, the other four,—as so many standpoints in man's enjoyment of the World and of himself. To them the state of spiritual Non-Existence which we have just described does not at all belong;—it is no possible or positive something, but a mere nothing; and so it is likewise altogether negative in relation to enjoyment and Well-Being. In it there is no such thing as Love,—whilst all enjoyment is founded on Love. Hence, to this condition enjoyment is altogether impossible; and therefore a description of it was requisite at the outset, as the description of absolute joylessness or unblestness, in opposition to the several modes, now to be set forth, in which man may actually enjoy the World or himself.

All enjoyment, I have said, is founded on Love. What then is Love? I say, Love is the affection (*Affect*) of Being (*Seyn*). Argue it thus with me:—Being (*Seyn*) is self-reliant, self-sufficient, self-complete; and needs no Being beyond itself. Now let this be felt in absolute Self-consciousness; and what arises? Obviously a feeling of this independence and self-sufficiency;—hence, of Love of this self;—or, as I said, an affection or attachment of Being, by means of itself alone; that is, the feeling of Being as Being. Add further, that in the Finite Being, such as we have described above, conceived of as in a constant state of change and transition, there likewise dwells an original ideal type of his True and Proper Being,—then does he love this ideal type; and when his actual and sensible being is in harmony with this ideal type, then is his Love satisfied, and it is well with him;—but when, on the contrary, his actual being is not in harmony with this primitive idea, which nevertheless continues living, inextinguishable, and eternally beloved within him, then it is not well with him, for then he wants that which nevertheless he cannot hinder himself from loving before all things, longing and sorrowing after it continually. Well-being is union with the object of our Love; sorrow is separation from it. Only through Love does man subject himself to the influence of well-being or of sorrow; he who does not love is secure from both of these. But let no one believe that the wan and death-like condition that we have described above, which as it is without love is also without sorrow, is on that account to be preferred to the life in Love, that is accessible to sorrow, and may be wounded by it. For, in the first place, even in the feeling of sorrow we at least feel, recognise, and possess *ourselves*, and this of itself is unspeakably more blessed than that absolute want of any self-consciousness; and, in the second place, this sorrow is the wholesome spur that should impel us, and that sooner

or later will impel us, to union with the object of our Love and to Blessedness therein. Happy, therefore, is the man who is able to sorrow and to aspire.

To the first standpoint from which man may view the World, in which reality is attributed only to the objects of **OUTWARD SENSE**, sensuous pleasure is of course the predominant motive in his enjoyment of himself and of the World. Even this,—as we have already said with a scientific purpose, and in illustration of the first principle we laid down of this whole matter,—even this is founded on an affection of Being,—in this case, as an organized sensuous life,—on the love of this Being, and for the obvious and direct means for the maintenance of this Being,—not, as some have supposed, perceived only by an unconscious inference of the understanding. An article of food has a pleasant taste to us, and a flower a pleasant smell, because they exalt and enliven our organic existence; and the pleasant taste, as well as the pleasant smell, is nothing but the immediate feeling of this exaltation and enlivenment. But let us not longer pause at this mode of enjoyment, which, although it certainly is a constituent element in the system of Universal Life, and on that account is perhaps not properly to be despised, is nevertheless undeserving of deliberate thought or earnest attention!—although I must candidly confess that, in a comparative point of view, he who can throw himself wholly and with undivided feeling into a sensuous enjoyment, is, in my opinion, of far greater worth in the eyes of the consequential philosopher than he who, from mere superficiality, vagrancy, and diffusiveness, is incapable of rightly enjoying even taste or smell, where only taste or smell can be enjoyed.

In the social state there intervenes between this merely sensuous appetite and the higher forms of enjoyment, another class of affections, interposed by means of fancy, which however always relate at last to a sensuous enjoy-

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ment, and proceed from such. Thus, for example, the miser indeed voluntarily subjects himself to present want for which he has no immediate desire, but only from fear of future want for which he has still less desire; and because he has so strangely trained his fancy, that he suffers more from this imagined future hunger than from the real hunger that he actually feels at the present moment. Neither let us pause any longer at these unsubstantial, shallow, and capricious affections, even although they are opposed to immediate sensuous enjoyment:—all that belongs to this region is alike shallow and capricious.

The second standpoint from which the World may be viewed is that of LEGALITY, in which reality is attributed only to a SPIRITUAL LAW ordering all actual Existence. What is the affection of this standpoint, and what is its consequent relation to Well-Being? For those among you who possess philosophical knowledge, I shall here, in passing, in a few short remarks and with strict consequentiality, throw a new light on this matter which has already been so well treated of by Kant.

From this standpoint, Man, in the deepest root of his being, is himself the Law. This Law is the self-reliant, self-supporting Being of such a man, which neither needs nor can admit of any other Being whatever besides itself:—a Law absolutely for the sake of Law, and wholly disdaining any purpose beyond itself.

In the first place:—thus rooted in Law, man can still be, think, and act. The philosopher who is not wholly superficial proves this *a priori*; the man who is not wholly rude or senseless feels it constantly in himself, and proves it by his whole life and thought. The celebrated axiom which, since this principle has been reproduced in our own time by Kant and others, has been brought forward and repeated *usque ad nauseam* by a decisive majority of the theologians, philosophers, and beaux-esprits of the age,—the axiom that it is absolutely

impossible for a man to will without having an external object of his volition, or to act without having an external object of his action—this axiom we need not meddle with, but have only to meet it with cold and contemptuous rejection. Whence do they know what they so categorically maintain, and how do they propose to prove their axiom? They know it only from their knowledge of themselves; and hence they ask nothing from an opponent but that he should look into his own bosom and find himself such as they are. They cannot do it, and therefore they maintain that no man can do it. But again:—*what* is it they cannot do? Will and act without an object beyond the action. And what is there that lies beyond will and action, and mental independence? Nothing whatever but sensuous well-being, for this is the only opposite of these:—sensuous well-being, I say, however strangely it may be described, and even although the time and place of its fruition may be placed beyond the grave. And thus, what is it which they have discovered in this knowledge of themselves? Answer:—that they cannot even think, move, nor in any way bestir themselves, unless with a view to some outward well-being which is thereby to be attained; that they cannot regard themselves as anything but the means and instruments of some sensuous enjoyment; and that, according to their firm conviction, the Spiritual in them exists only for the purpose of nursing and tending on the Animal. Who shall dispute their self-knowledge, or attempt to gainsay them in that which they must know best of all, and which, in truth, only they themselves can know?

Man, on the second standpoint from which the World may be viewed, is himself the Law, we said;—a living, self-conscious, self-attached Law,—or an affection of Law. But the affection of Law, as Law, and in this form, is, as I call upon you to perceive, an absolute command, an unconditional obligation, a Categorical Imperative; which,

on account of this very categorical nature of its form, wholly rejects all love or even inclination towards the thing commanded. It *shall* be, that is all:—simply it *shall*. If thou *wouldst* do it, there would be no need of the *shall*; it would come too late, and would be rejected; while, on the contrary, as surely as thou, on thy part, obeyest the *shall*, and canst so obey, so surely dost thou not *will*; volition is superfluous, inclination and love are expressly laid aside.

Now, could man wholly resign himself with his entire Life to this affection of Law, there would then be for him nothing beyond this cold and rigid commandment; and, with regard to his view of himself and of the World, the absolutely uninterested judgment whether a thing be in accordance with the Law or not;—wholly excluding all personal inclination and every thought of it being agreeable or disagreeable; as indeed is actually the case where men give themselves up to this affection. Such an one, notwithstanding his strict acceptance of the Law, might yet declare that he did not, and would not, act in accordance with it, without anything like remorse or displeasure with himself; and indeed with the same coolness with which he might acknowledge that some thousand years before his birth, and in a remote quarter of the world, some other person had not performed the obligation imposed upon him. But, in actual life, this affection is usually conjoined with an interest in ourselves and our own personality; which latter interest then assumes the nature of the first affection, and becomes modified thereby; so that the view we take of ourselves, while it remains indeed a mere judgment, which it must be in virtue of the first affection, is yet not wholly an uninterested judgment;—we are constrained to despise ourselves if we do not walk according to the Law, and we are free from this self-contempt if we act in harmony with it; and we would much rather find ourselves in the latter position than in the former.

The interest which man feels in himself, we said, is swallowed up in this affection of Law. He desires only not to be constrained to despise himself before the tribunal of the Law. Not to despise himself, I say,—negatively; he cannot seek to respect himself,—positively. Wherever positive self-respect is spoken of, it is only, and can only be, the absence of self-contempt that is meant. For the judgment of which we here speak is founded solely on the Law, which is absolute, and assumes jurisdiction over the whole of humanity. There is no third course:—either man is not in harmony with the Law, and then he must despise himself; or he is in harmony with it, and then he has nothing to allege against himself;—but, in his fulfilment of the Law, he can by no means transcend its requirements in aught, and do something beyond what he is bound to do, which would thus be done without commandment, and hence be a free and voluntary act;—and therefore he can never positively respect himself, nor honour himself as something excellent.

The interest which man feels in himself is swallowed up in the affection of Law; this affection annuls all inclination, all love, and all desire. There is but one thing needful to him—not to despise himself; beyond this he wills nothing, needs nothing, and can use nothing. In that one want of his nature, however, he is dependent on himself alone; for an Absolute Law, by which man is wholly encompassed, must necessarily represent him as entirely free. By means of this conception he is now elevated above all love, desire, and want, and thus above all that is external to him and that does not depend on himself; needing nothing but himself; and thus, by the extinction of everything in him that was dependent, himself truly independent, exalted above all things, and like the blessed Gods. It is only unsatisfied wants that produce unhappiness: require then nothing but that which thou thyself canst secure,—(thou canst, however, make sure

only of this, that thou shalt have no fault to find with thyself),—and thou art for ever inaccessible to unhappiness. Thou hast no need of anything beyond thyself;—not even of a God,—for thou art thine own God, thine own salvation, and thine own Redeemer.

No one who can justly lay claim to the amount of historical knowledge which every educated man is presumed to possess, can have failed to perceive that I have now set forth the mode of thought peculiar to that celebrated system of antiquity—Stoicism. A venerable picture of this mode of thought is the representation, made by an ancient poet, of the mythical Prometheus, who, in the consciousness of his own just and good deed, laughs at the Thunderer seated above the clouds, and at all the torments heaped upon his head by the relentless God; and who, with undaunted courage, sees a world crashing around him into ruins, and, in the language of one of our own poets, thus addresses Zeus:—

“ Here I sit,—forming men
After my image;
A race that, like me,
Shall suffer, weep,
Enjoy and rejoice,—
And despise thee, Zeus!
As I do.”*

You have sufficiently understood that to us this mode of thought stands only upon the second grade in the possible views of the World, and is only the first and lowest form of the higher Spiritual Life. You have already, in our former lecture, received indications of a far more earnest and perfect Life, which shall be further developed in the succeeding lectures. Yet it is not our intention to surrender this mode of thought, which is indeed worthy of all honour, to the fashionable scorn of spiritual perversion, nor even to leave a single lurking-

* Goethe's "Prometheus."

place open to such perversion. With this view I add the following.

It is unquestionably true that this mode of thought can arrive at the admission of a God only through inconsequentiality; and that, wherever it is consistent, although it may at times make use of the conception of a God,—perhaps for the theoretical explanation of Nature, but assuredly never for its own practical need of such a conception,—yet it needs no God for its own heart, reverences none, and is indeed its own God. But what sort of God is that which it rejects? It is no other, and can be no other—because on this standpoint no other is possible—than the arbitrary distributor of sensuous well-being, whom we have already described, whose favour must be acquired by means of some expedient:—even if that expedient be a behaviour in accordance with the Law, it is still but an expedient. This God, so constituted, is rightly rejected; he ought to be rejected, for he is not God; and the higher view of the World never again accepts God in this shape, as we, in the proper place, shall clearly see. Stoicism does not reject the truth, but only the lie; it does not attain to the truth, but remains, with relation to it, only in a negative position;—this is its defect.

Thus also, the delusion of a certain system that calls itself Christian,—that sensuous desire is sanctified by means of Christianity, and its satisfaction entrusted to a God, and that it has discovered the secret that it may serve this God even by indulgence of this desire;—this delusion too, I say, remains an error. The happiness which the sensuous man seeks is irrevocably separated from the Blessedness which Religion—does not indeed promise, but—immediately presents, by the gulf of subjection to a Sacred Law before which all desire grows dumb;—separated, not in degree, but in its very nature. And thus do those who, as philosophers, teach this same

doctrine, and who in the most animated appeals seek to convince us that, by our demands, we would destroy the essential character of human nature, and tear its very heart from its body, besides their fitting despicableness make themselves also ridiculous. So also those beaux-esprits, who raise an outcry about the extirpation of love by means of Stoicism—meaning by this love, not the flame of Divine Love, of which we shall afterwards speak, but only mere earthly love and desire—and who believe that, since a child who innocently extends its little hands towards an offered dainty is a touching and therefore a pleasing spectacle, so may the grown man, who behaves in like manner, demand the moral approval of the earnest censor, and that whatever is capable of affording the beholder a pleasing æsthetical spectacle is, on that account, in itself noble and good,—these, I say, are lost in the most singular confusion of ideas.

Thus much had I to say, with reference to Well-Being, regarding the second standpoint from which the World may be viewed by man; which, in this respect, is only negative,—mere Apathy: and I desired to set forth this strictly and clearly, in order, by means of this Apathy, as the middle state, to distinguish the Vulgar from the Holy, and to set up an insurmountable wall of separation between them. Wherein this Apathy is limited, and how it thereby becomes an impulse towards the development of a Higher Life in the Divine Love;—of this we shall speak in our next lecture.

LECTURE VIII.

**EXPOSITION OF FORM AS THE UNIVERSAL CONDITION
OF EXISTENCE ;—FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE
OF THE EGO ;—CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE ;—
PASSAGE TO THE HIGHER MORALITY.**

THE entire purpose and import of these Lectures may be thus briefly stated :—to give a description of the One, True, and therefore Blessed Life. Every good description, however, ought to be genetic, and gradually unfold the matter described before the eyes of the beholders. The true Spiritual Life is peculiarly susceptible of such a genetic description ; for it develops itself, as we said before, —figuratively, as it then seemed, but, as it now appears, with very literal earnestness,—this Life develops itself as a rule only gradually, having its several determinate stations. As these stations of the Spiritual Life, we have recognized five chief standpoints in man's possible view of the World ; and through these we have traced the ascent of Life, at first in a mere cold and uninterested survey ;—but in the preceding lecture we have, in place of this merely intellectual view, taken cognizance of its affections, its love, and its self-enjoyment ; and thereby we have, for the first time, completed the *forms* of Life. This Life, thus defined, we have followed, in

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our last lecture, through the conditions of Nullity, of mere Sensuous Enjoyment, and of strict Legality or harmony with an assumed Law.

As such a description of the Spiritual Life ascends to its higher forms, it becomes, for obvious reasons, more obscure and unintelligible to a majority of a degenerate age, because it now enters upon regions which are foreign to such an age,—not known to it, either by its own spiritual experience, or even by hearsay. Thus it becomes the duty of those who undertake to speak of such subjects, if they must resign the hope of being positively understood by all men, at least to guard carefully against themselves giving occasion for any misconception; and, if they cannot bring home the truth to all, yet to take care that no one, through their fault, is led to receive anything false; and at least so to equip and prepare those who possess the power of fully comprehending their instructions, that these shall be able, each in his own circle, to give an account of the truth, and to correct the misapprehensions of others. This consideration has determined me to devote a portion of this lecture to a profound and exhaustive exposition of the matter which, in our last lecture, we brought to its culminating point, and have still to treat of in this.

Those among you who are already initiated into speculative science shall, on this occasion, be introduced into the organic central-point of all speculation, in such a manner as, to my knowledge, has never and nowhere been attempted before. The others, who either are unable, or do not desire, to philosophize with us, may at least avail themselves of the opportunity thus presented to them of listening to a strictly philosophical demonstration, in order to acquire a general conception of the matter, and to be convinced that, when rightly conducted, it is by no means so strange and artificial a thing as is commonly supposed, but proceeds in a quite

simple and natural manner, and requires in the student nothing more than the power of sustained attention. Nevertheless it will be necessary that even they who belong to this latter class should apprehend what is now to be said, historically at least, because before the conclusion of the lecture we shall come to something which all will wish to understand, but which cannot be understood unless the first part has been at least historically apprehended, and assumed as a possible hypothesis.

We have seen and understood :—that Being (*Seyn*) is—absolutely;—that it has never arisen nor become, nor has anything in it ever arisen or become. But further, this Being is also outwardly present, *ex-ists*,—as may be discovered and perceived, but not genetically understood; and after it has been thus discovered and perceived as *ex-isting* there present, then it may also be understood that this *Ex-istence* (*Daseyn*) has likewise not arisen nor become, but is founded in the inward necessity of Being (*Seyn*) itself, and is, through it, absolutely determined. By means of its thus *ex-isting*, and in this *Ex-istence*, Being now becomes Consciousness; and that a Consciousness separated and broken up into a manifold variety of Forms :—and this may, in like manner, be seen and understood as the necessary result of *Ex-istence*.

In order that we may not have constantly to repeat the same series of words, we shall now comprehend under the term *Form* everything that attaches to Being in consequence of *Ex-istence*;—which word, *Form*, shall henceforward signify all that we have already seen to be the necessary result of *Ex-istence*. (I may here mention, for the benefit of those who do not enter with us into the strictly philosophical view of our subject, that this is the case with all philosophical terminology;—its expressions are only abbreviations of speech, employed to recall to mind briefly something which has been previously apprehended in immediate contemplation; and to him who has

not been a partaker in this immediate contemplation, but to him alone, they are empty, unmeaning, formulas.)

Thus we have these two elements:—Being, as it is essentially and in itself,—and Form, which is assumed by the former in consequence of its Ex-istence. But how have we expressed ourselves? What is it that assumes a Form? Answer:—Being, as it is in itself, without any change whatever of its inward Essential Nature:—this must be borne in mind. But what then is there in Ex-istence? Answer:—Nothing else than the One, Eternal and Unchangeable Being, besides which there can be nothing. Again:—May this Eternal Being ex-ist otherwise than in this precise Form? How were that possible, since this Form is nothing else than Ex-istence itself; and consequently the assertion, that Being could also ex-ist in another Form, would be equivalent to saying, that Being could ex-ist, and yet not ex-ist? Let us call Being *A*, and Form,—I mean universal Form, apprehended in its unity,—*B*;—then Real-Ex-istence is $A \times B$ and $B \times A$,—or *A* as determined by *B*, and the reverse. *Determined*, I say emphatically, so that your thoughts may now proceed, not from one of the extremes, but from the central-point; and you may thus understand, that in Reality both these elements are united, and reciprocally interpenetrated by each other, so that in Reality, and indeed without the annihilation of the Reality of Existence, they can never again be separated. This is the point upon which everything depends; this is the organic central-point of all Speculation; and he who thoroughly penetrates to this, has attained perfect light.

To make this yet stronger:—God himself, that is, the Essential Nature of the Absolute, which is separated from his outward Ex-istence only by our limited comprehension, cannot throw off this absolute blending of Es-sence with Form; for even his Ex-istence, which only

to the first merely phenomenal glance seems contingent and phenomenal, is yet to true Thought, which is the only decisive criterion, not contingent,—but, since it is, and otherwise could not be, *it must be a necessary result of his inward Essential Nature*. By reason therefore of God's Essential Nature itself, this Essential Nature is inseparably bound up with Form, and has of itself entered into Form; which to those who are able to comprehend it, thoroughly solves the highest difficulty of Speculation which has existed from the beginning of the world down to the present day, and confirms our previous commentary on the words of John:—"In the beginning,—absolutely independent of all possibility of opposition, of all caprice, of all contingency, and therefore of all Time,—founded on the inward necessity of the Divine Nature itself,—was Form;—and Form was with God,—contained in, established on, and its very Ex-istence proceeding from, the inward determinate character of the Divine Nature;—and Form was itself God; God manifested himself in it even as he is in himself."

For example:—One portion of Form was the infinitely progressive and continuous manifestation and characterization of Being, which *in itself* eternally remains the same, = *A*. I ask you, that you may hereby test your knowledge of the subject:—In this Infinite Manifestation and characterization, what is the real and active principle that is manifested and characterized? Is it Form? This, *in itself*, is nothing. No: it is the Absolute Reality = *A*, that manifests itself as it essentially is;—manifests itself, I say, according to the law of an Infinity. *Nothing* does not manifest itself;—but the Essential Divine Nature manifests itself.

Out of this Infinity, take, wherever you will, the substance of any one particular moment. This substance, let it be understood, is wholly determined; it is that which it is, and nothing else. I ask:—Wherefore is it that which

it is, and by what has it been thus determined? You can give no answer but this:—By two factors;—in the first place, because the Absolute, in its Essential Nature, is as it is; and, in the second place, because this same Absolute flows forth in an Infinite Manifestation. After deducting that element of the substance of the moment which proceeds from the Essential Nature of the Absolute, what remains in this moment—i. e. that in it which is purely and simply Manifestation—is that which especially belongs to this moment out of the infinite multiplicity of Form.

We have said that this infinite divisibility is the one portion of Form; and we made use of this portion as an example, in order thereby to make our fundamental principle more distinct. For our present purpose, however, we require the second portion of Form, to which we must also apply the fundamental principle we have laid down, and which is now, we hope, understood;—to which end I must again lay claim to your attention.

This second portion of Form is a division into five collateral—but as dominant points reciprocally exclusive—standpoints in the view of Reality. Collateral, but as dominant points reciprocally exclusive:—it is of importance that this should here be borne in mind. We have already proved this above; and indeed it is immediately evident at the first glance. Once more then:—What is it that is divided in this new division? Obviously the Absolute, as it is in itself;—the same Absolute which, in the same unity and completeness of Form, divides itself likewise to Infinity. Of this there can be no doubt. But how are these points presented to us:—are they presented as *actual*, like the entire Infinity that flows through Time? No, for they reciprocally exclude each other, as dominant, in one and the same moment of Time; and hence, in relation to the fulfilment of all moments of Time by any one of them, they are all as-

sumed only as equally *possible*; and Being appears, in relation to each of them individually, not as necessarily to be so understood, nor as actually so understood, but only as possibly to be so understood. Specially:—Does then the One Being, which is indeed, irrevocably broken up into an Infinite Time, itself assume this first mode, or this second mode, and so on? Certainly not:—this Being is, in and through itself, perfectly undetermined and wholly indifferent with regard to these modes of its acceptation. In this relation, Reality proceeds only the length of Possibility, not further. It thus assumes, by means of its Ex-istence, the existence of a Freedom and Independence in the mode of its acceptation, or in the way in which it is reflected, wholly independent of itself in its inward Essential Nature. And now to express the same thing more strictly:—The Absolute Being, in this its Ex-istence, regards itself as this Absolute Freedom and Independence in the mode of its own acceptation, and as this Independence of its own inward Being;—it does not create a Freedom external to itself, but it is itself, in this portion of Form, its own Freedom external to itself;—and in this respect, the self in its Ex-istence is separated from the self in its Being, and is projected, as it were, out of itself, in order to return again to itself as a living Ex-istence. Now, the universal form of Reflexion is *Ego*;—hence we have here a free and independent *Ego*;—or, what is the same thing, an *Ego*, and that which alone is an *Ego*, a free and independent *Ego*, belongs to Absolute Form= B , and is the peculiar organic central-point of the Absolute Form of Absolute Being;—since even that division into an Infinite Manifold which we placed by the side of this second portion of Form, is, according to our own deduction, founded upon the independence of the Form of Reflexion; and, according to the above remarks, is inseparable from the inward necessity of the Divine Na-

ture, so that it cannot be cast off even by God himself.

It is convenient, in passing, to note the following principles:—(1.) Freedom certainly and truly exists, and is itself the very root of Ex-istence: but yet it is not *immediately* real, for in it Reality proceeds only the length of Possibility. The paradox apparently contained in this latter principle will be solved of itself as we proceed in our inquiry. (2.) Freedom, in Time, and as an independent, self-determining fulfilment of Time, exists only in relation to the five standpoints of Spiritual Life which we have set forth, and only in so far as it arises out of these:—but it does not exist outside that five-fold division,—for beyond that there is nothing but the inwardly determined Absolute Being, in the likewise unchangeably determined Form of Infinity and of Time immediately filled by Reality itself;—nor does it exist within that division, the Ego being then established in one of these points,—for, here again, there is nothing but strict necessity and sequence from principle. —

This in passing, on account of its importance in another connexion, and also because it does not seem to be very well understood. Not however in passing, but as belonging essentially to our present subject, we add the following, to which I must anew demand your attention:—(1.) Since this Independence and Freedom of the Ego belongs to its essential Being, and all Being has its Affection (*Affect*) in Consciousness, there must necessarily exist, in so far as there is an immediate Consciousness of personal, individual Freedom, an Affection for such Independence, the Love of it, and consequent Faith in it. In so far as there is such an immediate Consciousness of personal, individual Freedom, I say: for (2.)—and this is the chief object of our whole inquiry, and the true end of all that has gone before,—and therefore I beg of you to note it well,—this Freedom and Independence is nothing but the mere *possibi-*

lity of the Standpoint of Life; this possibility, however, is limited to the five modes already pointed out, and hence, if any one has completed the comprehension of Life according to this scheme, he has at the same time completed the round of possibility and passed into reality; he has expended his power and exhausted his estate of Freedom,—there is in the root of his Ex-istence no more Freedom remaining; but with the Being of Freedom there also necessarily disappears the Affection, the Love, and the Faith in this Freedom,—doubtless to give place to a far holier Love and a far more bliss-giving Faith. So long as the Ego has yet to labour, by its own original self-activity, in moulding itself to the perfect Form of Reality, there indeed remains in it the impulse towards such self-activity, the unsatisfied impulse, as a salutary impelling spur,—and the intimate self-consciousness of Freedom, which consciousness, in this position of the matter, is absolutely true and without delusion;—but when this self-discipline has been completed, then that consciousness, which would now certainly become deceptive, disappears; and henceforward Reality flows forth before it in the sole remaining and indestructible Form of Infinity.

Thus,—and I now announce this result as what may be understood by all, and not by the speculative portion of my audience only,—thus the *presence* of an Affection, a Love, and a Faith in personal, individual Freedom on the one hand, and the *absence* of such Affection on the other, are the fundamental points of two entirely opposite modes of viewing and enjoying the World, into which I shall now combine more strictly our previous five-fold division.

In the first place, with regard to the condition of the *Presence* of the Affection for personal, individual Freedom:—this again has two different forms,—(you will observe that this is a subordinate division in the first section of

the principal division)—the first and lower of which I thus explain to you. The Ego, as the subject of this Freedom, is, as you know, Reflexion. This, as you also know, in its first function, forms, determines, and characterizes the World. Within these forms, and in the exercise of this formative function, the particular Ego here to be described by us is a proper and independent Being; and this, its determinate Being, it on that very account, embraces with Love; and thus acquires an impulse towards, and a need of, this determinate Being. Again:—What kind of Being is this? Being in a determinate Form of its Life. Whence the need of this Form? From its self-love in this standpoint of its Freedom. If the need were satisfied, what would be the result? Enjoyment. Whence would this Enjoyment arise? From a certain modification of its Life by means of the World which it has itself formed,—that is, of the objective, divided, and manifold World. Herein lies the foundation of the sensuous instinct of man, and this is the true creator of the World of Sense. Thus there arises the desire and need of a certain and determinate Form of our Life—this is the important point, the characteristic feature, to which I entreat your attention,—the impulse towards Happiness in determinate, and by means of determinate, objects. That the objective determination of this impulse towards Happiness is not without foundation, but rests upon the Reality still remaining in this Form of Independence, is understood:—as also this, that since, in this Form of the progressive development of the World, there is an uninterrupted course of change, the Ego itself likewise unceasingly becomes changed; and, on that account, that also in which it is compelled to place its Happiness gradually changes; and in the course of this change the first objects of desire are set aside, and others take their place. From this absolute uncertainty respecting the particular object in

which the source of Happiness is to be found, a conception is at last arrived at, in this respect completely empty and indefinite,—but which yet retains this fundamental characteristic, that Happiness is to arise from some determinate object;—the conception of a Life in which all our wants, whatever they may be, are to be satisfied upon the spot, an absence of all grief, all weariness, and all toil,—the Islands of the Blessed and the Elysian Fields of the Greeks, the Abraham's bosom of the Jews, the Heaven of the ordinary Christians. At this stage the Freedom and Independence are material.—The second mode of the Presence of the Affection for personal, individual Freedom and Independence is that in which the feeling and love of this Freedom is only general, and therefore bare, empty, and formal, without any definite object being thereby either proposed or striven after. This gives the standpoint of Legality described at the end of the last lecture, and which, recalling its better known name, we also called that of Stoicism. Here man regards himself as free, in general, for he assumes that he has the power to refuse obedience to the Law; he consequently separates himself from, and places himself, as an independent power, over against the Law, or whatever may appear to him as Law. He cannot otherwise comprehend and regard himself than as one who has it in his power to refuse obedience to the Law, I said. But, according to his likewise necessary view of things, he is bound to obey the Law and not follow his own inclination; he therefore loses all claim to Happiness, and, if his professed doctrine be actually living within him, he loses also the need of Happiness, and of a God who is the author and giver of Happiness. But through that first supposition of his ability to refuse obedience, there also arises to him, for the first time, a Law;—for his Freedom, bereft of inclination, is now empty and without aim. He must once more control it;

—and constraint upon Freedom, or Law, is one and the same thing. Hence it is only through that Faith in Freedom, which still remains after the surrender of inclination, that he makes a Law possible for himself, and gives to his view of true Reality the form of a Law.

Comprehend this profoundly, and therefore fully and clearly, thus:—(1.) The Divine Nature does not enter, whole and undivided, into these reciprocally exclusive points of Freedom, but it enters them partially only:—beyond these points, however, it reveals itself, unconcealed by any veil whatever (every such veil having its foundation only in these points), such as it is in itself,—in an infinitely progressive development and Manifestation—in this Form of eternal, progressive Life which is inseparable from its pure, internal Life. This eternal forth-flowing of the Divine Life is the true, innermost and deepest root of Ex-istence,—the absolutely indissoluble union of Essence with Form which we have referred to above. This Being of Ex-istence, like all other Being, obviously carries with it the Affection of itself; it is the abiding, eternal, and unchangeable *Will* of the Absolute Reality thus continuously to develop itself, as it necessarily must develop itself. (2.) So long as any Ego whatever occupies any one of the points of Freedom, he has still a personal, individual Being, which is a partial and imperfect Ex-istence of the Divine Ex-istence, and hence really a negation of Being; and such an Ego has also an affection for this Being, and an abiding and unchangeable will to maintain this his Ex-istence. This his actual will, ever present with him, is hence by no means identical with the abiding Affection and Will of the perfect Divine Ex-istence. (3.) Should an Ego, occupying this standpoint, be nevertheless capable of willing in conformity with that Eternal Will, yet could this never come to pass by means of his mere passive will, but this Ego must first make the Eternal Will his

own by means of a third intervening volition, usually called a *determination of the Will*. Exactly in this case stands the votary of Law; and he becomes so just because he stands in this case. Since he professes,—and this is the peculiar root of his whole mode of thought, and that whereby we must comprehend him,—since he professes that he is also able to refuse obedience,—which (since we have nothing to do here with mere physical power, the dependence of which upon will we must assume), is obviously equivalent to saying that he also has it in his power *to will* such disobedience,—to which assertion, as the immediate expression of his self-consciousness, we must doubtless accord faith,—this profession is equivalent to saying that it is not his predominant and ever-present will to obey;—for who can act contrary to his own will, and who can think in opposition to his own ever-present and continually active will? Not that he is disinclined to obedience;—for then another, and indeed sensuous desire would necessarily bear sway in him, which is contrary to the supposition, since he would then not be even a moral being, but would require to be maintained in order and discipline by means of outward compulsion;—but only that he is not positively inclined to it, and occupies a position of mere indifference. In consequence of this indifference of his own actually present will, does that other Will become to him a foreign behest, which he at first regards as a Law to his own naturally inactive will; and to the fulfilment of which he must first produce in himself the will that is naturally wanting, by means of a positive determination. And thus, the indifference towards the Eternal Will, which still remains after actual renunciation of the Sensuous Will, is the source of a Categorical Imperative within us; as the faith which we still retain in our own, at least formal, Independence, is the source of that indifference.

Just as this faith disappears by means of the highest

crowning act of Freedom, does the previously existing Ego likewise disappear in the pure Divine Ex-istence; and we can no longer say, strictly speaking, that the Affection, the Love, and the Will of this Divine Ex-istence is *ours*, since there are no longer two Ex-istences and two Wills; but now one Ex-istence, and one and the same Will, is all in all. So long as man cherishes the desire of being himself something, God comes not to him, for no man can become God. But so soon as he renounces himself sincerely, wholly, and radically, then God alone remains, and is all in all. Man can create no God for himself; but he can renounce himself as the proper negation,—and then he is wholly absorbed in God.

This self-renunciation is the entrance into the Higher Life which is wholly opposed to the lower life,—the latter taking its distinctive character from the existence of a self; and it is, according to our former mode of computation, the attainment of the Third standpoint in the view of the World;—that of the pure and HIGHER MORALITY.

The peculiar and essential nature of this Morality, and of the Blessedness which dwells in the central-point of this world, we shall describe in our next lecture. At present we shall only point out the relation of this standpoint to the lower and sensuous world. I hope that I have already laid my foundation so deep, that I shall not fail of success in my subsidiary purpose of taking away all possible subterfuge from the common practice of confounding together Blessedness and Happiness. This mode of thought, which, when a more earnest sentiment comes over it, would rather not have said what it is yet continually saying, loves much a charitable twilight, and a certain indefiniteness of conception; and it is therefore the more desirable to drag it forth into clear light, and to separate ourselves from it with the strictest precision. Its supporters would indeed willingly accommodate the

matter,—we know it well,—they do not wish to cast aside the spirit altogether,—we are not so unjust as to accuse them of that,—but neither will they give up aught of the flesh. We however neither will nor can accommodate the matter; for these two things are utterly irreconcilable, and he who would possess the one must renounce the other.

The view of himself, as a person existing for his own sake and in a World of Sense, does indeed still remain for him who has attained the third standpoint; for this is a necessary and inevitable part of Form; but the Love and Affection for it are here no longer felt. What is now to him this person, and all sensuous activity? Obviously, only means for the purpose of doing that which he himself wills and loves above all else,—namely, the Will of God manifesting itself in him;—just as this personality is to the Stoic only the means of obeying the Law: and both are herein alike, and of equal value in our estimation. To the sensuous man, on the contrary, his personal sensuous Ex-istence is his ultimate and especial object, and everything else which he does or believes beyond it, is to him but the means for the fulfilment of that object.

It is wholly impossible, and an absolute contradiction, that any one should love in two different directions, or hold two opposite purposes. The Love of God which we have described entirely extirpates personal Self-love. For only by the renunciation of the latter do we attain the former. Again, where personal Self-love is, there the Love of God is not; for the latter suffers no other Love beside it.

This, as we have formerly observed, is the fundamental character of sensuous Self-love,—that it requires a Life fashioned in a particular way, and seeks its Happiness in a particular object; while, on the contrary, the Love of God regards every form of Life and all objects but as

means; and knows that all that is is the proper and necessary means; and therefore never desires any object determined in this or that particular way, but accepts all as they present themselves.

What then would the sensuous man who requires an objective enjoyment do, were he indeed a man, and consistent? I should think that, relying upon himself alone, he would exert all his strength to gather around him the objects of his enjoyment; enjoy what he had, and be content to do without that which was beyond his reach. But what happens to him, if he be also a superstitious child? He persuades himself that the objects of his enjoyment are in the gift of a God who will indeed grant them to him, but who for this service demands something from him in exchange:—he alleges that there has been a covenant made with him on the subject;—he adduces a collection of writings as the voucher of this pretended covenant.

When he fully accepts this idea, how is it then with him? Enjoyment still remains his especial object, and his duty to his imagined God only the means for the attainment of this object. This must be confessed,—there is no escaping it. It will not do to say, as is frequently said:—"I desire that the Will of God be done for its own sake;—I wish Happiness—only *by the way*." Setting aside for a moment thy "*by the way*," thou yet admittest that thou wishest Happiness because it is Happiness; and because thou believest that, having it, it will be well with thee; and because thou wouldst willingly have it well with thee. But then thou certainly dost not desire that the Will of God be done for its own sake alone; for then thou couldst not desire Happiness, since the first desire supersedes and destroys the second; and it is absolutely impossible that that which is destroyed can exist beside, and be associated with, its destroyer. Dost thou also wish, as thou sayest, that the

Will of God be done?—then thou canst wish this only because thou believest that thou canst not otherwise obtain that which thou especially desirest,—namely Happiness;—and because this wish is imposed upon thee by the desire by which thou art more especially animated;—thou wishest therefore the Will of God only “*by the way,*” and because thou art constrained to do so; but from the bottom of thy heart, and with thy own good will, thou wishest only for Happiness.

It is nothing to the purpose that this Happiness is removed far from immediate sight, and even placed in another world beyond the grave, where it is thought that it may be possible to confound the two ideas with less trouble. Whatever you may say with regard to this your Heaven,—or rather whatever you may not say, in order that your true meaning may not come to light,—yet the single circumstance that you make it dependent upon Time, and place it in another world, proves already incontrovertibly that it is a Heaven of sensuous enjoyment. Here Heaven is not, you say;—but yonder it shall be. I pray you,—What then is that which can be different yonder from what it is here? Obviously, only the objective constitution of the world, as the environment of our existence. It must therefore, according to your opinion, be the objective constitution of the present world which makes it unfit for a Heaven, and the objective constitution of the future world which makes it fit for that purpose;—and thus you cannot any longer conceal that your Happiness depends upon outward circumstances and therefore is a sensuous enjoyment. Did you seek your Blessedness there where alone it is to be found, solely in God and in his Manifestation, but by no means in the mere casual Form in which he is manifested,—then would you not need to refer yourselves to another Life, for God is even now to-day, as he shall be in all Eternity. I assure you,—and remember my words when

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it shall come to pass,—just as, in the second Life to which you may have attained, you will again make your Happiness dependent on outward circumstances, you shall fare just as ill there as you do here; and you will then console yourselves with a third Life, and in the third with a fourth, and so on for ever;—for God neither can nor will confer Blessedness by means of outward circumstances, since he desires, on the contrary, to give us Himself independent of all Form.

In a word:—this mode of thought, thrown into the form of a prayer, would thus express itself:—“Lord! let but my will be done, and that throughout an Eternity which on that account shall be blessed; and in return thou shalt have Thy Will in this short and wearisome present Time.”—And this is manifest immorality, senseless superstition, irreligion, and actual blasphemy of the holy and bliss-giving Will of God.

On the contrary, the expression of the constant mind of the truly Moral and Religious Man is this prayer:—“Lord! let but Thy Will be done, then is mine done also, for I have no other will than this,—that Thy Will be done.” This Divine Will is necessarily done now and for ever;—in the first place, in the Inward Life of this man thus devoted to it,—of which in our next lecture;—and then—what immediately belongs to our present subject—in everything that meets him in his Outward Life. All these events are nothing else than the necessary and unalterable Outward Manifestation of the Divine Work fulfilling itself in him; and he cannot wish that anything in these events should be otherwise than what it is, without wishing that the Inward Life, which can only thus manifest itself, should be otherwise,—and without thereby separating his will from the Will of God, and setting it in opposition thereto. He cannot any longer reserve to himself a choice in these things, for he must accept everything just as it happens; for

everything that comes to pass is the Will of God with him, and therefore the best that can possibly come to pass.* To those who love God, all things must work together for good, absolutely and immediately.

To those also, in whom the Will of God is not inwardly accomplished, because there is indeed no Inward Life in them, but who are altogether mere outward things,—to them also the Will of God is done outwardly, as alone it can reach them;—appearing at first sight ungracious and chastening, but in reality in the highest degree merciful and loving;—while with them matters grow worse and worse, and they weary themselves out, and even render themselves despicable and ridiculous, in the vain chase after a good which ever floats before their vision and ever eludes their grasp,—until they are thereby at last driven to seek for Happiness there where alone it is to be found. To those who do not love God, all things must work together immediately for pain and torment, until, indirectly by means of this very torment, they are at last led to salvation.

* For an account of a remarkable incident connected with this passage, see "Memoir" p. 140.

LECTURE IX.

EXPOSITION OF THE HIGHER MORALITY—PASSAGE
TO THE STANDPOINT OF TRUE RELIGION—
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE MORAL-
RELIGIOUS WILL.

THE following were the results of our last lecture, and indicate the point at which we now stand:—So long as man still desires to be something on his own account, the True Being and Life cannot develop itself within him, and hence he likewise remains inaccessible to Blessedness; for all personal, individual Being is but Non-Being, and limitation of the True Being; and, on that very account, is either obvious Unblessedness,—as in the case of the first standpoint, that of mere Sensuousness, which looks to outward objects only for its enjoyment, whereas no outward object can possibly satisfy man;—or else, if not actual Unblessedness, yet just as little Blessedness, but only mere Apathy, passive indifference, and absolute incapacity for all enjoyment of Life,—as in the case of the second standpoint, that of mere formal Legality. On the contrary, as soon as man, by an act of the Highest Freedom, surrenders and lays aside his personal, individual freedom and independence, he becomes a partaker of the Only True Being, the Divine,

and of all the Blessedness that is contained therein. We showed, in the first place,—in order to separate ourselves distinctly from the opposite sensuous mode of thought, and to lay this aside once and for ever,—how such an one, who has attained the True Life, looks upon the outward and sensuous Life; and we found that he regards his whole personal Ex-istence, and all outward occurrences that affect it, but as means for the fulfilment of the Divine Work in him; and indeed all of them as they occur as necessarily the best and most suitable means; and hence he desires to possess no voice or choice whatever with regard to the objective disposition of these occurrences, but accepts them all as they present themselves. On the other hand, we reserved for our present lecture, the description of the inward and peculiar Life of such a man:—which description we now begin.

I have already shown, on a former occasion, that the Third standpoint of the Spiritual Life,—which undoubtedly is that at which we have now arrived, that, namely, of the HIGHER MORALITY,—is distinguished from the second, that of mere formal Legality, by the creation of a wholly new and truly Super-sensuous World, and by the development of this world within the world of sense as its sphere; while, on the contrary, the Law of Stoicism is only the Law of an order in the world of sense. It is this assertion that I have, in the next place, to establish on a deeper foundation, and thus more clearly explain and more strictly define it.

On this standpoint, the whole sensible world, the existence of which is assumed only because of our love and affection for a determinate Ex-istence in outward objects, becomes only a means; but unquestionably not a means for nothing,—upon which supposition it would not be a means, since besides itself there would then be nothing, and it would consequently remain for ever an end, as sole and absolute Ex-istence,—but it becomes undoubtedly a

means for an actual, true, and real Being. What is this Being? We know it from what has been said above. It is the inward Essential Being of God himself, as it is absolutely, in itself and through itself, immediately, purely, and without intervening medium, without being modified, veiled, or obscured by any Form contained in the personality of the Ego, which is on that account obstructive and limiting;—but broken only by the indestructible Form of Infinity. Since this Being is determined only, on the one hand, by the Essential Divine Nature, which is founded absolutely on itself alone, and, on the other, by the Form of Infinity, which, in Actual Ex-istence, can never be dissolved or brought to a conclusion,—as we have very distinctly set forth in our last lecture,—it is clear that we cannot by any means comprehend *mediately*, through any other conception, and thus *a priori*, how this Being will disclose itself; but that it can only be *immediately* perceived and experienced, and only apprehended in the act of its living forth-flowing from Being into Ex-istence; so that the specific knowledge of this new and Super-sensuous World cannot be communicated, by means of description and characterization, to those who do not themselves live therein. He who is inspired of God reveals to us how it is;—and it is as he reveals it, just for this reason—because *He* so reveals it; but without such inward revelation no man can speak of it.

In general, however, and by means of an outward and merely negative mark, this Divine World may be characterized; and that in the following way:—All Being carries with it its proper Love and Affection, and so also the immediate Divine Being which is manifested in the Form of Infinity. Now this Being is such as it is, not through anything else, or for the sake of anything else, but through itself, and for its own sake alone; and when it appears and is beloved, then it must necessarily be beloved and

enjoyed through itself alone, purely and solely on its own account;—but by no means on account of something else, and thus only as a means for this other thing, which would then become the ultimate end of its being. And thus we have found the desiderated outward criterion of the Divine World, whereby it is completely separated from the World of Sense. Whatever is a source of enjoyment *in itself*, and indeed of the highest degree of enjoyment, infinitely transcending all other degrees, is a Manifestation of the immediate and essential Divine Nature in Reality. We may even describe it as the most perfect phenomenon of each particular moment, under the given conditions of Time;—provided we do not understand thereby such a perfection as is given by means of a mere logical conception, which contains nothing more than the order and completeness of the Manifold,—but on the contrary, a perfection given through an immediate affection towards a determinate Being.

Thus much as to the possible characterization of the New World created by the Higher Morality within the World of Sense. Should you desire of me yet greater clearness on this point, you will doubtless not expect that I should attempt a clearer characterization, for I think that in this way nothing can be added to what we have already said,—but you will require from me examples. Willingly indeed shall I satisfy this desire, finding myself in these regions so concealed from the vulgar eye; reminding you, nevertheless, that I can here adduce only individual examples, which cannot of themselves exhaust that which can be exhausted only in characterization, and which we have already so exhausted;—examples which themselves can only be fully comprehended by means of such characterization.

I say:—The inward and absolute Nature of God manifests itself in **BEAUTY**; it manifests itself in the perfect **DOMINION** of **MAN** over **NATURE**; it manifests itself in the perfect **STATE** and **POLITY** of **NATIONS**; it manifests itself

in SCIENCE;—in short, it manifests itself in those conceptions which, in the strict and peculiar sense, I term IDEAS, and to which I have directed attention in many ways, both in the lectures which I delivered here last winter,* and in others which have some time ago appeared in print.† In order to explain my fundamental conception by means of the lowest form of the Idea, concerning which we may venture to hope that we shall be able at once to attain the requisite clearness—namely Beauty:—There is much talk of the splendours of the surrounding world, of the beauties of nature, &c. ; as if,—were it intended that we should accept these words in their literal acceptation,—as if Beauty could ever appertain to the Earthly and Perishable, or could be transferred to these. But the source of Beauty is in God alone, and it reveals itself only in the minds of those who are inspired by Him. Imagine, for example, a Holy Virgin who, borne up into the clouds, and encircled by the heavenly hosts who fall down before her presence in rapt contemplation, surrounded by all the splendours of a Heaven of which she herself is the highest ornament and delight, can yet alone of those present see nothing of all that takes place around her, being wholly overwhelmed and lost in this one feeling:—“Behold the handmaiden of the Lord : be it unto me according to thy word;”—clothe this feeling, thus surrounded, in a human body, and then unquestionably you have Beauty in a determinate Form. Now what is it that makes this Form beautiful? Is it the separate parts and members of which it is composed? Is it not much rather the one feeling which is diffused throughout all these members? The Form is superadded, only because in it, and by means of it, the Thought becomes visible; and it is transferred by means of lines and colours to the canvas, because thus

* “Characteristics of the Present Age.”

† “On the Nature of the Scholar and its Manifestations.”

only can it be communicated to others. Perhaps this Thought might also have been expressed in hard and senseless stone, or in any other material. Would then the stone thereby become beautiful? The stone ever remains stone, and is wholly unsusceptible of such a predicate; but the soul of the Artist was beautiful when he conceived his work, and the soul of every intelligent beholder in whom the conception is repeated will likewise become beautiful;—the stone ever remains only that which fixes the limits of the outward perception during this inward spiritual development.

This ideal Being and the creative Affection of it, as a mere natural phenomenon, manifests itself generally as GENIUS—for Art, for Government, for Science, &c. It is understood, of course, and to every one who has any experience whatever in matters of this kind it is by means of this very experience sufficiently known, that—since the natural affection for such creations of Genius is the very foundation of the Life of Genius in which all its other life is swallowed up,—I say, it is understood that true Genius does not require to stimulate and urge itself on to industry in its Art or in its Science by any Categorical Imperative, but that all its powers, of their own accord, direct themselves towards this its all-engrossing object;—further, that, so surely as any one possesses True Genius, his work always prospers well, and the products of his labour are always pleasing to him, and thus he is ever surrounded, inwardly and outwardly, by the Beautiful and Agreeable;—that, finally, he does not employ this Activity for the attainment of any object whatever beyond itself, nor will accept aught in exchange for it; but, on the contrary, no earthly consideration would induce him to leave undone what he alone may do, or to do it otherwise than as seems right and pleasing to himself;—that he consequently finds his true and satisfying Enjoyment of Life only in such work,

purely and solely as work, and for the work's sake; and whatever of the external world he may accept besides does not of itself engross his thoughts, but he accepts it only in order that, renewed and strengthened by it, he may return to his own true element. And thus mere natural Genius soars far above both the low desires of the Sensualist and the callous indifferentism of the Stoic, and carries its possessor through an uninterrupted succession of blissful experiences, for which he needs nothing beyond himself, and which, without painful effort or labour on his part, blossom forth spontaneously out of his Life. The Enjoyment of a single hour passed happily in the pursuit of Art or of Science far outweighs a whole lifetime of Sensuous Enjoyment; and before the picture of this Blessedness, the mere Sensuous Man, could it but be brought home to him, would sink in envy and longing desire.

In the illustration we have thus adduced, we have assumed a natural Genius as the peculiar source and root of the Spiritual Enjoyment of Life, as well as of the scorn of mere Sensuous Enjoyment; and I have desired, by means of this single example of the Higher Morality and its Blessedness, to lead you to a more universal conception of it. But this Genius,—notwithstanding that its object is in itself truly super-sensuous, and the pure expression of the Godhead, as we showed in particular by the example of the Beautiful,—does yet desire, and must desire, that its Spiritual Object should receive a certain representative form and clothing in the World of Sense; and thus Genius does also desire, in a certain sense, such a determinate Form of its World and its environment as in our previous lecture we unconditionally censured and condemned in the case of Sensuousness;—and if the self-enjoyment of Genius were dependent on the accidental realization or non-realization of this outward result as the aim of its efforts, then

would the peace and tranquillity of Genius itself be at an end; and the Higher Morality would be exposed to all the miseries of the lower Sensuousness. But, so far as Genius is concerned, so surely as it is Genius, it will assuredly succeed in the expression and representation of its Idea in the appropriate medium. Its desired Form and environment can therefore never be wanting; while nevertheless it is the Activity with which it produces this Form which is the true seat of its *immediate* enjoyment. To this the Form itself only contributes indirectly, because in it only does the Activity become apparent;—which is obvious from the fact that True Genius never lingers long over anything it has already attained, nor dwells in voluptuous enjoyment of it, and of itself in it, but proceeds onward without delay to new developments. In general, however, apart from particular Genius, and with reference to all possible Life in which the Divine Being manifests itself purely, I lay down the following principle:—So long as joy in the deed is mixed up with desires regarding the outward result of the deed, even the possessor of the Higher Morality is not yet perfect in purity and clearness; and thus, in the Divine Economy, the outward failure of his deed is the means of forcing him in upon himself, and of raising him to the yet higher standpoint of True Religion,—that is, to the comprehension of what it really is that he loves and strives after. Understand this as a whole, and in its connexion, thus:—

(1.) The Free Ego, deduced and described with sufficient distinctness in our previous lecture, and which, as Reflexion, ever remains one and the same, does yet, as Object—that is, as the reflecting substance that exists only in Appearance—become divided, at the first glance into an Infinity, but also, for a reason that lies too deep to be treated of in these lectures, into a progressive system of Individual Personalities. (This separation is

a portion of that division of the objective world into the Form of Infinity which we have already sufficiently described upon several occasions; and thus belongs to the absolutely fundamental Form of Ex-istence which cannot be cast off even by the Godhead itself:—As Being originally separated itself in this division, so it remains separated in all Eternity; and hence no Individual having a place in this division—that is, no Individual who has come into Actual Ex-istence,—can ever perish; this is to be noticed only in passing, and in opposition to those among our contemporaries, who by means of a half-philosophy and whole-bewilderment esteem themselves enlightened when they deny the continued Ex-istence in higher spheres of the Individuals actually existing here.) In them,—in these Individual Personalities thus arising from the fundamental Form of Ex-istence,—the entire Divine Being is separated into an infinite progressive development in Time, and is, as it were, divided among them, according to the Absolute Law of such a division, which is founded in the Essential Divine Nature itself; whilst, further, every one of these Individuals, as a section of the One Ego determined by its own essential Form, necessarily bears this latter Form in its entirety,—that is, as we said in our last lecture, it is free and independent in relation to the five standpoints. Each Individual has therefore in his own free choice, which cannot be taken away from him even by the Divinity himself, the possibility of viewing and of enjoying from any of these five standpoints that portion in the Absolute Being which is characteristic of him as an Actual Individual. Thus has each Individual, in the first place, his determinate portion in the Sensuous Life, and in its Love; which Life will appear to him as the ultimate and absolute end and purpose of his Being, so long as this freedom, which is discovered only by its actual use, is wholly engrossed therein. But if he should rise, per-

haps through the sphere of Legality, to that of the Higher Morality, then will that Sensuous Life become to him but a means; and his portion in the Higher, Super-sensuous, and immediately Divine Life, will reveal itself to his Love. Every one without exception necessarily receives, by his mere entrance into Actual Ex-istence, his portion in this Super-sensuous Being; for otherwise he would be no result of that division of the Absolute Being, according to its own Essential Law, without which there is no Actual Ex-istence, and he would not otherwise even have become actual; but to every one without exception, there is nevertheless the possibility of this Super-sensuous Being remaining concealed, should he fail to renounce his Sensuous Being and its objective independence. Every one without exception, I say, receives that portion in the Super-sensuous Being which is exclusively his own, and which belongs in the same manner to no other Individual whatever but himself; which portion now develops itself in him in all Eternity,—manifesting itself as a continuous course of action,—in such a form as it can assume in absolutely no other Individual;—and this, in short, may be called the individual character of his Higher Vocation. Not that the Essential Divine Nature is divided in itself;—in all men, without exception, the one and unchangeable Divine Nature, as it is in itself, is present;—and if they can but attain True Freedom, may also appear in actual manifestation;—but this Nature manifests itself in each Individual in a different Form, peculiar to himself. (Let Being, as we have already supposed, be = A , and Form = B ; then A , which has absolutely entered into B , divides itself by this very act of entrance, not according to its Essential Nature but according to its Absolute Form in Reflexion, into $(b + b + b \dots) =$ a System of Individuals: and each individual b contains in itself—(1.) the whole and indivisible A , (2.) the whole and indivisible B , (3.) its own

particular δ ,—and the same with all the other results of A throughout ($\delta + \delta + \delta . . .$.)

(2) No one can discover, by means of mere thought alone, this his peculiar portion in the Super-sensuous Being; nor can he deduce it by way of inference from any other truth; nor can he be made acquainted with it through any other individual, since this portion cannot be known to any other individual;—but he can attain a knowledge of it only by immediate personal consciousness; and his Being must necessarily and spontaneously assume this Form so soon as he has surrendered and wholly annihilated all personal will and personal purposes within him. Hence it is clear, in the first place, that with respect to this, which only each man can clearly comprehend for himself in his own immediate consciousness, it is impossible to speak in general terms, and that I must here necessarily stop short. And what end, indeed, could here be served by speech, even were speech possible? He to whom his especial Higher Vocation has revealed itself knows it as it is revealed to him; and he may conclude by analogy how it is with others to whom their Higher Vocation has also become clear and intelligible. But as for him to whom it has not revealed itself, to him no information on this subject can be communicated;—it serves no purpose to speak of colours to the blind.

Has this peculiar Vocation revealed itself to him?—then does it penetrate him with unspeakable Love, and with the purest Enjoyment;—penetrates him wholly, and takes possession of all his Life. And thus it is the very first act of the Higher Morality, which must infallibly ensue so soon as the mere personal will has been resigned, that man becomes wholly penetrated with his own especial Vocation, and desires to be nothing whatever but that which he, and only he, can be; which he, and only he, in virtue of his Higher Nature, that is, of

the Divine Nature in him, ought to be;—in short, that he desires nothing whatever but that which, at bottom, he actually wills. How could such a man ever do anything with unwillingness, since he never does anything else but that in which he has the highest delight? What I said above of natural Genius, is even still more applicable to the Virtue which is born of perfect Freedom; for this Virtue is the highest expression of Genius; it is the immediate power of Genius,—i.e. of that Form which the Essential Divine Nature has assumed in our Individuality. On the contrary, the desire and effort to be something else than that to which we are called, however great and noble that other thing may seem, is the highest Immorality; and all the constraint that man imposes upon himself for that purpose, and all the unhappiness that he consequently suffers, are themselves rebellions against the rule of the Divine Order, and resistances of our will to the Divine. What is it then that has thus set up within us a purpose not imposed upon us by our Higher Nature, but personal will, personal choice, personal self-complacent wisdom?—and thus we are very far indeed from the renunciation of our own personal, individual will. This effort is necessarily the source of the greatest unhappiness. In this position we must constantly enforce, constrain, urge, and deny ourselves; for we can never do that willingly which, at bottom, we cannot will; and we can never attain a successful issue, for we cannot accomplish that which our Nature itself forbids. This is the assumption of outward sanctity against which we are warned by Christianity. It may remove mountains, and even give its body to be burned, and yet that will profit it nothing if such be not the dictate of true Love,—that is, if it be not the dictate of its own peculiar Spiritual Being which necessarily brings with it its own Affection. Strive to be—we mean in supersensuous things, for in mere sense there is no Blessed-

ness—strive to be what thou oughtst to be, what thou canst be, and what at bottom thou really willest to be :—this is the fundamental Law, as well of the Higher Morality as of the Blessed Life.

(3.) This Higher Vocation of Man, which, as we said, penetrates him with complete and undivided Love, exhibits itself indeed, in the first place, in his own conduct; but in the second place, and by means of that conduct, it likewise manifests itself in a determinate result in the World of Sense. So long as man does not recognise the true root and essential central-point of his Ex-istence, the two elements we have named,—his own Inward Being and its Outward Result,—remain undistinguished. Something proves unsuccessful with him, the outward result at which he aims does not ensue,—which indeed is not his fault, for he wills only what he can will, but that of outward circumstances which are not susceptible of his influence,—and then his Love, which has still an uncertain object, is dissatisfied with this failure, and thereby his Blessedness is disturbed and destroyed. This forces him more deeply in upon himself, in order that he may make it perfectly clear to himself what it really is that he strives after; and what, on the contrary, it is that in deed and truth he does not strive after, but which is indifferent to him. In this self-examination he will discover what we have plainly enunciated above, although he may not express it in the same words,—namely, that it is the development of the Divine Being and Life in him, this particular individual, which he strives after especially and in the first place;—and thereby his whole Being and his true and proper Love will become perfectly clear to him, and he will be raised from the Third standpoint of the Higher Morality, in which we have hitherto retained him, to the Fourth—that of RELIGION. This Divine Life now continually develops itself within him, without hindrance

or obstruction, as it can and must develop itself only in him and his individuality;—this alone it is that he properly wills;—his will is therefore always accomplished;—and it is absolutely impossible that anything contrary to it should ever come to pass. This his proper Inward Life does indeed still desire constantly to flow forth in surrounding circumstances and to fashion these after itself, and only in this effort after outward expression does it show itself to be true Inward Life, and not mere dead devotion. But the result of this effort after outward expression does not depend on his own isolated individual Life alone, but upon the general Freedom of other individuals besides himself: this Freedom God himself cannot wish to destroy, therefore neither can the man who is devoted to God, and who has attained a clear knowledge of God,—neither can he wish that it should be destroyed. While, therefore, he certainly desires this outward result, and labours unceasingly and with all his power to effect it,—because he cannot abstain from doing so, and because this is his own proper Inward Life,—he yet does not will it absolutely and unconditionally; and it therefore would not, even for a single moment, disturb his Peace and Blessedness should it nevertheless remain unaccomplished;—his Love and his Blessedness return into his own proper Life, where they always, and without exception, find their true satisfaction. Thus much in general. Beyond this, the matters now touched upon demand a further exposition, which we reserve for our next lecture, in order that we may here reach a result which will spread a general light over the whole;—namely:—

(4.) Everything which this Moral-Religious Man wills and constantly promotes, has, *in and for itself*, no value whatever to him;—as indeed it has none in itself, and is not in itself the most perfect, but only that which is most perfect in this moment of Time, to be superseded in a

Future Time by something still more perfect;—but it has value for him only because it is the immediate Manifestation of God,—the Form which God assumes in him, this definite individual. Now God also dwells originally, likewise in a peculiar Form, in all other surrounding individuals, notwithstanding that he remains concealed from most of them in consequence of their personal, individual Will, and their want of the highest Freedom, and thus is not actually manifested either in themselves, or in their conduct towards others. In this position the Moral-Religious Man—although with reference to himself he has entered upon his portion of True Being—is, with reference to other individuals, separated and cut off from the constituent parts of Being which are related to him; and there abides in him a sorrowful striving and longing to unite and associate himself with these kindred elements:—not indeed that this longing disturbs his Blessedness, for this is the permanent lot of his Finite Being, and a part of his allegiance to God, to embrace which with Love is itself a portion of his Blessedness.

For what then would this concealed Inward Being, were it manifested in the conduct of other individuals,—for what would it possess a value in the estimation of our supposed Religious Man? Obviously not for itself,—since even his own nature has no value whatever to him in itself,—but because it is the Manifestation of God in these individuals. Further, for what will he desire that this Manifestation should possess a value in the estimation of these individuals themselves? Obviously only that it may be recognized by them as the Manifestation of God in themselves. Finally, for what will he desire that his own conduct and effort should possess a value in the estimation of these individuals? Obviously only that they may recognize in it the Manifestation of God in him.

And thus we have now a general outward characterization of the Moral-Religious Will, in so far as it comes forth from the Inward Life, which ever remains hidden in itself, into Outward Manifestation. In the first place, the object of this Will is ever only the Spiritual World of reasonable beings; for the World of Sense has long ago with him been reduced to a mere sphere of spiritual activity. In this Spiritual World, his positive Will is this—that in the conduct of each individual there may be manifested purely that Form which the Essential Divine Nature has assumed in him that particular individual;—that, on the other hand, each individual may recognize God, as he is outwardly manifested to him in the conduct of all other men;—that all others may in like manner recognize God as he is outwardly manifested to them in the conduct of that particular individual;—and that thus God alone may ever be wholly manifested in all Outward Appearance;—that He alone may live and rule, and nothing besides Him;—and that, everywhere and at all times, He alone may be present to the eye of mortals.

Thus, as it is expressed by Christianity in the form of a prayer:—"Thy kingdom come:—even that condition of the world in which Thou alone art, and livest, and rulest, so that—Thy will may be done on earth,—in the Actual, by means of that Freedom which Thou Thyself wilt not take away,—as it ever is done, and indeed never can be otherwise done, in heaven,—in the Idea, in the world as it is in itself, and without relation to Freedom."

For example:—Yonder they complain that misery is so abundant in the world, and go about with a zeal, praiseworthy in itself, to make it somewhat less. Alas! the misery that lies most open to view is not the true misery;—since things are as they are, misery is the best of all that is in the world; and since the world does

not improve notwithstanding all this misery, one might almost believe that there is not yet enough of misery in it:—that the image of God, Humanity, should be sullied, degraded, and trodden in the dust,—this is the true misery in the world, which fills the Religious Man with holy indignation. Perchance thou dost alleviate the sorrows of humanity, so far as thy hand can reach, by the sacrifice of thine own dearest enjoyments. But if this happen only because Nature has given thee a system of nerves so sensitive, and so harmoniously attuned with the rest of humanity, that every sorrow which thou beholdest repeats itself more keenly in thine own organization;—then it is to this delicate organization that our thanks are due;—in the Spiritual World thy deed passes unnoticed. Hadst thou done the like deed in holy indignation that the Son of Eternity, in whom also there dwells something god-like, should be tormented by such vanities as these, and should be left there so forsaken by his fellow-men;—with the desire that he might have at least one glad hour in which he might raise his eyes joyfully and thankfully to Heaven;—with the purpose that in thy hand he might see the saving hand of God, and might know of a surety that the arm of God is not yet shortened, but that He has yet everywhere instruments and servants to do His will, and that thus Faith and Hope and Love might arise in his soul;—if thus what thou desiredst to help had been his Inward Nature, and not his Outward, which is ever without true value;—then had thy deed been the outward expression of a Moral-Religious Spirit.

LECTURE X.

SURVEY OF THE WHOLE SUBJECT FROM THE STAND-
POINT OF TRUE RELIGION ;—DELINEATION
OF THE BLESSED LIFE.

Now that it is our purpose to bring these lectures to a close, let us once more combine into one view the doctrine which we have built up before you.

Life in itself is One ; it remains unchangeably the same ; and since it is the perfect fulfilment of the Love of Life that dwells in it, it is perfect Blessedness. This True Life exists, at bottom, wherever any form or degree of Life is to be found ; but it may be concealed by an admixture of the elements of Death and Nothingness ; and then, by means of pain and torment and mortification of this imperfect Life, it presses onward towards its development. We have followed, step by step, this development of the True Life out of the imperfect Apparent Life by which it may at first be concealed ;—to-day it is our purpose to accompany this Life into the central-point of its dominion, and to invest it with all its glory. In our last lecture we characterized the highest Form of Actual Life—that is—since Reality consists wholly in a Form of Reflexion, whilst the absolutely indestructible Form of Reflexion is Infinity—that Life

which flows forth in an Infinite Time, and employs the personal Ex-istence of Man as its instrument, and hence manifests itself as Action—we have, I say, characterized this Life by the name of the HIGHER MORALITY. We were constrained to admit that, on account of the separation of the one Essential Divine Nature into many individuals—a separation unalterably imposed by the law of Reflexion—the activity of each particular individual cannot avoid striving after an outward result, not wholly dependent on the individual himself, in the surrounding world of Freedom;—that nevertheless the Blessedness of such an individual will not be disturbed by the failure of this result, provided only that he raise himself to a true comprehension of that which he strives after *unconditionally*, as distinguished from that which he seeks only *conditionally*;—which comprehension we termed the standpoint of TRUE RELIGION. With respect to this latter point especially, I referred you to our present lecture, in which I promised a more thorough exposition of this subject.

I shall prepare the way for this exposition by a survey of our whole subject from its profoundest standpoint.

Being ex-ists; and the Ex-istence of Being is necessarily Consciousness, or Reflexion according to fixed laws which are contained in, and are to be developed from, Reflexion itself:—this is the fundamental principle, now sufficiently explained on all sides, of our whole doctrine. It is Being alone that ex-ists,—that “*is*,” in Ex-istence, and by whose being in it alone Ex-istence is;—that eternally abides in it as it is in itself, and without whose indwelling within it Ex-istence would vanish into Nothingness:—no one doubts this, and no one who understands it can doubt it. But in Ex-istence, as Ex-istence,—i.e. in Reflexion, Being directly changes its absolutely incomprehensible Form, which can only be described as pure Life and Action, into an Essence or Nature—a specific and

definite mode of Being; so that we have never spoken of Being, and no one can ever speak of Being, otherwise than by speaking of its Essence or Nature. Although, therefore, our Being is ever *in itself* the Being of Being; and thus remains, and can never become other than this; yet that which *we ourselves*, and *for ourselves*, are, have, and possess,—i.e. in the Form of ourselves, of the Ego, of Reflexion in Conscienceness,—this is never Being *in itself*, but only Being in *our Form*, as Essence or Nature. How then is this Being, which certainly does not enter into Form in all its native purity,—how is it yet connected with Form?—does it not thereby irrevocably project forth from itself, and set up beside itself, a second, wholly new Being,—which new and second Being is altogether impossible? Answer:—Ask not for the “*How* ;”—be satisfied with the fact. They are connected; there is such a bond, which,—higher than all Reflexion, proceeding from no Reflexion, and not recognizing the jurisdiction of Reflexion,—yet appears beside, and indissolubly associated with, Reflexion. In this companionship with Reflexion, this bond is Feeling;—and, since it is a bond, it is Love;—and, since it is the bond that unites Pure Being and Reflexion, it is the Love of God. In this Love, Being and Ex-istence, God and Man, are ONE; wholly transfused and lost in each other;—it is the point of intersection of the *A* and *B* we have spoken of above;—the act of Being, in supporting and maintaining itself in Ex-istence, is its Love for itself, which we do not conceive of as Feeling only because we do not conceive of it at all. The Manifestation of this act of Being, in supporting and maintaining itself in Ex-istence, in companionship with Reflexion,—that is, the Feeling of this act of Self-existence,—is our Love towards it; or, in strict truth, its own Love towards itself in the Form of Feeling; since we have no power to love it, but only itself has power to love itself in us.

This—not its, nor ours—but this reciprocal Love, which first separates us into two, and then binds us together into one, is the original creator of our oft-mentioned abstract conception of a Pure Being, or a God. What is it that thus carries us beyond all determinate and comprehensible Ex-istence, and beyond the whole world of absolute Reflexion? It is our Love which no Ex-istence can satisfy. Conception does here that only which it alone can do;—it defines and fashions this Love, by abstracting from its object, which only by its means becomes an object, everything that does not satisfy this Love; leaving in it nothing but the pure negation of all conceivability associated with infinite and eternal love-ableness. What then is it that assures us of God but pure, self-sufficing Love, which is superior to all the doubt that is born of Reflexion, and is only possible therein?—and what makes this Love thus self-sufficient, but that it is the immediate self-supporting and self-maintaining Life of the Absolute itself? Not Reflexion,—which by virtue of its very nature divides itself into parts, and thus is ever at variance with itself;—no, Love—is the source of all certainty, all truth, all reality.

It is the conception of God, which has thus become a purely abstract conception, that gives shape and definition to this Love, we said. In its own immediate Life, on the contrary—and I entreat you to note this well—this Love is not thus defined and fashioned; but it is, and it has and holds the object of its affection, not by any means in conception, which never overtakes it, but immediately in Love; and that as it is in itself, because it is in truth nothing else than the self-supporting Life of Absolute Being. Now it is this substance and material of Love, which Reflexion, in the first place, converts into a permanent objective Essence or Nature; and then again divides, even to infinity, clothing it with

new and ever-varied Forms;—and thus creates its World. I ask:—What is it then that gives a true and proper fundamental substance to this World, the Nature and Form of which are evidently products of Reflexion? It is obviously the Absolute Love:—the Absolute, I say,—or, as we may now express it,—the Love of God towards his Ex-istence, or, the Love of that Ex-istence towards the living God. And what remains for Reflexion? To give an objective standing to this substance, and to fashion it into an infinite succession of objective Forms. But even with reference to this last point,—What is it then that prevents Reflexion from ever pausing in this work, and impels it incessantly forward from one Form towards another, and from this again to another, in endless succession? It is the inextinguishable Love for that which necessarily escapes Reflexion, which lies concealed behind all Reflexion, and is therefore necessarily to be sought for behind all Reflexion, and under all its infinitely varied Forms,—the pure and real Absolute;—this it is which impels Reflexion onward through Eternity, and stretches it out into a living Eternity. Love is therefore higher than all Reason; it is itself the fountain of Reason and the root of Reality; the sole creator of Life and Time;—and thus I have finally declared to you the highest, real point of view of a Doctrine of Being, Life, and Blessedness,—that is, of true Speculation, towards which we have hitherto been gradually advancing.

(Finally, Love, as it is the source of all truth and certainty generally, so is it the source of completed truth in the actual man and his life. Completed truth is SCIENCE; and the element of Science is Reflexion. Only when Science becomes clear to itself as the Love of the Absolute, and comprehends this Absolute, as it necessarily must, as lying wholly beyond all Reflexion, and inaccessible to it in any possible Form,—does it

attain to pure objective truth; and only so does it become capable of apprehending and distinguishing Reflexion, which formerly it had always confounded with Reality; of completely recognising and comprehending all the products of Reflexion in Reality;—and, thus, of laying the foundation of a Doctrine of Knowledge. In short, the Reflexion which has become Divine Love, and is therefore wholly absorbed in God himself,—is the standpoint of Science:—this I desired to avail myself of a fitting opportunity to mention in passing.)

And now to present this to you in a form which may be easily retained, and also to connect it with an already familiar illustration:—We have already twice translated the words of John—“In the beginning was the Word,” &c.—into the language of our immediate theme:—in the first instance, thus:—“In the beginning, and absolutely associated with Being, was Ex-istence;” and then, in the second instance, after we had more distinctly recognised the manifold inward modifications of Ex-istence, and had combined these together under the name Form, thus:—“In the beginning, and absolutely associated with God, or Being, was Form.” Now, however, since we have seen that Consciousness with all its manifold Forms, which before we had held to be the true Ex-istence, is but Ex-istence at second hand, and indeed the mere Appearance or Manifestation of Ex-istence, and have recognised the true and absolute Ex-istence, in its own proper Form, as Love;—now, we render these same words, thus:—“In the beginning, before all Time, and the absolute Creator of all Time, is Love; and Love is in God, for it is his own act whereby he maintains himself in Ex-istence; and Love is itself God,—God is in it, and for ever abides in it, as he is in himself. By it, and from it, as the fundamental substance of all Ex-istence, are, by means of living Reflexion, all things made, and without it is not anything made that is made; and it for

ever becomes flesh, in us and around us, and dwells among us; and, if we will, we may behold for ever before our eyes, its glory, as the glory of the eternal and necessary Effluence of the Godhead."

True Life is Love; and, as Love, holds and possesses within itself its own object—the object of this Love—bound up, interpenetrated, transfused, and wholly absorbed in it:—eternally One and the same Love. It is not Love that sets up this object before it in outward representation and separates it into parts;—it is Reflexion that does this. Thus, in so far as man is Love, —and this he is always in the root of his Life, and can be nothing but this, although it may be that he is but the Love of himself,—but especially in so far as he is the Love of God, he remains eternally and for ever one, true, and unchangeable as God himself, and is indeed in reality God himself; and it is not merely a bold metaphor, but a literal truth, that John utters when he says:—"He who dwelleth in Love, dwelleth in God, and God in him." It is only his Reflexion that first separates him from this Love which is his own proper Being and not any foreign Being;—and that strives, throughout a whole manifold infinity, to lay hold of that which he himself is and remains, now, everywhere, and for ever. Hence it is not his inward Essential Nature, —that which is his own, which belongs to himself and to no other,—that is subject to continual change; but it is only the Appearance or Manifestation of this Nature, which in itself is withdrawn from outward Appearance, that suffers this continual change. Formerly we said: —The eye of man conceals God from him, and separates the pure light into coloured rays. Now we say:—The eye of man conceals God from him, only because he himself is concealed from himself by it, and because his vision never reaches his own true Being. What he sees is ever himself, as we also said formerly;—but he does

not see himself as he truly is;—his Being is one, but his vision is infinite.

Love necessarily enters into Reflexion, and manifests itself there immediately, as a Life which employs as its instrument a personal, sensuous Ex-istence,—and thus as Individual Action;—and that indeed in a sphere peculiar to itself and lying beyond all Sensuousness—in a wholly new World. Wherever the Divine Love is, there is necessarily this Manifestation; for thus only does this Love reveal itself, and that without any new intervening principle; and, on the contrary, where this Manifestation is not, there this Divine Love is not. It is altogether in vain to say to him who does not dwell in Love—“Act morally,”—for only in Love does the Moral World arise, and without Love there is no such world; and just as superfluous is it to say this to him who does dwell in Love,—for his Love lives already of itself, and his activity, his moral Action, is merely the silent Manifestation of this his Life. The Action is nothing in and for itself, and it has no independent principle in itself; but it flows forth, calmly and silently, from Love, as light seems to flow forth from the sun, and as the World does actually flow forth from the inward Love of God to himself. If any man does not act, neither does he love; and he who supposes that he loves, and yet does not act, in him imagination alone is excited by some picture of Love conveyed to him from without, to which picture there is within him no corresponding, inward, self-supporting reality. “If a man say I love God,”—thus speaks the same John, after representing brotherly love in a certain very just sense as in itself the Higher Morality—“if a man say I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar;”—or, as we would say, in language more suitable to our age, although not a whit more tenderly,—he is a sham, and has not the Love of God abiding in him;—abiding, I say, really indwelling within him,—it is not the root

of his true Life, but he can at most only picture it in imagination.

Love is eternally complete, and contained within itself; and, as Love, it has ever within itself complete Reality; it is Reflexion alone that separates and divides into parts. Hence,—and thus we return to the point which we reached in our previous lecture,—hence the division of the one Divine Life into different individuals does not by any means take place in Love but only in Reflexion. The individual, who is revealed to himself only in Action, and all other individuals who appear around him, are thus but the *Manifestation* of this one Love, not by any means the thing itself. In his own Action, Love must be manifest, for otherwise it would not be present; but the moral Action of others is not to him the immediately apparent Manifestation of Love; hence the absence of this does not immediately prove the absence of Love;—therefore, as we said already in our previous lecture, he does not desire the Morality and Religion of others unconditionally, but only under the condition of their Freedom; and the absence of this general Morality does not disturb the peace of Love, which is wholly independent of everything beyond itself.

The Morality and Religion of the whole Spiritual World are closely connected with the Action of each particular individual, as effect with cause. The Moral-Religious Man desires to spread Morality and Religion universally. The distinction between his Religion and the Religion of others is but a distinction in Reflexion. The affection produced in him by success or failure must therefore take place according to the law of Reflexion. But, as we have already seen on another occasion, the peculiar affection of Reflexion is approbation or disapprobation; not cold and indifferent, but the more passionate the more loving the nature of the man. Reflexion always

bears with it an affection towards the Morality of others; and this Reflexion is highest of all in the Religious Man;—it is the true root of the World around him, which he embraces with affection, and which is, to him, purely and solely a Spiritual World.

From what we have now said, we obtain the principles by which we may characterize more profoundly than we could do in our former lecture, the disposition of the Religious Man towards others;—or what would be commonly called his Philanthropy.

In the first place, there is nothing further removed from this Religious Philanthropy than a certain good-natured indifferentism which accepts everything as equally good, and which we hear much bepraised now-a-days. This mode of thought, far from being the Love of God, is much rather that absolute shallowness and inward vagrancy of a mind that is capable neither of love nor of hate, which we have sufficiently described in one of our earlier lectures. The Religious man does not concern himself about the physical happiness of the Human Race, —unless it be his special calling to provide a fitting subsistence for men;—he desires no happiness for them save in the ways of the Divine Order. He cannot desire to make them happy by means of outward circumstances, as little as God can desire this; for the will and counsel of God, even with regard to his fellow-men, are always his. As it is the will of God that no one shall find peace and repose but in Him, and that men shall be continually driven onward by means of sorrows and vexations to renounce themselves and to seek a refuge in God;—so is this also the will and wish of the man who is devoted to God. When they have again found their Being in God, he will love this Being; their Being out of God he hates with a perfect hatred, and his very love towards their true Being consists in hate towards their degraded Being. "Think not that I come to bring peace on earth," says

Jesus,—peace, that is, this same indifferent acceptance of things as they are;—no, since ye are such as ye are, “I come not to bring peace but a sword.” The Religious Man is likewise far removed from the well-known and much-commended effort of this same superficiality to put such a construction upon surrounding events as may enable it to maintain itself in this comfortable frame of mind:—to explain them away, and to interpret them into the Good and the Beautiful. He wishes to see them as they are in truth; and he does so see them, for Love sharpens his sight; he judges strictly but justly, and penetrates even to the very root of every prevalent mode of thought.

Having in his view what men might be, his ruling sentiment is a holy indignation at their actual existence, so unworthy and void of honour. Seeing that in the profoundest depths of their nature they still bear within them the impress of the Divine, although it does not find its way to outward Manifestation;—considering that what they are accused of by others is the source of the greatest wretchedness to themselves, and that what men call their wickedness is but the outbreak of their own profound misery;—reflecting that they need but to stretch forth their hand to the Good that constantly surrounds them in order to become at once worthy and blessed;—seeing all this, he is filled with the deepest melancholy,—the most heart-felt sorrow. His hate is awakened only by the fanaticism of perversity, which is not satisfied with being worthless in its own person, but, so far as its influence extends, endeavours to make all others as unworthy as itself, and which is profoundly irritated and moved to hatred at the sight of anything better than itself. For while the former is but the wretched work of Sin, the latter is the work of the Devil;—for the Devil also hates Goodness, not simply because it is good, which would be wholly unintelligible, but from envy, and because he himself cannot attain to

it. Just as, according to our recent description, the man *inspired of God* desires that God alone, as He is in Himself, should be revealed in His glory, at all times, on all sides, and in all events, to him and to all his brethren;—so, on the contrary, he who is *inspired of himself* desires, that, to him and to his fellow-men, there should be revealed at all times, on all sides, and in all events, only the image of his own worthlessness. By thus transcending his own individuality, he surpasses the human and natural boundaries of Egoism, and makes himself the universal ideal and God;—all which the Devil also does in like manner.

Finally, the Love of his fellow-men reveals itself in the Religious Man, unalterably determined and for ever remaining the same, in this:—that he never, under any condition, ceases to labour for their ennoblement, and consequently never, under any condition, gives up his Hope in them. His action is indeed the necessary—Manifestation of his Love; but, on the other hand, this action necessarily proceeds towards an outward world, presupposes an outward world as its sphere, and assumes that he entertains the thought of something to be accomplished in this outward world. Without the extinction of this Love in him, neither his action, nor this thought necessarily assumed in his action, can ever cease. As often as it fails of the anticipated result, so often is he forced back upon himself to create, from the fountain of Love that eternally flows within him, a new impulse, and new means of accomplishing his purpose; and is thereby impelled to a fresh effort, and should even this fail, again to another;—at each renewed attempt assuming that what has not hitherto been successful may yet be accomplished this time, or the next time, or at some future time;—or, even if it should not be accomplished at all by him individually, yet that, through his

aid, and by means of his previous labours, it may be accomplished by some one following in his steps. Thus does Love become to him an ever-flowing fountain of Faith and Hope:—not in God, for God is ever-present, living within him, and therefore he has no need of Faith to make that presence possible; and God ever gives Himself to him whole and perfect as He is in Himself, and therefore there is no room for Hope:—but Faith in Man, and Hope in Man. By this firm and immovable Faith, this untiring Hope, he can raise himself, whenever he will, far above all the indignation or the sorrow with which he may be filled by the contemplation of present reality, and can invite into his heart the surest peace, the most indestructible repose. Let him look beyond the Present to the Future!—for that glance he has a whole Eternity before him, and may add to the vista cycle upon cycle, which to him are as nothing, as far as thought can reach.

At last—and where then is the end?—at last all must arrive at the sure haven of eternal Peace and Blessedness;—at last the kingdom and the power and the glory of God must surely come!

And thus have we gathered into one point the essential elements of a picture of the Blessed Life, in so far as such a picture is possible. Blessedness itself consists in Love, and in the eternal satisfaction of Love;—it is inaccessible to Reflexion; it can only be negatively expressed by the understanding, and therefore only negatively by our description which is the language of the understanding. We can only show that the Blessed are free from pain, trouble, and privation;—wherein their Blessedness positively consists cannot be described but must be immediately felt.

Unblessedness comes of doubt, which continually drags us to and fro, and of uncertainty, which spreads around us an impenetrable night in which our feet can find no sure path. The Religious Man is for ever secured from the possibility of doubt and uncertainty. In every possible moment he knows distinctly what he wills, and ought to will; for the innermost root of his Life—his Will—for ever flows forth from the Divinity, immediately and unmistakably; its indication is infallible, and for that indication he has an infallible perception. In every possible moment he knows assuredly that in all Eternity he shall know what he must will, and ought to will; that in all Eternity the fountain of Divine Love which has burst forth in him shall never be exhausted, but shall uphold him securely, and lead him onward for ever. It is the root of his Existence; it has now arisen upon him clear and bright, and his eye is fixed upon it with unspeakable Love;—how could that fountain ever be dried up, how could his eye ever turn away from that Divine guide? Whatever may come to pass around him, nothing appears to him strange or unaccountable; he knows assuredly, whether he understand it or not, that it is in God's World, and that there nothing can be that does not tend to Good.

In him there is no fear for the Future, for the absolute fountain of all Blessedness eternally bears him on towards it;—no sorrow for the Past, for in so far as he was not in God he was nothing, and this is now at an end, and only since he has dwelt in God has he been born into Life; while in so far as he was in God, that which he has done is assuredly right and good. He has never aught to deny himself, nor aught to long for; for he is at all times in eternal possession of the fulness of all that he is capable of enjoying. For him all labour and effort have vanished; his whole outward Ex-istence

flows forth, softly and gently, from his inward Being, and issues out into reality, without difficulty or hindrance. To use the language of one of our great Poets:—

“ Ever pure and mirror-bright and even,
 Light as zephyr-breath of Heaven,
 Life amidst the Immortals glides away.
 Moons are waning, generations wasting,—
 Their celestial youth blooms everlasting,
 Changeless ‘midst a ruined world’s decay.”*

Thus much have I desired to say to you in these lectures, concerning the True Life and its Blessedness. It is true that we might say much more on this subject; and that, in particular, it would be very interesting, now that we have learned to know the Moral-Religious Man in the central-point of his Being, to accompany him thence out into common life, and even into the most ordinary concerns and circumstances of his Existence, there to contemplate him in all his admirable serenity and loveliness. But without a fundamental knowledge of that first central-point such a description might become, to the hearer, either empty declamation, or else a mere air-castle, producing indeed an æsthetic pleasure, but containing within itself no true ground of endurance;—and this is the reason why we rather choose to abstain from this prolongation of our subject. As to principles, we have already said enough—perhaps more than enough.

In order that we may add a fitting conclusion to our whole work, I invite you here once again.

* Schiller's "Das Ideal und das Leben," *Mercival's Translation.*

LECTURE XI.

CONCLUSION.

THE subject of our inquiry has been completely exhausted in our last lecture, so far as it can be here exhausted; and it only remains for me to point out its general practical application,—respecting, of course, those limits which are imposed upon me by good manners, and by that free and liberal relation which these Lectures have established between you and me, and which this day brings to a close.

It was my desire to establish between us the fullest possible understanding; as it were, to penetrate you with myself, and in turn to be penetrated by you. I believe that I have actually expressed the ideas I had here to clothe in words, with a clearness that at least had not previously been attained, and also that I have succeeded in setting forth these ideas in their natural connexion. But even after the clearest exposition of such ideas, and after a very accurate comprehension of them, on the part of the audience, there may yet remain a great gulf fixed between the giver and the receiver; and the communication may fall far short of establishing the fullest possible understanding between them. In this Age of ours, we have to calculate upon this defect as the rule;—the opposite is the exception.

There are two chief causes of this want of a thorough reception of proffered instruction in this Age.

In the first place, the hearer does not give himself up with his whole mind, as he ought to do, to the instruction presented to him; he may perhaps approach it only with the understanding, or with the fancy. In the first case, he regards it merely with curiosity, or with the desire of knowing what shape and form it may assume;—but is otherwise indifferent about its substance, whether it may prove to be this, that, or the other thing. In the second case, he merely amuses himself with the succession of pictures, phenomena, pleasing words, and modes of speech that may be passed in review before his fancy, but is otherwise indifferent to the substance. He represents it to himself as something out of and separate from himself; and thus places it at a distance from himself, instead of trying it, as he ought, honestly by his own Love and seeing how it may answer to that. He then attributes this same disposition to the speaker, believing that he too has no other motive for his speculating than that he may pass the time in an agreeable way, letting his ingenuity and dialectic art be admired, producing fine phrases, and such like. But were he to put the question, even although it were only to his own heart, whether the speaker is himself earnestly and vitally penetrated by what he says, and even to suppose that he wished so to penetrate others if he were able to do so,—he would fear thereby to transgress the limits of individual right, insult the speaker, perhaps even make him out to be a fanatic. Should this supposition not be made, where nevertheless it both could and should be made, then indeed no harm is done to the speaker, since he can easily disregard this foreign judgment which falls so far short of understanding his true meaning; but harm is assuredly done to the hearer himself, for to him the imparted instruction is no more

than what he takes it to be, and for him it contains no application to Life if he himself does not give it this application. This cold and indifferent contemplation by the Understanding alone is the characteristic of the scientific mode of thought;—all actual development of Science commences with this indifference towards the substance, and interest only in the correctness of the form;—in this indifference it remains until it has attained its perfect form, flowing back, when thus completed, into Life to which all things are at last related. Our aim in the present lectures was not in the first instance Scientific,—notwithstanding that, in passing, I have frequently taken notice of the scientific wants of my hearers, so far as they were known to me,—but it was *practical*. Now, therefore, at their close, we must at once avow that we have nothing to say against its being assumed that what we have said in these lectures has been said by us with entire and perfect earnestness;—that the principles we have asserted have, in our own case, arisen from Life and flowed back upon Life;—that we have certainly desired that these principles should also influence the Love and Life of our hearers;—and that only in the event of such an influence having been actually exerted should we consider our object perfectly accomplished, and believe that our communication has been as complete as it ought to have been.

A second obstacle to thorough communication in our Age is the prevalent maxim that we ought to embrace no party, and decide neither for nor against;—a mode of thought which is called Scepticism, and assumes also many other distinguished names. We have already spoken of this mode of thought in the course of these lectures. It is founded upon an absolute want of Love, even in its most common form—that of self-love;—and this is the lowest grade of that vagrancy of mind which we have already described, in which man cannot trouble

himself even about his own destiny;—or it is the wholly brutish opinion that Truth is of no value, and that no advantage can arise from the knowledge of it. In order to escape from this Scepticism,—which does not by any means manifest acuteness, but, on the contrary, the lowest degree of stupidity,—we must at least make up our minds as to whether there is any Truth at all, whether it is attainable by man, and whether, when attained, it possesses any value for him. Now at the conclusion of these discourses, I must confess, that should any man not yet have attained to certainty on these points,—even should he but find it necessary to ask time for consideration before resolving on a decisive yes or no with reference to the results we have announced,—and perhaps, admitting the completeness of the statement, yet profess that he has not himself arrived at any judgment on the matter,—I must, I say, confess that the communication and mutual influence between such an one and myself has proved to be of the shallowest sort; and that he has received only an addition to his existing store of possible opinions, whilst I intended something much better for him. To me it is—not so certain as the sun in heaven or as this feeling of my own body,—but infinitely more certain, that there is Truth, that it is attainable by man, and clearly conceivable by him. I am also firmly convinced that I, for my part, have seized upon this Truth from an assured point of view peculiar to myself, and with an assured degree of clearness; for otherwise I should certainly have kept silence, and abstained from teaching either by speech or writing. Finally, I am also firmly convinced that what I have declared, here as elsewhere, is that same eternal, unchangeable Truth, which makes everything that is opposed to it Untruth; for otherwise assuredly, I would not have thus taught it, but rather have taught whatever else I held to be Truth. For a long time it has been

attempted, both in prose and in rhyme, among the great reading and writing public, to bring upon me the suspicion that I hold this last-mentioned singular opinion; and I have frequently pled guilty to the charge in print. But printed letters do not blush,—thus do my accusers seem to think,—and they continue to entertain good hope of me that I shall, one day or other, become ashamed of this charge, which, for that purpose, they still continue to repeat;—and I have therefore desired once for all, by word of mouth, in the presence of a numerous and honourable assembly, and looking them in the face, to confess the truth of this accusation against me. In all my attempts at communication with my fellow-men, and consequently in these discourses also, it has ever been, in the first place, my earnest purpose and aim, by every means in my power, to make that which I myself have perceived clear and intelligible to others, and, in so far as it lay with me, to force them to such comprehension; being well assured that a conviction of the truth and justice of what I had taught would then follow of itself;—and thus it has certainly been my aim, at all times, and consequently at this time, to “disseminate my convictions,” to “make proselytes,” or by whatever other phrase they who hate this design, which I thus candidly avow, may choose to describe it. That modesty which is so frequently, and in so many ways, recommended to me, which says:—“See, here is my opinion, and how I for my part regard the matter, although I am likewise of opinion that this opinion of mine is no better than all the other opinions that have arisen since the beginning of the world, or those that will arise even till its end”—such modesty, I say, I cannot assume, for reasons which I have already adduced, and likewise for this reason:—that I consider such modesty to be the greatest immodesty; and even hold it to be a frightful arrogance, and worthy of all abhorrence, to suppose that any one

should desire to know how we personally regard the matter; or to open our mouth to teach, so long as we are not conscious of *Knowledge* but only of mere *Opinion*. When it has happened that my hearers have not understood me, and for that reason have not been convinced, I have then had no alternative but submission; for there are no outward logical means of compelling understanding, since understanding and conviction arise only from the inmost depths of Life and its Love;—but to submit beforehand to this want of understanding, and to reckon upon it, even during instruction, as upon a necessary result,—this I cannot do, and have never done, either at any previous time or in these lectures.

These obstacles to a more intimate and fruitful communication upon subjects of earnest thought are constantly maintained and renewed, even in those who possess both the desire and the power of rising superior to them, by means of the daily influences that surround us in this Age. When my meaning shall appear more distinctly, you will perceive that I have hitherto neither directly mentioned these things, nor indirectly hinted at them;—now, however, after mature reflexion and consideration, I have determined, in concluding, to explore the nature of these influences, to try them by their own principles; and, by means of this deeper investigation, to arm you against them for the future, so far as I, or any other foreign power can do so.

I shall not be withheld from doing this by the almost universal hatred which, as I am well aware, is entertained against what is called polemics; for this hatred itself proceeds from that very influence which I undertake to combat, and is indeed one of its chief elements. Where this hatred has not yet become something still more worthless and contemptible,—of which more hereafter,—it is at least a diseased aversion to all that strict distinction and discrimination which is necessarily pro-

duced by controversy; and the unconquerable love of that confusion and vagrancy of spirit, in which the most opposite things are confounded, and which we have already sufficiently described.

As little shall I be withheld from this investigation by the admonition which one hears so frequently:—that we should rise superior to such things and despise them. It is surely not to be expected that, in our Age, any man of character who is possessed of clear knowledge should fail to despise the supposition that he could, in his own person, be hurt or degraded by a judgment proceeding from such surroundings; and such admonishers perhaps do not consider what fulness of contempt they themselves deserve, and often indeed immediately receive, through their first reminding us of the contempt which is due from us to such things.

I shall not be withheld from this investigation by the common supposition that we wrangle and dispute only in order to gratify personal feelings, and to retaliate upon those who have injured us in some way;—by which supposition weak men, who are ignorant of any certain truth and of its value, think they have obtained a creditable ground for hating and despising, with seeming justice, those polemics which otherwise would drive them from their propriety. That any one should believe that we could set ourselves in opposition to anything upon mere personal grounds, proves nothing more than that such an one, for his part, would himself do so merely upon such grounds; and that, should he at any time enter into controversy, mere personal ill-will would certainly be his motive for doing so; and here then we willingly accept the counsel given to us above to despise such things: for that such an one should, without farther proof, set us down as his fellow, is an insult which can only be repaid with contempt, and will be so required by every honest man.

Neither shall I be withheld from this investigation by its being said that there are but few who speak or think thus; for this assertion is simply a falsehood, with which the culpable timidity of better men imposes upon itself. At a moderate calculation, ninety-nine out of every hundred among the cultivated classes in Germany think thus; and in the highest circles, which give the tone to all the others, this Scepticism is most virulent; and therefore the party we have indicated cannot at present decrease but must increase. And even if there are but few speakers belonging to it, and but few who publish its sentiments through the press, this arises only from the speakers being always, and in every case, the fewer in number; while the portion who do not print anything read, and refresh themselves in the secret silence of their minds with the published expression of their own sentiments. That this is indeed the case with the last-mentioned section of this party, and that we do no injustice to the public by this accusation, becomes indisputably manifest so soon as they get into a passion, however carefully they may watch over their expressions so long as they preserve their composure; and this always ensues when any one attacks one of their speakers and mouthpieces. Then they all arise, man by man, and unite against the common enemy, as if each individual thought himself attacked in his own dearest possessions.

Thus although we may set aside and disregard the individual persons composing this party who are known to us, yet we ought not to dismiss the thing itself with mere contempt; since it is held by the decisive majority of the Age;—nay, carries with it almost universal consent, and will long continue to do so. The careful avoidance of any contact with such things, under the pretext of being superior to them, is not unlike cowardice; and it seems as if one was afraid of soiling one's fingers in

those dim corners;—while, on the contrary, the potent sun-light must be able to disperse the darkness of these dens, without necessarily absorbing any part of it. It cannot indeed open the eyes of the blind inhabitants of the dens, but it may enable the seeing to perceive what goes on there.

In our former lectures * we have shown, adverting to it also from time to time in these, that the mode of thought prevalent in this Age precisely reverses the ideas of Honour and Shame,—regarding what is in truth dishonourable as its real glory, and the truly honourable as its shame. Thus, as must be immediately evident to every one who has listened to us with calm attention, the above-mentioned Scepticism, which the Age is accustomed to honour under the name of acuteness, is obvious stupidity, shallowness, and weakness of understanding. Most especially and preëminently, however, this total perversity of the Age is exhibited in its judgment of Religion. I must have altogether wasted my words if I have not made this much at least evident to you,—that all Irreligion goes no further than the surface of things and mere empty show;—that it therefore presupposes a want of strength and energy of mind, and consequently betrays weakness both of intellect and character;—that Religion, on the contrary, raising itself above mere appearance, and penetrating to the very nature of things, necessarily exhibits the most excellent use of the spiritual powers, the greatest depth and acuteness of thought, and the highest strength of character, which is indeed inseparable from these;—that, therefore, according to the principles by which we pass judgment upon Honour, the Irreligious Man must be held in light esteem and despised;—the Religious Man, on the contrary, highly honoured. The mode of thought prevalent

* "Characteristics of the Present Age."

in this Age completely reverses all this. With the majority of the men of our day, nothing is more immediate and certain disgrace than for any one to allow himself to be penetrated by a religious thought or sentiment; consequently nothing can more surely bring honour to a man than to keep himself free from such thoughts or sentiments. What appears to furnish some excuse to the Age for holding such an opinion, is this:—that it can conceive of Religion only as Superstition, and that it thinks it has a right to despise this Superstition as something to which it is vastly superior; and, since this Superstition and Religion are identical, therefore to despise all Religion. Herein its total want of understanding, with the immeasurable ignorance arising therefrom, plays it two mischievous tricks at once. For, in the first place, it is not true that the Age is superior to Superstition;—the Age, as one may plainly see at every turn, is yet essentially filled with Superstition, for it trembles with terror whenever the root of its Superstition is even touched by any powerful hand. Besides, and this is the chief thing, Superstition is itself the absolute antipodes of Religion; it is even Irreligion merely in another form;—it is the melancholy form of Irreligion, while that which the Age would willingly assume if it could, merely as a liberation from that melancholy, is the gay form of Irreligion. Now, we can easily understand how a man may enjoy a slightly more comfortable frame of mind in the latter state than in the former,—and one cannot grudge men this little improvement in their condition;—but how Irreligion, which, notwithstanding this change in its outward form, still remains essentially the same, can by such change become reasonable and worthy of honour, no man of understanding will ever comprehend.

Thus the majority of the Age unconditionally scorn and despise Religion. How then do they find it prac-

licable to give outward expression to this scorn? Do they assail Religion with argument? How could that be, since they know nothing whatever about Religion? Or perhaps with derision? How could that be, since even derision necessarily presupposes some conception of that which is derided, which they have not? No!—they only repeat word for word that, here or there, such or such things have been said, which may perhaps refer to Religion; and then without adding anything of their own, they laugh, and of course every polite person laughs with them for company;—not by any means as if the first or any of his followers were actually moved to laughter by a really comic representation in his own mind,—which indeed is wholly impossible without some conception of what is laughed at,—but only in accordance with the general agreement; and so, by and by, the whole company laugh together without any single individual among them being conscious of any ground for laughter, although each one supposes that his neighbour perchance may have some such ground.

To continue our illustration by reference to present circumstances, and indeed to our immediate occupation here. The story of how I was first induced to deliver a course of popular philosophical lectures to a mixed audience in this city would carry us too far. This, however, once got over, every one who has any acquaintance whatever with the subject will understand, that if the purely scientific purpose be laid aside, there is nothing left in Philosophy, generally interesting or generally intelligible to a mixed audience, but Religion. That the awakening of religious sentiment would be the true and proper purpose of these addresses, I distinctly announced at the conclusion of my lectures of last winter,* which are now in print, and in print for this same purpose;—

* "Characteristics of the Present Age."

and I added by way of explanation, that those lectures were but a preparation for this purpose, and that in them we had traversed only the principal sphere of the Religion of the Understanding, while we had left altogether untouched the whole sphere of the Religion of Reason. It was to be expected of me that, if I should ever resume these discourses, I should resume them where I had left off. Further, it was requisite that I should describe the subject of such popular lectures in a popular way; and I found that the title, "The Way towards the Blessed Life," would completely and truly characterize these lectures. I still believe that I have not erred in this; and you yourselves can determine, now that you have heard the matter to an end, whether you have heard me point out the Way towards the Blessed Life, and whether you have heard anything else than this. And thus it came to pass that an announcement to that effect was made in the public journals, which to this moment seems to me quite fitting and natural.

It could not, however, be unexpected on my part, and indeed it seemed to me quite as natural as my announcement itself, that to a majority such as we have described, my announcement and my whole undertaking should seem preëminently comic, and that they should discover in it a rich source of laughter. I should have found it quite natural for publishers of newspapers and editors of pamphlets to place regular reporters in my lecture-hall, in order to guide into their own channels the fountain of the ridiculous which was here flowing forth in such abundance and thus employ it for the amusement of their readers. "The Way towards the Blessed Life! We do not know indeed what the man may mean by Life, or by Blessed Life, but it is a strange collocation of words which have never before reached our ears in this connexion; it is easy to see that nothing will come of

this but things which no well-bred man would choose to mention in good society; and, in any case, could not the man have foreseen that we should laugh at him?—and since, if he were a reasonable man, he would have desired to avoid this at all hazards, his unpolished stupidity is manifest. We shall have a laugh beforehand, in accordance with the general agreement; and then during this operation some idea may perchance occur to one of us by which to justify our laughter.”

Nor is it altogether impossible that such an idea might be discovered. For example, might it not be said:—“How blessed is the man himself to be esteemed, who seeks to show others the Way towards the Blessed Life!” At first glance the sally seems rather witty; but let us take patience to cast a second glance upon it. Suppose the case that he who is spoken of rests calm and tranquil in clear possession of his own principles;—have you not done him an unmerited insult by thus speaking of him? “Yes, but then to speak so of himself,—is not that shameless self-praise?” To have spoken *directly* of himself,—that surely he could not do; for a discreet man must have other topics besides himself on which to speak, if he will speak. But suppose that in the assertion that there is a certain mode of thought by which peace and tranquillity are spread over Life, and that in the promise to communicate this mode of thought to others there is necessarily contained the assumption that one does himself possess it; and, since nothing but peace can thereby arise, that he has likewise, by means of it, attained this peace and tranquillity; and also that it is impossible to announce the first of these assumptions in a rational way without at the same time tacitly recognising the other; then we must let the result be as it will. And would it then be such gross presumption, and give room for such inextinguishable laughter, if such an one, compelled by the connexion of his subject, had let it be known that

he did not regard himself either as a blockhead or as a bad and miserable man ?

And this, indeed, is precisely the peculiar impudence and peculiar absurdity of the majority of whom we now speak ; and in what we have just said, we have brought to light the innermost principle of their Life. According to the principle which, although it may perhaps be unperceived by this majority, yet lies at the bottom of all their judgments, all intercourse among men ought to be founded on the tacit assumption that we are all in the same way miserable sinners ; he who regards others as anything better than this is a fool, and he who represents himself to be anything better is a presumptuous coxcomb ;—both should be laughed at. Miserable sinners in Art and Science :—none of us indeed can either know or do anything ; we nevertheless each like to have our say ; let us humbly acknowledge and grant this among ourselves, and so agree to talk and let others talk ;—but he who misinterprets this bargain and conducts himself in real earnest, as if he actually knew and could do something, acts in opposition to the agreement, and is a presumptuous fool. Miserable sinners in Life :—the ultimate purpose of all our emotions and endeavours is to improve our outward circumstances,—who does not know that ?—the conventional mode of life indeed requires that this should not exactly be said to others in so many words, for then others would be compelled to admit it in words, and to avoid this, certain conventional pretexts have been set up ; but each one must be supposed tacitly to assume it, and he who sets himself in opposition to this tacit assumption is not only a presumptuous fool, but a hypocrite into the bargain.

From the principle to which we have adverted arises the well-known complaint which is made against the few in the nation who are animated by better principles—a

complaint which we hear everywhere, and everywhere may read; the complaint:—"What! the man will speak to us of the Beautiful and the Noble! How little does he know us! Let him give us, in insipid jests, the true picture of our own trivial and frivolous life;—that pleases us, and then he is our man and has a knowledge of his Age. We indeed see well enough that that which we do not desire is excellent, and that that which pleases us is bad and miserable; but yet we desire only the latter, for—such indeed we are." From this principle also proceed all the accusations of arrogance and presumption which the authors make against each other in print, and the men of the world against each other in words; and the whole amount of the recognised coinage of wit which passes current among the public. I pledge myself, if the problem should be proposed, to trace back the whole store of ridicule in the world, setting aside at most a mere fraction for other causes, either to this principle:—"He knows not yet that men are miserable sinners," or to this other:—"He thinks himself something better than all of us besides,"—or to both of these principles put together. Usually the two principles are found united. Thus, to the mind of the majority, the ridiculousness of attempting to point out the "Way towards the Blessed Life," did not consist merely in my believing that I could point out such a way, but also in my assuming that I should find hearers, and especially hearers who should return to a second lecture with the intention of having this way pointed out to them; and, in case I should find such, in their believing that they should find here anything which they could carry away with them.

In this supposition of the common sinfulness of all men the majority live on;—this supposition they require every one to make; and he who on the contrary rejects it, him they laugh at if they are in a good humour, or

get angry with if they are irritated;—which latter is usually the case when, for instance, they encounter such searching investigations into their true nature as the present has been. Through this very supposition they thus become bad, profane, irreligious, and all the more so the longer they abide in it. On the contrary, the good and honest man, although he acknowledges his defects and unweariedly labours to amend them, yet does not esteem himself radically bad and essentially a sinner; for he who recognizes himself as such in his own nature is thereby reconciled to it, and consequently is so and remains so. Besides what is deficient in him, the good man also recognizes what he is possessed of, and must recognize it for he has to make use of it. That he does not give the honour to himself is understood; for he who still has a *self*,—in him assuredly there is nothing good. Just as little does he assume men to be bad, and to be miserable sinners, in his actual intercourse with them, whatever he may think theoretically of the society around him; but he assumes them on the contrary to be good. With the sinfulness that is in them he has nothing to do, and to that he does not address himself; but he addresses himself to the good that is assuredly in them, although it may be concealed. With respect to whatever *ought not* to be in them, he does not even assume its existence, but acts towards them as if it were not there; while, on the contrary, he calculates with confidence on everything that, according to existing circumstances, *ought* to be in them, as upon something that must be, something that is to be assumed, and from which they can on no account be released. For example:—should he teach, it is not by mere listless vagrancy that he desires to be understood, but only by earnest attention; for such listless vagrancy ought not to be; and besides it is of far more importance that a man should learn to be attentive than that he should learn

particular doctrines. He will not spare nor conciliate the aversion to ascertained truth, but he will defy it;—for this aversion ought not to exist, and he who cannot endure truth ought not to receive it at his hands;—firmness of character is of far higher value than any positive truth, and without the former no one is capable of appropriating anything resembling the latter. But will he not then seek to delight and influence others? Certainly:—but only by means of what is just and right, and only in the way of the Divine Order;—in any other way than this he will assuredly neither influence nor delight them. It is a very complacent supposition, indulged in by that majority, that there is many an excellent man, in art, in doctrine, or in life, who is most anxious to please them; only that he does not know how to set about it rightly because he is not sufficiently versed in the depths of their character, and that therefore they must tell him how they would wish to have it done. What if he understood them far more deeply than they themselves shall ever be able to understand themselves, but did not care to make this knowledge apparent in his intercourse with them only because he did not care to gratify them, or to accommodate himself to them, until they themselves had first become worthy of his regard?

And thus, with the delineation of what we usually see around us in this Age, I have also pointed out the means by which we may rise superior to it and separate ourselves from it. Let a man only not be ashamed of being wise, even if he alone be wise in a world of fools! As to their ridicule:—let him but have courage not to join in the laugh, but to keep his earnestness for a moment and look the thing in the face;—he shall not thereby lose his laugh, for in such cases true wit lies in the background, and belongs to us; and just in as far as the good man outweighs the bad, in so far does his wit also outweigh that of the bad. As to their love and their

approbation:—let him but have courage resolutely to forego it, for in any case he can never obtain it without becoming bad himself;—and it is this alone that so cripples and weakens even the better men of our day, and so hinders their mutual recognition of each other and their union among themselves, that they will not give up the attempt to unite two things that never can be united,—their own uprightness and the applause of the crowd,—and cannot determine to know the bad only as bad. If a man has once raised himself above this hope and this want, then he has nothing more to fear:—Life proceeds in its accustomed course; and though the world may hate, it cannot really harm him;—nay, after it also has had to abandon the hope of making us like itself, its ill-will decreases, and it becomes more disposed to accept and use us as we are:—or, in the worst case, a good man, if he be but resolute and consistent, is stronger than a hundred bad men.

And now I believe that I have said everything to you that I intended to say,—and here I close these lectures;—not unconditionally desiring your approval, but, should it be accorded to me, then so desiring it that it may do honour both to you and to me.

OUTLINES
OF THE
DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE

BERLIN

1810.

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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

THE following Outline of the Doctrine of Knowledge (*Die Wissenschaftslehre in ihrem allgemeinen Umrisse*) was printed by Fichte for the use of his students at the close of his lectures in the Spring of 1810, preliminary to the formal opening of the University of Berlin, of which he was the first Rector. Although not properly belonging to what we have called his "Popular Works," being indeed a severely condensed summary of the *Wissenschaftslehre* in its strictly scientific form, demanding close and sustained attention even from the student, it may nevertheless be of service to the general reader as a chart wherein he may be enabled to recognise the doctrines expounded in the more popular writings, and especially in "The Doctrine of Religion," and to trace their connexion with the general scheme of philosophy. It may therefore be regarded as a fitting appendix to these volumes.

W. S.

I.

THE Doctrine of Knowledge, apart from all special and definite *knowing*, proceeds immediately upon Knowledge itself, in the essential unity in which it recognises Knowledge as existing; and it raises this question in the first place:—How this Knowledge can come into being, and what it is in its inward and essential Nature?

The following must be apparent:—There is but One who is absolutely by and through himself,—namely, God; and God is not the mere dead conception to which we have thus given utterance, but he is in himself pure Life. He can neither change nor determine himself in aught within himself, nor become any other Being; for his Being contains within it all his Being and all possible Being, and neither within him nor out of him can any new Being arise.

If, therefore, Knowledge must be, and yet be not God himself, then, since there is nothing but God, it can only be God *out of* himself,—God's Being out of his Being,—his Manifestation, in which he dwells wholly as he is in himself, while within himself he also still remains wholly such as he is. But such a Manifestation is a picture or *Schema*.*

* The word *Schema* here employed by Fichte as representing the Manifestation of the Infinite, and which is left untranslated, may be regarded by the general reader as the equivalent of the '*Logos*' of Plato, the '*Word*' of the Fourth Gospel, the '*Divine Idea*' of The Nature of the Scholar (vol. i.), and the '*Ex-istence (Daseyn) of God*' of The Doctrine of Religion (vol. ii.)

If there be such a Schema—and this can only become evident through its immediate being, seeing that it is immediate—it can only be because God is; and, so surely as God is, it cannot but be. It is, however, by no means to be conceived of as a work of God, effected by some particular act, whereby a change is wrought in himself; but it is to be conceived of as an immediate consequence of his Being. It is absolutely, according to the Form of his Being, just as he himself is absolutely; although it is not he himself, but his Schema.

Again:—Out of God there can be nothing whatever but this;—no Being that is essentially independent, for that he alone is;—only his Schema can there be out of him, and thus a Being out of God signifies merely his Schema;—the two expressions mean precisely the same thing.

II

Further:—Since it cannot be overlooked by the Doctrine of Knowledge that Actual Knowledge does by no means present itself as a Unity, such as is assumed above, but as a Multiplicity, there is consequently a second task imposed upon it,—that of setting forth the ground of this apparent Multiplicity. It is of course understood that this ground is not to be derived from any outward source, but must be shown to be contained in the essential Nature of Knowledge itself as such;—and that therefore this problem, although apparently two-fold, is yet but one and the same,—namely, to set forth the essential Nature of Knowledge.

III

This Being out of God cannot, by any means, be a limited, completed, and inert Being, since God himself

is not such a dead Being, but, on the contrary, is Life;—but it can only be a Power, since only a Power is the true formal picture or Schema of Life. And indeed it can only be the Power of realizing that which is contained in itself—a Schema. Since this Power is the expression of a determinate Being—the Schema of the Divine Life—it is itself determined; but only in the way in which an absolute Power may be determined,—by laws, and indeed by determinate laws. If this or that is to become actual, the Power must operate in this way or that, subject to that determination.

IV.

Thus in the first place:—There can be an Actual Being out of God only through the self-realization of this absolute Power:—this Power, however, can only produce pictures or Schemæ, which by combination become Actual Knowledge. Thus, whatever exists out of God, exists only by means of absolutely free Power, as the Knowledge belonging to this Power, and in its Knowledge;—and any other Being but this out of the true Being which lies hidden in God is altogether impossible.

V.

Again, as to the determination of this Power by laws:—It is, in the first place, determined through itself, as the Power of Actual Knowledge. But it is essential to Actual Knowledge that some particular Schema should be realized through this Power; and then that through the same identical Power, in the same identical position, this Schema should be recognised as a Schema, and as

a Schema not in itself independent, but demanding, as a condition of its Ex-istence, a Being out of itself. The immediate and concrete expression of this recognition,—which in Actual Knowledge never attains to consciousness, but which is elevated into consciousness only by means of the Doctrine of Knowledge,—is Actual Knowledge itself in its Form; and, in consequence of this latter recognition, there is, of necessity, assumed an Objective Reality, wholly transcending the Schema and independent of Knowledge. Since in this Knowledge of the Objective Reality, even the Schema itself is concealed, much more is the Power which creates it concealed and unseen. This is the fundamental law of the Form of Knowledge. So surely therefore as the Power develops itself in this particular way, it develops itself as we have described; not merely schematizing, but also schematizing the Schema as a Schema, and recognising it in its dependent nature;—not that it must unconditionally do this, but that only by means of this process can it attain to Actual Knowledge.

In consequence of this there is much that remains invisible in Actual Knowledge, but which, nevertheless, really is as the manifestation of this Power. If therefore this, and all other manifestation of this Power, were to be imported into Knowledge, then could this only occur in a Knowledge other than that first mentioned; and thus would the unity of Knowledge necessarily be broken up into separate parts, by the opposition of the law of the form of visibility to that law by which Knowledge perceives itself as a perfect and indivisible whole.

VI.

Further:—Within this its Formal Being, this Power is also determined by an unconditional Imperative. It

shall recognise itself as the Schema of the Divine Life, which it is originally, and through which alone it has Existence;—consequently this is its absolute vocation, in which its efficiency as a Power is completely exhausted. It *shall* recognise itself as the Schema of the Divine Life,—but it is originally nothing more than a Power, although most assuredly it is this determinate Power of the Schema of God:—if it is to recognise itself as such a Schema in Reality, then it must make itself so actually, by the realization of the Power—by its self-realization.

VII.

The recognition of itself as a Power to which an unconditional Imperative is addressed, and which is able to fulfil that Imperative, and the actual realization of this Power, should the latter come to pass, are distinct from each other; and the possibility of the latter is dependent on the previous accomplishment of the former.

It *shall* recognise itself as the Divine Schema, not by means of any Being inherent in itself, for there is no such Being, but by means of the realization of the Power. It must therefore previously possess the knowledge that it is such a Power, and also by what marks it may recognise itself in its self-realization, in order that it may direct its attention to these characteristic marks, and so be enabled to judge of the realization which they denote.

Or it may be regarded thus:—By means of the realization of the Power there arises a Schema, and a consciousness of that which is contained in the Schema, and not more than this (§ V.) The formal addition, which lies beyond the immediate contents of the Schema,—i.e. that it is the Schema of God,—is not immediately con-

tained in it; and can only be attributed to it in consequence of some characteristic mark perceived in the actual realization of the Power. The characteristic mark is this:—that the Power realize itself, with absolute Freedom, in accordance with the recognised universal Imperative.

VIII.

If it *shall* recognise itself as a Power to which an unconditional Imperative is addressed, it must, previous to this *definite* recognition, have also recognised itself *generally* as a Principle;—and since it can only recognise itself by means of its own self-development, it must necessarily develop itself before being able to recognise itself immediately as the Principle in this development. The necessity for this is contained in the intention that the Imperative shall become visible to it; and it may therefore be named a necessity of the Imperative—a *shall* of the *shall*—namely, a necessity of its visibility:—consequently this Imperative—this *shall*—lies in the primitive determination of the Power through its Being from God. Since, when it does not recognise itself *generally* as a Principle, it cannot, in the same position and at the same time, recognise itself in any more *definite* form, it is clear that these two modes of Knowledge are separate and distinct from each other. We call Knowledge by means of an immediate invisible principle—*Intuition*.

IX.

Since neither the Power itself as such, nor the Divine Life, is schematized in Intuition, by which indeed there

first introduced the practical possibility of such schematizing, it is clear that there is nothing left remaining in Intuition but the mere Form of Power as given in its immediate expression. It is (§ V.) a Power of Contemplation,—and that indeed without direction towards the one Divine Life, which from this standing-point remains concealed;—an undefined, wholly indeterminate, and yet absolute Power,—and hence an Infinite. It therefore schematizes itself as contemplating an infinity in one glance:—SPACE; it consequently thus also schematizes *itself* as contracting and limiting itself, in the same undivided Intuition, to a point in that first infinity, a point which in itself is likewise infinitely divisible, a consolidated infinite Space within the other simple infinite Space,—or MATTER;—thus as an infinite Power of self-concentration, and consequently also as an unlimited Material World in Space:—all which, according to the fundamental law of Knowledge which we have already adduced (§ V.) must appear to it as actual, self-existent Being.

Further:—by virtue of its merely formal power of Being, it is an absolutely primitive Principle. In order to schematize itself as such in Intuition, it must, antecedent to its *actual* activity, perceive a *possible* form of activity which—thus it must seem to it—it either might or might not be able to realize. This possible form of activity cannot be perceived by it in the Absolute Imperative, which to this point of view is invisible; hence it can only be perceived in a likewise blindly schematized Causality, which indeed is not an immediate Causality, but only appears to become so through the apparent realization of the Power. But such a Causality is an Instinct. It was necessary that the Power should feel itself impelled to this or that form of activity, but without the source of the impulse being *immediately* perceived, since such an immediate recognition would deprive

it of the appearance of Freedom, which is here an indispensable characteristic.

This activity demanded by Instinct can only be an activity exercised on the Material World. Hence the Instinct to activity comes into view in immediate relation to material existences; these are consequently recognised in this immediate relation, and acquire, through this relation, not merely extension in Space, but, even more, their internal qualities:—and by this remark we have completed the definition of material existences, which was before left incomplete.

Should the Power, by means of this Instinct and the consequent appearance of self-determination, perceive itself as in a state of real activity, then, in the perception of this activity, it would be associated with the Material World in the same undivided Form of Intuition; and hence in this Intuition, thus uniting it with the Material World, it would perceive itself as a material existence in a double relation to the Material World:—partly as Sense, that it might feel the relation of that world to its Instinct,—partly as Organism, that it might contemplate its own activity therein.

In this activity it now beholds itself as the same identical Power in a state of self-determination; but as not exhausted in any form of its activity, and as thus remaining a Power *ad infinitum*. In this perception of its unlimited Power there arises before it an Infinity; not in one glance, like that first mentioned, but an Infinity in which it may behold its own infinite activity;—an infinite series of successive links:—TIME. Since this activity can be exercised *ad infinitum* only on the Material World, Time is likewise transferred to that world in the unity of Intuition, although that world already possesses its own peculiar expression of Infinitude in the infinite divisibility of SPACE and of all its parts.

It is obvious that the position in which the Power

gives itself up wholly to the contemplation of the Material World and is exhausted therein, is distinct from that in which it becomes cognizant of its Instinct towards activity in this previously recognised World;—that nevertheless there remains, even in the latter position, a Schema of present and necessary Existence, in order that it may be possible for the Instinct to enter into relations with such Existence:—and this forms the connexion between these two separate and distinct positions of Intuition.

This whole domain of Intuition is, as we said, the expression and Schema of mere Power. Since Power, without the Schema of the Divine Life, is nothing, while here it is nevertheless schematized in this its nothingness,—this whole domain is consequently nothing in itself, and only in its relation to Actual Being does it acquire significance, the practical possibility of the latter being dependent upon it.

X

There is further contained in the Power an original determination to raise itself to the perception of the Imperative, the practical realization of which is now rendered immediately possible by the recognised Existence of the whole domain of Intuition. But how and in what way can this elevation be accomplished? That which abides firmly in Intuition, and is indeed the very root of it, is Instinct;—by its means the Power itself is made dependent on Intuition, and is imprisoned within it. The condition and the only means for the now possible realization of the Power, is therefore the liberation of itself from Instinct, and the abolition of the latter as the invisible and blind impulse of schematizing;—and in the

abolition of the principle, the consequence of it—imprisonment in Intuition—is likewise abolished. Knowledge would then stand forth in its primitive unity, as it is perceived at first by the Doctrine of Knowledge;—in this its essential unity it would manifest itself as dependent, and as requiring a *substratum*—a unity which shall exist absolutely through itself. Knowledge in this form is no longer Intuition, but Thought;—and indeed Pure Thought, or Intelligizing.

XI

Before proceeding further, we must from this central-point indicate a distinction hitherto unnoticed in the sphere of Intuition. Only through blind Instinct, in which the only possible guidance of the Imperative is wanting, does the Power in Intuition remain undetermined; where it is schematized as absolute it becomes infinite; and where it is presented in a determinate form, as a principle, it becomes at least manifold. By the above-mentioned act of Intelligizing, the Power liberates itself from Instinct, to direct itself towards Unity. But so surely as it requires a special act for the production of this Unity,—(in the first place indeed inwardly and immediately within the Power itself, because only under this condition could it be outwardly perceived in the Schema),—so surely was the Power not viewed as One in the sphere of Intuition, but as Manifold;—this Power, which now through perception and recognition of itself has become an Ego—an Individual,—was, in this sphere, not one Individual, but necessarily broken up into a world of Individuals.

This indeed does not occur in the Form of Intuition itself. The original schematizing principle, and the prin-

ciple which recognises this Schema immediately and in the very act of its production as a Schema, are of necessity numerically one, not two; and thus also, in the domain of Intuition, that which immediately contemplates its Intuition is a single, self-inclosed, separate principle, in this respect inaccessible to any other:—the individuality of all men, who, on this account, can each have but one separate individuality. But this separation of Individuals must certainly take place in that Form in which alone unity also is produced,—namely, in that of Thought;—hence the individuality we have described, however isolated it may appear in the immediate Intuition of itself, yet, when it comprehends itself in Thought, perceives itself, in this Thought, as an Individual in a world of Individuals like itself; which latter, since it cannot behold them as free principles like itself in immediate Intuition, can only be recognised by it as such, by an inference from the mode of their activity in the World of Sense.

From this farther definition of the sphere of Intuition—that in it the Principle, which through its Being in God is *One*, is broken up into *Many*—there follows yet another. This division, even in the *One* Thought, and the mutual recognition, which nevertheless is necessarily found in connexion with it, would not be possible were not the Object of the Intuition and of the Activity of all, one and the same,—a like World to them all. The Intuition of a World of Sense existed only in order that through this World the Ego might become visible to itself as standing under the Law of an Absolute Imperative. For this nothing more was necessary than that the Intuition of such a World should simply be;—the manner of its being is absolutely of no importance, since for this purpose any form of it is sufficient. But the Ego must besides recognise itself as *One* in a given Multiplicity of Individuals;—and to this end it is necessary, besides the

general determinations of the World of Sense already mentioned, that this World should be the same to each beholder:—the same Space, and the same filling up of it for all;—notwithstanding that it is still left to individual Freedom to apprehend this common filling up in its own particular order in Time:—the same Time, and the same filling up of it by sensible events for all;—notwithstanding that it still remains free to every one, so far as his own thought and action are concerned, to fill it up after his own fashion. The necessity for the Imperative becoming visible (§ VIII.) as it proceeds from God, is assuredly contained in the One Principle, since there is but One Principle that proceeds from God; and thus, in consequence of the unity of the Power, it is possible for each Individual to schematize his World of Sense in accordance with the law of that original harmony;—and every Individual, under the condition of being found on the way towards the recognition of the Imperative, must so schematize it. I might say:—Every Individual can and must, under the given condition, construct the *True* World of Sense;—for this indeed has, beyond the universal and formal laws above deduced, no other Truth and Reality than this universal harmony.

XII

Let us return to Pure Thought or Intelligizing (§ X). By it Knowledge is perceived as its only possible Schema of the Divine Life. In this Thought I do not possess Knowledge immediately, but only in a Schema; still less do I possess in it the Divine Life immediately, but only in a Schema of the Schema,—in a doubly ineffectual conception. I reflect,—and a power of so reflecting must, for the reason to be given presently, be contained in the

general Power,—I reflect that *I* perceive this Knowledge; that therefore I can perceive it; that since, according to the insight thus obtained, Knowledge is the expression of God, this Power itself is likewise his expression; that the Power exists only that it may be realized; and that consequently, in virtue of my Being from God, I *shall* perceive it. Only by means of this reflection do I arrive at the insight that I *shall*, absolutely:—but I *shall*, besides, attain this insight;—hence,—this must surely be now apparent—there must, likewise in virtue of my Being from God, be an absolute Power of this reflection contained in the general Power. The whole sphere which we have now described thus reveals itself as an Imperative of perception:—that *I*,—the Principle already perceived in the sphere of Intuition,—that *I shall*. In it, the Ego, which through mere reflection is immediately visible as a Principle, becomes the Principle of the Schema,—as is apparent in the insight of Knowledge in its unity, and of the Divine Life as its *substratum*, which we have already adduced;—to which I may now add, by virtue of this immediate reflection:—*I* think this,—*I* produce this insight. This Knowledge, by means of a Principle which is immediately visible as a Principle, is Pure Thought, as we said;—in contradistinction to that by means of an immediate invisible Principle—Intuition.

These two, Pure Thought and Intuition, are thus distinguished from each other in this,—that the latter, even in its very principle, is abolished and annihilated by the former. Their connection, on the other hand, consists in this,—that the latter is a condition of the practical possibility of the former;—also that the Ego which appears in the latter, still remains in the former in its mere Schema, and is there taken into account, although in its Actuality it is abolished along with Instinct.

XIII

In the Thought thus described I merely conceive of Knowledge as that which *may* be the Schema of the Divine Life, and,—since this possibility is the expression of God and is thus founded in Being,—as that which *shall* be the Schema of the Divine Life;—but I myself by no means *am* this. To be this actually no outward power can compel me; as before no outward power could compel me even to realize the Intuition of the true Material World, or to elevate myself to Pure Thought, and thereby to an actual although empty insight into the absolutely formal Imperative. This remains in my own *power*; but now, since all the practical conditions are fulfilled, it stands *immediately* in my power.

If, setting aside on the one hand mere void Intuition, and on the other empty Intelligizing, I should now, with absolute freedom and independence of these, realize my Power, what would ensue? A Schema;—a Knowledge therefore which, through Intelligizing, I already know as the Schema of God; but which, in the Knowledge thus realized, immediately appears to me as that which I absolutely *shall*;—a Knowledge, the substance of which proceeds neither from the World of Sense, for this is abolished,—nor from contemplation of the mere empty Form of Knowledge, for this too I have cast aside;—but which *exists* through itself absolutely as it is, just as the Divine Life, whose Schema it is, is through itself absolutely as it is.

I know now what I *shall*. But all Actual Knowledge brings with it, by its formal nature, its schematized apposition;—although I now *know* of the Schema of God, yet *I am* not yet immediately this Schema, but I am

only a Schema of the Schema. The required Being is not yet realized.

I shall be. Who is this *I*? Evidently that which is,—the Ego given in Intuition,—the Individual. This *shall be*.

What does its Being signify? It is given as a *Principle* in the World of Sense. Blind Instinct is indeed annihilated, and in its place there now stands the clearly perceived *Shall*. But the Power that at first set this Instinct in motion remains, in order that the *Shall* may now set it (the Power) in motion, and become its higher determining Principle. By means of this Power *I shall* therefore, within its sphere,—the World of Sense,—produce and make manifest that which I recognise as my true Being in the Super-sensuous World.

The Power is given as an Infinite;—hence that which in the One World of Thought is absolutely One—that which *I shall*—becomes in the World of Intuition an infinite problem for my Power, which I have to solve in all Eternity.

This Infinitude, which is properly a mere indefiniteness, can have place only in Intuition, but by no means in my true Essential Being, which, as the Schema of God, is as simple and unchangeable as himself. How then can this simplicity and unchangeableness be produced within the yet continuing Infinitude, which is expressly consecrated by the absolute *Shall* addressed to me as an Individual?

If, in the onflow of Time, the Ego, in every successive moment, had to determine itself by a particular act, through the conception of what it *shall*,—then, in its

original Unity, it was assuredly indeterminate, and only continuously determinable in an Infinite Time. But such an act of determination could only become possible in Time, in opposition to some resisting power. This resisting power, which was thus to be conquered by the act of determination, could be nothing else than the Sensuous Instinct; and hence the necessity of such a continuous self-determination in Time would be the sure proof that the Instinct was not yet thoroughly abolished; which abolition we have made a condition of entering upon the Life in God.

Through the actual and complete annihilation of the Instinct, that infinite *determinability* is itself annihilated, and absorbed in a single, absolute *determination*. This determination is the absolute and simple Will which makes the likewise simple Imperative the impulsive Principle of the Power. Even if this Power should still flow forth into Infinitude, as it must do, the variety is only in its products, not in itself:—it is simple, and its purpose is simple, and this purpose is at once and for ever completed.

And thus then the *Will* is that point in which Intelligizing, and Intuition or Reality, thoroughly interpenetrate each other. It is a *real* principle,—for it is absolute, irresistibly determining the Power, while it also maintains and supports itself;—it is an *intelligizing* principle,—for it penetrates itself, and recognises the Imperative. In it the Power is completely exhausted, and the Schema of the Divine Life elevated to Actuality.

The infinite activity of the Power itself is not for its own sake, and as an ultimate end; but it is only for the sake of evidencing, in Intuition, the Being of the Will.

XIV.

Thus then does the *Doctrine of Knowledge*, which in its substance is the realization of the absolute Power of intelligizing which has now been defined, end with the recognition of itself as a mere Schema in a *Doctrine of Wisdom*, although indeed a necessary and indispensable means to such a Doctrine:—a Schema, the sole aim of which is, with the Knowledge thus acquired,—by which Knowledge alone a Will, clear and intelligible to itself and reposing upon itself without wavering or perplexity, is possible,—to return wholly into Actual Life;—not into the Life of blind and irrational Instinct which we have laid bare in all its nothingness, but into the Divine Life which *shall* become visible to us.

THE END.


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